Chapter 5 - Redefining Pro-Israelism

Chapter 5

Redefining Pro-Israelism


Politics Makes Strange Bedfellows
Charles Dudley Warner

An incongruous amalgamation of Jewish actors, spanning the internal opposition, outside elite and peace camp, worked assiduously to undermine Likud resolve and promote American foreign policy toward the Arab-Israel conflict. These players shared a number of convictions. All believed that the Arab-Israel conflict had shifted to a non-zero-sum contest and that the crux of the struggle was communal (i.e., between Arab Palestinians and Israeli Jews). They were irritated by Israel’s recalcitrant stance toward conflict resolution efforts developed by the United States. Moreover, they were genuinely frustrated with Likud’s refusal to address Palestinian aspirations for a homeland.

To be sure, there were distinctions among Israel’s American Jewish critics:

The internal opposition, introduced in some detail in the previous chapter, stopped short of promoting a PLO role in the diplomatic process. They adhered to the Presidents Conference (and Labor Party) consensus regarding conditions for PLO involvement. The internal opposition carried on the scrimmage within the Jewish organizational framework.

The outside elite, as earlier noted, sought to assist the PLO in meeting American prerequisites for a dialogue. Outside elite leaders forsook long-standing affiliations and influential positions inside the Jewish establishment in order to confront the Likud-led Israeli government.

The peace camp essentially favored unconditional PLO participation at the negotiating table. Their primary nexus within the Jewish community was ipso facto their opposition politics.

The purpose of this chapter is to compare and contrast these three groupings which I argue were central to redefining pro-Israelism.1 This redefinition was a critical stepping stone in facilitating a U.S.-PLO dialogue. And that dialogue decision was significant not for what was discussed or accomplished but for what it symbolized about the nature and evolution of the conflict. It was only after this perceptual shift was enshrined that the Madrid Conference, and indeed, the Rabin-Arafat Accord could logically take place.

The Shift

The rupture between what was to become the outside elite and the Israeli government can be traced at least as far back as the Prime Ministership of Golda Meir.2 Peace with the Arabs, these American Jewish leaders sensed, was already truly possible. But Israeli leaders treated their advice and ideas condescendingly. Meir’s approach to them was often insolent, haughty and peremptory.

Nahum Goldmann, president of the World Jewish Congress (WJC), helped lead the vanguard movement of a “new Diaspora” independent of official Israeli influence. Beyond the not insubstantial personal differences he had with Israeli leaders, Goldmann opposed the idea that Diaspora life was inferior to Israeli Zionist life. The following passage from his 1969 memoirs offers some insight into outside elite thinking:
Diaspora has played a role in the history of different peoples but never such a central role as it has with the Jews. . . . In our history Diaspora has proved to be a way of life no less enduring and no less legitimate than life in a country of our own. . . . The somewhat naïve Zionist idea that a normal life is possible only in a homeland and that Diaspora life is in some way abnormal is understandable in the light of the historical evolution of other peoples, but it does not hold true for us. . . . There is a tendency in Israel to turn to Diaspora Jewry as a natural helper in times of need but to permit it no voice in shaping policies, to treat it as somehow inferior and of unequal status, and to entrust the future development of the country exclusively to its citizens.3


There had always been an undercurrent of tension between the establishment and Israel. This internal rift was eventually to spawn a contentious politically well-positioned outside elite as well as a comparatively more muted internal opposition. Philip Klutznick, the wealthy former president of B’nai B’rith, had been leading the opposition against Israeli predominance in Diaspora life. To provide an intellectual basis for Diaspora independence, Klutznick funded the Institute for Jewish Policy Planning and Research as part of the Synagogue Council of America. Ira Silverman was appointed to head the institute.4 Others in the establishment believed that Israel was dictating, and the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations uncritically swallowing, an official line American Jews were expected to follow. This criticism was muted between the 1967 Six Day War and the 1969-1970 War of Attrition. But by early 1973 the rumblings had become public.

An American Jewish version of “No Taxation Without Representation” underlined much of the criticism leveled by the internal opposition. A top professional at the American Jewish Committee, Bert Gold, complained about Israel’s primacy in Jewish life as well as insufficient Diaspora influence over Israeli policy. He faulted Israel for absorbing too many dollars. “Who is it that decides that poor Jews in Tel Aviv need improved housing and financial aid more urgently than do the poor Jews in Miami?”5 Hertzberg, while president of the American Jewish Congress, called for strengthened consultation over priorities between Israel and the American Jewish leadership.

Whatever their differences, a unified establishment (as distinguished from the nascent outside elite) shared Israel’s assessment of Arab intentions and opposed U.S. pressure for diplomatic concessions. In 1975, for example, in response to the Ford Administration’s hardball tactics, the American Jewish Committee warned that “U.S. pressure to surrender key defense positions without reciprocal Arab political moves from war and toward lasting peace would be dangerous to Israel. . .”6

So, despite tensions in the American Jewish-Israel relationship, the internal opposition adhered to the establishment line and deferred to the Israelis on security issues. The rules of the game changed in May 1977 when Likud captured power in Israel. Labor’s loss of power (it had led every government since Israel was established) combined with Anwar Sadat’s journey to Jerusalem altered the political landscape. Now, not only did the same old issues separate the establishment from Israel but a new set of acrimonious ingredients was added. Whatever their differences with Golda Meir and other Laborites, these distinctions paled in comparison to the historical antipathy the establishment felt toward the Jabotinsky movement embodied by Menachem Begin.7

Schindler correctly noted that Labor governments did not welcome Jewish dissent any more than Likud governments. But Schindler suggested that what had changed was the nature of the Arab-Israel struggle. Now, the questions were:
Must we indulge in annexationist fantasies in order to prove that we are passionate Jews? Must I justify every single restrictive measure in Judea and Samaria in order to demonstrate my love for Israel? . . . So let us once and for all reject the notion that by speaking the truth as we see it, by giving the Israelis our own perception of events, we are somehow treasonous. . . . I believe with every fiber of my body that there should be absolutely no inhibition to any internal discussion. If I speak of valid inhibitions and constraints it is only with respect to public statements; there caution is required.8


Begin’s election, among other factors, propelled Rabbi Arthur Hertzberg to embrace the views of the outside elite. During the middle to late 1970s, Hertzberg straddled the fissure between the outside elite and the internal opposition. Hertzberg is an academic, a former acting-chairman of the Presidents Conference, ex-head of the American Jewish Congress, vice-president of the World Jewish Congress and a former Conservative pulpit rabbi. He helped lead the charge of protest against Begin’s policies. A prolific writer, scholar and intellectual, Hertzberg’s frequent essays and Op-Ed pieces were motivated by a worldview predicated upon what he saw as the precariousness of Jewish continuity.9 In the summer of 1979, Hertzberg made one of the earliest outside elite critiques of Likud policy. In an “open letter” to Begin, Hertzberg laid out his objections to the establishment of a Jewish settlement, Elon Moreh, in Samaria outside Shekhem (Nablus). He wrote:
The government which you lead has just expropriated privately owned land near Nablus to create a new Jewish settlement. I . . . condemn this act. . . . From its beginning in Herzl’s day, the Zionist movement has overpaid for land in order to acquire it with the assent of its owners. . . . It is a delusion to imagine that American Jews are united behind your government’s policies on the West Bank. . . . There is a liberal America which loves Israel precisely because it represents moral ideals and democratic living. . . . “Tsiyyon be-Mishpat tipadeh” (“Zion shall be redeemed with justice”).10


One can only speculate as to the motivations which impelled some players in the internal opposition to opt for the outside elite. In some cases they were no longer bound by financial or contractual ties to establishment groups. At any rate, it is important to remember that, philosophically, far more united the internal opposition to the outside elite than divided them. The genie of anti-Israel criticism was out of the bottle. And, with Begin’s election there was less and less stigma attached to association with the outside elite.

Both camps agreed that Arab intentions had changed. But as these remarks from Ted Mann indicate, unlike the outside elite, the internal opposition had stronger misgivings well into the early 1980s about public criticism of Israel:
Those of us who are opposed to annexation are generally not as certain of our truth as those who favor annexation are of theirs. Spinoza once said that it is impossible to have a true idea without knowing in your guts that it is true; the man with a true idea harbors no doubt whatever as to its truth. I hope Spinoza was wrong, but for my part, I must tell you that I have never been able to bring myself to believe any more than this: The annexationists are most probably wrong in terms of what is in the long-term best interest of the Jewish people. I have never been certain that they are wrong. And if I make certain plausible assumptions, the question becomes closer still. If, for example, I assume that regardless of Israeli behavior, the Arabs cannot and will not be induced to make a permanent peace, or if I assume that the Islamic revolution is not merely a ten-year spasm or aberration in the region, but is instead a permanent condition, then it becomes a very close question.11


Hauser’s Conversion

How does one explain the mystery of Rita Hauser’s conversion, by 1988, from AJCommittee figure to the most renowned Jewish advocate for the Arab Palestinian cause in the United States? Actually, Hauser’s conversion from establishment opposition to outside elite is a metaphor for others in her class. In hindsight, her pragmatic moderate Republican politics made her as logical a candidate as any to spearhead the outside elite.

It is worthwhile to briefly survey her ideological odyssey. In 1976, sometime after leaving the post of U.S. Representative on the UN Human Rights Commission, Hauser became frustrated with Ford Administration policy toward Israel. She publicly demanded that the U.S. stop “flirting” with the PLO. Her views on the PLO were outlined this way:
America should stop flirting with the idea of a Palestinian state, which the PLO would dominate, for it is now perfectly clear that such a state would preclude stability in the area on which peace between the Arabs and the Israelis can be predicated. Dispersal of the refugees living in the UN camps would wreck the remaining effectiveness of the PLO, and then, surely, Israel and Jordan, and perhaps Syria, can get down to the business of settling their differences, including the fate of the bulk of the Palestinians living in territory occupied by Israel.


Even four years into Begin’s stewardship she took Time magazine to task for its essay “What to do About Israel,” writing: “Time does grave injury to a strong and solid alliance by its clarion call for such a debate between the United States and Israel.”12 But at the end of the day, Hauser’s status, upbringing and worldview had little in common with Begin’s. So that at a 1983 Moment magazine symposium, when the AJCommittee’s Ira Silverman posited the idea that his group had been reluctant to tell “the truth” to American Jews about Israeli policies, Hauser readily agreed:
I have been through endless meetings with Mr. Begin, and my impression is that he doesn’t care very much to hear my views. . . . Israel is today the overwhelming power in its region. It faces no serious threat from the inhabitants of the West Bank, and it no longer faces a serious military threat from the PLO. . . . People are afraid to say anything that might harm Israel. And that’s what bothers me. . . . Since when have Jews avoided looking at questions because they are afraid the answers might not please them. Nothing should be undebatable.13


Hauser, of course, started out detesting Begin and Likud while considering Labor’s Peres “a good friend.” Moreover, she had always thought of herself as “pro-peace.” When a State Department study claimed that PLO terrorism was “down, way down,” Hauser discerned a significant message: the PLO was embarked upon a wholly different track.14

Her embrace of the PLO appears genuinely and openly heartfelt in contrast to her earlier, seemingly staid support for Israel. When she reminisces about the cathartic effect of the Intifada; how Arafat talked about the tire burning and rock throwing: “Those are my leaders,” he told her, she does so with warmth and passion. Incongruously, Hauser the affluent Republican moderate exhibits a camaraderie for Arafat and the PLO more typical of the progressives in the peace camp. On the curious role she plays, Hauser says: “Well, it’s funny. Nowadays when we get a call at 2 a.m. and you think, my God, maybe somebody died. It turns out to be Tunis . . . asking for advice. . . . My family says ‘It must be the PLO’ when the phone rings late at night.”15

The Hauser-Sheinbaum group played a pivotal sanctifying role during the culminating events of December 1988. Yet it is the uniquely Jewish component of her involvement that Hauser downplayed. She argues that American Jews “did not have a hold on” U.S. policy toward the PLO. Asked if the Administration sought out the support of Jewish elements in pursuit of a PLO dialogue, Hauser is vague:
The new [Bush] Administration wanted to make a fresh start. The initiative for our meeting came from Stockholm. . . . I later found out their Ambassador was a regular tennis partner of Bush and Schultz. . . . Sten [Foreign Minister Sten Andersson], a dear friend, came to me. He knew I was interested in promoting the peace process.16


Andersson had, indeed, been “waging a quiet, unheralded campaign to bring the United States and the PLO together.”17 And all along it was clear to Hauser that the State Department was completely apprised of what the Swedes were doing.18

Ostensibly, as The New York Times subsequently reported, “Rather than discuss its plan with the United States Government, the Swedes decided to deal first with some American Jews.”19 This may explain why she draws a distinction between herself and Jerome Segal, the peace camp activist, reminding a visitor that she did not “solicit” the Stockholm role.20 When pressed, Hauser adds that “Prominent people in the Jewish community were needed,” because dealing with Arafat could “ruin careers” at the State Department. If influential American Jews determined that Arafat had genuinely met U.S. conditions for a dialogue with the PLO, she implies, the way would be paved for official U.S. acceptance of Arafat’s pronouncement. Asked if she thought the Americans had “put the Swedes up to it all along?” Hauser responds: “That’s an interesting question. I hadn’t thought of it.”21

Surprisingly, the Israeli peace movement is more closely aligned with the outside elite than with its American counterpart. The International Center for Peace in the Middle East (ICPME), for instance, served as the vehicle for the Hauser-Sheinbaum group. Though its New York headquarters operates out of a Manhattan Post Office box, the Tel Aviv-based International Center for Peace in the Middle East was a useful mechanism, primarily for the outside elite, but also for the internal opposition. Indeed, many of Israel’s most capable critics within the U.S. Jewish community coalesced around ICPME which, in turn, provided them with an ideologically tolerant and convenient organizational structure. Originally founded by the progressive Israeli magazine New Outlook, ICPME developed into an informal group that brought together dovish Knesset members, like-minded Israeli and Arab intellectuals, and American Jewish critics. It also undertook activities the Labor Party was unable to openly spearhead.

ICPME has long stressed the need for a full solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through “mutual recognition, self-determination and coexistence.”22 ICPME also sponsors “think tank” research whose findings are made available to left-wing Knesset members. David Hall-Cathala studied the Israeli peace movement and notes that:
As an international centre, the ICPME plays the dual role of giving well-known Diaspora Jews a voice in the debate over the peace process and by providing them (through press briefs and newsletters) with news of Israel not often presented in the international media.23


As a “think tank,” writes Hall-Cathala, ICPME:
Organizes conferences in Israel and abroad, for Israelis, Palestinians and others; works to influence members and other influential Israelis towards recognition of Palestinians’ political rights. The ICPME project, Jewish-Arab Council for Peace Education, prepares materials on peace and democracy education in Hebrew and Arabic, and also organizes seminars for teachers, principals, and students. Also publishes Israel press briefs, excerpts from the Hebrew, Arabic, and English Israeli press.24


Prominent Jewish critics who coordinated their efforts through ICPME include: Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow, Rabbi Arthur Hertzberg (who declined a Hauser invitation to Stockholm), Rabbi Wolf Kelman of the Conservative Rabbinical Assembly of America, Philip Klutznick, honorary president of B’nai B’rith International, Professor Seymour Martin Lipset, Theodore Mann (after his term as chairman of the Presidents Conference) and Labor Zionist Alliance president Menachem Rosensaft.25 Formally, Abba Eban serves as the International Chair for ICPME while Rita Hauser is the chairperson of its American section. Hauser did not actually join ICPME until 1987. Support for ICPME comes from the Ford Foundation, European sources and through fundraising.26

* * * * * * *

The outside elite came to profit from more than a decade of domestic opposition to Likud policies. By 1988, for instance, Lipset co-founded The Committee of Concerned Jews whose proclaimed aim was to “honor the values of justice and humanity upon which Israel was founded.”27 The committee was comprised mostly of outside elite and some well-connected peace camp critics including: David Cohen of Washington, D.C., Alan Baron, Rabbi Balfour Brickner, Jonathan J. Cohen, Professor Ruth Kovnet, Rabbi Robert Marx, Florence Thomasses, Edna Wolf, and Jocelyn Wurzburg.28

American Jewish critics of Israel could count on moral and sometimes financial support from outside the Jewish community. Mel Thorpe’s Foundation for a Middle East Peace is a case-in-point. Thorpe had been critical of Israeli policies and calling for a two-state solution to the Arab-Israel conflict starting in 1975. His message dovetailed with Begin critics and Thorpe began to fund such criticism. At the time of Thorpe’s death in 1994, the Foundation had spent tens of thousands of dollars on the purchase of Op-Ed advertising space, mostly in the Washington Post but also in the New York Times, promoting the “two-state” solution. He also sponsored books and educational projects aimed at promoting the Palestinian-Arab cause.29

U.S. Jewish Peace Camp

The primary mission of the peace camp was to foster resolution of the Arab-Israel conflict along the Israeli-Palestinian divide on terms acceptable to the PLO. Their strategic goal was unconditional PLO participation in the diplomatic process. But an equally important intra-Jewish goal was self-fulfillment for the activists involved; to transform the perceptual framework so that it was no longer an oxymoron to call oneself pro-Israel while holding a torch for the PLO. This was a critical element to the many progressives in the movement who had little or no previous ties to American Jewish life. Using the combined “transformative” lexicon of the progressive-Left, personal development and “recovery moment,” the American Jewish peace camp labored in the vanguard of deliberate efforts to redefine pro-Israelism. Bringing a heightened level of moral relativism and ambiguity to the issues, they repeatedly asked what it meant to be pro-Israel. They cried out for inclusivity and an end to silencing of progressive views by establishment hegemony. They rejected subservience and called for relationships based on mutual affirmation in an alienated world. The peace camp viewed their own efforts as counter-hegemonic. In the words of Marla Brettschneider:
In the empirical way in which real life is dialectical, these groups are struggling in a space “between.” They are relatively unalienated islands in a presumed sea of alienation. They are thus fraught with contradiction, and exist in the dynamic space of struggle. They are struggling so that the pursuit of justice and mutual affirmation in relationship become increasingly normative aspirations of the Jewish community. This is not necessarily because they have uncovered some essentially non-dominating core of Judaism. Instead, they seek justice and affirmation of difference because these are what they feel makes being Jewish meaningful.30


The “mainstream” Israeli peace movement had more in common, as noted previously, with the internal opposition and outside elite than with progressives in the American peace camp. The growth of an indigenous mainstream peace movement in the post Sadat-in-Jerusalem era (as opposed to the communist-led fringe which had long been a feature of Israeli politics) promoted the legitimacy of anti-Likud criticism within the American Jewish community. In turn, American Jewish protests reinforced the resolve of Begin’s domestic opponents. The most politically palatable Israeli peace group, from the viewpoint of the American Jewish establishment, was Peace Now.

In its early stages, Peace Now (Shalom Achshav) did not articulate an alternative to Begin’s policies. Peace Now’s origins can be traced to a letter signed by some 350 IDF reservists which was delivered to the Prime Minister. The letter, written in March 1978, after the historical Sadat visit, called for exchanging “land for peace.”
A Government that prefers the existence of the State of Israel within the borders of the Land of Israel over peace and good neighborly relations would cause us difficult reflections. A government that prefers the existence of settlements across the Green Line to the elimination of the historic conflict; and the advent of normal relations in our area would raise questions among us about the justice of our path.”


Begin had been in office for less than a year but, not surprisingly, the reservoir of animosity against all that he stood for was not depleted. During this early period, Peace Now was funded exclusively with small contributions, money raised by independent Kibbutzim and Moshavim (cooperative settlements) as well as support from wealthy Labor oriented industrialists. Peace Now struck a chord with part of the Israeli polity and developed a momentum of its own. The group turned out thirty thousand people for an April 1, 1978 rally in Tel Aviv.31 The fact that the movement was led by reserve officers underscored the ethical permissibility of criticizing Israeli security policies. The movement promptly captured the attention of the Jewish establishment in the United States. An AJCommittee report on Peace Now prepared in 1978 concluded:
. . . “Peace Now” is, in a certain way, serving the interests of the Labor party. . . . What about the relationship with U.S. Jewry? While the “officers” denounced the demonstrations against Begin in Chicago and Los Angeles by people carrying banners of “Peace Now,” since they claim that the struggle should be kept within Israel, they still reject the accusation against them that they are helping to split American Jewry and thus damaging the Israeli position. They claim that the government’s positions cannot be explained abroad and do not enable American Jewry to identify with them. They believe that their movement shows that the people in Israel are reasonable and really want peace, and that their positions can be explained in the U.S. and identified with by American Jews.32


But American Jewish critics could hardly be expected not to capitalize on Peace Now’s critique of Begin. A virtual floodgate had been raised. Three weeks later, 37 “prominent Jews” from across the internal opposition – outside elite spectrum, including Nobel Prize winner Saul Bellow, political scientist Seymour Martin Lipset, and American Jewish Committee leader Irving Levine, signed and promoted a letter which read:
We are heartened by your call for greater flexibility in Israel’s negotiating position with Egypt. We share your view that a secure peace is more important than a Greater Israel. We applaud your initiative even as we continue to oppose those aspects of American policy which threaten to diminish Israel’s security.

The undersigned are lifelong friends of Israel; nothing can destroy that friendship or the efforts on Israel’s behalf that follow naturally from it. It is because of our commitment that we are disturbed by the Begin Government’s response to President Sadat’s peace initiative.

We recognize the skill with which President Sadat has successfully captured the American imagination; we lament the fact that the Israeli Government has contributed to that success; we are distressed by the dangerous Middle East policies of the American Government; we are troubled by the fact that the Israeli Government has made it easier for the Carter Administration to win support for those policies.33


* * * * * * *

Jerome Segal emerged onto the scene in the late 1980s as the foremost articulator of the organizationally diffuse peace camp. Segal not only met with Arafat several times prior to Hauser but actually helped draft plans for declaring the State of Palestine.34 His role was by no means a sideshow to Hauser’s. It was simply a different approach from a different angle. If Hauser’s contribution was to facilitate U.S. acceptance of Arafat’s “magic words” in Stockholm by giving them an advance Jewish stamp of approval, Segal’s contribution was more ephemeral. His goal was to psychologically bolster Arafat, enabling the PLO to make fundamental political concessions. He says Arafat would never have given Hauser the “magic words” in Stockholm if the PLO had not on November 15, 1988 declared, in Tunis, the State of Palestine.
Only because the State of Palestine had already been declared was Arafat able to drop the term ‘self-determination’ from the Stockholm statement. It was psychological. Palestinians had suffered so much at the hands of the Israelis. The victimization comes through when you speak to Arafat. You don’t even have to solicit it. That’s why declaring a state was a necessary psychological hurdle that enabled them to take the steps necessary for peace.35


Segal laid the groundwork for the success of the outside elite. He paved the way for a declaration of Palestinian statehood through a number of meetings with Arafat and other PLO officials, beginning in the spring of 1987. These efforts received the private support of Abba Eban. Eban lectured Segal on the need to impress upon Arafat that the PLO’s renunciation of terror would have to be precise and explicit.36 Ultimately, Segal believes, the work of the Hauser-Sheinbaum group was made infinitely easier because the State of Palestine had already been declared. It negated Arafat’s need to explicitly condition recognition of Israel upon Palestinian self-determination (since a Palestinian state already “existed”). Otherwise, a quid pro quo would have faced U.S. rejection.37

His efforts met stiff opposition from the internal opposition, which steadfastly embraced Labor’s line on PLO inclusion. Rabbi Marc H. Tennenbaum, director of international relations for the American Jewish Committee, complained that “Segal intends his proposals as serious, but it emerges as a political fantasy because it creates an illusion that the Palestinians are engaged in a peace offensive, and that illusion has little basis in reality.”38

In contrast to the players associated with the outside elite, Segal had no previous involvement in Jewish affairs before taking on a leadership role in the peace camp. Now, Segal devotes himself full-time to managing the Jewish Peace Lobby which seeks to condition U.S. support for Israel upon Israeli concessions in the diplomatic process.39 Segal’s employment at the State Department which facilitated access to Richard Murphy and other foreign policy officials will be discussed in Chapter 8.40

Antecedents

Long before it was “safe” inside the Jewish community to champion Palestinian Arab statehood and criticize Israeli security policies, a small number of individuals and groups did precisely that. The emergence and success of outside elite and peace camp actors (starting in the late 1970s and into the late 1980s) benefited enormously from the years of groundwork undertaken by Breira and its successor organization, New Jewish Agenda.41

The first nationally significant peace camp group was Breira (Hebrew for alternative). Breira was founded in 1973 by Alan Mintz and others to support unconditional inclusion of the PLO in the diplomatic process. Unlike Noam Chomsky, and others on the hard-Left, who supported a “democratic secular state” in place of Israel, Breira members wanted a vehicle through which they could express their Jewishness (one hundred Reform and Conservative rabbis signed on to Breira’s 1974 Advisory Council).42 To participate in Jewish communal affairs on their own terms, Breira would have to redefine what it meant to be pro-Israel. Parenthetically, there was talk that Nahum Goldmann, the outside elite figure par excellence, had helped finance Breira.43

Breira’s influence far exceeded its actual numbers (which never went much beyond 1000-1500 members). In addition to unconditional PLO involvement in the diplomatic process, Breira advocated the establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza. Domestically, Breira called for open discussion and debate on Israeli policies.

Breira’s one and only national conference took place in February 1977. By then the group had attracted enough attention to make it unwelcome in Jewish communal life. The establishment reacted most negatively to Breira’s desire to speak as a Zionist group. B’nai B’rith’s Hillel organization cautioned its employee-rabbis not to affiliate with Breira;44 Hadassah’s Newsletter termed Breira “cheerleaders for defeatism”; the West Coast Jewish Weekly said Breira was the “creation of . . . a coterie of left-wing revolutionaries.”45 Indeed, perhaps more than its message, the close ties between Breira’s core leadership group and well known personalities of the hard-Left delegitimized the organization.46 Among those who criticized Breira were Albert Vorspan, Leonard Fein and Arthur Hertzberg. Brettschneider argues the real issue was precisely Breira’s message: “Key centers of hegemonic pro-Israel power responded to the challenge presented by Breira’s ‘alternative’ with a smear campaign designed to delegitimize the organization. This politics of silencing was disguised as a plea for ‘unity.’ Even though in this case those silenced were not always members of non-dominant subsections of the communal polity, the content of their opinion was decidedly non-dominant.”47

Breira’s legacy, given its brief existence, was extraordinary. The barrier against public criticism of Israeli policies had been broken (even though Breira was never formally part of Jewish communal structure); the “talking” to the PLO taboo had been publicly challenged by Jews; the Arab-Israel conflict had been portrayed as a non-zero-sum Israeli-Palestinian struggle; and, the “land for peace” movement had been infused with scores of experienced anti-Vietnam war activists who knew something about mobilizing a community for peace.

Breira’s successor organization turned out to be the New Jewish Agenda (NJA). Founded in 1980 by Breira-affiliated rabbis Gerald Serotta and Albert Axelrod, NJA attracted many of the same people who had coalesced around Breira.48 But the Agenda’s future was brighter than Breira’s.49 In part this was because NJA operated in the Begin era at a time when outside elite criticism of Israeli policies had become an accepted feature of Jewish communal life.

The 1982 Lebanon War further bolstered NJA’s ranks. Unlike Breira, which never took to the streets, NJA activities included vigils outside the Israeli Consulate in New York to protest “beatings” of Palestinians by Israeli troops;50 joining the “land for peace” struggle with other progressive causes;51 and sponsoring visits by Arabs and Israelis favoring “an end to occupation.”52 NJA was able to form alliances with various Arab groups and communist front organizations while still developing a level of legitimacy as a Jewish organization that had eluded Breira.53

Plainly, the perceptual environment between 1973 and 1980 had changed dramatically. This allowed NJA to portray itself as basically mainstream and paint the establishment as retrograde. Gerald Sorotta explains that: “The Agenda was set up in 1980 as a response to the perception that Jewish community organizations had become more parochial and conservative and that American Jews needed to re-broaden their outlook to what it had been.” A revised Passover Hagadda (an ancient liturgical book used to conduct the Passover Seder ceremony) published by NJA calls for the liberation of both Jews and Palestinians and includes passages from the Koran.54 The Agenda’s relative success (it has yet to apply for Presidents Conference membership) reflects the extent to which pro-Israelism has been redefined and the perceptual framework of the Arab-Israel conflict transformed.

Conclusion

Outside elite and peace camp critics of Israeli policy embraced an approach predicated upon three principles: (1) the Arab-Israel struggle had evolved to a non-zero-sum conflict; (2) the Palestinian problem had become the crux of the conflict; and (3) the PLO, which dominated the Palestinian-Arab policy, needed to be constructively engaged.

Critics needed organizational vehicles and it was clear the Presidents Conference could not serve that purpose. The towering importance of pro-Israelism to the rank-and-file constrained the leadership from pursuing a line at odds with Israel’s stated position. So, establishment leaders who came to share the ideas of a Klutznick or Goldmann had to forsake the Presidents Conference entirely. Contrary to Goldmann’s original hopes, the Presidents Conference, in coming into its own, had become tethered politically and emotionally to Israeli policies and approaches.

Neither the peace camp nor the outside elite are monoliths. Still, certain patterns are evident. The peace camp sought to reshape the fabric of Jewish communal life in its own “progressive” image. Outside elite criticism was focused far more narrowly on policy differences (and motivated, perhaps, in many instances by personal pique). The internal opposition came along considerably later and agreed in broad outline with many of the complaints raised by the outside elite and peace camp, though not necessarily with the solutions they offered.

The pages that follow spotlight the crisscrossing activities of all three elements in making the case that each was influenced by, and contributed to, changing perceptions of the conflict. The perceptual transformation, in turn, paved the way for PLO inclusion in the process.