Chapter 9 Conclusion

It was, as Pravda was fond of saying, “no accident” that so many in the American Jewish leadership were invited to witness the signing of the Rabin-Arafat accord on the White House lawn on September 14, 1993. They had served an important adjunct role which made the day possible. This case study has shown that America’s decision to “talk” to the PLO was facilitated, sanctioned and legitimized by key Jewish leadership elements in the United States. It has also shown that, by the late 1970s, even those elements that, at the time, opposed PLO participation nevertheless supported the tenor of the U.S. stance toward the Palestinian Arabs.

Pragmatism and remarkable consistency marked the U.S. approach toward resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. U.S. policymakers found it politically expedient to seek the support of the American Jewish leadership for their policies which were predicated upon a re-evaluation of the nature of the struggle. This support translated into American Jewish pressure in advancing policies antithetical to the Likud line. The American Jewish role was an important and by no means incidental sideshow. The 1988 end game – in which Arafat recited the magic words – was orchestrated by Secretary of State Shultz, who in the words of Abba Eban “had worked skillfully with the Swedish foreign minister and with a group of Jewish leaders headed by Rita Hauser. . . .”

This study calls attention to the fundamental reason for Israeli and American Jewish opposition to PLO participation in efforts to address Palestinian Arab grievances. The PLO was opposed not because it was a terrorist organization or because it exploded civilian airliners or killed Diaspora Jews. The PLO was excluded because it was perceived as pursuing total conflict with Israel. There was nothing to negotiate about so long as the PLO was dedicated to the elimination of the Zionist enterprise. By 1988, those who held fast to this view came to be portrayed as being mired in the past.

Having determined early on that the PLO would not go away, the U.S. purposefully worked to coax the Palestinian movement away from its maximalist all-or-nothing mission. In the interim, the various Administrations sought Jewish leadership support for their nuanced handling of the Palestinian problem. Initially, there was a wide gulf between Administration and Jewish perceptions about the nature of the conflict, the centrality of the Palestinian issue and, thorniest of all, PLO intentions. This study acknowledges that Jewish perceptions changed as a result of a variety of factors but calls particular attention to the role of political suasion.

This case study demonstrates that it was only after the Jewish leadership came to subscribe, more or less, to the Administration’s assessment of the conflict that the leadership acquiesced to a Palestinian-Arab, and later, PLO role. Moreover, this study found that various Administrations aggressively sought American Jewish support.

Ideological cleavages between the liberal Jewish establishment and the conservative Likud combined with Israel’s failure to successfully articulate a legal, historical and religious case for retaining Judea, Samaria and Gaza also contributed to the ultimate outcome. In the final analysis, the future of the West Bank hinged on whether the PLO would enunciate the “magic words.” There was no fall-back position once an ostensibly reformed PLO came forth ready to make peace.

Conflict resolution, as the U.S. understood it, was possible only because of the belated political maturation of the Palestinian Arab polity. The PLO established its “monopoly on Palestinian national identity.” Their movement became relatively independent of exogenous control. This set the stage for a perceptual shift of the Arab-Israel conflict. Aaron David Miller, an American Jewish Arabist, persuasively argues that these changes allowed Arab goals to shift from what was desirable (the destruction of Israel) to what was possible.

Research Hypothesis 1
The Jewish Role

By tracing the activities of the Jewish leadership, their contacts with various Administrations and Israeli Governments, this case study establishes the extent to which American Jews were part and parcel of the U.S. foreign policy equation as Administration decision-makers approached the PLO dialogue issue.

The case study provides evidence that:

1.1 Through meetings with Administration figures, Arab heads of state, PLO representatives and others, the American Jewish leadership was an intrinsic component in the process leading up to the U.S. decision to “talk” to the PLO. The process was achieved using “salami” tactics with Jewish leaders reassured, at each milestone, that “U.S. policy remained unchanged.”

1.2 The Hauser-Sheinbaum group of outside elites (using the International Center for Peace in the Middle East as a vehicle) and the peace camp activists exemplified by Jerome Segal played a substantive adjunct role in promoting a U.S.-PLO dialogue.

1.3 The activities of Bassam Abu Sharif and others demonstrate that the PLO aimed part of its “peace offensive” at U.S. Jews. Obviously, the PLO believed there was something to gain by convincing American Jews that it no longer sought Israel’s demise.

Research Hypothesis 2
Perceptions

The alpha and omega of U.S. conflict resolution efforts, culminating in a PLO peace process role, required confronting the psychological element of Arab-Israel relations. First and foremost it was vital that Israel and its American Jewish supporters perceive PLO intentions from the Administration’s vantage point. Equally important, they needed to accept the centrality of the Palestinian problem.

2.1 Using the words of State Department and White House officials, this study provides ample evidence that various Administrations portrayed the struggle in non-zero-sum terms.

2.2 Based on the statements of various Jewish leaders cited in this study, it is plainly evident that they came to accept that the struggle had indeed shifted in nature. Having become convinced of this, the evidence presented shows that they called for concomitant Israeli concessions.

2.3 In the post-1977 period, the evidence presented shows that an internal opposition within the Presidents Conference developed as a result of shifting perceptions. It lobbied for addressing the Palestinian problem. An outside elite and peace camp developed which actively lobbied for PLO participation in the diplomatic process and the establishment of a PLO-led state in territories abandoned by Israel.

Research Hypothesis Number 3
Suasion and Agenda Setting

This study has shown how suasion and agenda setting were used to impede support within the American Jewish community for Likud policies and that various Administrations, together with elements of the Jewish leadership, engaged in this tactic. Strategically, “disassociation” was especially important to suasion and agenda setting. Consequently, “pro-Israelism” was redefined and divorced from backing Israel’s claims to Judea, Samaria and Gaza.

3.1 This study establishes that a policy of “disassociation” articulated during the Carter Administration was de facto U.S. policy (at least) until December 1988.

3.2 State Department pronouncements cited make it clear that various Administrations endeavored to block Israeli efforts to solidify control of the West Bank and Gaza so as to keep the “land-for-peace” option available on the Palestinian front. In criticizing Israeli activities in the Territories they were abetted by elements in the Jewish leadership.

3.3 Neither U.S. policymakers nor the American Jewish leadership demanded that the PLO abandon its sacred covenant calling for the elimination of the “Zionist entity.” This was a foremost agenda setting success.

3.4 Even as the Presidents Conference was immobilized, the internal opposition, outside elite and peace camp lobbied vigorously against Likud Government policy regarding Judea, Samaria and Gaza and in support of Palestinian Arab aspirations.

3.5 Jewish critics of the Likud-led Government consulted with and counseled the PLO on its image and other aspects of public diplomacy.

3.6 The internal opposition was largely responsible for immobilizing the Presidents Conference by its refusal to work within a consensus framework. Moreover, critics of Likud were encouraged to “speak out” by the Labor Party.

This paper posed a number of research questions which can now be answered:

1. The mechanism through which political choices facing the American Jewish leadership were recast, so as to be unfavorable to the Likud, involved political suasion by the Administration and key Jewish leadership elements. These suasion efforts were predicated upon (and contributed to) shifting perceptions about Arab intentions

2. This study has identified shifts over time in the perceptual framework and tied these changes to turnabouts in leadership behavior. I make no claim to having demonstrated a causal relationship between perceptions and policy. Still, the correlation is obvious enough and does not require a leap of faith.

3. As to the “generalizability” of this case study: A focus on the inner dynamics of an important foreign policy interest group (looking at perception and suasion) can enrich our overall understanding of how the political system deals with complex foreign policy dilemmas which have delicate domestic implications.

Possible applications that come to mind include the foreign policy role of African-Americans (inter alia, regarding famine relief, regime disintegration, democratization); the Hispanic community (with regard to Latin and South America); Haitian Americans (on Haiti), and Asian Americans (on U.S. policy in the Pacific, human rights policy toward the PRC, etc.); and Americans of East European heritage (on U.S. policy toward former satellites of the Soviet Empire). This is not an off-the-shelf approach by any means. In some instances the time may not yet be ripe for application. Still, there is reason to expect that, as these groups continue to mature politically and serve a linkage role to their ancestral homelands, they may find themselves in conflict with American foreign policy pragmatism. At that point, a focus on inner group dynamics will prove worthwhile.

4. Evidence cited in the case study establishes that the executive branch exploited personality and policy differences within the Jewish leadership to drive a wedge between it and the Likud-led government of Israel. Often, this was accomplished by circumventing the Presidents Conference.

5. Similarly, this case study found that Likud’s American Jewish critics often took their cues from the Labor Party (this was especially true in the post-1985 period).

6. To the extent that “normal informational and propaganda programs conducted in an overall atmosphere of relatively peaceful relationships” may be termed “psychological warfare,” U.S. and American Jewish suasion efforts against Israel’s Likud Government certainly contained elements of “psychological warfare.” The study points to any number of psychological instruments (propaganda, political measures, strategic statements, and advertisements) which were employed to influence, confuse or otherwise undermine Likud morale, standing and policies.

This study found that the intervening variable of American Jewish suasion efforts in conjunction with the independent variable of changing perceptions (itself connected to suasion) did impact on the dependent variable (the ability of the U.S. to open a dialogue with the PLO).

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In talking about the power game in Washington, George Shultz reminds us that: “Nothing ever gets settled in this town. It’s not like running a company or even a university. It’s a seething debating society in which the debate never stops, in which people never give up. . . .” Only time will tell whether the actions of the PLO and Hamas will yet cause American Jews to re-evaluate their analysis of Arab intentions.