America talks to the PLO - Marking 20 Years

How to make your way around this site

2009-01-18T00:47:00.000-08:00

Dear Reader,

Thanks for your interest in my dissertation.

The way this site is "organized" requires you to do a bit of extra clicking and scrolling in order to read my work from start to finish.

The content was posted in sequential order -- so Chapter 1 is actually at the very bottom.

When I have the time, I'll re-post the entire book so it can be more easily read.

My immediate goal was to get what I wrote in pre-Internet days on the web so my research can be accessed by interested scholars and those who follow events in our region.

Elliot Jager
www. elliotjager.com

Chapter 9 Conclusion

2009-01-18T00:39:00.000-08:00

It was, as Pravda was fond of saying, “no accident” that so many in the American Jewish leadership were invited to witness the signing of the Rabin-Arafat accord on the White House lawn on September 14, 1993. They had served an important adjunct role which made the day possible. This case study has shown that America’s decision to “talk” to the PLO was facilitated, sanctioned and legitimized by key Jewish leadership elements in the United States. It has also shown that, by the late 1970s, even those elements that, at the time, opposed PLO participation nevertheless supported the tenor of the U.S. stance toward the Palestinian Arabs.

Pragmatism and remarkable consistency marked the U.S. approach toward resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. U.S. policymakers found it politically expedient to seek the support of the American Jewish leadership for their policies which were predicated upon a re-evaluation of the nature of the struggle. This support translated into American Jewish pressure in advancing policies antithetical to the Likud line. The American Jewish role was an important and by no means incidental sideshow. The 1988 end game – in which Arafat recited the magic words – was orchestrated by Secretary of State Shultz, who in the words of Abba Eban “had worked skillfully with the Swedish foreign minister and with a group of Jewish leaders headed by Rita Hauser. . . .”

This study calls attention to the fundamental reason for Israeli and American Jewish opposition to PLO participation in efforts to address Palestinian Arab grievances. The PLO was opposed not because it was a terrorist organization or because it exploded civilian airliners or killed Diaspora Jews. The PLO was excluded because it was perceived as pursuing total conflict with Israel. There was nothing to negotiate about so long as the PLO was dedicated to the elimination of the Zionist enterprise. By 1988, those who held fast to this view came to be portrayed as being mired in the past.

Having determined early on that the PLO would not go away, the U.S. purposefully worked to coax the Palestinian movement away from its maximalist all-or-nothing mission. In the interim, the various Administrations sought Jewish leadership support for their nuanced handling of the Palestinian problem. Initially, there was a wide gulf between Administration and Jewish perceptions about the nature of the conflict, the centrality of the Palestinian issue and, thorniest of all, PLO intentions. This study acknowledges that Jewish perceptions changed as a result of a variety of factors but calls particular attention to the role of political suasion.

This case study demonstrates that it was only after the Jewish leadership came to subscribe, more or less, to the Administration’s assessment of the conflict that the leadership acquiesced to a Palestinian-Arab, and later, PLO role. Moreover, this study found that various Administrations aggressively sought American Jewish support.

Ideological cleavages between the liberal Jewish establishment and the conservative Likud combined with Israel’s failure to successfully articulate a legal, historical and religious case for retaining Judea, Samaria and Gaza also contributed to the ultimate outcome. In the final analysis, the future of the West Bank hinged on whether the PLO would enunciate the “magic words.” There was no fall-back position once an ostensibly reformed PLO came forth ready to make peace.

Conflict resolution, as the U.S. understood it, was possible only because of the belated political maturation of the Palestinian Arab polity. The PLO established its “monopoly on Palestinian national identity.” Their movement became relatively independent of exogenous control. This set the stage for a perceptual shift of the Arab-Israel conflict. Aaron David Miller, an American Jewish Arabist, persuasively argues that these changes allowed Arab goals to shift from what was desirable (the destruction of Israel) to what was possible.

Research Hypothesis 1
The Jewish Role

By tracing the activities of the Jewish leadership, their contacts with various Administrations and Israeli Governments, this case study establishes the extent to which American Jews were part and parcel of the U.S. foreign policy equation as Administration decision-makers approached the PLO dialogue issue.

The case study provides evidence that:

1.1 Through meetings with Administration figures, Arab heads of state, PLO representatives and others, the American Jewish leadership was an intrinsic component in the process leading up to the U.S. decision to “talk” to the PLO. The process was achieved using “salami” tactics with Jewish leaders reassured, at each milestone, that “U.S. policy remained unchanged.”

1.2 The Hauser-Sheinbaum group of outside elites (using the International Center for Peace in the Middle East as a vehicle) and the peace camp activists exemplified by Jerome Segal played a substantive adjunct role in promoting a U.S.-PLO dialogue.

1.3 The activities of Bassam Abu Sharif and others demonstrate that the PLO aimed part of its “peace offensive” at U.S. Jews. Obviously, the PLO believed there was something to gain by convincing American Jews that it no longer sought Israel’s demise.

Research Hypothesis 2
Perceptions

The alpha and omega of U.S. conflict resolution efforts, culminating in a PLO peace process role, required confronting the psychological element of Arab-Israel relations. First and foremost it was vital that Israel and its American Jewish supporters perceive PLO intentions from the Administration’s vantage point. Equally important, they needed to accept the centrality of the Palestinian problem.

2.1 Using the words of State Department and White House officials, this study provides ample evidence that various Administrations portrayed the struggle in non-zero-sum terms.

2.2 Based on the statements of various Jewish leaders cited in this study, it is plainly evident that they came to accept that the struggle had indeed shifted in nature. Having become convinced of this, the evidence presented shows that they called for concomitant Israeli concessions.

2.3 In the post-1977 period, the evidence presented shows that an internal opposition within the Presidents Conference developed as a result of shifting perceptions. It lobbied for addressing the Palestinian problem. An outside elite and peace camp developed which actively lobbied for PLO participation in the diplomatic process and the establishment of a PLO-led state in territories abandoned by Israel.

Research Hypothesis Number 3
Suasion and Agenda Setting

This study has shown how suasion and agenda setting were used to impede support within the American Jewish community for Likud policies and that various Administrations, together with elements of the Jewish leadership, engaged in this tactic. Strategically, “disassociation” was especially important to suasion and agenda setting. Consequently, “pro-Israelism” was redefined and divorced from backing Israel’s claims to Judea, Samaria and Gaza.

3.1 This study establishes that a policy of “disassociation” articulated during the Carter Administration was de facto U.S. policy (at least) until December 1988.

3.2 State Department pronouncements cited make it clear that various Administrations endeavored to block Israeli efforts to solidify control of the West Bank and Gaza so as to keep the “land-for-peace” option available on the Palestinian front. In criticizing Israeli activities in the Territories they were abetted by elements in the Jewish leadership.

3.3 Neither U.S. policymakers nor the American Jewish leadership demanded that the PLO abandon its sacred covenant calling for the elimination of the “Zionist entity.” This was a foremost agenda setting success.

3.4 Even as the Presidents Conference was immobilized, the internal opposition, outside elite and peace camp lobbied vigorously against Likud Government policy regarding Judea, Samaria and Gaza and in support of Palestinian Arab aspirations.

3.5 Jewish critics of the Likud-led Government consulted with and counseled the PLO on its image and other aspects of public diplomacy.

3.6 The internal opposition was largely responsible for immobilizing the Presidents Conference by its refusal to work within a consensus framework. Moreover, critics of Likud were encouraged to “speak out” by the Labor Party.

This paper posed a number of research questions which can now be answered:

1. The mechanism through which political choices facing the American Jewish leadership were recast, so as to be unfavorable to the Likud, involved political suasion by the Administration and key Jewish leadership elements. These suasion efforts were predicated upon (and contributed to) shifting perceptions about Arab intentions

2. This study has identified shifts over time in the perceptual framework and tied these changes to turnabouts in leadership behavior. I make no claim to having demonstrated a causal relationship between perceptions and policy. Still, the correlation is obvious enough and does not require a leap of faith.

3. As to the “generalizability” of this case study: A focus on the inner dynamics of an important foreign policy interest group (looking at perception and suasion) can enrich our overall understanding of how the political system deals with complex foreign policy dilemmas which have delicate domestic implications.

Possible applications that come to mind include the foreign policy role of African-Americans (inter alia, regarding famine relief, regime disintegration, democratization); the Hispanic community (with regard to Latin and South America); Haitian Americans (on Haiti), and Asian Americans (on U.S. policy in the Pacific, human rights policy toward the PRC, etc.); and Americans of East European heritage (on U.S. policy toward former satellites of the Soviet Empire). This is not an off-the-shelf approach by any means. In some instances the time may not yet be ripe for application. Still, there is reason to expect that, as these groups continue to mature politically and serve a linkage role to their ancestral homelands, they may find themselves in conflict with American foreign policy pragmatism. At that point, a focus on inner group dynamics will prove worthwhile.

4. Evidence cited in the case study establishes that the executive branch exploited personality and policy differences within the Jewish leadership to drive a wedge between it and the Likud-led government of Israel. Often, this was accomplished by circumventing the Presidents Conference.

5. Similarly, this case study found that Likud’s American Jewish critics often took their cues from the Labor Party (this was especially true in the post-1985 period).

6. To the extent that “normal informational and propaganda programs conducted in an overall atmosphere of relatively peaceful relationships” may be termed “psychological warfare,” U.S. and American Jewish suasion efforts against Israel’s Likud Government certainly contained elements of “psychological warfare.” The study points to any number of psychological instruments (propaganda, political measures, strategic statements, and advertisements) which were employed to influence, confuse or otherwise undermine Likud morale, standing and policies.

This study found that the intervening variable of American Jewish suasion efforts in conjunction with the independent variable of changing perceptions (itself connected to suasion) did impact on the dependent variable (the ability of the U.S. to open a dialogue with the PLO).

* * * * *

In talking about the power game in Washington, George Shultz reminds us that: “Nothing ever gets settled in this town. It’s not like running a company or even a university. It’s a seething debating society in which the debate never stops, in which people never give up. . . .” Only time will tell whether the actions of the PLO and Hamas will yet cause American Jews to re-evaluate their analysis of Arab intentions.

chapter 8 - part 3

2009-01-09T00:59:00.000-08:00

Segal’s Tunis Mission

The use of political manipulation to undermine Likud was hardly new. Peres’ Laborites had engaged in it and so had the Americans. For the past several years, the internal opposition had also made use of political suasion tools. But the most overt use of political manipulation, thus far, was undertaken by the peace camp.

Most (but not all) peace activists, as noted earlier, were new to Jewish communal concerns. They traced their political legacy to the anti-Vietnam war movement. Jerome Segal, who emerged as a peace activist leader, had virtually no involvement in Israel or Jewish affairs until he became absorbed in the Palestinian Arab cause while doing unrelated work as a junior State Department staffer.

Segal traveled to Tunis, in June, to meet with Arafat in what was billed as the “first American Jewish delegation representing Jewish organizations ever to meet the Chairman of the PLO.” This mission to the PLO leadership was aimed at convincing them to display greater public moderation. Segal also saw his task as bringing the PLO’s message of peace and moderation to a larger audience. Segal was accompanied by Hilda Silverman of the New Jewish Agenda and Mary Appelman of the America-Israel Council for Israel-Palestinian Peace. In terms of political suasion, the meeting served to manipulate dimensions and widen the circle of “Jewish leadership.” In subsequent years, Segal has served as an informal adviser to the PLO and has helped them develop a “blue-print” for a Palestinian State. He heads the Washington D.C.-based Jewish Peace Lobby.

In her description of their meeting with Arafat, Silverman offered some insight into the principles and philosophy of the peace camp:
I spoke mostly . . . on Jewish fears. I’ve heard that in past meetings he hasn’t wanted to listen to that. But he couldn’t have been more responsive. . . . When I spoke to him of the visit of Sadat to Jerusalem and told him that was the high point of the lives of many Jews in Israel as well as the United States, I had expected him to dismiss it, but he was nodding and smiling.

. . . Arafat especially talked about how difficult it is to get the PLO perspective and information about the PLO to the U.S. media. . . . Concern about the charter (the PLO Charter) was one of the issues that did come up in one of the conversations; the response was “we cannot now, we cannot do it.” It’s a real psychological problem for both sides. There’s no question in our minds that that was one of the things that would happen at the time there are serious negotiations . . .

. . . [Regarding terrorism] . . . I think it’s desperately important for people to understand that we were talking to people who are subject to violence every single day of their lives, and they are representing people who are subject to violence. . . . I think it’s very important for the media particularly to see and share with the American public the violence that is being done to the Palestinians. . . .

Segal lobbied against closing PLO offices in the United States: “There’s a very deep symbolic issue here. It goes beyond the question of dialogue. . . . There’s a history of denial of their existence.” In a further illustration of political suasion, the peace camp insinuated that Arafat had embraced non-zero-sum goals but that there was a psychological explanation as to why the PLO could not modify its violent rhetoric: Arafat’s first responsibility was to meet the needs of his own constituency, not the semantic concerns of Israeli or American Jews.

Peace Offensive

What separated the peace camp from other Jewish critics of Israel was their unconditional embrace of the PLO, and their readiness to ignore violent PLO rhetoric. Some days after the Segal-Arafat meeting, the PLO reaffirmed its rejection of Israel and reiterated its call for “armed struggle until the establishment of an independent Palestinian State.” There were some very real dangers associated with even tactical moderation. For instance, Hanna Seniora, editor of the Jerusalem newspaper Al-Fajr (and Eban’s interlocutor earlier in the year), was threatened for contemplating a run for the Jerusalem City Council by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). But despite difficulties in conveying a coherent message of moderation, Arafat apparently made a strategic decision to accentuate the PLO’s image of moderateness. Contacts with “progressive” Jewish and Israeli “peace elements” became routine. On June 11, a delegation of left-wing Israelis met with members of the PLO Executive Committee in Budapest. Later in the month, Abdel Wahab Darousha, an Arab Knesset Member, announced that Arafat was willing to meet Knesset members who supported the national rights of Jews and Palestinians. At the same time peace camp activists, associated with the New Jewish Agenda, intensified their lobbying on behalf of PLO inclusion in the peace process.

* * * * *

The taboo against negotiating with the PLO was fading largely because, among the intelligentsia and progressives in Israel (and to a lesser extent within the American Jewish community), there was a shift in how the conflict was labeled. Once the conflict shifted perceptually to non-zero-sum terms, as it did for some, the old regime became irrelevant. That is why Ezer Weizman commented that the PLO would have to be included in the peace process. Complicating the perceptual ambiance were rumors spawned by an Israeli Government suffering from a form of multiple personality syndrome. At the trial of Uri Avneri and Ari Eliav, a Shin Bet (General Security Service) agent testified that the government had sanctioned their illegal meetings with the PLO. The Shamir component of the Government deprecated the report.

In the U.S., meanwhile, the symbolism of continuing to allow two PLO offices to remain open – when only one was mandated by the United Nations – weighed heavily on the perceptual environment. In July, Murphy said that for complicated international legal and constitutional reasons he had strong reservations about closing the offices. The Administration continued to signal the Palestinian Arabs that, although the PLO could not be a party to the peace process without meeting American demands, the U.S. would continue to pursue the Palestinian component. Shultz explained: “You have to find Palestinians that are able to represent the Palestinian people on the West Bank and are acceptable to Israel.”

In August, a Shamir aide reported confidentially to Shultz (without the knowledge of the Israeli embassy in Washington) that the Prime Minister met with King Hussein outside of London and that if left to their own devices they might be able to work something out. “Was there a chance here,” Shultz wrote disparagingly, “that Shamir had caught a mild case of peace fever?” Peres was, of course, also sending emissaries to Shultz to lobby for an international conference. Charles Hill, Shultz’s Executive Assistant, sought to sell the international conference idea to Shamir on the grounds that it would lead to face-to-face negotiations with the Arab states. Shamir decried the United States’ open alignment with Labor. He cautioned the United States not to interfere in domestic Israeli politics. But the American Ambassador in Tel Aviv, Thomas Pickering, asserted the U.S. was intent on working with both Shamir and Peres. As for U.S. criticism of Shamir:
It is true that some in Israel who have been sensitive to our position have criticized us merely for articulating it, but nowhere in my diplomatic history did the doctrine of non-interference in the internal domestic affairs ever impinge upon a state’s right, indeed obligation, to its own people to make its views known. . . . Where I think people have made a mistake in Israel is in asking the United States not to express its views.

Shultz took the case for an international conference directly to the pro-Israel community. He told a Hadassah convention: “I don’t have to tell you what time it is on the demographic clock in Israel. . . . We observe that this peace process is beset by partisanship . . . we know that no one (not us) – not Israel, not the Arabs – improves the chances of peace by doing nothing at all, by just sitting around.

Progressives Meet Arafat

On September 8, Arafat attended a meeting in Geneva “on the Palestine question” organized at the behest of U.N. NGOs. He declared that the PLO was prepared to participate in an international conference based on all relevant United Nations resolutions including Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Inherent in Arafat’s message was that Palestinian participation would not be bound by American conditions. He also met and posed with Knesset members Charlie Biton, Tawfik Zayyad, Matti Peled and Muhammad Miari of the Progressive List for Peace party. Later Arafat summoned Biton to his hotel suite to declare: “Tell Shamir and others that I am ready to meet them anywhere and talk on all subjects.” Arafat’s dalliances with Israeli progressives left Peres skeptical. Said Peres: “I did not hear Yasir Arafat’s announcement. I only heard what Charlie Biton said Yasir Arafat announced. . . . Arafat loves to play word games occasionally, especially when he sees some Israeli leftists. . . .

Anticipating harsh Congressional legislative action, the State Department preemptively closed the Washington PLO offices. The PLO Observer Mission in New York remained open. The Administration was walking a fine line between domestic political imperatives and its commitment to addressing Palestinian aspirations. The State Department said the United States continued to support the “legitimate rights” of the Palestinian people. The State Department explained the closure by citing contacts between the PLO and the Abu Nidal group, Abul Abass’ leadership role within the PLO, as well as terror acts committed by the PFLP: “This action is being taken to demonstrate U.S. concern over terrorism committed and supported by organizations and individuals affiliated with the PLO.” The Presidents Conference enthusiastically welcomed the announcement, although, echoing the consensus position within Israel, the Presidents Conference said that the New York PLO should also be closed.

Amirav

The Israeli Left was not alone in courting the PLO. Likud Knesset Members Moshe Amirav and Ehud Olmert caused the “national camp” a great deal of discomfiture when their own meetings with Dr. Sari Nusseibeh and Feisal Husseini, Jerusalem Arab leaders with well-established PLO ties, were revealed. Amirav remarked: “It is possible that now, in light of the leaks of the talks, my partners to the talks will be forced to make a denial.” Dan Meridor of the Likud strongly criticized the meetings, claiming that they gave legitimacy to the PLO. He might have added that the revelations left many in the American Jewish leadership wondering.

According to Amirav’s report intended for Shamir, and not released at the time, the parties agreed to propose secret Likud-PLO talks:
. . . Based on the establishment of a region of Palestinian self-administration in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. The Palestinian self-administration will cover this area – which encompasses some 5,000 sq. km. – and its capital will be in East Jerusalem. . . . Such an interim arrangement would guarantee Israel’s security and enable it to maintain its settlements in Judea and Samaria at a fixed and unchanged level. . . . It is proposed, under the plan for this interim arrangement, to advance within a year to the establishment of the Palestinian self-administration, which would wield powers approaching those of a state.

Conditions for entering negotiations:

. . . Mutual recognition. . . . Recognition of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people – not as refugees, but as a people – to its own state. . . . Recognition of Israel’s existence within the 1948 borders and of its right to exist within said borders in peace and security (i.e. 242 or amendment of the Palestinian Covenant.

Internal Opposition

Under the leadership of Ted Mann, the American Jewish Congress emerged in the forefront of the internal opposition. In a break with tradition, the AJCongress sided publicly with Labor in supporting Israeli participation in an international peace conference. This stance both reflected and reinforced the prevailing non-zero-sum analysis among many in the Jewish establishment. Mann declared that American Jews had a right to participate in the debate over what was best for Israel. Na’amat USA (formerly Pioneer Women) moved quickly to side with the AJCongress. The Conference of Presidents reacted to the AJCongress announcement with a roundabout statement. Abram’s letter read, in part:
Restraint in giving public advice to Israel on matters of security has been the tradition of the Conference of Presidents from its very beginning . . . [but at the same time] membership in the Conference does not restrict constituent organizations from taking their own individual position subject to their sense of the common good.

Shamir’s reaction to the AJCongress pronouncement was considerably more direct. In a letter to Abram, he wrote that only Israelis could decide their future: “The regrettable recent attempt to breach this understanding sets a dangerous precedent. There is a shock of disbelief in Israel.” Abraham H. Foxman, national director of the ADL, a centrist voice, also took the AJCongress to task:
. . . While it is good to be involved there are limits, the most significant limit being that decisions relating to security must rest with Israel, not American Jews, because the consequences of those decisions could mean life or death for the people of Israel . . . now that restraint is being challenged from without and from within. . . . Today, it is the foreign minister of Israel and a major American Jewish organization who invite our involvement. . . . What has changed? . . . Should American Jews enter the Israeli internal fray, our effectiveness on the American scene will surely be diminished. . . . The very meaning of community action will be placed in question.

Shultz in Israel

Parallel to these events, Arab resistance to Israeli control of the West Bank took on a more systematically violent turn. In fact, Shultz’s October visit to Israel (his first in two years) was marred by violence. Palestinian leaders from the Territories refused to meet with Shultz because of last-minute PLO opposition. The Secretary had come to Israel to see if Shamir could somehow be cajoled into accepting an international conference by a semantic sleight of hand: the meeting would be termed a “summit.” A myriad of “understandings” and “assurances” addressing Israeli concerns about an international conference would be part of the package. Under intense pressure, Shamir agreed to an international conference provided it led straightaway to direct negotiations with the Arabs. Shultz writes:
As I was leaving for the prime minister’s residence, Murphy said, “If Shamir’s answer is no, this will be a brief, pleasant evening. If his answer is yes, we’ll be up all night, negotiating an MOU [memorandum of understanding] with them.”

But that was not the way it turned out. I had a private dinner with Shamir. We talked about problems in the region, my negotiations with the Soviets, the problems of Soviet Jewry, the Israeli economy. After dinner, two or three people on each side joined us, and we turned to the issue at hand. Our session was brief and direct. “Well, Mr. Secretary,” Shamir concluded softly, “you know our dreams, and you know our nightmares. We trust you. Go ahead.”

That was it. No more had to be said. He had rolled the dice with us. . . .

The next evening, at King Hussein’s Palace Green residence in London, I put the proposal to him as one from the president of the United States. . . .

The next day, Tuesday, October 20, I met again with King Hussein. He had made up his mind: his answer was no.

The king gave me two reasons. His nerves went raw at the very mention of Shamir. “I can’t be alone with that man. . . .” He did not believe that Shamir would ever permit negotiations to go beyond the issue of “transitional” arrangements for those living in the West Bank and Gaza. . . .

Internal Opposition Presses Disassociation

Taking situational advantage of various developments on the ground, several groups joined the AJCongress in mobilizing support against continued Israeli control over Judea and Samaria. The internal opposition had made its choice: intensified criticism of Israeli policies would be used to force a policy change. Anticipating a visit to the U.S. by Shamir later in the month, Schindler exhorted American Jews to take part in the controversy over the peace process. Speaking at the 59th Annual UAHC Convention, the leader of Reform Judaism called on Israel to “reject the status quo” in the West Bank and Gaza and “to relentlessly pursue all avenues to peace that will maintain the Jewish and democratic character of the State.” He mitigated this criticism by demonstrating an understanding of Israeli concerns that an international conference would quickly turn into a kangaroo court. Essentially embracing Labor’s political line, Schindler argued that: “The prolongation of the status quo . . . in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza exposes Israel to infinitely greater risk than does any international umbrella for direct negotiations.” The American Jewish Committee took much the same stance at their National Executive Council meeting held in Atlanta. After listening to an address by Jimmy Carter, the AJCommittee released a position paper terming the status quo in the Territories “dangerous.” Meanwhile, the Administration vigorously adhered to its policy of disassociation. Israel’s efforts to secure and control Judea, Samaria and Gaza district were routinely undermined. So, when the Israelis considered deporting Mubarak Awad, head of the inappropriately named Palestinian Center for the Study of Non-Violence, the U.S. strenuously objected.

In November, a Federal District Court in Washington dismissed civil liberties arguments and upheld a State Department order closing the PLO Information Office. Meanwhile, the U.N. successfully thwarted Congressional moves to close the PLO Observer Mission. The State Department said that, while the U.S. had the legal authority to close this office, “As a practical matter it is too late to challenge the institution of permanent observer missions, or the extension of that institution to non-governmental organizations like the PLO.”

Parenthetically, the freedom for Soviet Jewry movement was the lone area of Jewish communal life in which a virtual consensus prevailed. In December, Jewish organizations were heavily engaged in staging a massive demonstration, Freedom Sunday, which brought over 200,000 people to Washington for a rally timed to precede the Reagan-Gorbachev summit.

Land Mark Event – Intifada

The perceptual turning point came five-and-a-half years after the start of the Lebanon campaign with the outbreak of the Intifada.

The Intifada irrevocably influenced American Jewish perceptions of the Palestinian cause. Its antecedents are, therefore, worth reviewing. In late November 1987 six IDF soldiers were killed and 7 wounded in a daring surprise attack by an Arab irregular who entered their Galilee army outpost on a hang-glider. This operation raised morale among the Arabs in the Territories and was followed several days later by the fatal stabbing of an Israeli civilian in Gaza. The actual beginnings of the Intifada can be traced to rioting on December 8.

Thereafter, the paroxysm of violence in the Territories became worse. The ferocity of the tumult in Gaza led to a stormy debate in the Knesset with Peres calling for the dismantling of Jewish settlements located in the Gaza District. As the mayhem spread, Defense Minister Rabin blamed Syria and Libya for fomenting the violence. Plainly, the frenzy was of a magnitude and nature not experienced since the Arab uprising of the 1920s and 1930s. The violence experienced in the Jerusalem area was unprecedented. On the West Bank and Gaza, mobs of Arab young people burned tires, threw rocks, bottles, and Molotov cocktails.

Media coverage of the violence mushroomed. The vast international press corps already stationed in Israel was augmented by auxiliary reporters, TV crews and photographers. Images of Palestinian rage were televised to viewers worldwide. Israeli security forces, under Rabin’s leadership, were at a loss to contain the unrest. In response to charges that the presence of TV cameras actually stimulated violence, Shamir considered closing the Territories to the news media. Ultimately, no substantive restrictions were placed on media coverage.

FIGURE NO. 5

The violence which may well have begun spontaneously soon became orchestrated. Divisions arose among the Arab inhabitants of the Territories – and the PLO leadership in Tunis – about where to take the Intifada. The interminable violence further tarnished Israel’s already battered image. Even more importantly, it reinforced earlier objections, raised by elements of the pro-Israel community in the United States, to Israel’s continued retention of the Territories. The State Department weighed in with complaints about Israel’s handling of the unrest.

Jewish Leadership Responds

Understandably, the violence (and saturation coverage of it in the media) caught the Presidents Conference unprepared. The leadership had been intensively focused on the Soviet Jewry issue and basking in the success of the Washington rally. Some three weeks after the start of the unrest Jewish leaders were divided on its significance and lessons. Responding to press inquiries, Abram said the unrest had “been planned, instigated and incited by Palestinian terrorists led by the PLO and Moslem fundamentalist groups.” Taking a different vantage point, Schindler said the violence “should shock Israel’s government” into ending the status quo. From outside the Presidents Conference, Americans For A Safe Israel lambasted Schindler for criticizing Israel. However, any semblance of solidarity with Israel crumbled in the face of the televised rioting.

Following a now familiar pattern, the United States joined in a U.N. Security Council vote deploring Israel’s handling of the violence. Jewish leaders complained that the State Department’s response to the violence was “unbalanced.” But in fact, both the U.S. vote and their own conflicted attitudes underlined the symbiotic relationship between perception and policy. Shultz’s description is illustrative:
The Intifada created a whole new situation, one that in its own way altered the fundamental concept of the peace process.

. . . The scene in Israel and the occupied territories was ghastly: “Israeli Police Storm Temple Mount: Witnesses Say Tear Gas Fired Inside Two Islamic Holy Places,” headlined the Washington Post. . . .

Four days after the Temple Mount clash, Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin declared that the intifada would be dealt with by “force, power and blows,” portraying this as a way to reduce the use of live ammunition and the killing of demonstrators. But he also said – repeatedly – that “there is no military solution to this problem.” Images of Israeli brutality appeared almost nightly on American television, and elsewhere throughout the world. Concern was intense in the American Jewish community. Violinist Isaac Stern came to see me, spoke of his shock, and said that on his upcoming trip to Israel, he would refuse to meet with any Israeli leaders.

“The Palestinians in the occupied territories had come center stage with a vengeance,” writes Shultz, “and Israel’s brutal crackdown was doing great damage to its own interests and its international reputation.” The Administration’s answer was to use political suasion to accelerate the “peace process” and press on with disassociation. To that end, the United States supported a Security Council vote against plans by Israel to deport Intifada “ring-leaders.” More substantively, Shultz proposed to parlay the latitude presented by the Intifada, into self-government for the Palestinian Arabs by February 1989. This approach was in harmony with long-standing American strategy to facilitate the entry and participation of the Palestinians (perhaps the PLO) into the peace process. Shultz controlled the political agenda by framing discussion around “territory for peace” and whether Arafat would utter the “magic words.”

All parties engaged in political suasion benefited from an atmosphere of crisis, imperfect information and insinuation. Arafat announced his willingness to accept “all UN resolutions” pertaining to the Arab-Israel conflict. Meanwhile, Peres muddied the waters by commenting that the Israeli Government had been “indirectly approached” by the PLO “to check whether we are prepared to open negotiations.” That left both Shamir and the PLO in the position of denying any such overture. An Israeli official, associated with the Shamir camp, rejected Arafat’s comments as duplicitous, arguing that many UN resolutions were inimical to Israeli survival. This was typical of Israel’s impaired diplomatic position. The Government was at odds with itself over the underlying cause of the violence and how to promote peace in the context of the unrest. Peres and Shamir used envoys and proxies to lobby their positions with Washington and the American Jewish community. As Foreign Minister, Peres advocated an international peace conference as the first step toward direct negotiations. As Prime Minister, Shamir was adamant in opposing anything but direct talks. Peres embraced Shultz’s peace initiative, which he said would lead to the convening of an international conference within 2-3 months and limited self-rule for the Palestinians in the immediate future. Shamir, however, insisted that any Palestinian autonomy scheme be implemented according to Camp David Accord stipulations. Labor’s stance was bolstered by the mobilizing support of Peace Now, which organized mass demonstrations demanding a “political solution” to the Palestinian problem. Outside the Israeli Consulate in New York, peace activists associated with the New Jewish Agenda held a vigil and fast to protest Israel’s handling of the violence.

Arab leaders scurried to take advantage of the opportunities presented by the West Bank and Gaza violence. Their foreign ministers, meeting in Tunis, pressed for convening an international conference with PLO participation. At the U.N., the PLO demanded an Israeli withdrawal from the Territories and interim deployment of U.N. forces, while Palestinians “determine their own future.” This line was also pursued when Al-Fajr editor Hana Sinyora and Gaza lawyer Fayiz Abu Rahme met with Shultz in Washington.

Soul-Searching

Abram and Hoenlein thought they had worked out a consensus position not to go public with statements criticizing Israel’s inept handling of the Intifada. But the internal opposition was distraught by graphic television coverage of the violence and what it connoted about liberal Jewish values. The American Jewish Year Book notes that Jewish organizations were “concerned over possible growing animosity in America, not just toward Israel but toward the American Jewish community as well.” These feelings unleashed a torrent of criticism. Schindler went public with a demand that the IDF end “indiscriminate beatings,” which were “an offense to the Jewish spirit.” He cabled Chaim Herzog, President of Israel, to passionately denounce Israel’s handling of the Intifada. (The New York Times published the cable as an Op-Ed essay.) The AJCongress’s Henry Siegman deplored “beatings” of Arab rioters. From Tel Aviv, AJCongress head Ted Mann said: “The current policy of force and beatings is regarded by us as inhumane and simply unacceptable.” The “national camp” did manage to mobilize some American Jewish support for Israel – holding demonstrations and protesting what they viewed as unfair media coverage of the violence – but these efforts drew scant media attention. The (Orthodox) National Council of Young Israel criticized Schindler and the AJCongress. But the Jewish right was poorly organized, under-funded and faced an unsympathetic prestige press and a Jewish media dominated by Israel’s critics.

Behind the scenes, the Conference of Presidents continued to unsuccessfully grapple with what had become, for American Jews, a public relations nightmare. Some five weeks into the Intifada the umbrella group publicly endorsed Israel’s handling of the uprising. A carefully crafted statement said: “Use of force is sometimes indispensable to restore order.” As the American Jewish Year Book explains: “What enabled it to do so was a message from Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Shamir stating that force was not being used indiscriminately, but only against violent demonstrators and those resisting arrest.” Abram then went public to confirm that: “Israel does not have a policy of indiscriminate beatings.”

But the public perception was that Israel did have such a policy. This motivated Jewish persons prominent in the entertainment community, who had never previously spoken out on Israel-Arab affairs, to do so now. Actor and celebrity Woody Allen wrote a New York Times Op-Ed essay, saying that as a Jew he was “appalled beyond measure by the treatment of the rioting Palestinians by the Jews.” He called for “every method of pressure – moral, financial and political – to bring this wrong-headed approach to a halt.

Public Opinion

Nor were the concerns of the internal opposition assuaged. The American Jewish Committee, which held observer status in the Presidents Conference, told the Israeli press that American Jews were “offended” by Israel’s actions on the West Bank. Not all Americans were offended, it turned out. In a poll (not limited to Jews) conducted by the centrist ADL, 12% of respondents said the IDF was “not harsh enough” in handling the riots; 29% said Israel’s actions were appropriate and 23% had no opinion. The AJCommittee’s stance was embraced by 36% of Americans. The ADL said that, compared to an August 1981 poll, there had been no erosion of support in American public opinion for Israel due to the Intifada. Other findings included: 43% of those interviewed said the PLO is “most responsible” for the unrest in the West Bank and Gaza and 78% said an international peace conference should be convened. One of the poll’s most illuminating findings, coming after twenty-one years of media coverage, was that 33% of the poll’s respondents did not know how Israel came to “occupy” the West Bank and Gaza: 16% thought it was because of Israeli invasion and a bare majority, fifty-one percent, said that it was “because the Arabs lost a war they had started.” But as the violence and negative media coverage continued, the Presidents Conference again sought to formulate a consensus position. In early February it issued a statement of general support that had the backing of the entire body including the internal opposition.

Meanwhile, the PLO sought to capitalize on the sympathy being generated by the media for the Palestinian cause. Taking a page from the Haganah, the PLO sought to replicate the Exodus saga by sailing a boatload of activists, including some 100 Arabs who had been deported by Israel over the years, into Haifa harbor. Well-known personalities from Jesse Jackson to Bruno Kreisky were also expected to be on board. Shultz, incidentally, deprecated the scheme. At any rate, the “boat of return” plan was ultimately sabotaged when three senior Fatah officials involved in implementing it were killed by a car bomb in Cyprus. Nevertheless, there was no dearth of publicity for the Intifada. For instance, CBS Television devoted its popular 48 Hours program to the plight of the Palestinians.

Shultz persevered in his efforts (and received Peres’ encouragement) to organize Arab-Israel talks within the framework of an international conference. Murphy, meanwhile, floated the idea of a phased IDF pull-out, starting in the spring, from Judea, Samaria and Gaza as a step toward ending the rioting. At about the same time, a decision on whether to shut the PLO’s UN Observer offices was again postponed by the Reagan Administration.

Disassociation Pressed

Criticism of Israeli policies within the organized Jewish community continued unabated. Leaders of the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council (NJCRAC) debated the issue of “who and what” was to blame for Israel’s declining image. Ultimately, NJCARC’s annual meeting in Los Angeles endorsed the Reagan Administration’s peace initiatives. Communal insiders leaked a story saying that UJA donors might be reluctant to make contributions because of unhappiness with Israeli policies. In fact, UJA’s “Super Sunday” metropolitan New York fundraising campaign raised a record amount of money. But the cycle of criticism and self-criticism persisted. A Presidents Conference delegation in Israel found Labor and Likud leaders bitterly divided. Vorspan saw this as justifying the internal opposition: “If there is a schizophrenia on the highest level in Israel, what expectations can we have from the Presidents Conference?” But the official Presidents Conference line, enunciated by Abram, was that American Jewish criticism should be kept private.

While the internal opposition still found it necessary to justify antagonism toward Israeli policies, the peace camp felt no such compunctions. Tikkun magazine’s Lerner wrote an impassioned seven-page editorial supporting the creation of a Palestinian-Arab state in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. He said that “American Jewish silence” on the Palestinian issue was actually a betrayal of Israel. “We did not survive the gas chambers and crematoria,” Lerner wrote, “so that we could become the oppressors of Gaza.”

The most vigorous voice within the Presidents Conference calling for an end to public criticism of Israel came from the centrist ADL. Burton S. Levinson and Abraham Foxman asked:
What has really changed that justifies this easy dropping of our commitment to unity? Has the enemy disappeared? Let us have faith that should real peacemakers emerge in the image of Sadat that the people of Israel will seize the opportunity, finding peace with security. For now, there are no such peacemakers.

Our free-for-all inhibits the search for peace. It generates pressures on Israel to make concessions prior to negotiations. It encourages the Arabs to believe that the American-Israeli relationship can be weakened after all, leading them inevitably to the conclusion that they do not have to consider peace because a U.S.-Israel break opens up future possibilities for yet another Arab war against Israel.

AFSI, which favors Jewish sovereignty over the Administered Territories, orchestrated an advertisement in the Israeli newspaper Ma’ariv signed by scores of American Jewish leaders. The Hebrew language ad declared:
We support Israel and the Israel Defense Forces wholeheartedly in their efforts to restore calm in the Land of Israel.

We urge the people of Israel to reject the demands of those American Jews who, having found easy access to the media, use it to vilify Israel. Their harsh words do not represent the true sentiments of the American Jewish community.

We urge you to resist pressure from whatever source. . . . We are with you in heart and soul. Be strong and have courage!

Nevertheless, the critics dominated the polemical field. The symbiotic relationship between Israeli and American Jewish critics grew increasingly stronger. In late February, writers Yehuda Amichai, Amos Elon, A.B. Yehoshua and Amos Oz called on American Jews to “speak up” against Israeli policies. Meanwhile, Defense Minister Rabin said the troubles on the West Bank were connected to Likud’s “strategic mistake” of going to war against the PLO in Lebanon.

Reagan

Ronald Reagan’s sentiments may have been with Israel. In practical terms, however, strategic policy was deferred to Shultz and State Department specialists. Personally, Reagan did not hold Israel entirely to blame for the violence: “We have had intimations that there have been certain people suspected of being terrorists, outsiders coming in, not only with weapons but stirring up and encouraging the trouble in those areas.” But it was Shultz’s more focused explanation of the violence – as resulting from 20 years of occupation – that guided American policy. As for a dialogue with the PLO, Reagan explained: “One of the blocking points (was) how do you sit down and try to get into a talk about peace when someone says they have no right to exist? And, I’m sure that the Secretary of State is apprised of this fact, and we’ll see what we can do there.” Indeed, Shultz pledged to pursue reports that Arafat had moderated his stance on accepting UN resolutions 242 and 338.

The internal opposition achieved another in a string of successes when several well known rabbis, from Judaism’s three main branches – Binyamin Walfish, of the Orthodox Rabbinical Council of America, Wolf Kelman of the Conservative Rabbinical Assembly and Joseph Glazer of the Reform Central Conference of Rabbis – publicly called on Israel to trade land-for-peace.

While Abram opposed criticism of Israeli policies he was sympathetic to Shultz’s quest for a solution. The status quo, he said, could not continue. Embracing the essence of Labor’s position, Abram said that Palestinian aspirations for a homeland should be realized in Jordan.

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The line between reportage and advocacy was repeatedly crossed. Simultaneously, a mutually interdependent relationship between media coverage, policy development and American Jewish attitudes promoted political suasion. Jim Lederman, a veteran journalist, explains the phenomenon:
The loop had developed a self-sustaining centripetal dynamic of its own, sucking anyone who ventured near, like Arab-Americans and American Jews, into its vortex. The U.S.-based stories were not merely human interest or reaction pieces. Eventually, they became vehicles for constituency mobilization behind American intervention. . . . A fascinating dynamic developed. Israeli spokesmen, bereft of any ideas on how to alter the flow of the loop, came to believe that they could not change things and virtually gave up trying to intervene to alter the course of the news flow . . .

. . . There was a growing feeling within the State Department that not only did someone have to step in to halt the killings and beatings, but the United States had to move to save Israel from itself. This feeling was, in part, the result of the heavy coverage given to the moral anguish American Jewish leaders were evincing as a result of the beatings policy and the continuing pictures of bloodied and beaten Palestinians. The intense press coverage given the American Arab and Jewish communities helped to create the kind of domestic constituency and consensus necessary for direct diplomatic intervention. A Jerusalem Post story on January 25 about a wall in Ramallah covered with bloodstains from Palestinians who had been beaten, galvanized journalists, liberal American Jews, and administration officials alike behind an interventionist policy. No less important, however, were the open splits within the Israeli cabinet over which policy to pursue in dealing with the Palestinians. These splits, it was hoped in the administration, would provide an opening for direct American action.

The internal opposition was most affected by the coverage and this spurred on disassociation. The AJCommittee’s Hyman Bookbinder, for example, said U.S. Jews were distressed by Israel’s policies in the Territories, but continued to support Israel on other issues. The establishment was also not interested in pursuing an ill-timed confrontation over the PLO’s U.N. Mission. Indeed, the Administration received Jewish support for its efforts to keep the PLO’s U.N. Mission in New York open. When domestic political drives accelerated maneuvering to close the mission (efforts in the House spearheaded by Kemp), Jewish organizations disavowed any involvement. “They are not doing this at the request of our American Jewish community,” Phil Baum of the AJCongress explained. “Our hope was to induce the State Department to use the powers it had to close the Washington office. We wanted to send a symbolic message that the PLO is a terrorist organization and it was not welcome in the United States.” Abram said he thought both PLO offices were terrorist missions but that the Observer Mission could not be easily closed because it was established in accordance with international agreements.

Labor Lobby

Labor heavily lobbied the Jewish leadership in support of disassociation. And the Jewish leadership, in turn, lobbied heavily against Likud. Nimrod Novik, a Peres aide, told a visiting delegation from the Presidents Conference: “I dread the day that we face an American public fed up with what it sees on TV, an American Congress fed up with what it sees on TV, a new American Administration picking up the pieces if this peace initiative does not succeed. . . . People have to bite the bullet and see what they can do for peace.” What were the American people seeing and hearing at around this time? Lederman offers the following:
Peter Jennings introduced a piece by saying, “A Palestinian doctor claimed the Israelis broke into a hospital, fired tear gas, and dragged out two boys and beat them.” The next night, in an introduction to a piece on Israeli plans to cut press access, Dan Rather stated, “In the West Bank, Israeli troops fired tear gas into a hospital, then grabbed a teenager and threw him down a flight of stairs, sat on him, and beat him with a club.” Both introductions were factually correct. However, they also were distortions of the truth. As AP had reported on March 1, Palestinian youngsters had been using hospitals and schools for six weeks as havens, hideouts, and staging grounds for rock and firebomb attacks. . . . These two particular introductions were not one-time lapses.”

The media was not the only source of confusion. Ma’ariv quoted Peres as telling high school students in Eilat that: “We have to listen very closely to what Hussein is saying. He wants the PLO but without Arafat. So let’s agree with him on this version. The PLO yes, Arafat no.” His remarks were broadcast by Israel Army Radio. Nevertheless, Peres denied making the statement and told the Presidents Conference delegation that he opposed the establishment of a Soviet-backed PLO-led state as a danger to Israel. Vorspan, Schindler’s deputy and a severe critic of Israeli policies in his own right, remarked that in this confusing atmosphere it would be a grave mistake to “impose conformity through a Presidents Conference or through any other vehicle,” on the Jewish leadership. Meantime, Abram and a contingent from the Presidents Conference called on Bethlehem Mayor Elias Freij who told them that the PLO covenant which called for Israel’s destruction was “dead.” Freij told them that the Intifada offered a twofold message: “We don’t want the military occupation, and we do want to make peace with Israel. The vast majority of our people are sincere in their desire to make peace once and for all.” Abram’s comments afterward verified the perceptual orientation that had become unofficial policy at the Presidents Conference: “I have made it perfectly clear that the status quo is not indefinitely acceptable to American Jews. What I’m also trying to say is that first of all I understand that the occupation is the cause of the disturbances. An occupation is a condition that exists until peace.” He then urged Israel to seek peace. Paradoxically, he later joined Prime Minister Shamir at a farewell dinner for the Presidents Conference delegation in cautioning that public criticism of Israel was harmful.

Intensifying their political suasion activities, elements of the Jewish leadership worked behind the scenes with key pro-Israel senators to orchestrate an open letter to Shamir criticizing his opposition to the land-for-peace formula. The letter was initiated by Sen. Carl Levin (D. Mich.), Rudy Boschwitz (R-Minn), Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ), Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio), Warren Rudman (R-NH), William Cohen (R-M), Alan Cranston (D-Calif) and Daniel Moynihan (D-NY). Hyman Bookbinder, the Washington lobbyist for the AJCommittee, said of the letter: “I accept this as a legitimate process that is going on.”

In truth, sympathy for the Shamir line was widespread within the American Jewish community. Two pro-Israel Senators, Arlen Specter (R-Penn.) and Chic Hect (R-Nevada), opposed their colleagues’ letter. The Orthodox Rabbinical Council of America called criticism of Shamir an “outrageous interference in Israel’s internal politics.” At about the same time, ZOA warned that it would “embolden the enemies of Israel.” In the face of countervailing pressure, Abram’s limpid comment was to deny that Shamir was an obstacle to peace.

Pressing Disassociation

Efforts by Israelis to influence American Jewish public opinion as well as Shamir’s reception by Reagan Administration officials led to several demonstrations set to coincide with his visit to the United States. An estimated 50,000 Peace Now demonstrators rallied in Jerusalem to demand that Shamir pursue a “land-for-peace” exchange. A pro-Shamir rally in Tel Aviv also drew tens of thousands of demonstrators. At a 5 a.m. stopover at New York’s JFK Airport, on his way to Washington, Shamir was greeted by about 100 enthusiastic “peace-for-peace” supporters.

The Administration went out of its way to portray the Shamir visit as a failure. After Shamir again rejected the international conference proposal put forth by the United States, Shultz said: “We haven’t found our way to bridge all of the differences.” Shamir tried and failed to convince Shultz to press an international campaign to replace Palestinian Arab refugee camps in Israel and the Territories with permanent housing units.

Both Shamir and Reagan lobbied the Jewish leadership. The President told a UJA audience that “We will not leave Israel to stand alone, nor will we acquiesce in any effort to gang up on Israel.” But the next day at a White House ceremony, with Shamir standing nearby, the President made the disassociation policy explicit; support for Israel did not extend to its West Bank policy. The Administration would continue to press for an international conference: “The United States will not slice this initiative apart and will not abandon it. Those who will say ‘no’ to the United States plan, and the prime minister has not used this word, need not answer to the United States. They’ll need to answer to their people on why they turned down a realistic and sensible plan to achieve negotiations.” Administration officials specifically wanted Shamir to influence his supporters within the American Jewish community to support the Administration’s approach.

Shamir told the same UJA audience addressed by the President, that Intifada rioting was aimed at the destruction of Israel. Explaining why he opposed abandoning Judea, Samaria and Gaza, Shamir was repeatedly interrupted with applause and cheers. Back in New York, he was greeted by demonstrations of support arranged by the national camp. On March 21 several thousand people staged a pro-Shamir rally outside his Park Avenue hotel. Addressing an open meeting sponsored by the Conference of Presidents, Shamir asked U.S. Jews to stop criticizing Israel: “Even if there are some differences of views, I don’t think that it is permitted to Jewish personalities to exert pressure on their governments and ask them to pressure Israel.” In Los Angeles, “despite a boycott by some community leaders who disagreed with his views, 1,600 people turned out to hear the prime minister speak, and others had to be turned away.”

This was not the message the internal opposition wanted Shamir to take back to Israel. When he spoke at venues under their control he was received coolly. Virtually all the questions Shamir received at one Federation meeting were critical of his policies. The head of the AJCongress charged that some Shamir allies espoused positions similar to those of Meir Kahane. Henry Siegman also claimed that American Jews supported Labor’s stance. “Israel must offer to negotiate with the Palestinians, not because this makes good public relations but because only by ridding itself of the permanent occupation of nearly 2 million Palestinian Arabs will Israel survive physically and retain its democratic values and Jewish essence,” said Siegman.

U.S.-PLO Contacts

Revelations that U.S.-PLO secret contacts were ongoing served to further undermine the rationale for the “no talk” policy. In March, CBS News reported that General Vernon Walters, the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., met with PLO leaders in Tunisia. Walters responded with a categorical denial: “I deny it, it is a lie, I have not met a PLO representative in Tunis. I am not authorized to speak with the PLO.” Walters did confirm that he had previous contacts with the PLO in the 1970s. “The report was correct in saying I spoke to them in 1975 (sic). They were killing Americans and I was sent to tell them to stop and they did. But that was 13 years ago,” Walters said. Indeed, Walters’ first meeting with the PLO’s Ali Hassan Salameh occurred when he was deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency (and Salameh was on the Agency’s payroll). That meeting took place at Kissinger’s request in November 1973. Its purpose was to arrange for an end to attacks by Arafat-led terrorists against American targets. The two met again in 1974 when Walters reportedly suggested that the United States would respond positively if the PLO abandoned violence against Americans and improved its relationship with other Arab states. According to Khaled al-Hassan, the PLO “followed through at Rabat” where the Arab states designated it the authorized representative of the Palestinians but “we didn’t get anything for it.” Hoenlein said that the Presidents Conference accepted “Walters’ assurances that he did not meet with the PLO and we wait for further clarifications.”

In one form or another the PLO now dominated the peace process agenda. Arafat worked diligently to stay in the media spotlight. He complained that American peace initiatives excluded the PLO. Elsewhere, Arafat expressed satisfaction that some Arab citizens of Israel had joined in the Intifada. “The most important thing is that the uprising has also spread to those who have lived under the occupation since 1948: those whom Israel calls Israeli Arabs.” In the U.S., meanwhile, the PLO spurned Justice Department notification to close its U.N. Mission. Zeidi Terzi, the PLO U.N. representative, argued that the order was a violation of international law. In any event, the Mission stayed open and the legal issues remained unsettled.

Eban v. Shamir

The main “villain” of the political environment in which the U.S.-PLO relationship played itself out was Shamir. His intransigence was the singular cause for the continued violence. American network news programs, especially ABC, pursued a campaign to delegitimize Shamir. And interviews with Israelis were heavily weighted (in terms of both the visual and verbal) in Labor’s favor. Abba Eban’s comments about the violence to Pierre Salinger of ABC were fairly typical: “This is a situation that cannot get better – like a malignant disease.” His forthcoming support for a U.S.-PLO dialogue would be an important milestone.

Eban’s opposition to the “malignancy” of occupation was a source of cognitive dissonance for Shamir critics. With his large following among American Jews, Eban’s mellifluous voice carried extra clout. So, when Eban publicly called for talks with the PLO, said it had moderated its position and supported PLO participation at an international peace conference, a major pillar of the “no talk” infrastructure crumbled. Eban now emerged as a key backer of the outside elite. Peres, Labor and the internal opposition were not yet prepared to call for talks with the PLO. The American Jewish Congress urged only that Israel accept the Administration’s approach on Palestinian representation.

Was Eban right? Had the PLO’s mission – Israel’s destruction – changed? In 1939 Churchill said of Stalin’s regime: “I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma; but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest.” PLO politics is even more difficult to unravel because many voices, independently, define its “national” interest. The PLO is a multifaceted, decentralized, umbrella entity led – to be unkind – by a political chameleon. This makes it next to impossible to separate tactics from strategy and strategy from mission. All that can be done is to take cognizance of the perceptual milieu. “Our struggle with Israel,” Ibrahim Souss, the PLO representative in Paris explained, “is a war of civilizations, and we have to use all the weapons at our disposal.” Arafat frankly told a Kuwaiti newspaper that he speaks one language for Western media consumption and another when he is addressing Arab audiences. In a speech to the 16th PNC meeting in Algiers in 1983, Arafat artfully described a “flexible ‘yes and no’ position (la’am in Arabic, a pun combination on the word la or no and na’am or yes). My own view is that Asser Susser of Tel Aviv University’s Shiloah Institute is correct in saying: “The PLO’s concept of self-determination has never been confined to the West Bank and Gaza, and like the term democratic state ... is a euphemism for the dissolution of Israel. . . . Zionism and Palestinian national rights, as defined by the PLO, are mutually exclusive.” The editor of Falastin A-Thawra, Ahmed Abd A-Rahman, wrote in 1988: “The Intifada is the tool for the complete liberation of Palestinian land.” Nevertheless, by 1988 to espouse the argument that the PLO had not, all but formally, embraced a non-zero-sum mission was anathema.

Shultz-PNC Meeting

On March 26, Shultz circumvented America’s commitment not to publicly negotiate with the PLO by meeting with Edward Said and Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, prominent members of the Palestine National Council (PNC).
For 15 years, U.S. officials have been meeting with members of the PLO, despite assurances to Israel that Washington would neither recognize nor negotiate with the group. Some liaisons were secret, some were quiet. The few that were public were hastily forgotten. Now Washington has entered a new phase of close encounters with the PLO, signaling fresh receptiveness to Palestinian views and pressuring the intransigent Shamir. . . . A former business associate of George Shultz is Palestinian construction magnate Hasian Sabbagh, a PNC member. Washington sources say the two men have also seen each other socially.

Despite the formal connection between the PNC and the PLO, the State Department held firm to its earlier declarations that U.S. policy toward the PLO was unchanged. In fact, Article 7a of the PLO Covenant (adopted in 1964 and revised in 1968) holds the PNC to be “the supreme authority of the Liberation Organization, drafting its policy and planning.” Moreover, Abu-Lughod and Said emphasized that they were acting as Arafat emissaries. Years later Shultz justified the meeting this way: “But these were American citizens; no one could justifiably complain about a U.S. government official meeting with U.S. citizens.” Among those who could not fault Shultz for holding the meeting was the AJCommittee.

Perhaps to further heighten the sense of crisis, some days later the State Department warned Americans against traveling to the West Bank and Gaza. State Department official Richard Schifter, on a visit to the region, accused Israel of “brutalizing” the Palestinians. All this was having its intended effect. By April 6, an Israeli poll showed 60% of the people favoring an international conference. “When I left the region,” writes Shultz, “I made it clear that I was not giving up and that I would be back. ‘He [Shultz] is wearing us down. How can we get him to go home and stay home?’ the press reported an Israeli official as saying. The problem was, I was not wearing them down.”

The momentum was slowing. Previously, Shultz had been able to count on the backing of the internal opposition to lobby Israeli officials. Now some of these groups were wavering. “By this time,” Shultz concluded, “Israeli leaders, especially Shamir, had weighed in with the Americans and turned them sour.” The AJCommittee’s Ted Ellenoff suggested that criticism of Israel should be restricted to the Jewish media. The committed internal opposition did not waver. In fact, it was more emphatic than ever. At the AJCongress, where Robert Lifton had replaced Ted Mann, criticism of Shamir had become, if anything, more strident. Still, AIPAC’s Tom Dine told Shultz: The pro-Israel community has lost its enthusiasm for the initiative. Inactivity is the word.” That is precisely why, from the Administration’s viewpoint, in the final countdown to a U.S.-PLO dialogue, the involvement of the outside elite was critical.

On matters of substance the Administration, Labor and the internal opposition shared a common outlook. Their consensus was to formally exclude the PLO from the peace process, oppose the establishment of a Palestinian state, yet foster Palestinian participation in the peace process. There were some differences in nuance. Labor wanted Israel to maintain security control over Judea, Samaria and Gaza (in some form) and opposed the dismantling of Jewish communities in the Territories.

Shultz summarized United States policy on a variety of PLO-related issues in late March. A Palestinian state was “just not in the cards,” he said. However, the law passed by Congress requiring the PLO to close its U.N. Mission was “dumb” and further legitimized the PLO at the U.N. Shultz again defended his meeting with the Palestinian delegation, saying that the PNC and the PLO were not the same. “It does not in any way change our policy, which I follow not simply because it was set in 1975, but I think it’s a very important idea that we are not going to talk to and negotiate with the PLO.” What was holding up progress, Shultz implied, was Shamir’s intransigence.

Anti-Shamir Ads

Starting in 1988, an avalanche of professionally produced political advertisements critical of Shamir’s policies began to appear in the print media. The advertisements contributed to, as well as reinforced, perceptual changes. The ads appeared in The New York Times, Los Angeles Times, Washington Post and USA Today. Occasional advertisements supporting Shamir also appeared. They were placed by a handful of wealthy freelancers who made no concerted effort to match the opposition’s aggressive campaign. The anti-Shamir advertisements came from a variety of sources. What they lacked in terms of a unifying message was more than made up by the sheer volume of the ads.

In this political environment, Israel’s ineffectual efforts to re-establish order in the West Bank and Gaza were viewed, ipso facto, as illegitimate. Anti-Shamir forces achieved a propaganda coup by forcing a U.S. manufacturer of tear gas to stop selling to Israel. In April, Israel expelled eight more Intifada activists. In this instance, the U.S. vetoed a Security Council resolution which would have condemned Israel on the grounds that it did not contain “a scintilla of balance.”

Violence in Judea, Samaria and Gaza abated, but only temporarily, following Israel’s killing, on April 16, of the PLO’s top military strategist, Abu Jihad (Kahlil Wazir), in Tunis. He had been the operative most directly responsible for PLO coordination of Intifada policies. American Ambassador to the U.N. Thomas Pickering said the action was “outside the standards of human rights which we and Israel share and advocate together. Concerned about a further escalation, the Administration used third-party Arab states to urge Arafat not to retaliate.

* * * * *

On April 24, Americans for a Progressive Israel (affiliated with the Mapam wing of the Labor Party) organized an anti-Shamir rally in New York which drew 2,000 protesters. Meanwhile, Abba Eban, who had become the mentor of the outside elite, toured the United States to mobilize Jewish audiences against Shamir’s policies as well as to make the case for PLO inclusion in the peace process. The selection of attorney Menachem Rosensaft as the new leader of Labor’s U.S. affiliate was a harbinger of its increased radicalization. Rosensaft urged Jews to “speak out” against Israeli policies in the West Bank. Rosensaft straddled the line between the internal opposition (his position made him a participant in Presidents Conference deliberations) and outside elite. Within eight months, he became the highest ranking Presidents Conference member to meet with Arafat.

The very ubiquity of the PLO in the political environment allowed it to dominate the peace process agenda. In April 1988, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev urged Arafat to recognize Israel so that the PLO could sit at the bargaining table. In the domestic political arena, Jesse Jackson continued to raise the Palestinian Arab cause in his quest for the Democratic presidential nomination. Generally speaking, pro-Palestinian Arab sentiment had been gaining momentum among Democratic party activists at the district level. In California, for example, anti-Israel forces claimed a “moral victory” because defeat of a proposal to include a pro-Palestinian plank in the Democratic party platform was overcome only after serious consideration.

Meantime, the rhetoric of moderation resonated within the political environment. Saleh Khalef (Abu Iyad), second in command to Yasir Arafat and the group’s chief of internal security, told a French reporter that the PLO was not out to destroy Israel. The PLO Covenant, “which the Israelis promote so much – we do not include them since the 1974 PNC meeting that reshaped out program.” He complained that it was the Israelis who reject peace, not the PLO: “Unfortunately, the Israelis of today speak the same language the Arabs used to speak 30 years ago. . . . We say yes to peace, yes to a political solution, de-facto recognition of the Palestinian homeland.”

Given the perceptual framework undergirded by talk of moderation and television images of Israeli brutality, it is hardly surprising that a national survey conducted by Reagan pollster Richard Wirthlin discovered that more college educated Americans (42 percent) were sympathetic to the Palestinian cause than Israel’s (38 percent). The pollster said that, overall, fewer Americans were now willing to give Israel the benefit of the doubt. Another survey by the Los Angeles Times discovered that most American Jews were opposed to the Likud’s approach to the peace process; they overwhelmingly supported an international conference; 41% felt there was an element of racism in Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians; 29% supported a PLO-led Palestinian state in Judea, Samaria and Gaza; and fully two-thirds favored Israel finding “a way” to accommodate Palestinian aspirations. The survey also revealed that fifty-six percent of American Jews did not contribute financially to Israel and two-thirds had no affiliation with any Jewish organization. Of particular interest were findings regarding media coverage. Three percent of non-Jews said the Intifada story was the one they had been paying the most attention to. But thirty-three percent of Jews regarded “Israeli unrest” as the news story they had been following most closely. Indeed, slightly more Jews than non-Jews (27%-24%) said that Israeli policies over the last several years had become “unacceptable” to them. On the one issue that still loosely united Labor and Likud: talks with the PLO, 61% of American Jews said the United States should not negotiate with the PLO while 52% of Americans in general favored U.S.-PLO talks. Least surprising, by a margin of 57% to 49% American Jews favored Peres over Shamir. Popular opinion was now where the Administration and a significant segment of the Jewish establishment wanted it to be.

Vorspan’s Soul-Searching

The New York Times under Max Frankel’s stewardship was strongly committed to an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza. The Times magazine, edited by James L. Greenfield, offered a series of scathing portraits of the Jewish presence in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. The paper published frequent critiques of Israeli West Bank policies (in the form of news, analysis and commentary), as noted earlier. However, the publication of Albert Vorspan’s diary in the Magazine section was a momentous expansion of the newspaper’s policy fostering Jewish dissent. Vorspan, the senior vice-president of Reform Judaism’s Union of American Hebrew Congregations, chronicled the “soul-searching” he did before publicly breaking with Shamir policies. His decision to publish a diary reporting on events at closed meetings was very much in keeping with the situational advantage-seeking element of political suasion:
Some of us are upset about the position of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations. Its chairman, Morris Abram, seems to be putting a kosher stamp on everything – shootings, deportations, excessive force. Yet our group and several others represented believe in taking a more critical line. We have ceased to be Jewish champions of social justice and become cheerleaders for failed Israeli policies. . . . Meeting of the full Commission of Social Action of Reform Judaism, Gen. Yehoshafat Harkabi, former head of Israeli military intelligence, tells us that to continue the occupation indefinitely will bring on the “Belfastization” of the West Bank. Territorial compromise is essential to Israel’s security. . . . [Polls show] American Jews overwhelmingly support the United States proposal for a Middle East peace conference, approve of public dissent . . . hold a more favorable opinion of George Shultz than of Yitzhak Shamir. . . . I remember the comment at the Shamir meeting in New York three weeks before: “Now you know how unrepresentative you are,” they had told me. I smile faintly, thinking of that, and feel more hopeful about the future.

Reaction to the publication of Vorspan’s diary varied. Israel’s Consul General in New York, Moshe Yegar, a Shamir appointee, condemned Vorspan. AIPAC’s Tom Dine and Malcolm Hoenlein of the Presidents Conference immediately criticized Vorspan – not for what he said, but for “going public” in the secular media. Such public expression of disunity among American Jews would, they argued, damage the pro-Israel community. In a letter to the editor, Abram took a similar line, complaining:
I deeply resent the unfair and unfounded accusations against me. . . . [Vorspan’s] outrageous charge that I put “a kosher stamp on everything – shootings, deportations, excessive force” – is belied by the series of unequivocal public statements I issued in the name of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations. The metaphor in itself is offensive. . . . The fact remains that public debate and criticism can have a very different effect in Israel and the United States.

Peres’ own political suasion campaign of divide and conquer was aimed at emboldening the Jewish leadership to criticize Shamir and back Labor. He participated in the AJCommittee’s annual meeting and, quite likely, encouraged its leadership to support labor’s stance. At a Presidents Conference appearance, Peres urged Shamir critics to “speak out” as a “free people.” The American Jewish Year Book reflected on the Peres visit: “Indeed, buoyed by the support of . . . minister and Labor bloc leader Shimon Peres . . . American Jews who considered the Shamir stance overly intransigent became quite vocal during the spring and summer.”

As Peres engaged in the political manipulation of the Jewish establishment, the Administration was doing its best to elevate the Labor leader’s stature. The White House offered accolades for his forward thinking vision. In contrast, the Administration implied that Shamir was “negative” and consistently rejected new ideas for peace.

By this point, the internal opposition did not need much encouragement to lobby Shamir on behalf of the Administration’s policy. AJCongress head Robert Lifton met with Shamir in Jerusalem. He publicized his opposition to Shamir’s policies and proffered the advice that the status quo in the Territories had to be brought to an end. In New York, the Workmen’s Circle, a secularist fraternal organization whose roots were non-Zionist (but generally pro-Israel) democratic socialism, endorsed the Peres approach to the peace process.

Against a backdrop of continuing violence in the Territories, Shultz paid his fourth visit to the Middle East in June to pressure Shamir into going along with an international conference. He wrote later:
In my arrival statement on June 3, I asked: “What is the Arab-Israeli conflict? It is the competition between two national movements for sovereignty on one land. . . . The fate of Zionism and Palestinian nationalism are interdependent.” I intended to stir things up with this equation of Israel and Palestinians in the same utterance with the words “national” and “sovereignty.”

In a cliché that had become de rigueur, Shultz warned that it was “an illusion” to think the “status quo” could be maintained. To heighten the sense of crisis, a component of political suasion, the White House implied that Shultz might have to suspend his peace-making efforts if Israel were not more forthcoming.

The internal opposition intensified its efforts to mobilize support for an Israeli withdrawal from Judea, Samaria and Gaza. The AJCongress brought retired IDF Generals Aharon Yariv and Ori Orr to the United States on a speaking tour. Addressing mostly Jewish audiences, they made the case that a West Bank and Gaza withdrawal was achievable from a security viewpoint. The generals conceded that the areas would require an IDF “presence” and have to remain “demilitarized.” In an effort which brought together the internal opposition, outside elite and peace camp, the Union of American Hebrew Congregations (under the leadership of Schindler and Vorspan) spearheaded a campaign by 12 other groups, which resulted in an open-telegram to Shamir supporting Shultz’s peace initiatives. They also called upon Israel to – as a goodwill gesture – withdraw from some of the administered territories. Groups joining in the campaign included: Labor Zionist Alliance (Menachem Rosensaft’s group), Americans For A Progressive Israel, Holocaust Survivors Association USA (Rosensaft’s other group), International Center for Peace in the Middle East (ICPME) and the Progressive Zionist Caucus. Peace camp elements, broadly defined, were also active independently. The CPUSA sponsored a speaking tour by Nazareth Mayor Tawfiq Zayyad and attorney Felicia Langer. They met with the Association of Black Journalists, New York area labor leaders and members of the New York City Council.

To this onslaught of faultfinding, the reaction of Presidents Conference members who did not disparage Shamir, was circumspect. Those who had not participated in the criticizing were not necessarily proponents of the Likud line. The non-critics argued the narrow case that the haranguing of Israeli policies had gotten out of hand. Abraham Foxman of ADL, for instance, urged that criticism should be kept to a minimum. For his part, Abram wrote an Op-Ed essay published in the Jerusalem Post saying:
Many American Jews argue that since the status quo is politically unacceptable, they are morally impelled to speak publicly even though these issues directly concern Israel’s security. Their strongest argument is that since the Israeli government is sharply divided, there is no logical or ethical reason why American Jewish leaders should not advocate positions that are supported by one cabinet minister instead of another. . . . On the other hand, American Jews do not live in Israel, vote in Israel or die in defense of Israel. We cannot dictate security policies . . . and we should not take a public stand in the debate . . . Israel must now rely almost exclusively on the United States. . . . Public criticism of Israel’s defense policies can only have the effect of misleading American public opinion and loosening the American commitment to Israel’s security . . .

* * * * *

Pro-Shamir Camp

A variety of factors, not the least of which was a legacy of nearly 30 years of Labor Party rule in Israel, contributed to Labor’s ideological dominance over the pro-Israel community in the United States. As noted elsewhere, a strong organizational base of support for the Jabotinsky ideological line did not exist in the United States. Begin’s 1977 victory did little to change the structural and ideological balance of power among Jewish organizations in the United States. Begin and later Shamir were dependent on the kindness of ideological strangers.

To be sure, there were a number of groups which were sympathetic to Likud’s political philosophy. But none effectively, coherently and systematically advocated support of Likud’s policies. The most prominent openly sympathetic group was the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA), a Presidents Conference member. But financial and organizational adversity made ZOA’s voice inside the Presidents Conference faint and ineffective. Likud USA, a sometimes Presidents Conference member (they did not always pay their dues) suffered from multiple organizational frailties. Likud USA’s main role was not, at any rate, political mobilization. It served mostly as a funnel for campaign dollars to the Israeli party. Likud USA also serves as the “address” of the Jabotinsky movement and its Betar-Tagar youth movement.

Outside the Presidents Conference, pro-Shamir groups tended to be small and fiercely ideological. But ideological cleavages, personality differences and organizational turf battles made a united front unobtainable. Despite its shortcomings, the most prominent “national camp” group active in the American Jewish arena in the period under study was Americans For A Safe Israel (AFSI). AFSI was the vanguard of the anti-“land-for-peace” movement. But the group was ill-suited to match the mobilizing prowess of its ideological opponents. AFSI also lacked a clear organizational focus (shifting from academic think-tank to Washington lobby to mobilizing force and back again). It suffered from a financial and leadership base too narrow to effectively challenge the balance of power inside the American Jewish community. In summary, a legacy of historical, structural, personality and ideological factors resulted in an American Jewish-right that was ill-prepared to have anything more than a marginal impact on the events described here.

PLO – Outside Elite Alliance

In June, the PLO escalated its peace offensive. Bassam Abu Sharif, Arafat’s press spokesman, circulated a statement announcing that the PLO accepted U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 despite the fact that “neither resolution says anything about the national rights of the Palestinian people.” The New York Times published a version of the statement, first distributed to reporters in Algiers at the Arab summit, as an Op-Ed essay:
The Palestinians want that kind of lasting peace and security for themselves and the Israelis because no one can build his own future on the ruins of another’s. . . . The PLO raison d’etre is not the undoing of Israel but the salvation of the Palestinian people and their rights, including their right to democratic self-expression and national self-determination. The PLO accepts (UN SC) Resolutions 242 and 338. What prevents it from saying so unconditionally is not what is in the resolutions but what is not in them. . . . We are ready for peace now, and we can deliver it. . . .

The outside elite promptly embraced the Abu Sharif statement even though its implied recognition of Israel was contingent upon the establishment of a PLO-led state. Rita Hauser, chairperson of ICME’s American Section, said it was “the most constructive statement the PLO has ever made. It is an enormous leap forward. What we want now (from the PLO) is a clarification that this is really the consensus of the majority of the organizations in the PLO.” Philip Klutznik called on the Israelis to join ICPME in embracing Abu Sharif’s statement.

With the Abu Sharif communication, ICPME came forth as the major pro-PLO lobby within the American Jewish community. In ICPME’s view, important segments of the PLO had gone through a metamorphosis and no longer sought the destruction of Israel. Instead, the new mission of the PLO was to set up a Palestinian-Arab state in the West Bank and Gaza which would live in peaceful coexistence with the Jewish State. Fifteen ICPME leaders in the United States signed a statement applauding the Abu Sharif statement. Among the signatories were: Kenneth Arrow, Irving Howe, Rita Hauser, Rabbi Arthur Hertzberg, Rabbi Wolfe Kelman, Philip Klutznick, Professor Seymour Martin Lipset, Nathan P. Glazer, Theodore Mann, Letty Cottin Pogrebin, Daniel Thursz, and Menachem Rosensaft.

Peres professed to see “nothing new” in the Abu Sharif essay and claimed it did not “merit a response.” Foxman, of ADL, decried ICPME’s embrace of Abu Sharif as too public and premature. He said that it might have been more appropriate to tell Shamir quietly, “Hey, fella, this is what you and we have been waiting for.” The reaction of the internal opposition was typified by Al Chernin of NJCRAC who said that Abu Sharif’s writings were clearly more than “just a restatement of old positions.” But he pointed out that there was no way to know if Abu Sharif spoke authoritatively for the PLO.

The PLO’s immediate reaction to the statement by Abu Sharif had been negative. While not endorsing the statement, Arafat called for a positive reciprocal gesture from the Administration. His number two, Abu Iyad (Salah Khalaf) said, “The important thing now is to . . . block the vain political gesture made by Bassam Abu Sharif and his deviationist statements in all fields.” Farouk Kaddoumi, PLO Foreign Minister, said Abu Sharif was expressing “the private views of the author.” The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a constituent of the PLO, also denounced Abu Sharif. Officially, the State Department termed the remarks “constructive” but not “authoritative.” Vice President Bush, who would be a presidential candidate in November, observed: “We keep hearing the PLO has all but recognized Israel’s right to exist. ‘The PLO has done this and the PLO has done that.’ The PLO must have a direct, definitive, clear statement regarding recognition of the appropriate U.N. Resolutions 242, particularly, and 338 and renunciation of terror.”

Abram Breaks With Shamir

In a break with Presidents Conference protocol that was as historic as it was anticlimactic, Abram publicly endorsed Labor’s interpretation of the land-for-peace formula. He said, “The Israelis must convince the Palestinians that if they recognize Israel and forswear their covenant of violence, territorial compromise becomes a realistic goal.” Meantime, Rabin also reiterated support for the “Land-for-peace” blueprint. The Defense Minister said: “Even though I accept the principle of territories for peace, I will not encourage any giving in to violence in whatever form – civilian violence, terror, or threats of war or wars.” Speaking at the National Press Club in Washington D.C., Rabin said that moderate Palestinians were afraid to enter into talks with Israel because they feared being assassinated by the PLO.

It must be recalled that the Zionist right opposed talks with the PLO purely on pragmatic grounds: there was nothing to discuss if Arafat’s goal was to “liberate” Palestine out from under the Jews. But there is reason to believe that Shamir had become curious about a possible shift in PLO intentions. In mid-July, Shamir’s office denied Abu Sharif’s claim that the Jewish State had been secretly negotiating with the PLO on an interim agreement for the West Bank. The two sides had been indirectly negotiating through the good offices of Rumania, according to Abu Sharif. Supposedly, at these talks, Israel offered to allow the PLO to take over many of the functions handled by the Civil Administration. Shamir acknowledged only that he had received a private message from Nicolae Ceausescu through the Rumanian President’s special emissary Konstantin Metea. Moshe Shahal, a Labor Cabinet minister, insisted that Abu Sharif’s claims were accurate and that Shamir did in fact hold indirect talks with the PLO while in Rumania. Shahal said Shamir’s overture to the PLO about taking over civilian duties in the West Bank was based on earlier recommendations made by Moshe Amirav (the ousted Likud official who had held talks with PLO supporters). Whether by design or otherwise, the incident served to sow discord and confusion within the Israeli policy.

* * * * *

Several personnel matters are worth briefly noting for what they tell us about how the players were positioned in the waning days of the U.S.-PLO dialogue scenario. In late July, Abram was asked to stay on an additional six months as chairman of the Presidents Conference, “as a result of a recent decision to have the term of office correspond to the calendar year.” In Israel, meanwhile, the Labor party failed to select Abba Eban as one of its top twenty candidates for the next Knesset elections. This indignity forced Eban out of government service. Thereafter, he devoted himself to, among other projects, the International Centre for Peace in the Middle East. In New York, Ira Silverman’s appointment as Executive Vice President at the AJCommittee signaled that the organization would continue to follow a centrist direction within internal opposition. “I don’t believe in speaking out against Israel,” Silverman said. “What I do believe in is stating plainly our view about how best to achieve a peace for Israel.” It was precisely this thinking that impelled the outside elite to take the initiative.

* * * * *

Whatever the truth about the Abu Sharif affair, in the final analysis Shamir held firm to the principle that the nature of the conflict had not altered. The Intifada, he said, “has not changed our basic situation. It has merely served to underscore the existential nature of the conflict. The fact that it has spread across the green line – in arson, stone-throwing, occasional fire-bombs, the effort ‘to destroy the unification of Jerusalem’ – this proves conclusively that the conflict is not over territory, but over Israel’s very existence.” If Shamir’s remarks suggested fortified weariness, Peres’ give the impression of being forward looking and flexible. U.S. plans to meet with prominent PLO aligned Arabs from the Territories, Peres said, did not bother him “because we, too, meet with them” and such meetings do not constitute talking to the PLO. That did not go far enough for Mubarak, who persisted in lobbying for a U.S.-PLO dialogue. He even insinuated that the two sides were close to talking, which compelled the State Department to issue the customary statement that U.S. policy toward the PLO remained unchanged.

Advertising “David v. Goliath”

Media advocacy reporting of the Intifada continued to influence the perceptual environment. Time magazine, for instance, referred to Arafat as “homeless.” This underdog theme was emphasized, in the summer of 1988, by an advertising campaign in the Washington D.C. Metro subway system, sponsored by the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee. The campaign featured graphic photographs of terrified-looking Arabs being confronted by heavily armed Israeli soldiers. Their tax-dollars, Metro riders were informed, paid for the Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank. Israel’s human rights policies were likened to those of South Africa.

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As noted earlier, Israel’s preoccupation about not dealing with the PLO did not extend to prisoner exchanges. One large exchange at year’s end returned hundreds of PLO activists to the West Bank in a swap for several IDF soldiers. (Five years later, many of the returnees played an instrumental role in sustaining the Intifada.) Despite the heavy cost of the Lebanon war, the resiliency of Arab terror was underlined by the bombing of a Jerusalem city bus early in December.

The phoenix-like survivability of Yasir Arafat kept the Palestinian cause in the forefront. He had been ousted by the IDF from the PLO’s Beirut stronghold. “Civil war” and violent disintegration within Fatah and among other PLO factions threatened the survival of his movement. The PLO “state within a state” in Lebanon had collapsed. Syria further humiliated Arafat by expelling him along with 4,000 loyalists from Tripoli, Lebanon. With Arafat and the PLO out of the way the pacification of the West Bank (perhaps under the Village Leagues) could have proceeded apace.

Just as Arafat’s fortunes seemed to be at a nadir, Egyptian President Mubarak came to his literal and figurative rescue. Mubarak received Arafat in Cairo just two days after his flight from Lebanon. It was the first meeting between Arafat and an Egyptian leader since Sadat’s 1977 trip to Jerusalem. The pro-Israel community reacted to Arafat’s Cairo reception with chagrin. Berman telegrammed the White House arguing that “betting on Arafat is a grim mistake.” But State Department spokesman John Hughes saw the meeting as anything but a grim mistake: “We are hopeful that such talks will serve to persuade Mr. Arafat that peace negotiations within the framework of the President’s Initiative are the best means of achieving Palestinian goals.” Hughes added that: “We are not meeting with Mr. Arafat or the PLO.” U.S. policy, said the State Department spokesman, was “absolutely unchanged.” The President saw the Mubarak-Arafat meeting in similar terms: “I think that what President Mubarak is doing is talking to him (Arafat) about returning to where he was earlier, making contact with King Hussein and getting those peace negotiations, our peace proposal under way again. . . . (Mubarak) is simply trying to persuade others to change their thinking.” But Near East Report, an AIPAC aligned newsletter, editorialized: “The Mubarak move (and the Administration’s response to it) defy common sense. Yasir Arafat is finished. . . . The Arafat option is a fraud. . . . It prevents Palestinians committed to coexistence with Israel from coming forward while it suggests that the path of terror will eventually pay off.” Shamir, now the Israeli Prime Minister, agreed: “The American government is mistaken if it thinks the Arafat-Mubarak meeting increases the chances of advancing the Reagan initiative.” Arafat, for his part, suggested that he would work for the establishment of a Palestinian government in exile.

IV

Perceptual Framework

Although the mainstream American Jewish leadership believed that Arafat was still engaged in a total contest with Israel, they no longer viewed the overall conflict in zero-sum terms. And events of the previous year demonstrated that the Palestinian problem could not be circumvented. For some, the prospect of a Labor victory in the upcoming Israeli elections offered hope that a compromise with non-PLO Palestinian Arabs could be achieved.

But United States policy was to reform and sanitize the PLO. Once the Palestinian issue was perceptually acknowledged as being at the core of the conflict and once the Administration demonstrated its tenacity to make Arafat and the PLO at the core of the solution, the leadership could only react by holding the parameter. They would oppose bringing the PLO into the process until it met the conditions outlined in 1975 by the United States. That was as far as they could possibly go, given the political environment. There was a certain inconsistency in not challenging the Administration’s underlying premises. Thus through a process of cognitive dissonance, the leadership had to question its own assessment of Arafat and the PLO.

The political environment for the coming year was shaped by Egypt’s efforts to bring the PLO into the peace process. Presumably, despite its “cold peace” with Israel, Jewish leaders looked at Egypt’s championing of the PLO as a sign that the PLO’s mission was undergoing change. This was a message now common in the political system. The Council on Foreign Relations described the PLO as a multi-faceted IR actor. Moreover, Israel’s political defeat in Lebanon underscored that there could be no military solution to the Palestinian-Arab aspect of the conflict. But the coming year’s most influential environmental factor, as far as the American Jewish leadership was concerned, was electoral. Jewish leaders waited to see how the American and Israeli elections would play themselves out. Inconclusive Israeli elections led to a government of national “disunity” comprised of both Labor and Likud. In the U.S., President Reagan was reelected to a second term. The cast of influential actors now came to include Shimon Peres, the new Israeli Prime Minister, and Kenneth Bialkin, the new Chairman of the Presidents Conference.

The political environment also continued to be greatly influenced by how the prestige press covered the Arab-Israel conflict. The New York Times, for instance, had run a series of four articles which argued that Israeli society was riddled with anti-Arab racism and prejudice traceable, the implication was, to the Likud’s hardline stance. The importance and influence of the Times on the Jewish leadership cannot be overstated. The paper’s coverage was a pivotal factor in shaping and reinforcing a shift in Jewish attitudes toward the conflict.

* * * * *

Following up on its diplomatic rescue of the PLO, Egypt launched a vigorous campaign to bring the movement into the U.S.-led peace process. Meanwhile, Israel’s efforts to extricate itself from Lebanon were greatly complicated by that country’s transformation into a suzerainty of Syria. The Presidents Conference found its agenda dominated by these two realities.

The establishment’s attitude toward the PLO can be gauged by its reaction to calls by PLO supporters, such as the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), for a U.S.-PLO dialogue and for an unconditional Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. The American Jewish Committee, which agreed that the Palestinian issue was crucial, nevertheless castigated the AFSC for espousing a PLO role. Political advocacy on behalf of the PLO cut across the American political and foreign policy spectrum. Supporters of the PLO were welcomed at various prestigious foreign policy forums. In February 1984, for instance, Dr. Christopher Giannou, a Canadian-born activist associated with the Palestine Red Crescent Society, was featured at a round-table discussion sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations. Giannou had earlier publicly declared that for him, “the Palestinian cause was sacred” and its enemy was Israel.

Prospects for a Lebanese regime that was not hostile to the Jewish State crumbled under Syrian pressure in March of 1984 when Lebanon abrogated the May 17, 1983 Israel-Lebanon Agreement. Shultz acknowledged that Syrian-sponsored violence had been largely responsible for its collapse. Concurrently, he reiterated the U.S. position on talking to the PLO:
Conditions for any dialogue between the PLO and the United States have been very clearly stated many times. The PLO should recognize Resolution 242 and should state its recognition of the right of the State of Israel to exist and under those circumstances the U.S. will conduct discussions with the PLO.

The establishment’s continuing antipathy toward bringing the PLO into the peace process, despite pressures permeating the political environment, can be traced to the consensus on the issue within the Israeli polity. The Presidents Conference convenes annually in Jerusalem for meetings and consultations with Israeli leaders. In his address to their sessions Labor leader Shimon Peres criticized Mubarak for “putting his weight in favor of the PLO – a helpless organization and an obstacle in the way of peace.” He ridiculed the idea that Arafat had become a moderate as “nonsense.” Before Berman and Hellman embarked for a visit with Mubarak in Cairo, the Presidents Conference formally denounced the Egyptian initiative.

Still, the internal opposition criticized Berman for overstating the level of consensus within the establishment regarding the PLO. In a political suasion tactic of splitting the majority, Steven M. Cohen charged Berman with misrepresenting and distorting the views of the constituent agencies of the Presidents Conference. Under Berman, he charged, the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations has:
. . . fashioned a position on Israeli security matters which articulates the more hawkish features of American Jewish consensual thinking on the conflict. The Conference gives little or no voice to American Jews’ willingness to support many Israelis’ efforts to articulate policies based on flexibility and compromise. As such, the Conference’s expressed views stand at the hawkish end of the spectrum of American Jewish diverse opinions and, as a result, they verge on misrepresentation of American Jewry both to Israel and to important American policy makers.

Cohen’s thinking, as noted earlier, closely reflected the views of the American Jewish Committee for whom he conducted survey polling intended to discover “the depth of dissent.”

Mroz Mission

America’s clandestine “procedural” negotiations with the Palestine Liberation Organization became public in late February 1984 when The New York Times reported that private citizen and Middle East specialist, John Mroz, had been secretly negotiating with the PLO on behalf of the State Department. The talks, conducted with the knowledge of Haig and Veliotes, were undertaken at Arafat’s request and lasted 9 months ending in June 1982. The Times reported that Mroz held more than 50 meetings with Arafat and other PLO officials and furnished accounts of the sessions to Veliotes. Mroz was identified by the paper as a 35-year-old president of the East-West Security Foundation. Previously, Mroz had been director of Middle East Studies at the International Academy of Peace in New York. Veliotes had persuaded Haig that the PLO could be split away from the Soviet Union, thus making it easier to accelerate the Arab-Israel peace process. After receiving the president’s approval in California, the Mroz mission was authorized by Haig in August 1981. In the wake of the PLO’s expulsion from Lebanon, Shultz authorized Mroz to meet with Arafat in Tunis. However, Arafat refused to see him. Who leaked the story and what their motives were are unknown. But insinuation had political suasion value. The news inoculated against the “no talk” taboo (or, given the number of “accidental” or “unauthorized” publicly known contacts, one could view this latest report as a booster shot). The reaction of the various players is slightly curious. Officially, the State Department downplayed the report and reiterated the U.S. refusal to recognize or talk to the PLO until its previously stated conditions were met. Spokesman Alan Romberg refused to be drawn into a discussion of the Times report other than to say: “We have contact with a variety of people who claim to have contact with the PLO. . . . When asked what they should tell the PLO, they are told to repeat the U.S. conditions.” Israel’s Ambassador to the U.S., Meir Rosenne, deprecated the report, telling a Zionist Organization of America audience: “I refuse to believe this is true.” Officially, he conveyed an Israeli Foreign Ministry protest to the State Department some days later. There is no record that the Presidents Conference protested the Mroz report.

The official Israeli attitude toward the PLO was unchanged. Responding to an Op-Ed essay by Harold Saunders, Rosenne made the zero-sum case in a letter to the editor: “The P.L.O. is not a national liberation movement but a terrorist gang whose intention to destroy Israel is stated with chilling clarity in its covenant and in countless declarations by all its leaders over many years. Contrary to Mr. Saunders, there is no division inside the P.L.O. on ultimate objectives. Internal differences revolve around tactics, not strategy.”

The strategy of the United States was to facilitate the entry of the Palestinians (perhaps the PLO under the right circumstances) into the peace process. Shultz told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Reagan Administration did not have indirect contacts with the PLO. But then he insinuated that it did, saying:
As I have looked at the record of those meetings, what was talked about in private was identical with what was talked about in public . . . if it proved anything, it was that the constant refrain we hear – that if only we would sit down with the PLO and talk with them everything would start falling into place – is simply not the case.

Continuing American adherence to the disassociation model was evident from the President’s remarks to a UJA group in February. He said, “Friendship between Israel and the United States is closer and stronger than ever before. And I am intent to keep it that way.” But he also reiterated American opposition to Jewish settlements in the Administered Territories. And, at around the same time, Shultz wrote to Sen. Charles Percy opposing legislation that would move the U.S. embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. He said such a move would “prejudge one of the key issues which must be freely negotiated between the parties. . . .” It is interesting to note that some political candidates still thought there was strong support within the Jewish community for retention of Judea and Samaria. Campaigning for the 1984 Democratic presidential nomination, Gary Hart declared that the settlements were not obstacles to peace.

Peres Flexibility

The PLO remained anathema to the mainstream pro-Israel community largely because it continued to signal a message of total conflict. Abu Jihad, for example, declared that armed struggle would strike “against the forces of the occupation army in Gaza, Nablus, Jerusalem, or deep in the Israeli heart, in Tel Aviv and in the other occupied towns.” Simultaneously, Arafat continued to dance around the idea of recognizing Israel. Regardless of the PLO’s stance, the Israeli body politic was divided over prospects for Arab moderation. Labor was ready to talk with a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation if one would come forth. Other than PLO intentions, the party viewed the conflict largely in non-zero-sum terms. In early May, Peres declared that Camp David need not be the sole peace process channel. The signal was unmistakable: a Labor Government would be far more flexible on staking claims to Judea and Samaria.

The fabric of American Jewish pro-Israelism was being torn asunder. The contributory factors varied: Official U.S. criticism of Israel’s policies was unceasing. Negative media coverage persisted unabated. The Times continued to play a vanguard role in fostering American Jewish criticism of Israeli policies. Arthur Hertzberg, WJC vice-president, and an important voice of the internal opposition, was granted a platform by the Times to call on the Administration to pressure Israel into pulling out of the West Bank. “Washington can press Israeli leaders to pay the political price of dealing with this [the Palestinian] question. The fundamental truth about the Palestinian question and the continuing war between Jews and Arabs is that it can be settled only by American leadership. America cannot impose a settlement, but it can cajole the parties. . . .” The United Jewish Appeal found it necessary to remind wealthy contributors that disagreement with Israel’s policies should not be an excuse for withholding their support. Such challenges from within the American Jewish community needed and received legitimization from the Israeli Opposition which challenged the Camp David process of limited Palestinian-Arab autonomy.

Kenneth Bialkin

Julius Berman’s tenure as chairman of the Presidents Conference drew to a close. Berman was the only head of the Presidents Conference (in the post-1977 era) whose natural affinity was for the Likud line. Berman’s valedictory speech in June articulated what little consensus still prevailed within the Jewish establishment, namely, opposition to U.S.-PLO negotiations unless the well-known conditions were met. Summarizing Berman’s tenure, the Presidents Conference Annual Report seeks to put the best possible “spin” on the level of establishment consensus toward Israel:
The ability to achieve and express . . . consensus was emphasized by the outgoing Chairman as representing the underlying strength of the Presidents Conference. He acknowledged that it was “no secret” that members of the Presidents Conference held differing views on some issues, including those of the West Bank and Gaza. But these differences were far less important than the overriding commitment of the Conference members to Israel’s security. . . . “The Presidents Conference cannot take positions where there is no unity,” Mr. Berman observed.

. . . In a separate article (he wrote) . . . “Indeed, it is a well-known secret that the fastest way to get your op-ed article published in a daily newspaper or weekly news magazine is to criticize Israel or call for American pressure aimed at changing Israeli policies. . . .

Although there are differences of opinion among us with respect to settlement policies in the West Bank, the overwhelming majority of American Jews reject the idea that Israeli communities in Judea and Samaria are illegal . . . any possibility of establishing a Palestinian state must be foreclosed. . . .

I believe these sentiments represent the views of the organized Jewish community in America. . . .”

The newly elected Chairman, Kenneth Bialkin, was by no means “soft” on the PLO “talk” issue. But his election did herald an important change. In all likelihood, Bialkin was selected precisely because, on the Labor-Likud divide, the 54-year-old Harvard Law School graduate, whose ties were with the centrist Anti-Defamation League, was a neutral figure.

Arafat studiously portrayed himself, in the non-Arabic press, as someone seeking a diplomatic outcome. With the sponsorship of Egypt and tacit encouragement from the Reagan Administration, Arafat had been resurrected. He succeeded in reuniting many, though not all, PLO factions which had broken away in the aftermath of the Lebanon war. Under pressure from the Soviet Union, Algeria and South Yemen, the hard-line Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine rejoined the PLO. Only the Syrian sponsored forces of Abu Musa were now identified as “rejectionist.” By summer’s end, it appeared as if the PLO had agreed to allow Jordan to represent its interests in the peace process.

The U.S. commitment not to negotiate with the PLO drew fresh attention with the publication of a Foreign Affairs article by Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., the former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs. Atherton wrote:
A further factor complicating the U.S. role in the peace process has been a 1975 Memorandum of Understanding with Israel, committing the United States not to recognize or negotiate with the PLO unless it accepted Resolution 242 and recognized Israel’s right to exist. This commitment was subsequently interpreted by successive American administrations as barring even exploratory discussions with the PLO. This was not the original intent. As a result, the United States has effectively been prevented from opening a dialogue with Palestinians who, however much one deplores the advocacy of terrorism and the hard-line position toward recognition of Israel by elements of the PLO, are widely recognized as a necessary element in any solution to the conflict. . . .

It has long been my personal view that such a dialogue would have been an opportunity to exploit the latent divisions within the PLO, between those who advocate terrorism and reject the very idea of peace with Israel, and those who are prepared to take a more pragmatic and less extreme approach.

Atherton’s underlying assessment that “elements” of the PLO were prepared to pursue a pragmatic non-zero-sum mission (as distinguished from a tactical bluff) was representative of current thinking in the U.S. foreign policy community. However, the American Jewish leadership – including those who opposed the Likud Government’s policies – continued to lobby against dialogue until the PLO explicitly accepted the long-standing American conditions.

Inconclusive elections in Israel led to the establishment, in September, of a government of national unity (more in name than in spirit). Labor leader Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Shamir of Likud agreed to a rotating premiership. Peres would serve first for two years as Prime Minister with Shamir as Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. Labor’s Yitzhak Rabin would serve the full four years as Defense Minister. Henceforth, as Lewis recalls, Washington would be dealing with “two Israeli governments.” Peres favored accommodating Jordan’s need for an international peace conference, but only as a ceremonial fig-leaf for bilateral talks.

It was also election season in the United States as former Vice President Walter Mondale sought to capture the White House from President Reagan. Mondale challenged the President for conducting “400 hours of so-called unofficial talks with Yasir Arafat and the PLO.” Both men campaigned on anti-PLO and pro-Israel positions. During a debate of the Vice Presidential candidates, George Bush stated that a “solution to the Palestine question” was important because it could contribute to a reduction in international terrorism. In a pre-election appearance at Manhattan’s Park Avenue Synagogue, Shultz declared: “When Libya and the PLO provide arms and training to the Communists in Central America, they are aiding Soviet-supported Cuban efforts to undermine our security. . . . The terrorists who assault Israel . . . are ideological enemies of the United States.” As it turned out, 70% of the Jewish vote went to Mondale. Still, Reagan did fairly well in politically and socially conservative Jewish districts.

Mixed Messages

Peres paid his first visit to the U.S. as prime minister in October seeking additional aid. As was customary, he also met with the Jewish leadership. But the “national unity government” played havoc with the Jewish leadership’s efforts to discern a consistent Israeli line on the peace process. American Jewish leaders who looked to Jerusalem for an understanding of Israeli concerns discovered that the Government was of two minds on most important issues, including: the substance of the Arab-Israel conflict; the question of Arab moderation; the disposition of the Administered Territories, and whether the PLO was capable of going through a political metamorphosis. Peres was quoted in the Labor Party newspaper Davar as saying he was “prepared to enter negotiations with King Hussein without any preconditions.” Regarding Likud opposition he said: “If Herut [the main faction of Likud] joins in, that is all right; and if it does not, that is tough luck.” He added that since his taking office no new settlements had been established.

After his re-election, Reagan expressed optimism that moderate Arab states would soon move to negotiate with Israel. The President pointed to a meeting between Representative Stephen Solarz, a staunchly pro-Israel Congressman, and Iraq’s Saddam Hussein as indicative of the trend toward Arab moderation. The PLO itself, the President told an interviewer, was “now taking on the radical factions in their own midst that were pro-Syrian.” His liaison to the Jewish community, Marshall Breger, said the President’s second term would include no “surprises,” reminding an interviewer that Reagan had an “instinctive pro-Israel feeling.”

But Reagan’s optimism about PLO moderation seemed misplaced. At the PNC meeting held in Amman during November, the Palestinian Arabs again rejected U.N. Resolution 242 as a basis for peace. Moreover, they peppered their final statement with zero-sum rhetoric. The PNC called on “our countrymen in the occupied territory . . . from Galilee to Gaza . . . from Nablus to Jerusalem, from the Negev to al-Yarmuk,” to confront the U.S.-Zionist alliance. Disregarding the rhetoric, Jordan and Egypt issued a joint communique endorsing a role for the PLO in the peace process. A Wall Street Journal Op-Ed piece by editor Robert L. Bartley argued it was now clear that “the Arab world is suddenly undergoing an outburst of moderation” with Arafat, “striking an alliance with Jordan and the moderates.” Indeed, Egypt reportedly conveyed to the U.S. Arafat’s conditions for recognizing Israel. Regardless of anything that was said in the hall, the perception of PLO moderation was bolstered because several of its constituent groups (Habash’s PFLP for instance) boycotted the Amman session.

Out of the limelight, the U.S. continued its discreet contacts with the PLO. An aide to Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy met with PLO Executive Committee member Fhad Kawasmeh (head of the occupied territories department). Earlier, Arafat authorized Palestinian-Arab Americans to negotiate with the Administration on his behalf.

Perceptually, the coming to power of Peres legitimized a chasm already present in the American Jewish-Israeli relationship. Peres brought good news and new possibilities. He confidently affirmed that there was a road which would lead to an accommodation with the Arabs – including the Palestinian Arabs. It would require abandoning Judea and Samaria if the right mix of conditions could be achieved. Thomas L. Friedman, the Times correspondent, reported that after 100 days in office, “Peres has come to represent . . . the so-called old liberal Israel.” Abba Eban remarked that “Peres’ tone is pragmatic and down to earth. He doesn’t brandish the Holocaust or appeal to biblical roots when making a point. The national style has changed.”

V

Perceptual Framework

At Camp David, Begin displayed a readiness to offer the Arab residents of Gaza, Judea and Samaria local autonomy. His policy was not contingent upon a change in Palestinian-Arab intentions. It did not require Israelis or their American Jewish supporters to alter their calculations about long-term Arab objectives. Peres’ willingness to work toward a deal with Palestinian Arabs from both inside as well as outside the Territories (and indirectly with the PLO under the aegis of Jordan) was predicated on redefining the conflict in non-zero-sum terms. Indeed, the Peres approach partially codified a re-categorization of the conflict. The struggle was no longer total nor was there any doubt that, at its core, the dispute was between Israel and the Palestinians, not Israel and the Arab states. Ironically, the “Palestinization” of the conflict was further underscored after Israeli aircraft flew to Tunis to bomb the PLO headquarters.

Labor’s hold on the Prime Minister’s Office in the “unity” Government made life considerably easier (though hardly carefree) for the Jewish leadership, since they were no longer at constant odds with the Administration over the peace process. But Labor in power did raise psychological issues of political consequence. Elements in the community had become skillful at arguing Israel’s absolute military need to retain Gaza, Judea and Samaria. The America-Israel Public Affairs Committee often referred to a “secret study” conducted by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff which concluded: “From a strictly military point of view, Israel would require the retention of some captured territory in order to provide militarily defensible borders.” And, while “land for peace” and the “Allon Plan” were part of an earlier mantra, the prospect of actually turning over even parts of the West Bank to an Arab authority was worrisome. Still, through a process of cognitive dissonance they could reassure themselves that Peres surely knew more about West Bank security issues than they did.

Meanwhile, the Jewish leadership’s self-image called on them to continue to oppose the sale of U.S. weapons to Arab countries including Jordan as well as any change in U.S. policy toward the PLO.

Key environmental factors

The issue that dominated the year 1985 was a proposed international peace conference. How would a Palestinian-Arab delegation be comprised? What safeguards would prevent the conference from becoming a substitute for direct talks between the parties? How could Israel be sure that the other participants would not “gang up” on her? And how could all these obstacles be overcome without incurring a PLO veto? All the while, differences within the Labor-Likud coalition over the desirability and nature of a conference were exploited by all parties. Likud viewed an international conference as the death knell of the Camp David process.

To the consternation of Foreign Minister Shamir, the internal opposition now had an ally in Shimon Peres. They disregarded Shamir’s wishes and, with the tacit approval of Prime Minister Peres, engaged in diplomacy with Mubarak regarding Israeli security issues. The political backdrop also contained new hints of moderation from Arafat, as well as a terrorist outrage that captured world attention. IDF forces, meanwhile, were beginning their phased pull-out from most of Lebanon.

Two events having nothing to do with the PLO issue debilitated the leadership’s ability to influence the peace process. Jonathan Pollard, an American Jew who was an analyst with the Naval Investigative Service, was arrested and charged with spying for Israel. This re-opened the nightmarish issue of dual loyalty. Second, the community was traumatized over an internal rift on the “Who is a Jew?” issue.

Several actors gained prominence in the course of 1985. Peres replaced Shamir at center stage. Bialkin replaced Berman. In addition, Ted Mann and Henry Siegman presented the case for the internal opposition. This opposition was now directed at the Likud half of the government.

Israel gradually began to lose physical control over parts of the West Bank during this period. One of the unintended consequences of the Lebanon conflict was that it monopolized and drained Israel’s intelligence and security apparatus. The resources available for monitoring the Territories were curtailed. Moreover, Israeli intelligence suffered grievous losses as a result of car bombings in Lebanon. To complicate matters even further, hundreds of convicted terrorists were returned to Judea and Samaria in a prisoner exchange with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command. All this was in addition to the psychological signals the Arab residents of the areas were receiving regarding Labor’s interest in a partial pull-out.

* * * * *

Administration criticism of Israel’s West Bank policies was now largely aimed at hampering Likud and bolstering Labor. The rescue and re-settlement of Ethiopian Jews prompted the Administration to call on Israel not to settle the new arrivals on the West Bank. In Israel, meanwhile, the left accelerated its activities. Six left-wing activists met with Arafat in Tunis in February. Their return prompted a debate over whether they should be tried for endangering national security.

The prospect of an international conference dominated the peace process agenda. Utilizing political suasion, the United States was able to confine discussion to the nature of Palestinian representation at an international conference. This strategic choice selection made any Likud objections to the very idea of an international conference a non-sequitur.

Shamir was suspicious of Jordanian and PLO efforts to establish a joint delegation to the conference. Jordan and the PLO reached a breakthrough agreement on the make-up of a joint delegation in February. The King told Shultz that the PLO would be “out at the beginning and in at the end” if they accepted U.S. conditions for a dialogue. The Likud leader regarded these efforts as tactical machinations aimed at fostering contact between the PLO and the United States. Shamir complained that the Arabs were proposing an international conference to avoid direct bilateral talks. To allay some of Shamir’s concerns, Shultz offered written assurances that the U.S. would only talk to the PLO if it recognized Israel’s right to exist and accepted U.N. Security Council Resolution 242. The Israelis had also been told that the U.S. would insist on direct talks between Israel and the Arabs.

Allusions of Arab willingness to accept Israel’s existence continued to be part of the perceptual environment. Saudi King Fahd’s very presence at the White House, to hear Reagan announce: “The security of Israel and other nations in the region and the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people can and should be addressed in direct negotiations,” was deemed to be a conciliatory gesture. But Saudi radio said the visit “denies the Zionist lobby the opportunity of pressuring the American President for the benefit of the Israeli enemy.”

The Arab camp continued to lobby the U.S. for PLO inclusion in the peace process. Mubarak told a National Press Club gathering in Washington, D.C. that Arafat “is a very moderate man,” that the PLO “has now chosen the peace option,” and that the recent Jordanian-PLO pact was “unequivocal and unambiguous. . . . The principles embodied in the agreement are derived from . . . 242 and the Reagan initiative. What counts is substance not form. The said agreement leads inevitably to direct negotiations.” Still, Arafat continued to articulate a strident message to Arabic-speaking audiences. In March he declared: “My aim is to establish our political state on our Palestinian soil. . . . Let everyone hear me. Our land is Palestine and Jerusalem is our capital.”

Peres’ support for an international conference was conditioned on the idea that a largely ceremonial session would pave the way to direct bilateral talks. Both Peres and Shamir opposed PLO inclusion at an international conference (though with different degrees of intensity). Shamir was convinced that the Jordanian-PLO pact was a Trojan Horse. But King Hussein reiterated that Jordan would not participate in peace talks without the PLO. Moreover, Egypt and Jordan jointly called upon the United States to meet with the PLO.

Peres reacted to the Jordanian-PLO diplomatic maneuvers by offering to meet with a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation so long as it did not include Palestinian Arabs who were PLO members. The Reagan Administration took a similar line: a joint delegation would be unacceptable if it included members of the PLO. Understandably, Arafat denounced the American stance as hypocritical. “They called for an agreement between Arafat and King Hussein. But when we signed it, they asked us for more.” He insisted that the PLO would not accept “any conditions or limitations” on who could be sent to an international peace conference to represent the Palestinian Arabs. Though Egypt and Jordan asserted that Arafat had accepted U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Arafat refused to say so explicitly.

Problems with finding the right modalities for Palestinian representation did not alter the fact that the U.S. remained committed to a solution that involved an exchange of land for peace and bringing the Palestinian Arabs into the peace process. At the core, Shultz viewed “autonomy talks” over “self-rule” as “transition talks” to “emphasize that further changes and negotiations were to come.” State Department spokesman Bernard Kalb said that despite the findings of Meron Benvenisti’s West Bank Data Project regarding the large numbers of Jews already residing in Judea and Samaria, it was still not too late to turn the lands over to the Arabs as part of a peace agreement. In an effort to overcome the hurdle of Palestinian representation, Richard Murphy presented Jordan with a list of potential non-PLO Palestinian negotiators who would be acceptable to both the PLO and Israel. The list was said to be under study by the PLO Executive Committee meeting in Baghdad. Murphy then went on to Israel where he met with Peres and Shamir as well as Arab leaders in the Administered Territories.

The desire to bring the Palestinian Arabs into the peace process was tempered by Shultz’s genuine frustration with the PLO. At around the time when Murphy was in the Middle East, Shultz told the Annual AIPAC Policy Conference in Washington that: “Those who chased illusions of ‘armed struggle,’ those who engage in terrorism ... have only brought death to innocents and prolonged the suffering of the Palestinian people. Such methods have achieved nothing constructive, and never will.” But Arafat remained steadfast in rejecting Murphy’s idea of non-PLO Palestinian participation.

A derivative of the attention the Palestinian cause achieved was its new-found support within the American political system. This backing now came from outside the province of traditional supporters of the Arab cause. As the perceptual environment shifted, support for Arab rights was no longer equated with opposition to Israel’s existence. Groups of visiting Congressmen now routinely included a session with Arafat as part of their Middle East itinerary. House Majority Leader Jim Wright (D-Texas) told the National Association of Arab Americans (NAAA) that Israel and the Palestinians should mutually recognize each other.

Reflecting the perceptual environment, liberal Democrats, who had been staunch supporters of the Israeli line, now placed great emphasis on solving the Palestinian problem. By mid-1985 they took for granted that the Palestinian-Arab conundrum was at the core of the Arab-Israel conflict. It was now conservative Republicans who seemed more sensitive to Israeli concerns as articulated by the Likud. For instance, several conservative senators and congressmen signed on to a memorandum drafted by Americans For A Safe Israel (AFSI) and written on the stationery of Sen. Jessie Helms (R-N.C). Addressed to the President, the letter said:
We are disturbed by the apparent re-emergence of the doctrine of “exchanging territories for peace.” We believe that there are two key elements of equal importance to the permanent security of Israel. The first is the maintenance of defensible geo-strategic borders, and the second is the development of positive and trustworthy relations between Israel and her Arab neighbors. . . . We also suggest that Israel’s historical and legal claims to Judea and Samaria be considered in any peace proposal. Eliminating Israel in stages is a widespread concept in the Arab world. The current diplomatic activity among Arab states may be a sincere attempt to abandon that concept; such a change ought to be welcomed. On the other hand, the demand that Israel leave Judea and Samaria to Arab rule may only be a prelude to the step-by-step dismantlement of Israel.

In the face of overwhelming odds, the American Jewish right was in no position to redirect the peace process. AFSI remained a peripheral player on the margins of Jewish organizational life. It had decided not to apply for Presidents Conference membership, describing itself as a pro-Israel but not Jewish organization. With all its structural limitations, until the early 1990s, AFSI was virtually the only organized voice of the American Jewish right.

The Israelis were united against bringing the PLO into the peace process. To bridge the chasm over PLO participation at an international conference, American policy-makers turned to the Palestine National Council (PNC) as an alternative to the PLO. Theoretically, one could be a member of the PNC but not of the PLO. In practice, the relationship between the PNC and the PLO was symbiotic. It was the PNC Charter (revised in July 1968) which called for the destruction of Israel. But the approach was consistent with the Administration’s strategy of facilitating entry and participation of the Palestinians into the peace process. Even if the PNC issue could be resolved, the Arafat-Hussein pact made no reference to direct bilateral negotiations. Officially, the U.S. denied that playing the PNC card was a way around its commitment not to negotiate with the PLO.

Jewish Community Acquiescent

The response of the organized Jewish community to these events reveals both paralysis and acquiescence. Several of the more powerful groups associated with the Presidents Conference were irresolute about how to proceed. The AIPAC-aligned Near East Report editorialized: “Jerusalem has accepted a liberal interpretation of who is and who is not a PLO member and therefore unacceptable for negotiations. It does not oppose U.S. dealings with Palestinians (even Palestine National Council members) if they do not support the PLO charter’s goal of eliminating Israel. . . .” In fact, Jerusalem was skeptical of the PNC scheme. Shamir’s position was that Palestinian-Arab negotiators “should not be members of the PLO, either officially, unofficially, or clandestinely, and they should not receive orders from the PLO.” There were those in the Jewish community who believed allowing the PNC scenario to play itself out might illuminate whether there were indeed moderate elements within the Palestinian movement prepared to negotiate with Israel. But it quickly became clear that despite their corrosive personal and party differences, Peres and Shamir both, at this stage at least, opposed the drift in U.S. policy regarding the PNC and an international conference. Like Shamir, Peres saw Jordan’s call for an international conference as “nothing more than a device to evade direct negotiations with Israel.”

The Presidents Conference was apparently unable to formulate a consensus position on the PNC alternative. The Jewish right was incensed with the failure of the Jewish leadership to respond publicly and forcefully to the prospect of an international conference with PNC participation. In mid-May they organized a protest rally outside the New York offices of the PLO. Several hundred demonstrators mostly associated with Americans For a Safe Israel (AFSI) and the Jewish Defense Organization (a Jewish Defense League splinter group) participated.

But now Peres began to waver in his objections to PNC participation. Consequently, Israel no longer had a unified foreign policy position. The U.S. reiterated its willingness to meet with non-PLO PNC members in early June. Peres responded that he too was willing to meet a non-PLO Jordanian-Palestinian delegation and would not “search the mind” of each delegate regarding his sentiments toward the PLO. The State Department did stress that even if the PLO said the requisite “magic words” it would not dictate with whom the Israelis should negotiate.

With the U.S. apparently backpedaling from its “no talk” with the PLO policy, Congress passed legislation codifying the 1975 Memorandum of Understanding. The legislation banned negotiations by American officials with the PLO, “so long as [it] does not recognize Israel’s right to exist, does not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and does not renounce the use of terrorism.”

Peres and the U.S. Jewish leadership were concerned about the pressure Israel was coming under to bring the PLO into the peace process. But they were also fearful about the long-term consequences of appearing intransigent. With Reagan’s tacit encouragement, King Hussein used a visit to Washington, in early June, to press the case for PLO participation. Bialkin’s response was to telegram the President – not about the Administration’s support for the Hussein-Arafat alliance – but urging the U.S. not to sell advanced weapons to Jordan. Israeli Ambassador Meir Rosenne told a Jewish audience in New York that the PLO and the PNC were one and the same. Defense Minster Rabin cautioned a National Press Club gathering in Washington that: “The PLO represents a philosophy and policy contradictory to the very existence of Israel.” Plainly, the Israelis believed that once a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation was stitched together, U.S.-PLO talks would follow naturally in its wake.

* * * * *

Reagan offhandedly tied American support for Israel to the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 by Lebanese Shi’ite Arabs: “We seem to be a target also, I’m quite sure, because of our friendship and support of Israel.” Insinuating that the cost of U.S. support for Israel, especially an intransigent Israel, was excessive can be interpreted as a form of political suasion intended to capitalize on a crisis so as to extract concessions. If the American people were confused as to where to direct their wrath, columnist Richard Cohen of the Washington Post made it explicit: “The hijacking of TWA Flight 847 . . . can be traced to the establishment of the first Jewish settlements on the inhospitable dunes of what was later to become Tel Aviv.” The terrorists demanded the release of 700 prisoners being held in Israel in exchange for the safe release of the passengers. The incident generated reports, which the Presidents Conference denied, that the Administration had pressured the Jewish leaders to intervene with the Israelis.

Despite reaffirmation by American policy-makers throughout the early summer that they were set to use the PNC, as distinguished from the PLO, as a vehicle for Palestinian participation at an international conference, the Presidents Conference took no public position. Peres’ earlier hints about not delving too deeply into the past associations of potential delegates likely contributed to the leadership’s inertia. Confusing matters further, Peres joined Shamir in reiterating Israeli opposition to negotiating with PLO members. In mid-July, Shultz received a list of names reportedly submitted indirectly by the PLO for U.S. (and presumably Israeli) consideration. Peres initially rejected the list, then reversed himself and accepted two of the names. Obviously, this made any criticism of the Administration by the Presidents Conference impolitic.

Peres and Shamir, separately, lobbied Shultz on the composition of the joint delegation and sent conflicting messages as to how far Israel was willing to go to accommodate Jordan (which in turn was trying to oblige the PLO). Shultz dispatched Murphy to meet with members of the proposed Jordanian Palestinian-Arab delegation. But the August meeting never came off because King Hussein was adamant that an international conference, not direct bilateral talks, should follow any such meeting. At the same time most of the seven Palestinians on the list were openly identified with the PLO and Reagan insisted that the U.S. adhere to its “no talk” policy.

On the surface Labor and Likud were in agreement about excluding the PLO. They even cooperated on a Knesset bill explicitly barring contacts between Israeli citizens and the PLO. In practice, the parties were deeply divided. Though Labor was skeptical of PLO assertions of moderation, Peres stood ready to meet with pro-PLO Palestinian-Arabs who were not publicly tied to the PLO. He might criticize Arafat for “a double policy. Talk peace in Jordan, kill people in Israel.” But Peres hoped Arafat would not make the same mistake of Haj Amin al-Husseini (the Mufti of Jerusalem in the 1940s) who led the Palestinian Arabs away from coexistence. Likud’s stance was of a different order entirely. Shamir’s assessment was that the PLO was merely engaging in tactical maneuvers and that its incontrovertible raison d’etre remained “to wipe Israel from the map.” This cleavage obviously made consensus within the American Jewish leadership unachievable.

Israeli-PLO Contacts

The distinction between Israel’s willingness to deal with the PLO on such issues as the release of POWs while rejecting diplomatic contacts was sketched out earlier. In September 1985, a story circulated that Israel may have been on the verge of contacts with the PLO which straddled the functional-diplomatic divide. The account alleged that several years earlier Arie Marinski, a senior aide to Defense Minster Moshe Arens, planned to invite Issam Sartawi to Jerusalem for face-to-face talks on a prisoner exchange. The symbolic importance of having Sartawi visit Jerusalem for the talks, which could more easily have been conducted elsewhere, is readily apparent.

Shultz continued to signal the PLO that it could be part of the peace process if only it moved away from violence and met U.S. conditions. He repeatedly met with Hussein to see if some arrangement could be worked out, with or without the PLO, for Palestinian representation. On September 30th, he took the King to see the President:
The session was bizarre. The king again urged that the process go forward and said that if the PLO would not meet the U.S. conditions and thus could not participate, he would go forward without the PLO. Instantly, Jordanian Prime Minister Zaid Rifai raised a host of objections. I could see that there was no coherent Jordanian position and that there would not be one. We got nowhere.

Publicly, Reagan praised the King for “moving steadily and courageously forward in the search for peace.” During 1985, lack of coherence was not limited to the Arab side. Conflicting signals from Jerusalem and policy variations within the Jewish leadership contributed to ennui at the Presidents Conference. Opposition to the State Department’s focus on the Palestinian Arabs and the “land for peace” formula coalesced outside the Presidents Conference, mostly around Americans For A Safe Israel (AFSI).

Internal Opposition

With the Presidents Conference split on how to deal with the peace process, Likud critics took the political suasion initiative. NJCRAC’s Ted Mann and Henry Siegman of the AJCongress traveled to Cairo for talks with Mubarak. Shamir viewed the meeting as an effort by some Jewish groups to manipulate the direction of the peace process. Mann and Siegman were well known, at the Presidents Conference, for their criticism of the Likud line. Shamir’s wariness of the Jewish leaders was matched by his mistrust of Egypt. Mubarak had long been lobbying for PLO partnership in the peace process and his wooing of American Jewish leaders exasperated Shamir. But Peres, who likely gave tacit endorsement for the Cairo meeting, said nothing. The Presidents Conference had little choice but to ignore events in Cairo altogether. The only consensus it could muster was opposition to a newly proposed sale of arms to Jordan. Several days later, Mubarak assured Reagan that the PLO had already implicitly met American conditions for a dialogue and would go even further once negotiations started.

Tunis Raid

Peres was engaged in a political suasion game of his own as circumstances presented themselves. Earlier, he said he would not “search the minds” of prospective PLO-aligned peace conference delegates. He tacitly went along with Egypt’s efforts to co-opt the PLO into the peace process. But he could demonstrate toughness as well. In retaliation for the murder of three Israelis on a yacht in Cyprus and a steep increase in attacks in the Administered Territories, IAF jets raided the Tunis operations headquarters of the PLO, killing 30 to 50 terrorists and staff. Peres declared that the PLO would not be allowed to carry out terrorist attacks while talking about peace. The U.S. termed the raid “legitimate” and called for an end to the cycle of violence. A day later it called the attack “understandable.” The U.S. had encouraged Tunisia to accept some PLO personnel evacuated from Beirut in 1982. But it was not anticipated that the PLO would set up a headquarters for “terrorist operations.” Shultz recalls: “I wanted in some way to reach out to Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba and his government. When the inevitable resolution came up in the Security Council denouncing Israel, though having no practical effect, I was among those who recommended . . . that the United States abstain rather than veto the resolution.” Predictably, the Presidents Conference protested the United States abstention. Later, as a sign of even-handedness, the U.S., together with several Western allies, lobbied successfully to prevent Arafat from visiting the U.N. But American signals toward the PLO continued to be muddled. That same month, the Palestine Liberation Front, a PLO faction led by Abul Abbas, hijacked the Italian cruise ship Achielo Lauro. Reagan expressed the hope that the PLO itself would bring the hijackers to justice. Arafat, meantime, disassociated himself from the hijacking though his staff was able to help resolve it.

Peres continued to explore ways of accommodating a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation while opposing PLO participation. At a U.N. speech, he recommended that direct talks “be initiated with the support of an international forum.” Even as Likud ministers back in Jerusalem were denouncing Peres for making the speech without consulting the Cabinet, the Reagan Administration called Peres’ proposals “statesmanlike, thoughtful and forward-looking.” Hussein rejected the Peres overtures. But the King did call on the PLO to abandon its terrorist activities, saying terrorist attacks had been “terrible setbacks” in his efforts to include the PLO in the peace process. And, he reiterated that Arafat had to be part of any Middle East peace talks.

Labor-PLO Moving Closer

Without explicitly giving the Americans what they wanted, Arafat plainly tried to accommodate U.S. demands that he publicly renounce terrorism and accept Israel’s right to exist. In November 1985, with Mubarak at his side, Arafat condemned “All outside operations and all forms of terrorism.” But he said the PLO retained the right “to fight against Israeli occupation in all possible ways.” The State Department, understandably, found this commitment “inadequate” in meeting U.S. policy requirements for direct talks with the PLO.

By year’s end, it had become fairly well established that the Labor-Likud “marriage” was dysfunctional. Labor was now embracing an almost identical stance toward the PLO as the Americans. Peres was ready to settle for a temporary state of nonbelligerency with Jordan as an interim step; peace talks under international auspices; a Soviet role in the process; and the participation of PLO-aligned representatives whose ties to the movement would not be scrutinized. But Peres may have gone even further. Israel Radio reported that Peres had consented to allowing the United States to drop the criterion that the PLO accept Israel’s right to exist. He said Israel did not need the PLO’s approval for its existence. Observers pointed to the State Department’s most recent statement on the PLO, which listed three requirements: (1) acceptance of U.N. Security Resolutions 242 and 338; (2) abandonment of terrorism; and (3) readiness to negotiate with Israel. This apparent change in U.S. policy seemed to presage direct U.S.-PLO contacts. The United States responded to these hints, in its usual way, by denying a shift in policy. But clearly, something was afoot. Some days later, Peres expressed appreciation of Egyptian efforts to pressure the PLO into renouncing terrorism. Mubarak’s message to the Americans remained constant: “Like it or not” the PLO represents the Palestinians and should, therefore, be invited to participate in the peace process. Somewhat paradoxically, it was Shultz who criticized European countries for legitimizing the PLO before it formally changed its policies.

This was the political backdrop when a 75-member delegation from the Presidents Conference visited Israel early in December. But their focus was not on hints of a shift in U.S. or Labor policy. Much of their attention was directed at internal communal discord over the “Who is a Jew?” issue. Assistant Secretary of State Murphy was also in Israel, this time successfully meeting with nine Arabs from the West Bank and Gaza in fruitless pursuit of Palestinian-Arab participation in the peace process. The State Department downplayed Murphy’s meeting. There was no apparent reaction from the visiting Presidents Conference delegation regarding possible PLO connections of the nine. Upon his return to New York, at the end of the year, Bialkin simply made a broad plea for an end to the scourge of terrorism.

Dual-Loyalty and Jewish Insecurity

The arrest (and subsequent conviction) of Jonathan Jay Pollard, a Jewish navy counterintelligence analyst, and his wife Ann Henderson Pollard, on November 21, 1985 on charges of spying for Israel had profound consequences for Diaspora-Israel relations. Details of the case are provided by Emanuel A. Winston:
Pollard . . . had obtained and transferred to Israel such information as Arab troop movements; data on Libyan air defenses enabling Israel to bomb the PLO headquarters in Tunis; information and performance analysis of Soviet deliveries of military equipment to Arab client states; status of nuclear weapons being developed by Pakistan with funding from Arab states; location of Syrian and Iraqi poison gas facilities and sources of that equipment in West Germany, etc. (Pollard was motivated by ideological reasons, but later agreed to accept payment from the Israelis.). . .

The affair opened a virtual Pandora’s box. The possibility that as many as 40 Americans were suspected of spying for Israel over the years was rehashed in the media. Rumors of a wider conspiracy also continued to receive press attention. For many in the Jewish establishment, the Pollard case was, in the words of the AJCommittee’s Hyman Bookbinder, a “watershed event.” Jill Amy Higer, who studied the dual loyalty issue, writes:
Bookbinder feels the Pollard case raised some of the most critical questions first posed when Zionism was born regarding the relationship between a Diaspora Jew and an Israeli Jew.” “Up until Pollard we haven’t been compelled much to address this question,” writes Bookbinder. “We had some differences between us and Israel, but never before a situation where we were required to make a decision between loyalty to Israel and to America.” According to Bookbinder, the most disturbing aspect was Pollard’s insistence that he did it because he was a Jew and a friend of Israel and therefore it was somehow incumbent upon him to steal documents. In essence, he says, what Pollard’s defense suggests is that “if you are a Jew and a Zionist and a friend of Israel, it is incumbent upon you to do these anti-American kinds of things.” Moreover, Bookbinder feels this “logic” has caused many American Jewish leaders, who previously refrained from publicly dissenting on issues pertaining to Israel, to join in criticism. . . . With some hindsight, it appears that the Pollard affair may have had more of an effect on the relationship between the Diaspora and Israel than on the relationship between the Israeli and United States governments. Indeed, perhaps more than any incident in the past decade, the Pollard case served as a disturbing reminder of the endemic potential for tension between the American Jewish community and the State of Israel. Most seriously, the Pollard case once again raised the dual-loyalty specter.

In a poll taken in 1987, 54% of Jews and 34% of non-Jews said the Pollard spy case and Israeli involvement in the Iran-Contra scandal would cause anti-Semitism to increase in the United States. Commenting on these feelings of insecurity, Shlomo Avineri, former director-general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry and a Laborite, wrote:
In the Pollard case . . . a degree of nervousness, insecurity and even cringing on the part of the American Jewish community which runs counter to the conventional wisdom of American Jewry feeling free, secure and unmolested in an open and pluralistic society . . . we see some senior American Jewish leaders falling over each other in condemning Pollard and distancing themselves – and the Jewish community – from him. . . .

They would also have liked to distance themselves from being guardians of the 1975 “no talk” commitment. They were psychologically drained from the AWACS battle, Andrew Young Affair, Lebanon War and now the Pollard scandal. Jewish leaders sought to avoid confrontation with the Administration as best as they could. With a divided Israeli government sending equivocal often conflicting signals about PLO intentions and the future of the West Bank, the Presidents Conference was relegated to a static defense of the 1975 pledge.

VI

The Year of the non-PLO Palestinians

Perceptual Framework

Disraeli’s adage that “The secret of success is constancy of purpose” could hardly be attributed to the American Jewish leadership. But it very much describes PLO objectives during 1986. Their singular purpose was to block efforts aimed at circumventing the organization. Still, the PLO was not able to parlay worldwide support for the Palestinians into a place at the negotiating table.

For the Jewish leadership, the categorization of the conflict was now well established as non-zero-sum and rooted solidly in the struggle between the Palestinians and Israelis. The community remained indirectly influenced by the activities of the Israeli left which continued their periodic contacts with the PLO.

Self-Image

The Jewish leadership viewed its role as providing earnest support for Labor’s goals. Not since mid-1977 did they feel this comfortable championing the pro-Israel cause. With Peres’ ascendancy as prime minister they had renewed hope for improving Israel’s image and their own standing in the political system. The perception that most of the mainstream leadership held of the PLO was unchanged. Since it seemed that PLO intransigence was blocking progress toward conflict resolution, they embraced Peres’ maxim: “The PLO without a solution or a solution without the PLO.”

The political environment was dominated by persistent American efforts to demonstrate empathy toward the Palestinian-Arab cause, while maintaining a carrot-and-stick approach toward the PLO. “The Palestinian problem is more than a refugee problem,” the State Department typically declared, “there should be no confusion between Resolution 242 and the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.” In this context the leadership’s consistent goal was not to endorse, in broad strokes, the emphasis on the Palestinian angle. With a wink and nod from Labor they now positively supported the American approach. Peres endorsed a scheme for unilateral autonomy; Eban warned that the Administered Territories would become another Lebanon; and “secret” diplomacy between Labor and Jordan continued. None of this went far enough as far as the peace camp was concerned. Outside the Presidents Conference, left-wing activists engaged in an influential drive on behalf of PLO inclusion in the peace process regardless of whether it met U.S. conditions for a dialogue. From the opposite end of the Jewish political spectrum other considerably less influential activists lobbied against the American Jewish leadership’s shift toward Labor.

For the most part the central cast of characters remained the same. The most noteworthy change was that Morris Abram, whose philosophical ties were with the AJCommittee, became Presidents Conference chair. Also, Yehuda Hellman, the influential Presidents Conference executive director, died. A magazine, Tikkun, established itself as a wellspring for peace-camp and outside elite criticism of the leadership’s cautious embrace of the Palestinian cause. Tikkun advocated a direct PLO role in the peace process.

* * * * *

Following the line established by Peres, the Presidents Conference pursued meetings with U.S.-based foreign ambassadors to protest their countries’ embrace of the PLO. Overall, there was an essential harmony between the Presidents Conference stance and the position of the Administration. Early in the year, Reagan reiterated that the United States wanted a solution to the Palestinian problem but would not negotiate with the PLO. With no evident complaint from the Jewish leadership, the Administration, however, sought to refashion the PLO; to entice it into making the necessary concessions so that direct U.S.-PLO negotiations could commence.

It was precisely this willingness to embrace the non-zero-sum analysis that angered the American Jewish right. Opposition to Palestinian-Arab claims to Judea and Samaria, the idea of Palestinian centrality and the Administration’s disassociation policy, prompted Americans For A Safe Israel into launching a petition drive demanding that PLO officials be ousted from the United States.

Jordan’s announcement that Arafat had frustrated King Hussein’s efforts to bring the PLO into the peace process was received in Israel with relief. Despite his ostensible flexibility Prime Minister Peres articulated, in stark terms, the choice Israel was offering the Palestinians: “The PLO without a solution or a solution without the PLO.” Peres also chided the Americans for their efforts to coax the PLO toward the peace process as a “total failure.” He suggested that Israel might now go ahead with a “unilateral autonomy” scheme, but this was opposed by both Defense Minister Rabin and Foreign Minister Shamir of Likud.

American efforts to cajole the PLO into changing its position had largely been the work of Special Envoy Wat Cluverius, who held meetings in Jerusalem with Hanna Seniora and Faez Abu Rahma. They, in turn, reported to Arafat. The United States had conditionally invited the PLO to participate in the peace process if it accepted U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The PLO was also expected to forswear terrorism and agree to negotiate with Israel. This invitation was later clarified to include the proviso that Israel’s agreement would be needed before the PLO could participate in an international conference.

Even as the Administration proceeded with its efforts to bring Arafat to the peace table, some in the organized Jewish leadership were fruitlessly lobbying the Justice Department to indict the PLO leader on murder charges. Notwithstanding Jordan’s frustration with Arafat or the desire of Labor and the American Jewish leadership to find alternatives to the PLO, the U.S. courted PLO participation The State Department declared that, “The Palestinian problem is more than a refugee problem . . . there should be no confusion between Resolution 242 and the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.” Some Arabs saw the remark as linking the Palestinian-Arab cause with 242. The phrase “legitimate rights” is often interpreted by the Arab side as synonymous with the establishment of a Palestinian state though both the U.S. and Israel reject that inference. Other unofficial messages reinforced the perception that the PLO was a potentially suitable partner in the peace process.

Sanitizing the PLO’s image sometimes involved besmirching Israel’s. In March, one State Department official asserted that both the PLO and Israel were guilty of terrorism. Earlier, scholarly journals associated with the Palestinian-Arab cause had developed the idea of “state terrorism” to counter criticism of terror group violence. Still, American frustration with the PLO, publicly articulated, was now a regular feature of Administration policy. State Department spokesman Charles Redman complained that the PLO was responsible for the breakdown in the peace process even as, in Jerusalem, Murphy was holding meetings with PLO-aligned Arabs. There was a sense of frustration that, with Shamir set to take over the “unity” government for two years, time was running out on bringing the PLO into the peace process. According to Shultz, this frustration was shared by at least some in the pro-Israel community.
One of Israel’s most powerful and most articulate friends in Congress telephoned me. His words revealed the agonies that this moment brought forward. “It’s a critical moment,” he said. “The door will slam soon, and when it does, Israel is doomed. There are two years of the Likud ahead, and there’s no turning back. Israel either stops being a Jewish state or stops being a democracy – and either is a catastrophe.” The congressman said he hated the PLO but that we should tell King Hussein that if the PLO accepted the conditions, we would be ready to see them at the international conference. “The king can’t move without them,” he said. He urged that I give the PLO something on the self-determination issue by agreeing to the words within the framework of the PLO-Jordanian February 11, 1985, accord. “If I said this publicly, I’d have to resign,” he said.

U.S. policy remained remarkably consistent insofar as the West Bank was concerned: Israel was epected to give up the land. What would happen afterwards was less clear. The popular wisdom in 1986 was that, if some variation of a Jordanian-Palestinian solution could not be found, the area could come under Palestinian “functional autonomy.” This was the Peres-favored approach.

Disassociation, it will be recalled, required a strong U.S. commitment to Israel on non-West Bank security issues. Reagan’s assurances to Jewish leaders that the United States would not sell weapons to Arab countries that could threaten Israel’s security, should be seen as part of the disassociation framework. At the White House in March he told the Presidents Conference that Israel was “that lonely outpost of democracy in the Middle East.”

* * * * *

Notwithstanding his public stance, rumors circulated that Peres was exploring the possibility of contacts with the PLO. Some tied a Peres visit to Germany with Uri Avnery’s use of a German passport to enter Jordan for talks with PLO elements. Regardless of its veracity, the report must have left the U.S. Jewish leadership hesitant and uncertain. The non-zero-sum message permeated the political environment. Elsewhere, for example, a group of Palestinan Arabs said they would begin resisting the Israeli presence in the West Bank with a Gandhi-like campaign of non-violence. Then there was the suggestion by Morocco’s King Hassan that the Arabs select “someone” to meet with Israel (an overture Peres accepted).

There is a symbiotic relationship between Israeli and American Jewish public opinion on Arab-Israel security issues. But in the final analysis, only Israeli opinion can make a particular course of action kosher. If Israelis opposed retention of the Territories it made it that much easier and legitimate for American Jews to do so. Thus another influential signal was sent to American Jewry when Peace Now activists and West Bank Arabs rallied together in Hebron against retention of the Territories. That Peace Now and Labor now shared a close relationship was equally significant.

Eban’s Transformation

Within Labor there was, as has been noted, much negative talk about the PLO, out of frustration with its refusal to join the peace process more than anything else. “Peace without the PLO or the PLO without peace,” Peres had warned the Palestinian Arabs. But having determined that Israel would one day cede control over the land (in a form to be decided), the Arabs shrewdly took a wait-and-see approach.

The message that Israel would be best served by abandoning Gaza, Judea and Samaria was one that still had to be marketed to American Jewish audiences. They had been inculcated with the belief that secure and defensible borders were synonymous with retention of the Territories. Still, if Abba Eban, one of Israel’s leading statesmen and a popular figure with American Jewry, could change his mind so could most American Jews. Eban made the case that, given the large Arab population in the Territories, Israel could not afford to retain them. He stopped short of advocating talks with the PLO because the group had yet to publicly abandon its stand opposing Israel’s existence. Still, Eban told a gathering of major UJA contributors that the Areas could become another Lebanon. For many American Jews, Eban was the “voice of Israel.” His embrace of the non-zero-sum analysis, as well as his championing of the Palestinian cause, lent stature and legitimacy to the message. Eban’s shifting views are a microcosm of how changing perceptions can affect fundamental positions. This is illustrated by Robert St. John’s description of Eban’s meeting with LBJ on the eve of the Six Day War:
Eban opened by saying that Israel had never before had a moment like this. The country was in a state of anxious expectancy. He had come to discuss the question of the blockade, but meanwhile an even graver situation had arisen – the reports from Jerusalem – “a total assault on Israel’s existence.”

Gradually, but especially in the post-Lebanon era, Eban’s appraisal of the nature of the struggle altered dramatically. He wrote: “To be or not to be is not Israel’s question. How and what to be is the question. The existence of statehood was never the whole of the Zionist ambition.” In 1982 Eban, the affluent Stanley Sheinbaum of Los Angeles, and others established the International Center for Peace in the Middle East (ICPME). Embittered by the loss of his Knesset seat in 1988, Eban moved to a New York hotel and spends his time writing and lecturing in the United States. In Personal Witness published in 1992, after the opening of the Israel-Arab talks in Madrid, Eban wrote:
Sovereignty must be both respected and transcended. I suggest a community arrangement on the European or Benelux model under which Israelis, Jordanians and Palestinians could each enjoy independence in agreed territorial spheres. . . . A Palestine state that could do exactly as it liked would arouse serious reservations in all sectors of Israeli opinion. But a Palestine self-governing entity, perhaps confederated with Jordan, that would accept community constraints and a coordinated security policy would pose a lesser threat than Israel faces in the present volcanic situation. The idea that national freedom is indispensable for Bosnia Herzegovina while military rule is reasonable for the Palestinian people defies all logic. Since 1967 the issue has always been how to reconcile Israeli security with Palestinian freedom. This cannot be achieved without an integrative process in the relations between the peoples that inhabit the Land of Israel.

* * * * *

Peres worked feverishly, using “quiet diplomacy” with Hussein in an attempt to achieve a territorial accommodation for the West Bank. He dispatched Minister without Portfolio Ezer Weizmann, known for his “dovish” views, to meet with U.S. officials. These sessions were conducted without the presence of the Likud-appointed Israeli ambassador. All this in anticipation of October when the rotation deal called for Shamir to become prime minister and Peres foreign minister.

Yehuda Hellman

On May 18, the Presidents Conference suffered a major loss with the death of its top professional, Yehuda Hellman, at 66 years of age. Hellman had been with the Presidents Conference for 25 years serving as the group’s executive vice president.

In June 1986, Morris Abram was elected to head the Presidents Conference, replacing Bialkin. A former President of the AJCommittee and chairman of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry, the 68-year-old Abram had held a number of prestigious communal positions. Concurrently, the Presidents Conference replaced Hellman with Malcolm Hoenlein, the founding Executive Director of the Jewish Community Relations Council of New York (the main umbrella group for local New York Jewish organizations). Some weeks later Abram and Hoenlein flew to Israel for meetings with top government officials.

* * * * *

The Administration maintained its carrot-and-stick approach toward the PLO. Shultz made it clear that Arafat “should not come to the United States” to try to attend the U.N. Security Council debate set for late June.

Between Bad and Worse

The publication in Israel of Yehoshafat Harkabi’s influential Israel’s Fateful Hour presented supporters of territorial withdrawal, in both Israel and the United States where an English edition was brought out in 1988, with a cogent line of argument. A former chief of military intelligence, Harkabi began calling for the abandonment of Judea, Samaria and Gaza, in his words “the Zionism of acreage,” in 1982. In Israel’s Fateful Hour, Harkabi made an all-encompassing argument that crystallized the dangers of retaining Gaza and the West Bank. The subsequent English edition invited American Jewish criticism of Likud policies:
Israel must withdraw from the occupied territories with their growing Arab population. . . . The settlement of the conflict cannot be by symmetrical compromises, with both parties offering commensurate concessions, because the situation is asymmetrical: Israel dominates areas thickly inhabited by Palestinians. . . . Israel will inevitably have to negotiate with the PLO. There is no hope of a local Arab leadership distancing itself from the PLO. . . . By describing the PLO as a basically terrorist organization we criminalize it and thus, unwittingly, criminalize the whole Palestinian community. . . .

Jews in the West, particularly in the United States, should participate in this debate. They should not be squeamish and discouraged by the fear that the arguments they air may help their enemies or those of Israel. The choice facing them, as well as Israel, is not between good and bad, but between bad and worse. Criticizing Israeli policies may be helping the enemies of Israel and Jews in general, but refraining from criticism and allowing Israel to maintain its wrong policy is incomparably worse. . . .

I am frequently asked how and why my position has changed. My answer is that mostly it came as a result of changes in the situations and positions of the Arab states and of the Palestinian people and their leaders, rather than of any changes in my outlook. . . .

Jews, especially in the United States, are disposed to liberalism. When liberal public opinion is critical of Israel they experience a cognitive dissonance, and this gnaws at their Jewish identity. The future of the reputation of the Jewish people throughout the world now depends on Israel’s good name and international stature. More than any other state, Israel is a hostage to world public opinion. Israelis must remember this. We Israelis must be careful lest we become not a source of pride for Jews but a distressing burden. . . .

Israel faces a moment of truth, a fateful hour. My main message is this: let us think about our situation seriously. In Israel and in the Diaspora we need debate on the issues I have raised. I do not come to impose a line but only to propose one for consideration.

Tikkun

Tikkun magazine, founded in June 1986, answered Harkabi’s challenge. While virtually every Jewish periodical was of a liberal bent, Tikkun’s mission was unique. It was founded to challenge Jewish neoconservatives because, coincidentally, they served as the intellectual base for Likud policies in the United States. Journalist and political historian E.J. Dionne explains: “Neoconservatism represented the defection of an important and highly articulate group of liberals to the other side. Precisely because they knew liberalism from the inside, the neoconservatives were often more effective than the old conservatives at explaining what was wrong with the liberal creed.” The Public Interest was one of the most important neoconservative publications in the U.S. However, Tikkun’s grievance against the “neo-cons” was not rooted in the public policy arena but in the hills of Samaria and Judea. Toward that end, Tikkun set its sights on the other “neo-con” flagship publication and made its raison d’etre to be “an alternative to Commentary because Commentary was the spokesperson for the view that liberal politics were out of step and disloyal to the Jewish world.” Tikkun challenged Commentary’s realpolitik with unreconstructed liberal utopianism. Promotional material for the magazine explained: “Tikkun is a Hebrew word meaning: to heal, repair and transform the world.”

The glossy bimonthly magazine spanned divisions connecting a number of Jewish political camps: peace activists, elements of the internal opposition and some elements of the outside elite. Many of the people involved with the New Jewish Agenda and other groups favoring PLO participation in the peace process began to coalesce around Tikkun. The Tikkun coalition even included former opponents of the peace camp, people like Arthur Hertzberg, Albert Vorspan and Leonard Fein, who in earlier years had been critical of Breira (a precursor to the New Jewish Agenda and Tikkun ideology). Now, these players constituted the outside elite or (in Vorspan’s case) internal opposition and found common cause with other Jewish critics of Israeli policies. Tikkun challenged the Presidents Conference to openly criticize Israel’s policies. Its editor charged that Presidents Conference organizations “don’t even understand how out of touch they are because they surround themselves with people just like themselves. They have made their religion the religion of blind support for Israel.” Tikkun wrote: “Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza [is] immoral and stupid.” Most importantly, the coalition built around Tikkun gave the peace camp a desperately sought-after sense of legitimacy. The “silencing” of Breira and the New Jewish Agenda because of their radical views was gradually ending.

* * * * *

Political Clout

In the wake of the Pollard affair, U.S. investigators began probing separate allegations that Israel sought to purloin American cluster-bomb technology. Perhaps it was a sense that the Jewish community was under psychological siege that motivated Abram’s enigmatic allegations that “lower echelons” in the Administration were seeking to weaken the de-factor alliance between Israel and the United States.

Abram’s overall assessment of the political clout of the Presidents Conference was generally positive, though he was candid about its limitations:
The Presidents Conference is a collection of elected heads of American Jewish organizations. It takes its direction from them and tries to express the will and opinions of this community. The American Jewish community is a vital functioning of American democracy and it has a certain influence – as it should have – upon American policy makers. It is not pretentious enough to say it’s a shaper of policy, but it adds its influence to elements that shape policy. It does it openly, as others do in a free society. The Presidents Conference has some influence, for instance, in shaping of the ultimate arms-package to Saudi Arabia recently. But we were not the sole shapers of the policy. There were scores of senators and congressmen who joined believing that certain weapons, such as the Stinger missiles, should not be sold to the Saudis out of fear that they might end up in the hands of terrorists.

Palestinian Aspirations

The well-entrenched policy of offering vague-sounding symbolic statements intended to assuage unease within the pro-Israel community while maintaining an overall strategy aimed at satisfying Arab aspirations for Israeli withdrawal from the territories captured in the 1967 Six Day War was maintained. In early August, for instance, Vice President Bush said that he did not want to see Jerusalem divided. Actually, the U.S. consistently opposed Israeli sovereignty over any part of Jerusalem (including pre-1967 West Jerusalem) in the absence of Arab acquiescence. During his visit to Jerusalem Bush met privately with Palestinian Arabs. He reiterated long-standing U.S. conditions for bringing the PLO into the negotiating process. Bush said that “negotiations must take into account the security needs of Israel, the security needs of all other states in the region and the aspirations of the Palestinian people.” Bush was not alone. Dovish elements within the Labor Party led by Secretary General Uzi Baram were also calling for Palestinian self-determination. Peres was slightly more circumspect but his goal was to turn over administrative control of Judea and Samaria to Arab authority.

Labor elements and American policy emphasized the Palestinian issue, while using the Jordanian option to circumvent an intransigent PLO. Israel and Jordan were supposedly working together to diminish PLO influence in the West Bank. Meanwhile, U.S. officials were, for the first time, funneling $4.5 million in aid for West Bank Arabs through Jordan. Jordan’s own see-saw relationship with the PLO was on the upswing. King Hussein allowed some of the 25 PLO offices he had ordered closed only weeks earlier to resume operations. Peres made it clear that he could be persuaded to attend an international conference with (non-PLO) Palestinian participation, adding that this did not imply acceptance of Palestinian statehood. Shamir, due to become Prime Minister in a matter of weeks, emphasized his opposition to an international conference. Naturally, in this atmosphere, the Presidents Conference had no interest in challenging the direction of the U.S.-led peace process.

Arafat announced, somewhat disingenuously, that Israel need not turn over the West Bank and Gaza directly to the PLO. He recommended that Israel relinquish the area to the U.N. which would then presumably hand it over to the PLO. Arafat explained his tactics to an Arab-language publication: “Sometimes we deem it necessary to intensify our military action and on other occasions we might deem it necessary to intensify our media campaigns, political action, or diplomatic efforts according to the circumstances and the stages of our struggle.”

That despite concerted American efforts to woo the PLO into the peace process, Arafat continued to insinuate a zero-sum approach to the conflict, continued to frustrate the Administration. As a confidence building measure, the Carter Administration decided in 1978 to allow the PLO to maintain its Palestine Information office (PIO) in Washington, D.C. The PIO was funded by the PLO in violation of the Foreign Agents Registration Act. In early October 1986 Edwin Meese, Counselor to the President, told the Presidents Conference that the Justice Department was “probing” the situation. Ultimately, the State Department concluded that keeping the PLO office open did not conflict with the country’s opposition to terror or its official policy regarding contacts with the PLO. The intelligence community reportedly urged the Justice Department to allow the office to remain open rather than go underground. A State Department spokesman explained that in any event: “The PLO is an umbrella organization which includes some terrorists and some organizations that foster terrorism, but also includes the Palestinian version of the Red Cross and a bar association.” In the American analysis the PLO revealed both “violent” and “diplomatic” elements. So, for instance, after a PLO attack against IDF soldiers and their families attending a ceremony outside the walls of the Old City of Jerusalem (the father of one of the soldiers was killed and 69 others were injured), the State Department criticized: “All those elements in and out of the PLO who have asserted responsibility.”

Intellectuals on the Israeli left did not share U.S. and Labor Party reservations about open dealings with the PLO. Arafat’s refusal to formally embrace a non-zero-sum stance was written off as a self-imposed and inconsequential stumbling block. A delegation of Leftists traveled to Bucharest, in November, for a symposium which included members of the PLO. Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu’s efforts to orchestrate “a larger political context” did not succeed. Nevertheless, the brief session further bolstered the perception that the struggle had entered a radically new phase. The sense that times were changing was further underscored when two PLO supporters appeared on Israel television to condemn the stabbing of an Israeli civilian.

Insecurity

American Jewish insecurity made it that much more unlikely that U.S. policy on the Palestinian Arabs would be challenged. Labor Party and State Department policies appeared, at any rate, to be in sync. And the leadership was in no position to do anything but swallow its doubts about Palestinian intentions. American Jews had their own problems. If their self-confidence had been shaken in 1985 by the Pollard affair, 1986 left the community reeling not only from the Iran-Contra affair but also from the Ivan Boesky humiliation. As the American Jewish Year Book explains: “Another concern was potential anti-Semitism. Earlier in 1986 New York City had been rocked by political scandals involving Jewish officeholders. There was fear that Boesky’s downfall, by attracting even more attention to Jewish dishonesty in the metropolis, might provide potent ammunition to bigots, especially in the South and West, who were predisposed against big cities, Jews, and Wall Street.”

Ending With Disassociation

At year’s end, the U.S. abstained as the U.N. Security Council condemned Israel for its handling of a new outbreak of West Bank violence. Defense Minister Rabin complained that media depictions of the violence were skewed ignoring the fact that the PLO had incited the violence. But the United States was not interested in the origins of this latest cycle of violence. For American policy makers the only possible solution remained Israeli withdrawal.

VII

Perceptual Framework

Nothing much changed with regard to the categorization of the conflict during 1987. The perception of the struggle remained well-entrenched along non-zero-sum parameters. Belief that the conflict was communal driven was widely embraced.

The Presidents Conference, under Abram’s leadership, was reticent in its public statements on the Palestinian issue. No doubt many in the Presidents Conference hoped Peres would somehow find a modus vivendi with the Palestinians regardless of Likud objections. Others, such as the Anti-Defamation League, wanted to leave the entire matter to the Israelis themselves. The dominant American Jewish-PLO milestone was a meeting held between Arafat and a peace camp delegation (comprised of Jerome Segal and several New Jewish Agenda activists) in Tunis.

An alternative Jewish self-image had begun to emerge. Outside the Presidents Conference, the peace camp took a proactive stance. They too actively supported Labor’s flexible approach to the peace process. But they felt Labor was not going far enough. Segal’s Arafat meeting was intended to pave the way for Israel-PLO talks by breaking down psychological barriers and “de-demonizing” Arafat. Even beyond the peace camp there was a sense that Arab intentions were truly changing. Where there is smoke there is fire. The sheer number of hints of Arab moderation was encouraging.

Despite their keen interest in facing up to Palestinian aspirations, the internal opposition, mimicking Labor, was by no means ready to embrace the PLO. In this they had an ostensible ally in Shultz.

Also, with Labor’s tacit endorsement, the internal opposition became increasingly outspoken. The conflict had robbed Israel of its splendor, they complained. At year’s end, when the Intifada erupted, their hope was that the crisis atmosphere would force Israel to pull out of Gaza, Samaria and Judea.

The cognitive consistency to which much of the Presidents Conference affiliated Jewish leadership adhered held that Israel’s survival, while vitally important, was less and less in doubt. What they doubted was whether Israel would continue to embody liberal values. Increasingly, they worried aloud that the Jewish State would become a semi-theocratic garrison state. Far from harming Israel, they told themselves, their criticism of its West Bank policies was helping to save it. This cognitive dissonance was fed by the divisions within the Israeli polity.

With Labor backing, the Presidents Conference held fast to the consistent goal of supporting the direction of the U.S. led peace process. In this they were opposed by the peace camp which was lobbying for unconditional PLO inclusion. The leadership, however, steadfastly opposed U.S. talks with the PLO until it met the 1975 conditions. Opposition from the Jewish right, though nettling, came almost exclusively from outside the Presidents Conferrence.

Environmental factors

The progressive shift in perceptions can be attributed to a variety of factors. Arab states expressed a willingness to enter into indirect talks with Israel through an international conference; Labor Party luminaries, such as Abba Eban, began a dialogue with PLO-aligned Arabs in Israel giving impetus to similar efforts by others in Israel and abroad; even Likud figures engaged in talks with PLO-aligned Arabs. In this context, it became ever more untenable to hold the PLO in the odium of past years or to argue that the rules of the game had not changed.

The Israeli government was bitterly fragmented, with Labor and Likud factions sending conflicting signals. Plainly, the Israelis were unable to articulate a consensus position on the Palestinian issue and this greatly affected the American Jewish leadership. It certainly left the consensus-dependent Presidents Conference immobilized and opened the door to further fragmentation. A number of leading constituent groups within the Presidents Conference openly split with Shamir and were supporting Peres’ initiatives aimed at bringing about an international conference. Peres argued that a conference would serve as a stepping stone for direct talks with the Palestinians. If Peres did not seem overly concerned about the nature of that representation (though he paid lip service to excluding the PLO), then why should the Jewish leadership? They shared Peres’ confidence that if the agenda and modalities could be controlled, the risk of a Palestinian-Arab state emerging from the talks would be reasonable.

The political agenda had been set. The tough stance taken by the United States against unconditional PLO participation, combined with Labor’s embrace of Palestinian centrality, pre-empted the Presidents Conference from lobbying on the issue. Another Jordanian-PLO rapprochement during the year made a mockery of the idea that the PLO could be excluded from peace-making scenarios.

Several unfamiliar actors, whose activities will be explored in the pages to follow, came to prominence in 1987. They included: Jerome Segal, Charlie Biton and Moshe Amirav. Others, including Ted Mann, Uri Avneri, and Alexander Schindler, reprised their roles.

International Conference

America’s peace process strategy remained the same: to facilitate the entry and participation of the Palestinian Arabs (perhaps the PLO) into a conflict resolution framework. The mission was to bring about an end to the Arab-Israel conflict. As Shultz tells it, he began to crystallize in his own mind what an ultimate solution would look like:
By early 1987, I had become more convinced than ever that the most promising way to approach the Palestinian-Israel conflict lay in some form of shared, overlapping, or interwoven sovereignties across Israel, the West Bank, and Jordan. . . . So, with this endgame in mind, I felt the idea was to figure out what interim steps would best get the parties there. . . . The process would start with an international conference, as King Hussein insisted. That was a way to give the king the legitimacy taken from him by the Arab decision at Rabat that gave the PLO the role of representing the Palestinians. . . .

This approach was anathema to Likud and its splintered advocates in the United States. Shultz was determined to circumvent Shamir and work with Peres. In this he had the tacit support of the Jewish leadership. Once the details were in place, Shamir would come under withering pressure to acquiesce. With Peres abandoning Israel’s long-standing demand for direct negotiations, Shamir’s stance appeared petulant and intransigent. Meantime, former President Carter visited the region and announced that both Syria and Jordan were ready to discuss peace with Israel within the framework of an international peace conference. In Israel, Carter scolded those who wanted to retain Judea and Samaria.

Under Peres’ leadership, the Israeli Foreign Ministry sought to interest the United States in providing economic aid to the West Bank in order to promote non-PLO elements. But the idea that, once the Palestinian cause was embraced as the crux of the Arab-Israel conflict, you could then address the problem while bypassing the PLO was self-delusion. The political culture of the region simply did not allow it. The Egyptians recognized this and continued to champion PLO participation. The Jordanians, who had expelled the PLO leadership when the Arafat-Hussein talks collapsed, rehabilitated their ties with the PLO. Jordan and the PLO consulted on how to spend $9.5 million, in mostly Saudi money, earmarked for the Administered Territories.

Within the American political system, support for Reagan Administration Middle East policies was generally high. However, Senator Robert Dole (R-Kan.), contemplating a race for the White House in 1988, called on the Administration to close the PLO offices in the capital: “It’s outrageous that this terrorist organization – which is out to destroy the State of Israel – can operate freely here.” On the whole, championing Israel’s cause resulted in serious political costs to the Jewish establishment. Earlier in the year, for instance, Jewish-Catholic relations were strained by Archbishop of New York John Cardinal O’Connor’s refusal to meet with Israeli leaders while on a visit to Jerusalem. The Pollard issue would not go away. Jonathan Pollard was sentenced to life in prison in March. Meanwhile, a U.S. federal grand jury indicted an Israeli colonel, Aviem Sella, for “running” Pollard.

In March, a Presidents Conference delegation returned from a visit to Israel with, in the words of a press statement, “a deeper understanding of Israel’s actions and motives concerning a number of vexing issues.” What the leaders may have understood better than before was that not only were Israelis profoundly divided, Labor’s approach to an international conference was an example of how it was making strategic choices intended to force choices. Laborite Abba Eban joined Hanna Seniora, a pro-PLO Palestinian, in issuing a call for an international conference. Meanwhile, Peres explored the concept with Soviet and Palestinian-Arab observers at the Socialist International meeting in Rome. Still, Peres was not yet ready to make the leap to unconditional PLO participation. He and Shamir appeared to be united against a PNC/PLO role. Egypt’s request that Israel allow 52 members of the PNC to attend a council meeting in Algiers was, therefore, promptly rejected.

Many in the labyrinth that is the PLO feared that perception of moderation might become a self-fulfilling prophesy. On April 18, the PNC met in Algeria to discuss PLO-Jordanian cooperation on joint representation. Opponents successfully challenged Arafat’s tactics of having the PLO take a back seat while Jordan ostensibly represented Palestinian interests. Ultimately, the PLO Executive Committee renounced the 1985 agreement with Jordan on pursuing a joint diplomatic effort. Internal harmony (Abu Nidal was rumored to have attended) came at the expense of PLO moderation. State Department disappointment was palpable. While in no way diminishing Palestinian centrality, the State Department would not yield on conditions for PLO participation. Murphy cautioned that the peace process should not be hostage to the PLO’s internal politics.

All this followed a secret meeting in London (behind Shamir’s back) between Peres and King Hussein (Shultz’s representative Wat Cluverius was in London as a facilitator). Shultz relates what Peres aide Yossi Beilin told him about the session:
The two had agreed . . . that the Secretary-General of the United Nations would invite the permanent members of the Security Council . . . and the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict to negotiate . . . based on . . . 242 and 338. . . . The conference would invite the participants to form geographical, bilateral committees to negotiate the issues between them. . . . Palestinian issues would be dealt with in the committee of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation and an Israeli delegation; participation in the conference would be based on the parties’ acceptance of 242 and 338 and the renunciation of violence and terrorism. . . . Hussein had taken a tough line on the PLO. He said the PLO would fall into line when it saw the process going forward without it. . . .

On April 20, Peres finally told Shamir about the secret London meeting. Shamir aide Eli Rubinstein later explained to Shultz that in Shamir’s view, if the U.N. was involved the PLO would be involved. “This international conference has become a passion. He is utterly against it.”

* * * * *

In the U.S. Congress, meantime, Representative Jack Kemp (R-NY) led an effort to close the PLO offices in the United States under the federal anti-racketeering law (RICCO). These offices were the PLO Information Office in Washington, officially registered with the Department of Justice, and its New York U.N. Observer Mission opened as a result of U.N. General Assembly’s Resolution 3237 inviting the PLO to participate in U.N. activities.

Shultz also took a tough line toward the PLO. In a fiery address before the Annual Policy Conference of AIPAC, in May, he ruled out PLO participation in the peace process:
Shultz: So you have to look for people who are qualified and ready, so let’s ask a few questions. Is the PLO qualified?

Audience: No.
Shultz: Hell, no! Let’s try that on for size. PLO?
Audience: Hell, no!
Shultz: You got it! Look at what they’ve just done. Their alliance involves the most violent and radical elements around, and they just put it together again. They showed once again that they don’t want peace; they want the destruction of Israel, so they’re not qualified.

Palestinians? Certainly. They have to be part of peacemaking. There are Palestinians who know that the only answer is through a non- violent and responsible approach to direct negotiations for peace and justice. We have to continue to find them, help them, and support them.

Shultz skillfully blended an anti-PLO message around a pro-Palestinian theme. Against Shamir’s wishes, the United States would continue to “explore the feasibility of a Mideast conference.” Taking a page from Peres, with whom he met privately at the AIPAC Conference, Shultz explained that the international conference was the framework, but “the name of the game is direct, face-to-face negotiations.”

The cleavages within the “unity” government influenced the actions of American Jewish leaders. Their sympathies lay squarely with Peres and Shultz. The American Jewish Committee commissioned another Steven M. Cohen survey and found, not surprisingly, that American Jews were now more willing to criticize the Shamir Government. Moreover, the emergence of a legitimate internal opposition was now a fait accompli. Thus criticism of Israeli policies among Presidents Conference leaders became commonplace. Malcolm Hoenlein, Executive Director of the Presidents Conference, suggested that this willingness to side with Labor over Likud represented “a maturation of the relationship.” This maturation was exemplified in various spheres. David Arnow, who broke with UJA to establish the New Israel Fund, said that like many Israelis, he found the Jewish State to be a “very complicated, very divided, very troubled place.” For Rabbi Wolf Kelman, a leader of the Conservative wing of Judaism, the ennui resulted from Israel having been “de-charismatized.” Kelman said: “It didn’t happen overnight. It’s a process that’s been happening since the Yom Kippur War. I would date it to that period, in 1973 and ’74, when Golda Meir’s omnipotent Israel collapsed.”

These statements must be understood in the context of what was happening on the ground. While hardly a day since 1967 passed in absolute peace, by mid-1987 smoldering violence, rioting and unrest became increasingly common in the Arab neighborhoods of Jerusalem and in the Territories. This violence reinforced the view among Israel’s American Jewish critics that the occupation had to end.

Chapter 8 The Inexorable Momentum of the Reagan Years 1981-1988 part 1

2008-08-21T07:13:00.001-07:00

Chapter 8

The Inexorable Momentum of the Reagan Years
1981-1988

Israel has never had a greater friend in the White House than Ronald Reagan. . . . Yet, the atmosphere of American relations underwent a change. Israel came under unprecedented and sometimes exasperated public criticism from officials of the Administration. The power of Israel and its friends to influence American policy in the Middle East weakened. . . .
-- Alexander Haig

Ronald Reagan, viscerally pro-Israel, could have been the one president able to redirect the U.S.-led peace process away from its focus on the Palestinian Arabs. Instead, he embraced Jimmy Carter’s legacy of disassociation with a pliancy that was astonishing. Dazed and worn out, the Jewish leadership offered virtually no opposition when his State Department maneuvered the PLO into saying the “magic words” recognizing Israel and forswearing terror. Providence ordained that, in the final days of Reagan’s second term, a formal U.S.-PLO dialogue was authorized. This historic action codified a redefinition of the nature of the Arab-Israel conflict.

An interest group cannot be expected to influence policy when it is made politically frail by internal divisions and required to operate in a politically inhospitable environment. Ravaged by cleavages and obliged to champion the “no talk” issue whose fundamental raison d’être was made moot by changing events, the U.S. Jewish leadership was completely out-maneuvered by a focused and determined Administration. The irony was that elements in the Jewish leadership played a critical role, throughout the Reagan years, in paving the way for a U.S.-PLO dialogue.

I

This section identifies instances of political suasion and other episodes in the political environment during 1981 which contributed to a perceptual shift on the part of the Jewish leadership. Examined by the American Jewish leadership from this vantage point, the conflict remained in transition though now more non-zero-sum than total and more Palestinian versus Israel than Arab versus Israel. The Jewish self-image was that of a liberal Jewish leadership constrained to defend a hard-line “right wing” Israeli Government, while contesting plans by a conservative Republican President to sell lethal weapons to Israel’s Arab enemies. Their image of the Arabs was also in flux: Egypt had exchanged de jure peace in return for Israeli-held land. The Saudi regime accelerated its public diplomacy which hinted at a willingness to embrace a non-zero-sum approach. The consistent goal of the Jewish leadership was to see progress in the West Bank Autonomy talks. In addition to opposing arms sales to the Arab countries, they consistently pressed the U.S. to adhere to its 1975 policy toward the PLO. With equal constancy, they loathed Begin’s personality and held his policies in disdain.

Joseph Polakoff, the veteran Jewish Telegraphic Agency journalist, identified disassociation as a guiding mechanism of American policy in the Carter years. He did so before it became evident that Reagan would pursue much the same strategy. The essence of disassociation was encouraging Jewish support for American (and Israeli) pressure aimed at forcing Israel to disgorge the West Bank. Polakoff traced the policy to Professor Ian Lustick, who worked briefly at the State Department on Middle East issues in 1979-1980:
Lustick plainly called for the U.S. to treat Israel with disdain. “A policy of steady, public, convincing disassociation from Israel’s policies toward the West Bank and Gaza” would help an “international political context supportive of elements in Israel that already are or will be aware of the necessity to reach a political accommodation with Palestinians.” He did not identify those elements. “A policy of disassociation rather than mediation or pressure,” he said, “would help the growing numbers of those both in Israel and in the U.S. Jewish community, who are striving to frame Israel’s choices in a way that focuses attention on the long-term costs of fulfilling maximalist ideological commitment. “Under the policy of “disassociation,” Lustick wrote, “the U.S. would continue current very high levels of military and economic aid to Israel but would publicly, concretely and regularly express its opposition to settlements, land expropriation, deportations, seizure of water sources, annexation of East Jerusalem, or any other aspects of the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza reflecting Israel’s ambitions that go beyond insuring order and security.” Like other Administration articulations legitimizing the PLO, Lustick suggested altering Camp David provisions because the peace processes “weaken U.S. credibility in the Arab world” and “an atmosphere develops in which Syria, Saudi Arabia and the PLO become less convinced of the possibility of a political accommodation with Israel.”2

It is debatable whether Lustick did any more than give coherence to a policy that had been desultory and incremental since Kissinger’s days and had simply matured under Carter. It is significant that Reagan’s State Department pursued much the same policy. To be sure, there were differences in nuance as well as substance as a result of the Administration’s early emphasis on the global context of the Arab-Israel conflict.

Carter’s defeat at the polls was seen as a deliverance from heaven for many in the pro-Israel community even if they found Reagan’s conservatism anathema. “Carter saw Israel through the warp of biblical history and the weft of hard-ball Jewish domestic power,” Samuel W. Lewis explains.3 Had he been re-elected, Carter would have had a free hand to impose his own solution to the Palestinian problem. Even outside of government, many Carter Administration officials persevered as staunch advocates of the Palestinian cause. Hermann Eilts, former Ambassador to Egypt, called for “open [emphasis added] U.S. contacts with the PLO leadership,” so as “to gauge whether the PLO would be willing and able to participate responsibly in broader peace negotiations.”4

But expectations that a Reagan White House would turn the tables on the State Department and reverse U.S. policy toward the PLO were dashed, when Secretary of State-designate Alexander Haig told The New York Times that: “One must be careful in the use of the term PLO. The PLO is an organization made up of elements with various interests. Some are just and reasonable while others are obviously dominated by the East financially as well as ideologically.5 John West, whom Carter had appointed Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, criticized the policy of not talking to the PLO (though the State Department spokesman said that West was speaking for himself).6 A more significant policy clue was the retention of Harold Saunders as Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs. Saunders had helped both Kissinger and Vance formulate a policy grounded in the “legitimate rights” of the Palestinians.7

There were many in the Jewish leadership who were crestfallen by the election of a conservative President. On the assumption that this might mean less pressure on Israel to abandon Judea, Samaria and Gaza, Edgar Bronfman of the World Jewish Congress warned Isarel not to expect “blind support” from world Jewry.8 Regardless of any discomfiture with Reagan, an unreformed PLO remained the central nemesis of the Jewish establishment. Growing acceptance of the importance of the Palestinian problem did not translate into a readiness to embrace the PLO as a peace process participant. In an effort to ascertain how far U.S.-PLO ties had developed under Carter, the American Jewish Congress, meantime, filed a Freedom of Information (FOIL) request with the federal government searching for documents relating to the PLO.9

Despite mixed signals from the Administration there were indications that Israel would enjoy a less strained relationship with the Reagan White House. That Haig would continue the policy of not dealing with the PLO while it advocated “views incompatible with the peace process” was hardly revolutionary.10 As with previous Administrations, U.S. policy would be to “neither recognize nor negotiate with the PLO for as long as they refuse to accept the provisions of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 and other U.N. resolutions.”11 But there was an evident change in tone. First, the Secretary publicly linked the PLO to Soviet support for terrorism.12 More significantly, Reagan’s perception of the essential nature of the Arab-Israel conflict and his views about Jewish rights to the Land of Israel were decidedly opposite those of Carter.
As to the West Bank, I believe the settlements there – I disagreed when the previous Administration referred to them as illegal, they’re not illegal. . . . I do think, perhaps now with this rush to do it and this moving in there the way they are is ill-advised because if we’re going to continue with the spirit of a Camp David, maybe this, at this time, is unnecessarily provocative. . . . I know that’s got to be a part of any settlement. I think in arriving at that, here again, there is the outspoken utterance that Israel doesn’t have a right to exist; there is the terrorism practiced by the PLO. I never thought that the PLO had ever been elected by the Palestinians. Maybe it is recognized by them as their leadership, but I’ve never seen that that’s been definitely established. But, again, it starts with the acceptance of Israel as a nation.13

Presidents Conference Meets Waldheim

The Presidents Conference turned its attention to the United Nations where the PLO’s international standing continued on the ascendant. In a two-hour meeting with U.N. Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, a delegation from the Presidents Conference, led by Chairman Howard Squadron, cautioned Waldheim that the pro-Israel community in the United States was growing increasingly disenchanted with the world body.14 But the United States faced countervailing international pressure from Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, who urged policy makers to use the PLO to induce Lebanese hostage-takers to release their captives.15

Settlements “Unhelpful”

If Reagan did not personally believe that Jewish life in the Administered Territories was “illegal,” the State Department swiftly convinced him that it was “unhelpful.” The strategy of the United States was to facilitate the entry and participation of the Palestinians (the PLO under the right circumstances) into the peace process. That had not changed. The U.S. still wanted to keep the door open to the possibility of an exchange of West Bank land for a commitment of peace. Understandably, therefore, the U.S. opposed actions by Israel which would diminish the prospects of such an exchange. In February 1981, the State Department strongly criticized Israeli settlement activities as “unhelpful.” The statement stopped short of embracing the Carter-line that they were also “illegal.”16 Yitzhak Shamir, the Foreign Minister, rebuffed the American criticism. But there is little doubt that the American Jewish leadership was growing weary of the bickering. The Jewish leadership’s overall assessment of the Arab-Israel struggle was undergoing an incremental deviation from Israel’s appraisal.17

Any resemblance between Reagan and Carter Administration policies was offset by the new Administration’s willingness to move away from an exclusive focus on the Palestinian Arabs. In contrast to Carter who was riveted to it, Haig de-emphasized the Palestinian issue. Soviet expansionism in the Middle East was the focus of American policy; the Arab conflict with Israel, a sideshow. As Lewis points out, “Reagan looked at Israel through the prism of East-West global confrontation as a natural ally.”18

The irony was that the cornerstone of the Reagan-Haig emphasis on the Arab states (not the Palestinian Arabs) required the Administration to furnish them with the latest weapons in the American arsenal. Haig’s first trip to the Mideast as Secretary of State revolved around the Administration’s plans to sell sophisticated military aircraft, F-15s, to Saudi Arabia. Only secondarily was the visit billed as an effort to re-start the Autonomy talks. Prior to leaving for the Middle East, Haig met with Squadron and Hellman. The Presidents Conference leaders lobbied against the F-15 sale.19 They also sought American support for expediting the Autonomy talks along the lines outlined at Camp David.20

Meanwhile, Nixon wrote Reagan to counsel that he go outside the Presidents Conference in his dealings with the U.S. Jewish community and suggested Max Fisher as a conduit: “He is one of those rare individuals supporting Israel’s position who can always be counted upon for total, loyal support for whatever decision is made by the administration. Equally important, he can keep his mouth shut.”21 Haig later explained that Fisher was brought in because “it is always helpful to have an extra channel that influences more formal dialogue.”22 Reagan did invite Max Fisher and another key Jewish Republican, Gordan Zacks, to the White House. They discussed events in Lebanon, the West Bank and the proposed arms sales. The President told his guests that he remained totally committed to Israeli military superiority.23 Whatever the impetus, the Presidents Conference decided not to launch a full-scale campaign against the F-15 sale.24

Irrespective of the Administration’s focus away from the Palestinian Arabs, elsewhere in the political system, the attention of the prestige press remained fixated. The extent to which the Arab-Israel conflict had evolved into a Palestinian-Israel affair, in which Israel was portrayed as a settler colonial state, is captured by a series of articles published in The Washington Post by William Clairborne and Jonathan Randal in mid-March of 1981: “By all appearances, the spirit of humanitarianism – which Israel’s political and military leaders invoke to this day as justification for waging sporadic war on sovereign Lebanese soil – had led Israel into the same kind of colonial trap of which it relieved Britain when it obtained independence in 1948.”25 This was the same tone underscored at a Palestine Congress of North America sponsored policy round-table on “Domestic Implications of the Mideast Crisis and U.S. Policy” held at the Rayburn House Office Building. Under the auspices of Walter Fauntroy, the Delegate from the District of Columbia, the gathering was aimed mostly at Black legislative aides and academics. Critics of Israeli policies, including Randall Robinson of TransAfrica, charged that there was a conspiracy between Jews in America, South Africa and Israel to support Apartheid.26

Despite such snipping, U.S.-Israel relations, particularly with regard to the PLO, had never been stronger. Abba Eban, now an opposition Knesset member, told the Presidents Conference in New York that he was encouraged by the Reagan Administration’s unfavorable attitude toward the PLO.27 Indeed, NSC Adviser Richard Allen vindicated Israeli Air Force strikes against PLO bases in Lebanon, saying they were hitting the “source of terrorism.”28

Downhill

The Administration’s strategy of building an anti-communist coalition called for the sale of advanced weaponry to pro-American Arab countries (even if they were technically still at war with Israel). The Carter Administration had pledged to sell AWACS (highly sophisticated early warning radar aircraft) to the Saudis. According to Haig, he and Shamir were quietly negotiating the sale when Weinberger stated publicly that “not only were we selling the Saudis AWACS, we were going to sell them [advanced sidewinder air-to-air missiles and extra fuel tanks designed to increase the AWACS range approximately 900 miles]. And then Shamir is blown out of the saddle by Begin. . . .”29 A crisis atmosphere conducive to political suasion had suddenly developed.

Jewish opposition to the AWACS sale now eclipsed other issues in the U.S.-Israel relationship. In early April 1981, the President’s Conference warned that it was prepared for a bitter fight if necessary.30 The organized Jewish community pursued the AWACS fight with its full political resources. In short order, the AWACS battle came to virtually dominate the Jewish community’s agenda. In an effort to widen the circle, typical of political suasion, and bring in figures who would fragment the opposition, a White House meeting was arranged for leading Jewish Republican figures.31 Then on March 31 Reagan was shot. Haig’s awkward “I’m in control here” White House statement opened him up to ridicule and diminished his influence. With the AWACS battle looming, Haig met in Jerusalem with Begin and Opposition party officials Peres and Eban. They were left with the impression that the U.S. and Israel shared an identical outlook toward the PLO, that the PLO would not be a participant in any forthcoming peace talks and that the U.S. continued to oppose a separate Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza.32 Also contributing to the sense of uniformity of views was the Reagan Administration’s opposition to PLO involvement in the El Salvador civil war.33 But it was the Arabist views of Weinberger and Vice President Bush which were in the ascendant.34

The AWACS battle, subsequent Lebanese missile crisis, and the 1982 Lebanon War provide an environmental context necessary to understand the role of the Jewish community in U.S.-PLO relations. For now it is enough to note that, beyond straining the U.S.-Israel relationship, the corrosive political battle over the AWACS unnerved and psychologically debilitated the pro-Israel community.35

Consolidation of the consensus the United States and Israel ostensibly shared with regard to the PLO, was further hampered by a series of events in Lebanon and Iraq. The chronology includes terrorist incursion attempts, artillery bombardments, and increased tensions along Israel’s northern border. This was followed by the shooting down of two Syrian helicopters attacking Christian-Arab forces aligned with Israel. In retaliation, Syria sent SAM-6 anti-aircraft missiles into Lebanon, potentially restricting Israel’s ability to strike at PLO targets. The President appointed Philip Habib to serve as his special envoy charged with resolving the Syria-Israel missile crisis peacefully.36

Another instance of the Administration framing the agenda to its own advantage came in May 1981. The Administration ordered the closing of the Libyan Embassy in Washington, D.C. in order to prevent possible terrorism against U.S. targets. But a State Department official said that the PLO mission would not be similarly closed because it had been in compliance with American laws and was staffed by U.S. citizens or resident aliens.37 Elsewhere, the PLO’s international standing continued on the ascendant. West German Chancellor Schmidt called for PLO participation at an international peace conference. The Presidents Conference leadership met with Schmidt when he visited Washington to argue against the new West German stance.38

The following month, the U.S. announced that the Autonomy Talks would resume in the Fall of 1981. In another important strategic choice selection, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South East Asian Affairs Nicholas Veliotes made clear that U.S. policy on the issue of Jerusalem remained firm. The status of the City would be determined through negotiations. The dexterous use of insinuation is an important component of political manipulation. In remarks analogous to Haig’s pre-inaugural interview with The New York Times, Veliotes also reiterated that the PLO was an umbrella group with some “terrorist elements.” Privately, the Administration was engaged in efforts to bring the PLO into the U.S.-led peace process.39

Attack on Iraqi Nuclear Plant

We do not know to what extent the Israelis were aware of State Department efforts to bring the PLO into the peace process. Ostensibly at least, the U.S. and Israel were in broad agreement on the PLO issue. Once again, however, other factors intervened to undermine U.S.-Israel relations and force the American Jewish leadership to expend its precious political resources.

Characteristic of political suasion, the United States engaged in situational advantage seeking in its response to the Israeli air strike against Iraq. On June 8th, IAF planes destroyed Iraq’s nuclear reactor facility near Baghdad. The United States condemned Israel’s action as “unprecedented.”40 Irritation was expressed about whether, in violation of U.S. laws, American supplied planes had been used in the attack. The State Department added that it had no evidence that Iraq was working on nuclear weapons. The U.S. voted to condemn the Israeli military strike in the U.N. Security Council. Meanwhile, the American Jewish leadership became entangled in this latest controversy in U.S.-Israel relations. Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger forcefully pressed the case within the Administration to penalize Israel. The State Department emphasized that there was no evidence to justify Israel’s apprehensions about Iraqi nuclear aspirations. Ultimately, the Administration retaliated by suspending delivery of F-16s to Israel. The underlying message was that in a non-zero-sum Arab-Israel theater military solutions were inappropriate. Beclouding the issue somewhat, the President made several conciliatory-sounding statements about the Israeli action.41

In this ambiance of crisis, Nahum Goldmann, a founder of the Presidents Conference and now the iconoclastic former President of the World Jewish Congress as well as of the World Zionist Organization, called for the establishment of a Palestinian state as essential to an Arab-Israel peace.42 Goldmann was the quintessential outside elite player (of the trans-national variety) engaged in facilitating PLO entry into the peace process. Goldmann had entrée into the corridors of power and the Op-Ed pages of the prestige press. Later, former Assistant Secretary of State Harold Saunders, in an address to the National Press Club, observed that Israel remained divided over what to do about the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Any solution will result in a “national trauma of some sort.” He continued: “There is no doubt in my mind . . . the PLO will play a role in this process. . . . If they are not at the table they will play a role behind the scenes.”43

More ominous still, from the Israeli viewpoint, was a Los Angeles Times report that for the past seven years the U.S. had held secret contacts with the PLO. Prime Minister Begin sought to downplay the revelation, saying that he was only aware of indirect U.S.-PLO contacts on such issues as the release of American hostages.44

But the attention of the U.S. Jewish leadership, publicly at least, was directed elsewhere. With Israeli officials stunned by the continued intensity of U.S. criticism over the IAF strike against Baghdad, Squadron and Presidents Conference Executive Director Hellman met in Jerusalem with Begin. In Squadron’s view, the media had unfairly portrayed the Israeli moves.45 They returned pledging to work harder at explaining Israeli actions in Lebanon and Iraq. The Presidents Conference decision not to politically target the newly revealed U.S.-PLO talks may simply be a case of following Israeli cues. The leadership certainly had its hands full. But the decision not to forcefully raise the issue could not but have sent a signal to the Administration that, if handled discreetly, U.S.-PLO contacts were politically tolerable to the Presidents Conference.

The interlocking nexus of international and domestic political systems now benefited the PLO’s stature as a legitimate actor on the world stage. Despite criticism from Peres and the Israeli Opposition that the recently U.S. brokered cease-fire arrangement in Lebanon had enhanced the status of the PLO, there was nothing that could be done to reverse the inexorable momentum.46 In Europe, Vatican officials were said to be in regular contact with the PLO.47 Arafat met with French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson, who advocated including the PLO in future Middle East peace talks.48

By now, the Haig-Reagan policy of building a Middle East strategic consensus incorporating Israel and the moderate Arab states in an anti-communist coalition, relegating the Palestinian issue to the back-burner, had been discredited.49 Indeed, Israeli moves aimed at crushing the PLO proved futile and counterproductive, and indeed propelled the Palestinian issue to center-stage.50 Fierce Israeli retaliations against PLO targets in Lebanon often resulted in collateral damage to civilians and that undermined popular support for the Jewish State among Americans. The Administration and media portrayed Begin as obdurate. Each onslaught of anti-Israel media coverage stunned and virtually incapacitated the Jewish leadership. Some in the Jewish leadership shared the Administration’s apprehension of Begin. Israeli air strikes aimed at overwhelming the PLO militarily only served to distance the Administration diplomatically. In the face of mounting tensions, the Jewish leadership was irresolute and full of remorse.51 The strategic mindedness of American policy, on the other hand, remained steadfast. Toughness toward Israel did not translate into softness toward the PLO. Despite a direct appeal from Sadat to Reagan calling for U.S.-PLO talks, the President and Haig stood by their commitment not to negotiate with the PLO unless U.S. demands were met.52

Perceptually, it became ever more untenable for the pro-Israel community to argue that the Arab side still sought a zero-sum outcome to the struggle. Media coverage of Israeli air strikes in Lebanon hardly fostered the image of a Hebrew David slaying the Palestinian-Arab Goliath.53 Saudi King Fahd’s peace plan, made public in the summer of 1981, tacitly accepted Israel’s existence within its 1948 borders. The plan, not incidentally, also called for the creation of a PLO-led state, and payment of reparations to the Palestinian Arabs.54 Sadat, meanwhile, continued to lobby regularly for bringing the PLO into the peace process. During August, he directed his efforts at the American Jewish leadership holding a meeting in New York with a joint delegation from the Presidents Conference and World Jewish Congress. In spite of their discomfiture with Likud policies, Squadron was hardly ready to lobby the Israelis on behalf of the PLO. He told Sadat “that the PLO is a terrorist organization bent on the destruction of Israel.” It was up to the PLO to recognize Israel first, Squadron said.55

The focal point of political discourse remained on the Palestinian Arabs, not on the confrontation states. Those advocating Palestinian centrality included former President Carter, who called on the Palestinians to recognize Israel and for the Jewish State to end its “military occupation.”56 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter’s NSC Adviser, now openly called on the U.S. to deal with the PLO.57 Ezer Weizmann, the former Israeli Defense Minister (and Likud party campaign manager turned passionate dove) echoed these calls. Weizmann said it was time to consider a “Palestinian entity” in Gaza and the West Bank.58

It remained difficult to convince the Likud Government that Arab intentions had sincerely changed. They were, at least, equally concerned about American objectives. The State Department’s response to an August 1981 terrorist assault on a synagogue in Vienna, in which two people were killed and 18 injured, seemed characteristic of situational advantage seeking. While evoking a State Department condemnation, the United States refused to blame the PLO for the incident.59

The idea put forth by various U.S. decision makers that the PLO was a complicated body, not merely a terrorist organization, was basic to sanitizing the group’s image and a prerequisite to ushering it into the peace process. Indeed, calls for direct U.S.-PLO talks became almost de rigueur. Adding their voices to the growing chorus were Talcott Seelye, the retiring U.S. Ambassador to Syria, and Senator Barry Goldwater.60

Begin Visit to U.S.

Begin no doubt knew that solidarity among American Jewish leaders for his policies was deteriorating. Though criticism was muted, Begin had to have been aware that some in the leadership thought him abrasive.61 Their perceptual analysis of the conflict now differed markedly from the official Israel evaluation. Nevertheless, on his way to Washington for a mid-September meeting with the President, Begin stopped in New York to address the Presidents Conference. And, again on his way back to Israel, the Prime Minister made another stop-over in New York and used the opportunity to lash out against two influential Israeli newspapers, The Jerusalem Post and Ha’aretz, complaining that their biased reporting was undermining support for his government.62

At the White House, Begin and the President met for the first time and discussed closer U.S.-Israel military ties as well as the planned resumption, after an 18-month suspension, of the Autonomy talks. But it was the AWACS battle that continued to dominate the domestic side of U.S.-Israel relations. Former President Nixon warned that elements of the U.S. Jewish community will “have to take the consequences if Congress kills the AWACS sale.” Furthermore, former State Department official George Ball remarked that the AWACS controversy was a test of strength between the President and the pro-Israel community. Innuendoes leaked by unnamed government officials questioned whether Jews were more loyal to Israel than to President Reagan.63

Sadat Assassinated

In early October 1981, Islamic extremists assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. The murder was a reminder that determined elements in the Arab world abhorred the very idea of peace with the Jews. The White House dispatched three former Presidents to attend the Sadat funeral.

Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter used the opportunity to discuss the role of the PLO. Carter and Ford then issued a joint public call urging that the PLO be brought into the peace process. Haig’s reaction was that U.S. policy would not change until the PLO recognized Israel’s right to exist.64 While the U.S. was not ready to publicly negotiate with the PLO, it was continuing to criticize the Israelis for taking steps that would make the creation of a Palestinian state all but impossible. Haig and NSC Adviser Allen reiterated that Jewish West Bank settlements were not conducive to successful Autonomy talks.65

Reagan reaffirmed long-standing U.S. policy of not talking to the PLO until it recognized Israel’s right to exist: “There would be a condition, always has been. There never has been any refusal to talk with the PLO. There has been only one condition: until they would recognize the right of Israel to exist as a nation which they still have never done.66 The U.S. was intent on not sitting idly waiting for the PLO to shift gears. Indeed, some days later, the State Department denied a Newsweek account which reported that Haig had asked former President Nixon to develop contacts with the PLO during his travels in the Arab world. Newsweek reported: “The Reagan Administration is working quietly to bring the PLO into the peace process . . . after discussions in Cairo with Secretary of State Haig, former President Nixon last week urged Saudi leaders to induce the PLO into accepting (Saudi) Prince Fahd’s eight-point peace plan, if only in principle, as a springboard for expanded negotiations later.”67

The Israeli attitude toward the Fahd plan – not restricted to the Likud alone – was harshly cynical. Insight into Israeli assessments of Arab intentions, during this period, can be garnered from the following indignant remarks by Former Foreign Minister Eban:
Every Israeli and every friend of Israel across the world should consider anybody who supports the plan as a dangerous adversary. The aim and consequence of Prince Fahd’s formula is to reduce Israel from a strong and self-reliant democracy to a stunted, impotent, humiliated ghetto, useless to itself, to the Jewish world and to the international community. The Arabs . . . should support the Camp David process. What Israel needs least of all is recognition of “its right to exist.” The phrase is full of insult and contempt. Israel did not need recognition from Saudi plutocrats or an organization like the PLO which has no juridical or moral right to award or deny recognition of states.68

Reports that Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter’s NSC Adviser, had met with Arafat merely underscored the growing political isolation of Israel and the American Jewish leadership.69 All the while, support for the PLO came from a variety of sources, including Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreous, who invited Arafat to visit Athens.70 PLO diplomatic and public relations gains were immaterial as far as the Israelis were concerned. Their assessment of PLO intentions remained constant. Speaking during a Knesset debate, Foreign Minister Shamir said the Jewish State would never negotiate with the PLO even if it recognized Israel.71 But they could hardly be sanguine about the direction of U.S. policy. The Administration’s affinity for the Fahd peace plan unnerved the Israelis. Begin requested and received American assurances that the State Department did not seek to replace the Camp David Accords with the Fahd Plan. On that score the Administration seemed ready to accommodate. At a November appearance on Capitol Hill, Haig did not refer to the Fahd Plan at all and instead affirmed that Camp David is the “best basis for progress.”72 In a rather enigmatic twist, Haig later questioned Jewish criticism of Israel. He told a Washington, D.C. gathering of Jewish leaders that Jews were Israel’s sharpest critics. Haig concluded that he would not join in such criticism.73

Defeated on AWACS

After a politically merciless battle, which ended in an Administration victory, the vaunted power of the Jewish lobby (always more smoke and mirrors than reality) seemed at a low ebb.74 Plainly, American policy was tilting toward a more even-handed Mideast policy and this would have repercussions for U.S.-PLO relations. More portentous still, from Israel’s vantage point, was the perception in some circles that the Jewish lobby had been enfeebled by accusations of disloyalty to the country. The use of political manipulation, particularly insinuation, had been fairly transparent. Somewhat disingenuously, Secretary Weinberger complained that criticism of Jewish lobbying efforts against the AWACS deal had taken on “an ugly tone.”75 At the end of November 1981, Reagan met with a joint delegation of Presidents Conference leaders as well as prominent Jewish Republicans to assuage Jewish apprehensions in the aftermath of the AWACS deal. According to Goldin: “The leaders voiced their distress over the anti-Semitic rhetoric that emerged around the AWACS debate. The meeting, however, did little to mitigate the bitterness that lingered between Washington and Jerusalem.”76 The White House did leak word that a staff member had been rebuked for suggesting that American Jews were being disloyal to the United States in opposing the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia.77 Earlier, Reagan’s off-the-cuff, and reassuring, remark that he favored Israeli sovereignty over an undivided Jerusalem was “clarified” by the State Department which explained that the status of Jerusalem had to be decided through negotiations.78

Relations between the Reagan Administration and the Begin Government had gotten off to a bad start. They quarreled over arms supplies and the AWACS sale. Moreover, after their meeting, Reagan thought Begin committed himself not to “lobby” against the sale and felt betrayed when Begin publicly opined that he was against it. The U.S. decision to withhold delivery of F-16s as punishment for the Osirak air strike had yet to be resolved. Nevertheless, Sadat’s assassination and the planned resumption of the Autonomy talks left Begin “overconfident” that the shared ideology of the two leaders would prevail over transient events.79 According to Lewis, Sharon proposed “a broad blueprint of potential areas of regional military cooperation of embarrassing pretension. Weinberger and others blanched, but the die was cast for much that unhappily followed.”80 Weinberger grudgingly signed the U.S.-Israel memorandum of understanding on strategic cooperation, which Lewis explains was replete with symbolism but devoid of substance. Certainly “it was a pale version of Israel’s original proposal.”81 Both the State and Defense Departments downplayed the agreement, suggesting that all that was involved was the storage of medical supplies and joint planning.82 The principal source of U.S.-Israel tension, resolution of the Palestinian Arab issue, was transparently papered over with an agreement that fit neatly within the parameters of the disassociation strategy. Communication had replaced understanding. The U.S. remained staunchly committed to an Israeli withdrawal from the areas captured in the 1967 war. Begin’s hobbled claim to Jewish rights in Eretz Israel (tempered by a commitment to adhere to Camp David and relevant Security Council Resolutions), combined with the complete disinterest, on the part of the American Jewish leadership, for Likud’s territorial line, set the stage for trouble ahead. Meanwhile, the PLO continued to make significant diplomatic strides, obtaining invitations from various South American countries and Canada for high-level delegations to visit.

So, when the Knesset voted to extend Israeli law to the Golan Heights, a major fissure in U.S.-Israel relations was exposed. The vote was undertaken precisely because certain Knesset members were not lulled by the appearance of goodwill between Israel and its patron. These members wanted to formally solidify control over the Golan. Begin supported but did not orchestrate the bill’s passage, which jolted the Administration. The United States retaliated by suspending the recently signed cooperation accord and joined in a U.N. vote condemning Israel.

Begin vowed that the Golan Heights law, passed by 2/3 of the Knesset, would not be revoked. The U.S. reaction to the Golan law was, for Begin, the final straw in a series of perceived slights. He implied that the Administration was waging a campaign of psychological warfare:
On June 7 we destroyed the Iraqi nuclear reactor Osirak near Baghdad . . . an act of national self-defense. Nonetheless you announced that you were punishing us – and you revoked a signed and sealed contract that included specific dates for the supply of planes. . . . Not long after, in a defensive act – after a slaughter was committed against our people leaving three dead and 29 injured – we bombed the PLO headquarters in Beirut. . . . You have no moral right to preach to us about civilian casualties. . . . A week ago, at the instance of the government, the Knesset passed on all three readings by an overwhelming majority of two-thirds the Golan Heights law. Now you are once again boasting that you are punishing Israel. You have imposed upon us financial punishments – and have (thereby) violated the word of the President. When Secretary Haig was here he read from a written document the words of President that you would purchase for $200 million Israeli arms and other equipment. You canceled an additional $100 million. What did you want to do – to hit us in our pocket? . . .

Now I understand why the whole great effort in the Senate to obtain a majority for the arms deal with Saudi Arabia was accompanied by an ugly campaign of anti-Semitism. What kind of expression is this – punishing Israel? Are we a vassal-state of yours/ Are we a banana republic?83

Squadron endorsed Begin’s criticism. The Presidents Conference was critical of the tone set by the Administration’s handling of the Golan Heights annexation issue. Referring to Begin’s gibe that, “No one will frighten the great and free Jewish community of the U.S. No one will succeed in cowing them with anti-Semitic propaganda. They will stand by our side,” Squadron cabled the Prime Minister: “Yasher koach (right on!).”84 Actually, the Jewish leadership had never stood with Begin on the most fundamental principle at issue: the future of the captured territories. It was the spirit of the Administration’s reaction (not to mention Begin’s own emotional rejoinder) more than the substance of its critique that irritated the Jewish leadership. The substance of the matter was not lost on two leftist groups, Americans for a Progressive Israel (affiliated with the Israeli Mapam party) and the New Jewish Agenda. They protested the Golan law on the grounds that it would make a land-for-peace exchange more difficult.85

* * * * *

Privately, the Administration had been indirectly negotiating with the PLO and its plans were to continue to do so.86 Overt perceptual shifts, meantime, had been reinforced by a number of disparate events: The Soviet Union called upon the PLO to embrace a non-zero-sum approach (the two-state solution). The Peoples Republic of China made a similar call.87 King Hassan of Morocco had already opined that the Arabs would live in peace with Israel once the Territories captured in the Six Day War were abandoned. King Hussein made no secret of his efforts to convince Arafat that Israel had a right to exist.88 The PLO leader authorized his officials to work out a joint PLO-Jordanian arrangement to pursue the peace process and suggested that Jordanian-Palestinian confederation might be possible once a Palestinian state was created.89 Iraq’s Saddam Hussein told Congressman Stephen Solarz: “No single Arab official includes in his policy now the so-called destruction of Israel or wiping it out of existence but there is not one Arab who believes in coexistence with an aggressive and expansionist enemy.”90 Prince Saud al-Faisal suggested that in return for Israeli acceptance of Palestinian rights and withdrawal from the Administered Territories, Saudi Arabia was prepared to “accept” Israel. The Saudi Foreign Minister said: “Arab countries did not accept Israel before, in 1948. The change has taken some doing. There has been a tremendous shift on the part of Arab countries to accept this situation.”91 Two days later, the Saudis disavowed the conciliatory remarks. “What His Highness Prince Saud said with regard to recognition was in essence a reference to the requirement that Israel recognize the rights of Palestinian people to return to their land, to self-determination and to the establishment of their independent state with Jerusalem as its capital.”92 Nevertheless, even the revised remarks were not bellicose and left the impression that an accommodation was possible. As Zartman has pointed out, a non-zero-sum encounter does not require the parties to like each other: “Each party wants the other to be satisfied too, not because they care about each other per se, but so that the other will make and keep the agreement that gives the first party its share.”93 This was the direction the Arabs and their sponsors seemed to be taking.

Most significantly, in terms of the overall perceptual transformation, the PLO also intensified its efforts to develop contacts with “pro-peace” forces in both Israel and the American Jewish community. This campaign was masterfully waged by Arafat operative Issam Sartawi.94 Elsewhere, Hassan Ali, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, called for direct contact between Israel and the PLO. He called on Israel and the PLO to mutually recognize one another. Bethlehem Mayor Elias Freij also called on the PLO to recognize Israel. On the Israeli side, Yossi Sarid, a left-wing member of the Knesset, said he was willing to meet with Arafat.95

Parenthetically, the second year of the Reagan Administration began with the resignation of Jacob Stein, the White House liaison to the Jewish Community. The 65-year-old former Chairman of the Presidents Conference gave no reason for his decision.96

II

Jewish Perceptual Framework

While the precise instant is impossible to pinpoint, 1982 was a perceptual turning point. By the close of the year no doubt would remain about the categorization of the conflict: it would be non-zero-sum and comprehended almost exclusively as an Israeli v. Palestinian Arab dispute. It is worth reiterating that once a non-zero-sum struggle was seen as prevailing the American Jewish leadership had no fall-back position with regard to Israeli claims to the West Bank. The Jewish leadership had not been bolstering Begin’s claim to Judea and Samaria. Its primary contention rested on security grounds related to Arab capabilities and intentions.97 During 1982, there were no significant public contacts between the American Jewish community and the PLO, largely due to the Lebanon War. The image of the PLO as a savvy public relations foe likely to strike a deal in return for the best possible outcome, was reinforced in the course of the year. The self-image of the Jewish leadership was that of a community hard-pressed to defend Begin’s hard-line and discouraged because the Reagan Administration seemed to be demanding additional Israeli concessions in the peace process, placing the onus for progress on Israel. The leaders found themselves more willing to defend Israel in the face of what they considered unfair media treatment of Israel in connection with the Lebanon war. In the short term, the war led to a hardening of the leadership’s attitude toward the PLO. Their consistent goal was to get the Administration to ameliorate its multifarious criticisms of Israel. They continued to oppose a change in the 1975 U.S. policy toward the PLO. The Presidents Conference protested U.S. efforts to restrain Israel from dealing a crushing blow to the PLO in Lebanon. Privately, some in the leadership were seeking ways to distance themselves from Likud policies and publicly embrace the policies of the Labor Opposition. Other key environmental issues have already been noted, namely, the conciliatory statements made by various Arab actors and their patrons which reinforced the idea that the conflict was in transition. The continuous media coverage of the Palestinian cause throughout 1982 was the year’s most important environmental factor and had long-term perceptual consequences. Moreover, the vigorous protests orchestrated by the domestic Israeli opposition against their Government’s policies in Lebanon gave impetus and legitimacy to American Jewish criticism. Even as the Israeli Government sought to crush the Palestinian-Arab cause militarily, the Israeli opposition was telling the American Jewish leadership that the Palestinian issue was here to stay. The unveiling of the Reagan plan and its acceptance by Labor and elements of the U.S. Jewish leadership ended with finality the idea that U.S. Jewish lobbyists would take their cue from the Israeli Government. On a personal level, Jewish leaders sought to cultivate a relationship with George Shultz, the new Secretary of State (in part, to counteract the role of Weinberger who was almost uniformly detested by the leaders). Some of the key players influencing, and influenced by, the 1982 perceptual environment were: Max Fisher, Squadron, Julius Berman, Schindler and Bronfman.

* * * * *

The Reagan Administration’s proposed sale of advanced communications equipment, valued at $79 million, to an Arab consortium which included the PLO and Libya, can be analyzed from the vantage point of political suasion because of what the deal insinuated.98 The President gave a direct assessment of the chances of a U.S.-PLO dialogue in an exclusive interview to Readers Digest. Asked if he would recognize the PLO if it acknowledged Israel’s right to exist, Reagan answered:
This is a decision to be made after they do it. I know the PLO has kind of held a position that their non-recognition of Israel is a bargaining chip that they could bring to a negotiating table. . . . I think they’re wrong. I don’t see how you sit down to bargain with someone who has taken a position where they deny your right to exist and that you should be destroyed. That is not a bargaining chip. And, I am hopeful that, as we continue dealing with the more moderate Arab states, we will bring them to accept recognition that Israel is a nation that is going to continue existing.99

The Administration’s line remained consistent. Edwin Meese, a key Presidential aide, revealed that Reagan had again rejected a call by Mubarak for a U.S.-Palestinian dialogue.100 The Administration, like previous Administrations, was pursuing a two-track approach: refusing to elevate the PLO diplomatically without significant concessions, while sanitizing the PLO’s image for the future. During the first six months of the year, the Administration routinely played down the significance of PLO military activities in Lebanon.101

The media’s coverage of, and emphasis on, the Palestinian Arabs provides added context in which to understand the shift in American Jewish public opinion. Television images, especially, can easily sway public opinion under the proper conditions. The ABC TV program 20/20, for instance, sought to sway public opinion when it televised a segment on the conditions of Arab life in the Administered Territories. Little pretense was made at providing context, balance or objectivity. Producer Stanhope Gould said “balance isn’t always just a matter of what you do in one story.” Moreover, it was easy to overlook “Israeli repression” unless people were made to feel it at the emotional level.102

The first Reagan Administration Human Rights Report issued by the State Department, in February, criticized Israeli practices in the West Bank and Gaza.103 Since the purpose of the report is to document abuses and embarrass abusers, it served as another political suasion tool. Plainly, the Israelis and their Jewish supporters in the United States were pained by the continued inclusion of Israel in the Report. The agenda was now set so that discussions about the future of the West Bank would encompass charges of abuse by Palestinian Arab human rights advocates. The PLO also pressed the human rights claim by financing visits of American clergymen to squalid refugee camps in Lebanon.104

As the Arab-Israel conflict underwent conversion into the Israeli-Palestinian struggle and the Palestinian cause gained adherents worldwide, Israel’s ineffectual response was to call attention to PLO-inspired violence. Invariably, Israeli threats of retaliation were met by American calls for self-restraint.105 Except for the Israelis, and many in the U.S. Jewish leadership, everyone agreed that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict had become a solvable, albeit not easy to unravel, political dispute. The Administration made plans to sell ground-to-air missiles to Jordan while paying lip-service to the Camp David process in order to facilitate the final stages of Israel’s withdrawal from Sinai.106

Jewish concerns were not assuaged by the Administration’s ostensibly strict adherence to its well known conditions for talking to the PLO.107 American officials, such as Admiral Bobby Inman of the Central Intelligence Agency, appeared to be making a conscious effort to portray the PLO in a positive light. Inman, for example, disparaged reports that the PLO was aiding the Marxist government of Nicaragua.108 Still, Arafat’s own pronouncement, that PLO pilots were in Nicaragua and El Salvador, was undisputed.109 Squadron said openly that there was simply no one in the Administration who understood Israel or appreciated its fears.110

With Haig’s discreet encouragement, meanwhile, confidential negotiations between the United States and the Palestine Liberation Organization were making painstaking progress. The talks were conducted by John Edwin Mroz (in conjunction with Cluverius, Veliotes, and CIA operative Robert Aims). The two sides bargained over a document intended to bridge PLO-U.S. differences on the diplomatic prerequisites for a dialogue.111 Arafat may have had these sub-rosa talks in mind when he told the ABC News Program Nightline that he would forfeit the respect of the Palestinian masses if he accepted American conditions for a dialogue.112 Arafat and Mroz met on May 5, 1981 and planned to sign an agreement at a session set for June. But that meeting never took place because of Israel’s war against the PLO in Lebanon.113

Meanwhile, in the public arena, intensified lobbying on behalf of a U.S.-PLO dialogue was being pursued by the American Friends Service Committee.114 The Presidents Conference, for its part, emphasized the “major sacrifices for peace” Israel had taken and took issue with the drift in U.S. policy.115 With the Presidents Conference unalterably opposed to both the tone and policy direction of the Administration, the White House opted to circumvent the official leadership and seek Jewish support elsewhere. In a session arranged by the Jewish affairs liaison for Republican National Committee, Richard Krieger, the White House invited Max Fisher and five other prominent Jewish Republicans: Albert Spiegel of Los Angeles; Gordon Zacks, Columbus, Ohio; Richard Fox, Philadelphia; George Klein, New York; and George Klein of Beverly Hills, California and president of AIPAC. This rather transparent effort to widen the circle of Jewish leaders in order to achieve a desired outcome was promptly denounced by the organized Jewish leadership. Squadron termed the session a “deeply disturbing break in Jewish unity.” The Presidents Conference chairman complained that the Reagan Administration was pursuing a divide-and-conquer approach precisely because of Jewish opposition toward Administration policies:
From the beginning of this Administration, an effort has been made to bypass the Presidents Conference so that the White House could designate its own “Jewish leaders.” The effort was vigorously rejected by the organized Jewish community on the grounds that it is not up to the President to select the Jews who represent the Jewish community. It is up to the Jewish community itself. . . . (The) most representative group in Jewish life today is the Conference of Presidents, the one body which by common consensus speaks for American Jews on issues affecting the security of our fellow-Jews in Israel and other lands abroad. . . . Of course, no President likes to hear criticism. That is why some self-appointed Jewish spokesmen, political supporters of the President, have tried to create a new group to serve as a buffer between the President and the organized Jewish community. American Jews reject this concept. We have no intermediaries, no “court Jews” to represent us in the halls of government. We speak for ourselves.116

The extent to which the Administration sought Jewish support for its policies was evidenced by the fact that it took Squadron’s grievances to heart. Within two weeks, Vice President Bush hosted a delegation of 75 Presidents Conference guests in Washington.117 Later, Jacob Stein arranged a “secret” meeting in New York between a group of Jewish leaders and Weinberger.118 They discussed the full range of issues involving the U.S.-Israel relationship.

The Administration was well-informed about the thinking of the Jewish leadership and must have known of their discomfiture with Begin. In this context, Schindler’s remarks, delivered at a Presidents Conference “leadership meeting” held in Washington in April, help to illuminate the conflicted thinking of many in the Jewish establishment.
There is an attempt being made to divide Begin from Israel, to distinguish somehow the Prime Minister from the people, to insinuate that the so-called “hard line” of Begin does not represent the true feelings of citizens of Israel. This is slander against one of the great statesmen of our time. . . . This is not to say that I agree with his every decision. . . . Against the scheming and maledictions of our enemies, we will extend our stake in Israel. We will not yield. We will stay and we will build.119

The leadership’s internal divisions and inconsistencies did not directly translate into softness on the PLO issue. Nevertheless, the PLO made substantial political advances in the American political system. Congressman Lee Hamilton (D-IN), a key member on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, denied press reports that he had invited the PLO’s Farouk Kaddoumi to visit Washington.120 However, former President Ford, in his capacity as a private citizen, offered to talk with Yasir Arafat as a prelude to PLO recognition of Israel.121

The Lebanon War

The 1982 War in Lebanon was a milestone event on the road to a U.S.-PLO dialogue. The war and its aftermath monopolized the political activities of the organized Jewish leadership. It also unleashed a deluge of images which transfigured Jewish perceptions about the nature of the Arab-Israel conflict. Arguably, had Israel been allowed free reign, it could have militarily decimated the PLO, dealing it a serious, perhaps even fatal, blow.

The public relations difficulties of Western oriented democracies in waging war in the age of “real time” television is a subject beyond the scope of this study. It is enough to speculate that Israel’s mission in Lebanon came unraveled in large measure because of American opposition to the brutalities of war as hammered home by television.122 From the rubble of Beirut, America worked diligently to salvage the PLO as a diplomatic entity and to rescue its leadership including Yasir Arafat. Far from diminishing the Palestinian-Arab cause, in the final analysis, the war served to amplify the pivotal role of the Palestinians. How this occurred, in the context of the quadrilateral dynamic that is the focus of this case study, merits closer examination.

* * * * *

On June 3, 1982 Arab terrorists ambushed and shot Israel’s Ambassador to England, Shlomo Argov, in London. Israel immediately blamed the PLO, though it developed that the perpetrators were associated with the Abu Nidal gang, a PLO breakaway faction. Israel retaliated against PLO targets in Lebanon and the PLO reacted by shelling the Galilee. The shelling presented the Israelis with a pretext for a massive onslaught against the PLO in Lebanon. Defense Minister Ariel Sharon’s debatable grand strategy – a plan he had been considering for some time – was intended to rout and emasculate the PLO militarily and weaken it diplomatically, while formalizing an alliance with Lebanon’s Christian-Arabs.123

At the war’s outbreak, on June 8, 1982, the Presidents Conference defended Israel’s foray against the PLO in Lebanon as a campaign against terror. The Jewish leadership called upon the international community to take measures “outlawing and quarantining the PLO” because of its assassination attempt against the Israeli ambassador to Great Britain.124

Berman New Chairman

Shortly after the war began, Julius Berman, a leader of the Union of Orthodox Hebrew Congregations of America, succeeded Squadron as chairman of the Presidents Conference. Raised in Hartford, Connecticut, Berman was both a rabbi and a lawyer.125 His term was dominated by the Lebanon war and by the inability of the Presidents Conference to harness the political influence of the U.S. Jewish community to support Israel’s Lebanon mission. On June 29 he declared: “I believe generally that there is an overwhelming consensus of the American Jewish community” to support Israel’s war aims.126 Just several weeks later, Berman admitted: “I can’t say that every Jew is behind the operation. . . . There are ads (signed by Jews opposing the invasion) but the basic consensus of American Jewry is solidly in support.”127

Chafets offers this explanation about the war’s unpopularity:

The devastatingly bad press Israel received during the war was the product not only of technology but of a number of trends and attitudes that had been ripening for years. A decade of sympathy for Palestinian nationalism and declining Israeli popularity and credibility combined to make Israel the target of a melodramatic and sometimes vitriolic press campaign, which was aided and abetted by Israel’s own conduct, both of the war and its press relations. . . .128

Of course, no Israeli Government would have tolerated the use of Lebanon by the PLO as a staging area for attacks against Israel. Still, Israel’s attack against the PLO in Lebanon was motivated, in part, by the Government’s desire to strengthen control over Judea and Samaria. While the Administration’s Middle East team was initially divided on how to handle the crisis (Haig tried to buy the IDF time), they nevertheless moved expeditiously to politically salvage the PLO.129 The President’s call for an immediate cease-fire and Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon can be understood under the rubric of political suasion as situational advantage seeking. His meeting with Begin at the White House on June 21 further contributed to the already present crisis atmosphere.130

The connection between the Lebanon campaign and the future of the Administered Territories was widely understood. Senator Robert Packwood, perhaps the staunchest pro-Israel voice in the U.S. Senate, urged the dismantling of the PLO in Lebanon in order to demoralize pro-PLO forces in Judea, Samaria and Gaza.131 Israeli officials spoke openly about the need to achieve a decisive PLO defeat in Lebanon to make autonomy easier.132

The war, however, did not proceed according to the plans developed by Sharon.133 If the war was intended to finish off the PLO as a political force, the great irony is that it accomplished just the opposite. In fact, the domestic political climate within Israel swayed some in the American Jewish leadership to oppose Begin’s stance on the essential nature of the conflict. Many Israelis vehemently opposed the war on the grounds that the conflict was not an absolute necessity. About two weeks into the war, on June 15, Peace Now issued its first protest statement. Three weeks after that, 100,000 Israelis demonstrated in Tel Aviv against the war. Meanwhile, Uri Avneri, an Israeli Leftist, appeared in Beirut to be photographed embracing PLO leader Yasir Arafat. Plainly, the perception was that, even at this early stage, the war inspired little popular support. Actually, a majority of Israelis supported the war.134 In mid-July, 200,000 people rallied to back the Government’s policies. Nevertheless, a national consensus on how to proceed eluded Begin. The Labor Party publicly withdrew its support from the war once it became clear that Israel would not adhere to the limited goals outlined by the Cabinet at the outset of the conflict.135

The political environment, in which the U.S. Jewish leadership acted, was greatly influenced by a deluge of media coverage from Beirut which portrayed the fighting as unfair and one-sided. The Palestinian Arabs were depicted as victims of Israeli military adventurism. Against a smoldering Beirut skyline, NBC network news anchor John Chancellor brazenly told American TV viewers: “. . . Nothing like it has ever happened in this part of the world. I kept thinking yesterday of the bombing of Madrid during the Spanish Civil War. What in the world is going on? Israel’s security problem on its border is fifty miles to the south. What’s an Israeli army doing here in Beirut? The answer is that we are now dealing with an imperial Israel . . . world opinion be damned.”136 ABC’s Mike McCourt “described (but had no pictures of) ‘two square miles of West Beirut [that are] now dust and mortar. The rest of the city, nearly all of it, resembles some ancient ruin. . . . The total in human terms has been appalling. Ten thousand dead, up to twenty-five thousand wounded, and more than half a million people, mainly Lebanese, left homeless.’ The kindest thing that can be said about this description is that it was untrue in every detail.”137 Even without such purposeful falsifications, the brutality of modern war, delivered in real time to their television sets, proved traumatic to many American (and especially American Jewish) viewers.

Relentless U.S. pressure on Israel for a cease fire, withdrawal and for the safe passage of the PLO leadership, made a mockery of Sharon’s plan to crush the PLO politically as well as militarily.138 Haig’s resignation as Secretary of State in late June, further debilitated Sharon’s strategy. The ostensible catalyst for Haig’s resignation was discord within the Administration over the management of American policy on the Lebanon crisis. His departure worried Israel and the American Jewish leadership. Haig had been perceived as the Administration figure – after Ronald Reagan – most empathetic to the Israeli cause. Though we now know that secret U.S. contacts with the PLO had been taking place during Haig’s brief tenure, the Palestinian issue was by no means the centerpiece of his Middle East policy. On the other hand, incoming Secretary of State-designate George Shultz was known to have close business ties in the Arab world through the Bechtel corporation.139 Fisher, acting independently, sent Shultz a cable from Jerusalem stating: “I resent the implications that you might be biased in your judgement because of your present business association, I have always known you to be a fair, honorable man with a real sense of integrity. Be assured of my cooperation.”140

Berman, meanwhile, was keenly aware that American Jewish support for the war against the PLO in Lebanon was fluid. Publicly he continued to argue that most U.S. Jews supported Israel’s actions.141 Nevertheless, the withering effect of the negative media coverage was draining Jewish resolve. Squadron candidly acknowledged that Israel had not handled the public relations aspect of the war satisfactorily.142 A further indication that the Lebanon war actually enhanced the PLO’s political standing came from Time magazine, which reported that the Reagan Administration threatened to deal directly with the PLO unless Israel cooperated in ending the war on American terms.143

Unquestionably, for Shultz the Palestinian conundrum was at the crux of the Arab-Israel conflict. An American policy which did not take this into account was untenable. During his Senate confirmation hearings, he remarked that the Lebanon situation only underscored the importance of the Palestinian issue.144 Clearly, the United States would not allow Israel to use the Lebanon war to rule out the PLO politically. Shultz implied that the PLO was capable of altering aspects of its character so that a diplomatic role would be possible. Like Haig, he refused to characterize the PLO as a terrorist organization suggesting that it could potentially serve as the “one voice” of the Palestinian Arabs.145 During his Senate committee testimony, Massachusetts Senator Paul Tsongas urged Shultz to get “tough” with Israel about Jewish settlements in the Territories.146

Quest for the Magic Words

While the fundamental American position on the PLO had not deviated since 1975, Shultz’s arrival at Foggy Bottom in July 1982 reinvigorated the public, as well as private, diplomatic campaign aimed at getting the PLO to “say the magic words” – recognizing Israel and denouncing terror. When the PLO floated conciliatory-sounding statements about Israel, U.S. officials invariably calibrated their response with a mixture of encouragement and skepticism. Thus, in July, Shultz dismissed vague press reports that the PLO was ready to recognize Israel. Shultz listed the now familiar prerequisites for a U.S.-PLO dialogue: the PLO must clearly say it recognizes Israel; and U.N. Security Resolutions 242 and 338; must lay down its arms and stop terrorism. “Then,” said Shultz, “we are dealing with a different organization.”147

Coordinating the diplomatic flirtation on behalf of the PLO, early in Shultz’s stewardship, was Issam Sartawi. Sartawi kept the conciliatory messages flowing. The 44-year-old cardiologist, with close ties to Yasir Arafat, announced that the PLO accepted Security Council Resolution 242 and thus “implicitly” recognized Israel. Uri Avnery, an Israeli proponent of bringing the PLO into the peace process, pointed out that Sartawi’s pronouncement had not been repudiated by the organization.148 But the State Department remained firm in pressing for an official and explicit statement from the PLO.149 “Inadvertent” meetings such as the one between Hatam Husseini and officials at the State Department took place. The Department was at a loss to explain the circumstances under which Khaled Hassan, another close Arafat colleague, entered the United States.150 This diplomatic dalliance continued week to week, month to month and year to year until December 1988.

In late July 1982, as the Administration was seeking to facilitate the withdrawal of PLO forces from Beirut, several U.S. Congressmen, among them Nick Rahall, Mary Rose Oakar, David Bonior, Paul McClosky and Marvyn Dymally traveled to Beirut as a show of support for the Palestinian cause. McClosky later announced he possessed a signed statement from Arafat that recognized Israel by acknowledging all U.N. resolutions pertaining to Palestine. That such recognition was implied, however, was denied by PLO radio the next day. While the State Department dismissed the document as not being “clear and unequivocal,” the rejection was balanced by spokesman Dean Fischer’s reminder: “If our conditions are met . . . we will be willing to talk to the PLO.”151 By facilitating the trip of the Congressmen and engaging in public discussions about conditions for a dialogue, the Administration was controlling the political climate and setting the agenda.

Begin’s Israeli critics had obliging access to the American media and could address themselves virtually directly to the pro-Israel community.152 Paradoxically, the pace of events in Lebanon enhanced the PLO’s diplomatic prospects even as they left many influential American Jews dispirited.153 Despite intra-Arab recriminations over the refusal of any Arab state to come to the military aid of the Palestinian Arabs, irrespective of the PLO’s precarious military and logistical predicament on the ground, the prestige and political standing of the PLO in the United States had seldom been more buoyant. To undergird this positive development, a number of influential Palestinian Arab leaders living in the West met in London:
The group, which included Dr. Walid Khalidi, Dr. Hisham Sharabai and Edward Said, all from the U.S., decided to hold a meeting in Europe next month in which some 300 wealthy Palestinians will be invited in order to raise $100 million for the project The meeting was revealed in the London-based Arabic-language weekly Al-Majallah and reprinted by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. . . .

According to Al-Majallah, some of the participants felt that the Palestinian military effort had “collapsed” and that efforts should be focused on securing the rights of the Palestinian people, concentrating on the U.S. since it “holds most of the cards.” The plan calls for creating a Palestinian lobby in the U.S. which would include contacting leading figures within or close to the Reagan Administration. The weekly listed Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger and former Treasury Secretary John Connally. . . .154

“Are you losing patience with Israel?” a reported pointedly asked the president. “I lost patience a long time ago,” Reagan replied.155 In the face of this debilitating political situation, Berman appealed to Reagan, in writing, to explicitly call on the PLO to evacuate Beirut.156 The Administration, however, was intent on sending an altogether different signal. As a further reproach, the United States halted delivery of cluster bombs to Israel.157 To the PLO, the President repeated that there would be no U.S.-PLO dialogue unless the previously enunciated conditions were met.158

Political suasion was much in evidence when Foreign Minister Shamir met with Reagan at the White House on August 2. Shultz recalls: “I had discussed it carefully ahead of time with the president. We knew it would be a tough encounter. Reagan did not smile . . . Shamir was calm and tried to be friendly. President Reagan kept after him, stressing the disproportionality of Israel’s response to relatively minor PLO cease-fire violations.”159 Shamir sought to downplay the perception of asperity. But his efforts were in vain. A photograph published on the front page of The New York Times the next day pictured a sullen President looking steadily across the table at Shamir. For an Administration famous for using media images, this glum caricature of the state of U.S.-Israel relations is unlikely to have been etched accidentally.160 Rumors that the United States was contemplating sanctions against Israel were now circulated in the press. At a stop-over in New York, Shamir told the Presidents Conference that he “cannot imagine” that the U.S. would impose sanctions against Israel. But Reagan reiterated publicly that Israel’s actions in Lebanon were “disproportionate.”161 Berman told Shamir the PLO should either leave Lebanon or face the consequences. The next day he and a delegation from the Presidents Conference went to Washington to meet with Shultz, Weinberger and Bush. They were assured that the Administration was not considering sanctions against Israel.162 Labor Party leader Shimon Peres, on a visit to New York, told a gathering at a UJA luncheon that he too opposed a PLO role in the peace process. He stressed, however, the importance of dealing with the Palestinian issue while not spelling out precisely how. At another New York appearance before the Presidents Conference, Peres defended Israel’s incursion into Lebanon.163

Salvaging Palestinian Prospects

The PLO may have been facing military defeat in Lebanon but it was also achieving a political victory in the United States. The President pronounced himself outraged by Israeli air-raids against Beirut.164 Far from exploiting the trouncing of the PLO to undermine its future, United States policy makers sought to do precisely the opposite.165 Opposition leader Peres, on a visit to Washington, told the President and Shultz that the PLO’s troubles created new opportunities: “The PLO’s record is hopeless. It is a Mafia whose structure is riven by blackmail, jealousy, terrorism; it leads the Palestinian people only to a dead end.” Shultz retorted: “The war is not a blessing. The Arabs feel helpless. . . . They are sure Israel will never leave Lebanon.”166 PLO and Syrian forces were finally evacuated from Beirut, in late August, with the aid of 800 U.S. marines. But the Administration appeared intent on helping the Palestinians save face. Shultz helped resuscitate talk of a Palestinian state by hinting that the U.S. could accept a demilitarized entity on the West Bank.167 The Presidents Conference sought and obtained a meeting with the Secretary of State. Afterwards Berman said: “We made it clear to him that the PLO had been destroyed not only militarily but politically as well . . . we stressed that it is important that the PLO will not be dealt with in any way.”168 Later, State Department spokesman John Hughes denied that the U.S. supported the creation of a demilitarized Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza.169

Reagan Peace Plan

The removal of PLO and Syrian forces from Beirut did not alter U.S. emphasis of the Palestinian component in the peace process. To the contrary. And, if the Israelis thought the Lebanon campaign would solidify Jewish claims to the West Bank, the Administration promptly disabused them of any such notion. The President sent Begin a letter calling for a freeze in Jewish settlement activity and suggested that Judea and Samaria should be linked to Jordan.170 Then, on September 2, the President unveiled his own Arab-Israel peace plan. Of the war against the PLO in Lebanon, the President said: “The military losses of the PLO have not diminished the yearning of the Palestinian people for a just solution of their claims. . . . It is clear to me that peace cannot be achieved by the formation of an independent Palestinian state. . . . So the United States will not support the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, and we will not support annexation or permanent control by Israel.”171

Essentially, the conflict resolution formula now espoused by the president (it had been in discussion for months), while emphasizing the Palestinian issue over the state-to-state aspect of the conflict, was largely a re-working of the Jordanian option favored by the Labor Party. It called for an exchange of land-for-peace and confederation of Judea and Samaria with Jordan. Shultz insisted that the U.S. still saw no role for the PLO.172 But the Israeli Government viewed matters differently. Begin decried what he saw as an effort to divide Eretz Israel [the Land of Israel].173 A Government statement said:
Were the American plan to be implemented, there would be nothing to prevent King Hussein from inviting his newfound friend, Yasir Arafat, to come to Nablus and hand the rule over to him. Thus would come into being a Palestinian state which would conclude a pact with Soviet Russia and arm itself with every kind of modern weaponry.174

Some in Likud suspected that the White House and the Labor Party had colluded to promote the Jordanian option just when the Palestinian-Arab position on the ground seemed weakest.175 Begin declared: “Israel is not Chile and I am not Allende.”176 But reaction from the American Jewish leadership, which Shultz carefully monitored, was more sanguine. AIPAC’s Tom Dine initially lauded the Reagan Plan because of its opposition to a Palestinian state.177 While acknowledging that the plan contained some positives, others in the Jewish leadership nonetheless viewed it as violating the spirit of Camp David. Presidents Conference head Berman complained that the effect of the Reagan plan was to preempt the outcome of Arab-Israel negotiations.178 Shultz’s reading of his meeting with the Jewish leadership emphasized their discomfiture with Begin: “They were disappointed, they said, that they had not been more fully consulted in advance. But they were clearly embarrassed by the vehemence of Begin’s rejection. They worried about a settlement freeze but could not really oppose the principles the president had outlined.179 Next, Shultz picked up the support of B’nai B’rith, which called the plan “worthy of consideration.”180 Shultz spoke before the UJA in New York where he received a polite reception. Haig later criticized the plan before the same audience. Haig said, having carefully studied the Camp David Accords, his conclusion was that: “Israel never committed itself to terminate permanent settlement on the West Bank. . . .” He then alluded to, and cautioned against, American political interference in Israeli internal affairs.181

Within weeks of the PLO’s expulsion from Beirut and the announcement of the Reagan plan, Saudi Arabia hosted the 12th Arab Summit Conference in Fez, Morocco. There the Arab leaders re-formulated the previously announced Fahd Plan. The proposal implied de facto recognition of a pre-1967 Israel and called for the establishment of a PLO-led state with El-Quds (Jerusalem) as its capital.182 This blueprint struck Abu Saleh, a member of the PLO and Fatah Executive Committee, as being dangerously conciliatory. He warned that it practically implied recognition “of the Zionist entity.”183

Military defeat in Lebanon continued to translate into a sort of surreal political victory elsewhere in the IR arena, for Arafat and the PLO. Both President Mitterrand of France and the Pope met with Arafat.184 But it was the assassination of Bashir Gemayel (it is widely assumed by Syrian agents) that further unraveled whatever political fruits Israel had hoped to derive from the Lebanon war. In retaliation, Christian-Arab militia members massacred mostly Moslem Palestinian Arabs in the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatilla, an area of Beirut under IDF control. The tragedy elevated the Palestinian cause and further blemished Israel’s standing in the United States and among American Jews. Shultz believed that by allowing the Christian Arabs to enter the camps, the Israelis had “facilitated – and perhaps even induced” a bloodbath.185

Officially, both Israel and the American Jewish leadership rejected suggestions that the Jewish State was somehow culpable in the Beirut tragedy. Still, Schindler, Maynard Wishner and other Jewish leaders in the United States echoed a Labor Party demand for an independent investigation of the calamity.186

This growing wariness of American Jews, coupled with scenes of tens of thousands of Israelis demonstrating in the streets against Begin, brought a shadowy charge to the fore: was there a concerted psychological warfare campaign underfoot to debilitate Begin? Reagan disclaimed a United States campaign to “overthrow” or “undermine” the Israeli government: “We have never interfered in the internal government of a country, we have no intention of doing so, never had any thought of the kind. . . . We expect to be doing business with the government of Israel and with Prime Minister Begin, if that is the decision of the Israeli people.”187

Despite an atmosphere of palpable tension and growing disharmony within the ranks of the U.S. Jewish leadership, Berman set out to emphasize the positive.188 The Presidents Conference leadership traveled to Israel, early in October, for meetings with Israeli officials. From Jerusalem, Berman denied outright that the Jewish community was split over Israel’s policies in Lebanon and the Territories. Arguing that a return to Israel’s pre-1967 borders would be ruinous, Berman disparaged the Reagan peace plan for demanding such a withdrawal. He then delineated areas of consensus within the community: opposition to talks with the PLO; antagonism to the establishment of a PLO-led state; and support for maintaining Israeli sovereignty over the city of Jerusalem.189

Given the strain in U.S.-Israel relations and Shultz’s determination to focus on the plight of the Palestinian Arabs, several Arab leaders reasoned that the time was propitious to contrive a public U.S.-PLO meeting. They urged the President to receive the PLO’s Farouk Kaddoumi as part of an Arab League delegation scheduled to visit the White House late in October. But in keeping with its publicly enunciated position regarding talks with the PLO, the Administration rejected their entreaties.190

Delegitimizing Israel’s West Bank Policy

The symbiotic relationship between Israeli opponents of Begin policies and their American supporters is typified by the work of the West Bank Data Project headed by Meron Benvenisti. The American funding sources for Benvenisti’s work included private contributions, university sources and foundation grants.191 Benvenisti argued that, in all likelihood, opponents of Jewish control over Judea and Samaria had only about 36 months to reverse Begin’s policies.192 Benvenisti was concerned that the planning and development of relatively large urban centers in the West Bank would create organic links to Israeli centers within the “green line.” He collected data about West Bank land ownership, economics, and water administration. His intention was to demonstrate how, if current Israeli building continued, Arab towns and villages, with little room for natural growth and expansion, would find themselves surrounded by thriving Jewish communities. Moreover, the crisis atmosphere Benvenisti was helping to foster is characteristic of political manipulation. Ostensibly, Benvenisti targeted his criticism at the United States for not acting decisively to stem Israel’s “imperial concept” of West Bank settlement.193

The Shultz line dominated Administration thinking. Still, not everyone embraced it. Ambassador Jean Kirkpatrick, for instance, continued to view the Arab-Israel conflict in zero-sum terms, telling a dinner-meeting honoring former Presidents Conference Chairman Howard Squadron that the goal of Israel’s enemies at the U.N. remained the destruction of the Jewish State.194 This assessment followed in the wake of remarks made by the former leader of Algeria, Ahmed Ben Bella, who said candidly that the Arabs would never accept the State of Israel.195 Shultz, meantime, wanted Max Fisher to press Begin to accept, at least in part, the Reagan peace plan. Fisher also wrote Shultz to provide him with insight into the thinking of the Jewish leadership: “As a result of your meeting (with American Jewish leaders, they have) a very warm personal feeling about you . . . on a personal level you have their confidence, which is vital. George, please don’t get discouraged. . . .”196 At the same time, shadowy hints of a joint United States-Israel Labor Party psychological warfare campaign aimed at undermining support for the Begin Government continued to circulate.197 One Shultz adviser had already gone public with complaints about Begin’s “intransigence” and insinuated that there was no alternative to a Palestinian state.198 Simultaneously, efforts by Israel aimed at reducing the influence of the PLO in the West Bank were disparaged. Shultz derided Israeli demands that college instructors certify that they were not PLO functionaries as recalling 1950s-era loyalty oaths against communism.199

Circumventing the PLO was the last thing on the minds of U.S. policy makers. Egyptian diplomats actively sought to broker a meeting between American and PLO representatives.200 Meanwhile, the United States was reportedly encouraging Egyptian-PLO relations.201 Though unwilling to publicly engage the PLO in negotiations, Shultz was fully committed to bringing the Palestinian Arabs into the peace process. He invited a mission of Palestinian Arabs to meet with him at the State Department. Preceding their arrival in Washington, some members of the delegation flaunted their PLO connections by flying to Tunis for a session with Yasir Arafat. The delegation included two West Bank mayors who had been expelled by the Israelis precisely because of their leadership role in the PLO. Nevertheless, State Department spokesman John Hughes rejected the notion that the U.S. had now opened indirect talks with the PLO, explaining: “We are confident they are not members of the PLO.”202 Plainly, the Administration was committed to bolstering the legitimacy of the PLO. When the PLO Central Council decided not to reject the Reagan peace initiative, the Administration interpreted the decision in the best possible light, praising the “process of consultation” within the Palestinian community.203

Talks were underway, in the interval, to bring about an end to the Lebanon debacle. But the Begin Government believed that the Administration was purposefully blocking Israeli efforts to achieve any semblance of diplomatic headway that would translate into a political defeat for the PLO.204 The Americans denied they were blocking an Israel-Lebanon peace agreement in order to pressure Israel into accepting the Reagan peace plan. But the United States did cajole Israel into dropping its demand that negotiations take place alternately in Beirut and Jerusalem.205

Impact on Internal Opposition

By year’s end the Israelis were faced with a vigorously led internal opposition, comprised of establishment figures from within the American Jewish leadership, who were dedicated to combating Begin’s policies. The 1982 Lebanon debacle, combined with fairly open encouragement from the Labor Opposition, gave the American Jewish internal opposition the legitimacy it needed to publicly challenge the Israeli government. Alexander Schindler emerged as one of the most articulate and vocal of Begin’s critics. The former Chairman of the Presidents Conference warned against incorporating the West Bank into Israel proper. The break with Begin was justified on grounds that world Jewry had a right to dissent from an Israeli policy which posed a danger to Israel’s survival. Schindler favored accommodation with the Palestinians but not with the PLO. Initially, the internal opposition sought to calibrate its criticism of Begin, stopping short, for instance, of sponsoring anti-Begin newspaper advertisements in the United States.206

Competing with Schindler for the leadership mantle of Diaspora opposition to Begin was Edgar Bronfman, president of the World Jewish Congress. Bronfman’s role can best be understood as a continuation of the outside counter-elite criticism previously associated with Nahum Goldmann. In a Jerusalem Post Op-Ed article, Bronfman advocated the right of Diaspora leaders to dissent from the West Bank policies of the Israeli government.207 In addition to Schindler’s Union of American Hebrew Congregations, the American Jewish Congress emerged as a vanguard force within the Presidents Conference, in opposition to Israeli policies. The AJCongress provided a platform for financier Felix G. Rohatyn and union leader Victor Gottbaum, personalities not previously known for an interest in Jewish affairs, to critique Begin’s West Bank policies and laud the Reagan plan.208 Not only were inhibitions on American Jewish criticism of Begin lifted by year’s end, public dissent from Israel’s policies became almost commonplace.

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III

Jewish Perceptual Framework

An outside elite (including a trans-national component) critical of Israeli policies had existed, in one form or another, for decades. Fortified by ostensible dissidents from within the establishment, it would later play a central role in the U.S.-PLO dialogue drama. The Jewish peace camp, which steadfastly supported a PLO role in the peace process, had also already emerged in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War (and the American defeat in Vietnam). It too would play a supporting, albeit peripheral, role in the U.S.-PLO dialogue decision. But only in 1982 did elements of the official (mainstream) pro-Israel establishment begin to operate in internal opposition to the policies of the Israeli government; and only thereafter was the Presidents Conference unable to muster a consensus of support behind Israel’s policies with regard to Gaza, Judea and Samaria.

By 1983, the Jewish leadership categorized the conflict, almost uniformly, in non-zero-sum terms. The Lebanon war reconfigured the conflict – once and for all – in terms of Israelis versus Palestinians. No publicly known diplomatic contacts between American Jews and Palestinian Arabs took place in 1983. Now, however, gingerly handled criticism of the Likud government was considered perfectly acceptable. In terms of cognitive consistency, the Jewish leaders could argue, as Schindler did, that Israel’s survival obligated them to criticize Likud policies. Moreover, now they could point to public criticism in the U.S. of the Israeli government by the Labor Opposition. However, 1983 was dominated – not by the Palestinian Arab conundrum – but by Israeli efforts to withdraw from Lebanon. The Jewish leadership sought to smooth over relations between the Administration and Israel (frayed now over precise conditions for the Lebanon withdrawal) while supporting maintenance of the Egyptian-Israel peace treaty.

The mainstream leadership associated with the Presidents Conference continued to oppose bringing Arafat or the PLO into the peace process. They also worked to head off U.S. sanctions against Israel for its handling of the Lebanon withdrawal. Criticism by key groups associated with the Presidents Conference of West Bank settlements was no longer muted. Still, Berman (the last Orthodox chairman of the Presidents Conference for the period and the last politically sympathetic to the Likud line) stood solidly with Likud against a revival of the Reagan plan.

The political environment influenced and was influenced by a new assertiveness on the part of Begin’s Jewish critics. Bronfman, of the WJC, became a pacesetting force for the outside (and transnational) elite. Now, however, the establishment joined in the criticism. The UJA warned that Begin’s policies made it difficult to raise funds and the AJCommittee, flagship of the establishment, explicitly renounced Jewish rights to Gaza, Judea and Samaria and embraced the Labor endorsed Jordanian option. Elsewhere in the American political system, former Presidents Ford and Carter termed Israeli settlements in the Administered Territories primary obstacles to peace. Meanwhile, Reagan urged the Israelis not to condemn themselves to life in a garrison state. He spoke of the need for a Palestinian Arab national home. By 1983, then, the unofficial American Jewish stance weas largely identical to the Administration’s viewpoint except that the Jewish leaders were far more cynical about PLO intentions.

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Begin’s determination to resist Arab sovereignty over the West Bank was framed by history and the Hebrew Bible which wedded Am Yisroel (the Jewish people) to Eretz Israel (the Land of Israel). Ideology, however, was buttressed by Begin’s reading of Arab intentions. Unlike the American Jewish establishment (and the U.S. Administration), Begin tenaciously clung to a zero-sum assessment of Palestinian Arab intentions. The raw data about PLO intentions, which circulated freely between Israel and the Diaspora leadership, was not in dispute. What was in contention was its evaluation.

At the 12th Palestine National Congress, held in June of 1974, the PLO enunciated a political program authorizing the establishment of “the independent combatant national authority for the people over every part of Palestinian territory that is liberated.” In effect, the PLO pronounced itself willing to accept a mini-state solution on the West Bank alone. “Once it is established, the Palestinian national authority will strike to achieve a union of the confrontation countries, with the aim of completing the liberation of all Palestinian territory. . . .”209 By 1983 the Mini-State Solution had become acceptable even to such “radicals” within the Palestinian movement as George Habash’s PFLP.210 In Begin’s view, PLO moderation was a tactic in its strategy aimed at the phased destruction of Israel. Documents captured by the IDF from PLO headquarters in Beirut during the Lebanon war only reinforced the Government’s worst fears about PLO intentions as well as the veracity of the PLO “peace offensive.”211 Begin refused to “talk” to the PLO or countenance a PLO role in the peace process not, as is often suggested, because the PLO was a “terrorist” organization. Israel had shown itself ready to negotiate with the PLO qua terrorist organization. For example, Israel was in official contact with the PLO in an effort to gain information on its POWs.212 It was precisely in its political constitution that Begin rejected, as futile, negotiations with the PLO. When Arafat told a Kuwaiti magazine: “We are moving politically with our finger on the trigger of the rifle,” Begin took him at his word.213

The Diaspora leadership inched away from the idea of permanent Jewish control over the Administered Territories, though it rejected a role for the PLO. Initially, their critique was framed in terms of the right to dissent. The outside elite argued that, as Edgar Bronfman declared, Israel was strong enough to accept criticism.214 They criticized Israel’s West Bank policies but were divided over alternative approaches. The Israeli left was not so divided. The Council for Israeli-Palestinian Peace, led by Matti Peled and Uri Avneri, sent a delegation to Tunis for meetings with Arafat. Afterwards, Peled asserted that the PLO’s goal was coexistence. The Prime Minister’s Office termed them “a fringe element.”215

The prevailing perceptual tide within the American political system was that the Israelis were primarily responsible for lack of progress in the peace process. A concerted effort seemed to be afoot to present Jewish claims to the West Bank as “major obstacles” to peace.216 Concurrent with these political suasion efforts, the Jewish leadership was exposed to repeated, albeit vague, messages of moderation and conciliation from the PLO leadership.217 For the most part the Jewish leaders (internal opposition and outside elite) opted for a middle-course: opposition to PLO inclusion in the peace process; protest against the mere hint of U.S. sanctions against Israel over Lebanon; and coupling these positions with a rejection of Jewish settlement activities of the West Bank. All in all, this approach was based on an agenda set by the Administration.

The President told a visiting delegation of 150 Jewish leaders in February that he would not use the threat of sanctions against Israel to obtain concessions in the Israel-Lebanon talks.218 But the Administration would not brook a campaign to circumvent the PLO inside the West Bank. In an effort to maintain control of the political agenda, they denigrated Israeli efforts to promote the Village Leagues as an indigenous, rural, traditional, and essentially non-nationalist alternative to the PLO.219

Jewish leaders were well informed about gradations of PLO policy. Since the Reagan plan was premised on the notion that the struggle had shifted to a non-zero-sum track, the PLO’s attitude toward the plan is worth examining briefly. The Palestine National Council (PNC) met in Algiers in February. Attention focused on how it would respond to the Administration’s overture. The PNC’s message was equivocal. The idea that a self-governing entity on the West Bank linked to Jordan would be negotiated without a public role for the PLO was difficult for the PNC to embrace.220 There were those who wanted to reject the Reagan plan outright as inadequate. Arafat considered that impolitic. He told the PNC:
The struggle will continue until the aims of our Arab nation are achieved . . . to continue our militant road and armed revolution until we achieve our firm national rights which are not open to disposal, including our right to return, self-determination, and the establishment of our independent Palestinian state on our national Palestinian soil and until our fluttering banners are raised over holy Jerusalem, capital of our independent Palestine. . . . Our choice to establish a confederation with our people in fraternal Jordan is a genuine expression of our conviction in comprehensive Arab unity. . . .221

But a final PNC communiqué was blunt. The movement rejected: “Imperialist and Zionist plots and liquidation plans, in particular the Camp David Accords and the Reagan Plan . . . since it denies the right of return and self-determination and the setting up of the independent Palestinian state. . . .”222 Mindful, perhaps, of the need to sustain the peace offensive, Saleh Khalef (Abu Iyad, the PLO’s second-in-command) told American reporters that if the Reagan Administration recognized “the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination and the creation of a state,” the PLO would consent to taking a back seat to the actual negotiations.223 Issam Sartawi, coordinator of the PLO “peace offensive,” threatened to resign from the PNC because his request to address the session was denied.224 But Sartawi also told Radio Monte Carlo that he opposed recognition of Israel, favoring instead contacts with the Israeli peace movement in order to develop a “third force.”225

The PNC’s rejection of the Reagan plan did not alter the basic thrust of U.S. policy. The centrality of the Palestinian cause, the need to deliver the West Bank and Gaza, and the prospect of a PLO role were the pillars of that policy. The President remarked that the Palestinians required “something in the nature of a national home” and, at any rate, Israel could not forever live as a garrison state.226 That the Reagan Administration had largely adopted Carter’s judgment on the centrality of the Palestinian issue in promoting an Arab-Israel peace process was long evident.227 Reagan consulted with Carter prior to making public his September 1982 peace initiative.228 Touring the Middle East, Carter called the Israeli presence in Judea and Samaria “illegal” and “an obstacle to peace.”229 More importantly, the former president also met with PLO officials. The State Department response to Carter’s meeting can best be understood in the context of insinuation which is part and parcel of political suasion. Foggy Bottom refused to be drawn into criticism of the Carter-PLO meeting.230 The Jewish leadership’s response to the cacophony of criticism of Israel’s West Bank policy was equally muted, in large measure because they had come to embrace the Administration’s overall approach (though differing on nuance and tactics).

In contrast to the leadership’s subdued reaction on West Bank and PLO issues, the Presidents Conference reacted energetically as bilateral relations between Israel and the United States deteriorated over Lebanon. The Administration withheld delivery of 75 F-16 military aircraft as leverage against Israel’s Lebanon policy.231 One well-placed Jewish community professional charged that Weinberger was conducting a “vendetta against Israel.”232

Internal Opposition Manipulates

Even as the Jewish leadership defended Israel on how to extricate itself from Lebanon, these apparently endless confrontations resulted in even further hemorrhaging of support for the Begin Government. It had become de rigueur to couch criticism in terms of the “right” of American Jews to rebuke Israeli policies. Stuart Eizenstat, a domestic policy adviser in the Carter Administration, made that case again in the Labor Party newspaper, Davar.233 But by April 1983, something far more extraordinary was in motion. In a seminal announcement, the American Jewish Committee – flagship of Jewish establishment organizations – issued a major policy statement opposing Jewish settlement in the West Bank. The AJCommittee openly embraced the Labor Opposition, saying it favored the “Jordanian option.” Ironically, Jordan announced that it would not negotiate on behalf of the Palestinian Arabs.234 Nevertheless, the import of the AJCommittee statement cannot be overemphasized.

The AJCommittee did not join the Presidents Conference until March 1991. But for over 23 years it held official observer status and arguably wielded more influence than many of the 46 organizations who are formal members.235 Never in the history of Israeli-American Jewish relations had elements of the Jewish leadership so openly sided with the official Opposition Party against the elected Government of Israel. Plainly, the AJCommittee was intent on influencing the political climate within the Jewish community. This was by no means an isolated instance of political suasion. To protest Begin’s line, a number of philanthropists threatened to stop supporting the United Jewish Appeal. Some UJA leaders wanted to exclude Begin from their fund raisers. The UJA relies heavily on a relatively few major contributors, so the boycott threat was taken seriously. “We are behaving as if Israel’s existence was threatened as in 1967 – which it isn’t,” a Begin critic complained.236 In this instance, the establishment came under the influence of the peace camp which charged that UJA money was going, albeit indirectly, to build settlements in the Territories. Brettschneider writes:
In 1979-1980 the New Israel Fund was formed as an alternative venue for philanthropic pro-Israel sentiment. American Jews were becoming more and more aware that their many United Jewish Appeal (UJA) donation dollars were also going to help build Jewish settlements in the Territories occupied by Israel. As settlement building in the Occupied Territories has long been viewed by the dovish Zionist and pro-Israel camps as illegal, immoral, a waste of Israel’s resources, and a threat to the long-term democratic character of the Jewish state, such activity has long been denounced as an act of Jewish suicide. These donors wanted their money going elsewhere in Israel to help build the country more in line with the politics of their Zionism . . . on behalf of battered women, Arab-Jewish co-existence projects, prisoner empowerment, abused children and Eastern Jews.237

The steady loss of support from the philanthropic infrastructure (of the UJA and the various federations) had wide-ranging repercussions for the Government of Israel. For one, many of the weekly newspapers serving the Jewish community are subsidized by their local federations. Invariably, these papers become more editorially audacious in their criticism of Begin.238 There were fewer and fewer voices available to defend Likud policies and virtually none to advocate them.239 Criticism of Israel’s retention of the West Bank among American Jews was commonplace and, paradoxically, newsworthy. A group of Jewish law students from Harvard, Yale and New York University had no trouble obtaining coverage in The New York Times for a protest letter they had sent Begin.240

It was Henry Kissinger who in 1975 had formally pledged the United States not to negotiate with the PLO unless it adhered to certain conditions. But as a private citizen in April 1983, Kissinger met with PLO official Ahmed Dajani in Morocco. The former Secretary of State acknowledged that he had discussed the trip with Shultz. He emphasized, however, that in private talks with the PLO he merely re-stated the public position of the U.S. The State Department maintained that Kissinger was not serving as a “back channel” to the PLO.241 Meanwhile, the United States assured Jordan it was attempting to pressure Israel into freezing Jewish settlement activity in Judea and Samaria.242

In April, Dr. Issam Sartawi, Arafat’s liaison to the Jewish peace camp, was assassinated in Portugal. Reports conflicted as to who was actually responsible.243 Arafat appointed an Israel-born Jew who was also a French citizen, Ilan Halevi, to temporarily replace Sartawi as the PLO representative to the Socialist International.244

Kissinger’s session with the PLO did not induce the group to accept U.S. conditions for its inclusion in the peace process. Shultz now professed to increasing impatience with the sluggish pace of the PLO’s drift toward moderation. An October 1974 declaration by Arab leaders meeting in Rabat Morocco had designated the PLO to replace Jordan as “the sole and legitimate representative” of the Palestinians. Shultz opined that the Rabat Mandate gave the PLO too much power and should be revoked.245 The U.S. was obliquely suggesting that the Jordanian option could still be salvaged. Later, on a Middle East visit, Shultz suggested that the PLO was fast becoming irrelevant. Reagan took up the same line, saying that “the negotiations don’t have to hinge on the PLO. . . . There has to be a solution to the problem of the Palestinians. No one ever elected the PLO among the Palestinians.”246 It remains unclear whether this was an effort to cajole the PLO into accepting U.S. conditions for a dialogue or reflected genuine frustration with Arafat’s intransigence. Others in the domestic political arena, however, were unwilling to write off the PLO. Presidential candidate John Glenn, for example, declared that: “No permanent solution to the conflict will be possible without the participation of the PLO.”247

The PLO’s political standing among United States policy makers was, temporarily, at a nadir. For its part, the Presidents Conference, whose decisions are rooted in consensus, mostly avoided the Palestinian issue. Instead, Berman called on Reagan to reinstate the U.S.-Israel Memorandum of Understanding.248 After Arab terrorists bombed the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, the Jewish leadership asked Reagan to re-think America’s estrangement from Israel.249

With the Presidents Conference largely neutralized by the internal opposition, the critics were ascendant. At Brandeis University, for example, several professors mobilized the campus against Israel’s West Bank policies.250 On any number of campuses with a Jewish student population, groups like the Progressive Zionist Caucus, Progressive Jewish Students Union, New Jewish Agenda, Socialist Zionist Union, Habonim-Dror, and Hashomer-Hatzair, spearheaded peace camp activities. Brettschneider calls them “counter-hegemonic,” and explains that their goal was to redefine pro-Israel politics.251 Meron Benvenisti, of the West Bank Data Project, contributed another warning that ongoing Jewish settlement of the West Bank was creating problems diplomacy would not be able to solve.252

The White House, looking for support in the 1984 elections, actively began mending fences with the Jewish community. Chief of Staff James Baker asked a number of Jewish Republicans to reconstitute the National Jewish Coalition, a Republican outreach effort to the Jewish community. Shultz returned from the Middle East with preliminary agreement on a withdrawal of Israel troops from Lebanon. The Administration’s most strident Israel critic, Defense Secretary Weinberger, told an American Jewish Committee audience that he too was a strong supporter of Israel. Criticism of Israel’s West Bank security policies need not be equated with anti-Israel sentiment, Weinberger strongly implied. This was a position the AJCommittee, which only months earlier had expounded an anti-settlement stance of its own, would hardly challenge.253 Weinberger also praised Israel as a bulwark against Soviet expansionism.

Outside (transnational) elite actors, such as WJC President Edgar Bronfman, asserted that Israeli illusions about the Territories could be shed if the Diaspora pursued Jewish values.254 Ironically, with U.S.-Israel relations on a somewhat better footing, Jewish critics could take a more forbearing view of Begin. Schindler, for instance, went so far as to attribute the improvement in relations between the two countries to Begin.255 At the Presidents Conference, Berman concurred that relations had improved and asserted that the Reagan plan was moribund. He also suggested that the future of the peace process rested with Jordan.256

Opposition on the part of the mainstream Jewish community (internal opposition and outside elite included) to Jewish sovereignty on the West Bank did not translate into support for PLO control of the area. At any rate, the PLO’s standing was undermined by a serious mutiny which broke out within Fatah ranks.257 However, the peace camp remained steadfast in its support for a two-state solution. Outside the campus, perhaps the best organized peace camp group was the New Jewish Agenda (NJA). In mid-1983 the NJA applied for official membership in the Jewish Community Council of Greater Washington.258 Another growing movement, Peace Now, began to establish chapters in Canada and the United States intent on using American Jews to manipulate political events inside Israel.259

With PLO fortunes in decline, the State Department no longer seemed concerned about sanitizing the movement’s image. Foggy Bottom now backtracked on its earlier depiction of the PLO as being uninvolved in anti-U.S. activities in Latin America.260 Thus, a recalcitrant PLO was being mildly, but publicly, ostracized. Nevertheless, the Palestinian Arabs remained at the core of U.S. peace-making efforts.261 Ad for the Jewish residents of the West Bank and Gaza, Shultz articulated a fairly nuanced position: the U.S. opposed Israeli settlements in the area, but Jews who already lived there should have the “right” to remain.262 Lest anyone misconstrue Shultz’s remarks as a softening of U.S. policy regarding the lands captured in the Six Day War, a State Department spokesman termed east Jerusalem “occupied territory.”263

Begin Resigns

At the end of August 1983, Begin astounded Israelis by announcing his immediate retirement. He did not explain the decision, though observers said he was emotionally distraught over the death, several months earlier, of his wife Aliza and the rising casualty figures for IDF soldiers in Lebanon. Whatever the reasons, Begin retreated to his home and became highly reclusive for the remainder of his life. He died in 1992.264 After the resignation, Near East Report editorialized:
Last January, then President Yitzhak Navon visited Washington and spoke of those areas on which there is consensus within the Israeli body politic. These included refusal to return to the unstable and indefensible borders of the pre-1967 period; opposition to the existence of a third state between Jordan and Israel; opposition to negotiations with any group dedicated to Israel’s destruction; and a commitment to a united Jerusalem under Israeli authority. On these fundamentals, Israel’s people stand as one. No future government – neither Likud nor Labor – will abandon any of them. Those who are banking on that kind of change in Israel will be sorely disappointed.265

* * * * *

For the internal opposition, poll taking served a political suasion purpose by helping to manipulate dimensions. James Q. Wilson observes that, “How we word the question can dramatically affect the answer we get . . . just altering the order in which people are presented with options affects which option they choose and thus what is ‘public opinion.’ . . .”266 Invariably, AJCommittee polling (usually done by Likud critic Professor Steven Cohen of CUNY/Queens), discovered a lack of support among American Jews for Israeli policies. If the PLO recognized Israel and renounced terror, one AJCommittee poll found, most would then “favor” an Israel-PLO dialogue.267 Cohen conducted his survey by using “distinctive Jewish names” gleaned from the telephone book.268

Lebanon dominated the agenda of the Presidents Conference throughout the fall of 1983. But the Jewish leaders were also concerned about the “cold peace” existent between Egypt and Israel. Berman and a delegation from the Presidents Conference met with Mubarak to discuss Egypt’s stance toward Israel and came away reassured.269

Rejecting Support

Given the difficulties facing the pro-Israel community, it is remarkable that the Presidents Conference spurned offers of support from potential allies inside the American political system. Evangelical and fundamentalist Christians, including Jerry Fallwell’s Moral Majority, were a natural source of political support for Likud policies. Socially as well as politically conservative, they interpreted the rebirth of modern Israel in messianic terms; favored Jewish sovereignty over Judea and Samaria; perceived the Arab-Israel conflict in zero-sum terms and strongly opposed the PLO cause. Moreover, they represented an important Reagan constituency. But the Presidents Conference membership was politically and, for the most party, socially, liberal. The traditional liberal base of pro-Israel support had atrophied, but the Presidents Conference, suspicious of the objectives of the Christian right, found it impossible to broaden their political coalition. In remarks delivered in London, Berman explicitly warned Israel to be leery of the ambitions and motives of the Christian right.270 Fallwell supported Reagan politically but opposed the President’s policies on the Arab-Israel conflict.271

Rhythm of Violence

When the Arab uprising or Intifada began in December 1987, it was promptly forgotten that the West Bank and Gaza had been experiencing steady, albeit episodic, violent unrest ever since 1967. After one such episode occurred during the winter of 1983, the State Department asserted that the troubles accentuated the need to move forward with the Reagan Peace Initiative of 1982.272 It also maintained its criticism of construction of Jewish towns and villages in the West Bank.273

A number of events set the stage for an American pull-out from Lebanon. They are mentioned here because the onus of U.S. entanglement in Lebanon was, in the mind’s eye of the public, traceable to Israel. And this further complicated the position of the Jewish leadership. In April, sixty-three people were killed, including seventeen Americans, when Arab terrorists bombed the U.S. embassy in Beirut. In October, a devastating suicide car bombing killed 135 Marines in Beirut. Then, in December, one pilot was killed and one captured when an A-6E Intruder flying from a U.S. carrier was shot down by Syrian forces in Lebanon.274

A quagmire of violence seemed to pervade the region. But Israeli efforts to contain Arab rage on the West Bank continued to draw considerable negative U.S. media coverage.

As noted earlier, Israel’s preoccupation about not dealing with the PLO did not extend to prisoner exchanges. One large exchange at year’s end returned hundreds of PLO activists to the West Bank in a swap for several IDF soldiers. (Five years later, many of the returnees played an instrumental role in sustaining the Intifada.)

Chapter 7 Perception Disassociation and Manipulation: The Emerging Centrality of the Palestinian Issue in the Carter Administration 1977-1980

2008-08-20T07:11:00.000-07:00

Chapter 7

Perception Disassociation and Manipulation:
The Emerging Centrality of the Palestinian Issue
in the Carter Administration 1977-1980

A dramatic shift in tone but not in substance occurred under Jimmy Carter. Ford and Carter shared an almost identical strategic outlook on what U.S. policy toward the Palestinian-Arabs and the PLO should be. But it was Carter who fostered the already developing wedge between the American Jewish community and the Israeli Government over the West Bank through a policy of “disassociation.” The new President made it clear, from the beginning of his Administration, that the Palestinian issue was at the root of the Arab-Israel conundrum. During his single term, American sensitivity toward the Palestinian cause manifested itself as never before.

I

Political Suasion by U.S.

Substantively, Carter continued the course established by Ford of trying to coax the PLO into making diplomatic and semantic concessions so that it could be ushered into the peace process. Simply stated, the mission of U.S. policy was to promote an Arab-Israel accord and thereby buttress the overall American geo-strategic position in the region. The United States’ strategy was to facilitate the entry and participation of the Palestinian-Arabs (perhaps the PLO under the right set of circumstances) into the peace process. U.S. Jewish leaders in particular, and American Jewish public opinion in general, were the targets of this strategy (though they were by no means the only targets), whose success depended on political suasion. U.S. strategy also included making clear its opposition to a continued Israeli presence in the Administered Territories. These strategic choices forced the American Jewish community to make its own set of selections.

Situational advantage seeking is a characteristic of political suasion. In this case, the Administration used the Camp David negotiations to reprise the Palestinian-Arab facet of the Arab-Israel conflict. Carter’s political suasion efforts also included undertaking to split the Jewish community away from Israel (disassociation) using tactics common to political combat: divide and conquer and widening the circle so as to dilute the power of your critics and empower those likely to support you. The President’s “power to persuade” (as Neustadt terms it) was employed with great finesse to control the climate of discussion and set the political agenda. Political suasion efforts were further assisted by the imperfect information available to the Jewish leadership. For instance, unbeknownst to them the Administration was periodically conducting secret negotiations with the PLO. They were also unaware of the extent to which neutralizing American Jewish advocacy for Israel was part of the Administration’s grand strategy. Deft use of insinuation was yet another building block of the Administration’s political suasion efforts as experienced by the Jewish leadership. Political suasion also benefits from a sense of crisis sometimes exacerbated by time constraints. The tension of time constraints also contributed to Israeli concessions at the Camp David talks. The atmosphere of crisis in Black-Jewish relations, engendered in the wake of the Young Affair, signaled the Jewish community that their standing and interests at home could be challenged by continued support of “intransigent” Israeli policies Finally, U.S. efforts at political suasion were also exemplified by “salami tactics” so that the embrace of a stance essentially neutral toward the PLO was developed incrementally. The full panoply of American efforts at political manipulation on the PLO issue can best be intuited from the description of Carter Administration activities depicted later in this chapter. For now it is enough to emphasize that the Administration successfully controlled the political agenda, key to political suasion, by riveting attention on the Palestinian-Arab issue.

Political Suasion by U.S. Jews

There is also another vantage point through which the political suasion analysis can be employed in an effort to better understand the role of the American Jewish community in the U.S.-PLO relationship. Political suasion efforts were not limited to one actor alone. As U.S. Jewish leadership elements were persuaded that the essential course (if not tone) of American policy toward the Palestinian-Arabs was correct, they too engaged in political manipulation, so that within the Jewish community, the internal opposition, outside elite, peace-camp activists and various trans-national actors all engaged in political suasion. Their targets included American Jewish public opinion as well as Israeli decision makers. With the exception of the peace activist camp, which favored unconditional dialogue with the PLO, the mission of these groups was to hold the U.S. to its commitment not to talk to the PLO unless and until it met the conditions set forth in 1975. In fact, this was the consensus position of the organized Jewish community as a whole. What distinguished the dissidents from the Presidents Conference was the alacrity with which they looked forward to seeing the 1975 conditions met based on their perception that the nature of the Arab-Israel conflict was indeed being transformed in a non-zero-sum direction.

One need not make the argument that Jewish critics of Israeli policies operated in collusion with the Administration to assert that the outcome of the combined campaign was potent. Political suasion by Jewish elements included making strategic choices forcing choices. For instance, critics deftly publicized their differences with the Begin Government in the American media by regularly demanding “territorial compromise.” The Likud was unable to successfully articulate why, in the long term, “territorial compromise” was a bad idea. Situational advantage-seeking was also employed. An Israeli announcement of the establishment of a new settlement in the Administered Territories was often followed by statements intended to disassociate American Jews from the Likud government’s West Bank policy. Steps were taken to split the majority and manipulate dimensions by holding “unauthorized” meetings with Arab leaders or by denouncing “consensus” statements painstakingly sculpted by the Presidents Conference almost as soon as they were issued. By never pressing Jewish historic, strategic and religious claims to the West Bank (except for Jerusalem), the organized Jewish community, in tandem with their critics, contributed to the shaping of the political agenda. Insinuation, another tool of manipulation, was used repeatedly. For instance, Jewish “exasperation” with Begin both personally and politically was leaked to the press. Crisis conditions were orchestrated between the American Jewish community and the Likud Government. Cleavages were publicized which served to undermine support for Israeli policies within the American Jewish community. A fuller description of political suasion undertaken within the Jewish community on the U.S.-PLO issue is presented later on in the chapter.

Perceptual Factors

A careful review of events during this period suggests that from the start of the Carter years, American Jewish perceptions of the Arab-Israel conflict were more non-zero-sum than zero-sum. By the end of the Carter years there was no ambivalence. The Palestinian-Arab dimension was accepted as being at the core of the Arab-Israel conflict. The categorization of the conflict, during the Carter years, was that of a struggle in transition from the Arabs v. Israel to the Palestinian-Arabs v. Israel. Attitudes toward the Palestine Liberation Organization were, however, another matter. With the exception of iconoclasts such as Nahum Goldmann, who was rumored to have been prepared to meet Arafat in 1979, American Jews held a highly negative image of the PLO. Their self-image was that of a liberal Jewish leadership forced to defend the hardline conservative policies of the Begin government in the face of pressure from an insensitive (to Jews and Israel) Carter Administration. Their image of the Arabs was going through a process of transformation. Clearly, Egypt was willing to trade de jure peace in exchange for territory. Arafat and the PLO insinuated a willingness to accept Judea, Samaria, Gaza and Jerusalem in exchange for a vague de facto arrangement with Israel, thus changing the perception that the Arabs were committed to drive the Jews into the sea.

The fluidity of Jewish perceptions can be gauged by contrasting, on the one hand, Arthur Hertzberg’s 1977 comment that Jews should tell the Administration “to go hang” if it tries to impose a settlement “for Israel’s own good” with a 1978 letter signed by 37 Jewish critics of Israel which included this argument: “Even as we continue to oppose aspects of American policy which threaten to diminish Israel’s security . . . we are disturbed by the Begin Government’s response to President Sadat’s peace initiative.”

To provide cognitive consistency to this self-contradictory stance Jewish critics could argue: despite changes in the Arab line, Israel still faces security threats and dangers. Conversely, at a time of great opportunity, Israel is being led by the wrong man with the wrong ideology. Their criticism could then be justified by maintaining that Begin’s settlement policy did not enhance the Jewish State’s security; that Begin contributed to a bad image for Israel and Jews generally; and that Begin was obsessed with Eretz Israel (the Land of Israel) while their own concern was with Medinat Israel (the State of Israel).

Jewish perceptions are reflected in several consistent objectives: pressuring the Carter Administration to adhere to the 1975 U.S. pledge about not talking to the PLO; undermining Begin’s status and policies among U.S. Jews; and developing a new criterion for being “pro-Israel.” The community opposed U.S. pressure on Israel to return to the 1948 borders; it opposed an imposed solution which circumvented face-to-face talks between the parties; and it opposed pressure aimed solely at Israel and the Carter Administration’s apparent preoccupation with the Palestinian-Arab dimension of the conflict.

The political psychology of perceptions also includes a schemata for approval and self-justification. Arguably, the American Jewish leadership sought the approval of the liberal media (pundits, editorial writers, journalists with the prestige press and television networks) with whose worldview they closely identified. Their principal self-justification, it can be easily argued, was saving Israel from all that Begin stood for (namely, Jewish parochialism).

I argue that cognizance of the role played by the Jewish leadership is fundamental to a comprehensive understanding of how the U.S. approached the issue of negotiating with the PLO. Individual Jewish leaders contributed to the perceptual dynamics of this issue in two interrelated ways: the actions they took affected how events within the political arena were perceived. Meanwhile, they were themselves affected by the perceptual environment.

During the Carter years, a number of individuals played important supporting roles in the overall U.S.-Israel-PLO chronicle. Many of them continued, long after the Carter years, to be combatants on the political battlefield upon which this issue was fought between 1977 and December 1988. They include: Alexander Schindler, chairman of the Presidents Conference; Albert Vorspan, Schindler’s deputy in the Reform movement; Rita Hauser, who quit the Connally for President campaign because the former Texas Governor had called on Israel to withdraw to its 1948 borders; Philip Klutznik, who moved from the World Jewish Congress to the Carter cabinet; Edgar Bronfman, who replaced Klutznik at the WJC; Arthur Hertzberg, who became the Vice President of the WJC; Leonard Fein, an academic, who helped lead the anti-Likud movement among scholars on the college campus; and Ted Mann of the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council, who served as chairman of the Presidents Conference directly after Schindler. Based on their public comments during the Carter years, it is a fairly straightforward task to identify the belief system to which they generally adhered: they believed in a liberal (Labor-Left oriented) interpretation of Zionism stressing democratic values. They opposed imbuing the movement with strains of nationalism or religion. Consequently, they opposed claims to the West Bank based on nationalism and religion. In a non-zero-sum setting, strategic requirements could be negotiated in the course of the evolving peace process.

Disassociation (Psychological Warfare) Model

I argue that, for reasons of political expediency, the Carter Administration engaged in a policy of disassociation whose goal or mission was to slacken American Jewish opposition toward the establishment of a Palestinian homeland (perhaps a state), thereby enabling a solution of the Palestinian-Arab problem. Strategically, the Administration sought to focus attention on the mounting long-term costs of not accommodating Palestinian-Arab aspirations. It also sought to foster debate among American Jews (and others) on Israeli West Bank policies.

Disassociation was intended to give succor to the nascent peace movement inside Israel. My focus, however, is on another aspect of disassociation which was intended to induce Jewish American criticism of Israel’s handling of the peace process. The underpinnings of disassociation included these premises:
Post 1967, the Arabs are willing to reach an accommodation (non-zero sum).
A comprehensive approach is better than an incremental one.
The Palestinian-Arab problem is absolutely fundamental to the Arab-Israel conflict.
The West Bank and Gaza can be used to solve the Palestinian-Arab problem.
The Likud Government will not cooperate by agreeing to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza.
A Labor Government will likely cooperate and withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza.
Under the right set of circumstances most Israelis will favor an exchange of land for peace.

Tactically, disassociation justified U.S. pressure on Israel by arguing that America did not want to be associated, in the eyes of the Arab world, with any part of the occupation. In all other spheres U.S. support for Israel would remain undiminished. In particular, this dual approach was intended to encourage American Jewish criticism of Israeli policies by demonstrating that such criticism did not debilitate Israel’s overall security position.

For disassociation to work, attempts to orchestrate a partial or step-by-step settlement would have to end. A more tractable political situation would have to be incubated. A political environment would have to be created which fostered American Jewish (and Israeli) elements willing to accommodate Palestinian-Arab aspirations. Ideally, American military and economic aid to Israel should be used to shape the debate over the Administered Territories. Disassociation depended on a number of specific ingredients:
A continuation of high levels of military and economic aid to Israel;
Repeated reassurances of U.S. support for Israel’s security;
Expressions of opposition to any and all aspects of the “occupation” in an explicit, concrete, public and regular manner;
Blaming the Likud government for blocking the peace process.

Diplomatically, the U.S. had to be prepared to deduct funds spent on settlements from U.S. aid to Israel; U.N. condemnations of Israel should no longer be blocked even if they were one-sided; Public debate over Israel’s West Bank and Gaza
FIGURE NO. 4
policies should be encouraged; Meanwhile, the U.S. should establish an informal dialogue with the PLO intended to encourage the group to be more responsible and forthcoming vis-à-vis U.S. peace process demands.1

II

To understand the nature of U.S. policy toward the PLO and the pivotal role played by the American Jewish community in defining that relationship, it is necessary to understand how the American Jewish image of the PLO shifted. In what was a recurring cycle, several weeks before Carter took office, the PLO denied that it had signed a joint statement with a group of Israeli doves recognizing Israel’s right to exist.2 This led Israel’s Ambassador to the U.S., shortly after Carter took office, to lament the willingness of some American Jews to meet with PLO officials.3

Perceptions of the conflict were affected by a range of environmental factors. One catalyst which gave the PLO cause a major boost was the first ever New York Times Magazine essay on the Palestinian-Arabs. Edward R. F. Sheehan’s feature story advocated the creation of a Palestinian state on the West Bank alongside Israel. Sheehan also called for Israeli reparation payments to the PLO-led state.4 Sheehan’s essay reverberated within the community just as Carter was about to take office.

Jewish Criticism of Israeli Policies: Breira

It is worth recalling that American Jewish unease with Israeli policies predates the Carter years .Some Jewish criticism of Israel, especially in its Left-wing (peace camp) incarnation, can be traced back to 1973. The year American involvement in the Vietnam War ended was also the year when the Yom Kippur War demonstrated the continuing volatility of the Arab-Israel conflict. Some “progressive” Jews, who had been active in the anti-Vietnam War movement, now turned their attention to the Arab-Israel conflict. These Jews felt “dis-empowered” within the community and were searching for “connection” and “meaning.” They were uncomfortable with, in the words of Marla Brettschneider, “the subservience of American Jewish communal concerns to Israeli issues” and embarked on a campaign to redefine what it meant to be “pro-Israel.”5 By the early 1990s it could be easily posited that they succeeded.

One of the earliest efforts by the ultra-Left to redefine pro-Israelism came as a result of the establishment of Breira. Its formation posed the question: Was it beyond the pale for a Jewish group to champion PLO participation in the peace process and to tenaciously promote the Palestinan-Arab cause? For the organized community the challenge was to decide how sweeping Jewish organizational structure should be and whether it ought to encompass groups like Breira.

The lesson of the Yom Kippur War for the Jewish Left was that “the situation in the Occupied Territories was untenable and could not last.”6 In November 1973, with the support of 250 Reform and Conservative rabbis, Robert Loeb helped launch Breira. Within two years the group evolved into a fairly structured membership organization. Breira (Hebrew for alternative) was a play on the Labor Party slogan “ein breira (there is no alternative).” The group took a neo-Marxist line on Israeli domestic politics. Its core leadership elements were drawn from academia, “rabbinical students and Jewish professionals from such establishment organizations as the American Jewish Committee and B’nai B’rith and the editors of Jewish and Zionist magazines such as Hadassah Magazine, Sh’ma and the Jewish Spectator.”7 The group received positive attention in the prestige press in 1976. Together with the American Friends Service Committee, Breira was active in promoting Jewish-PLO contacts.8 By 1977, Breira’s efforts to redefine the parameters of legitimate Jewish communal advocacy and its demand for “open discussion and debate” drew a sharp negative response from the establishment.

In 1976, with Labor’s Rabin in the Prime Minister’s Office, Breira’s pro-PLO dialogue stance was vigorously rebuffed by Israeli officials in the United States as “poison.”9 In February 1977, the Jewish Community Council of Greater Washington, an umbrella group of local institutions, rejected Breira’s charges that the dissenters’ calls for “diversity” and “discussion” were contributing to Jewish disunity.10 But clearly many establishment Jewish leaders saw things differently. Judah Cahn, President of the New York Board of Rabbis, for example, denounced Breira as a danger to Israel’s security.11 This early history of Breira helps establish the perceptual yardstick on the U.S.-PLO dialogue issue. The extent to which perceptions among the Jewish elite deviated from 1977 to 1988 is depicted in the pages which follow. While recognizing that many factors contributed to this perceptual evolution, I call explicit attention to the role of political suasion in influencing the change.

While these events were occurring within the Jewish community, the Carter Administration was engaged in a multi-level effort to create a new “peace process” agenda. One pillar of this strategy required the Administration to induce the PLO into modifying its zero-sum stance. Criticism and punishment of PLO activities were balanced by frequent expressions of understanding about the Palestinian problem. Characteristic of this calibrating technique was the State Department decision to block the PLO’s Sabri Jiryis from participating in a Quaker political meeting which he had been invited to address.12 The PLO response to Carter’s efforts at political suasion was to remain steadfast. The organization wanted diplomatic links with the U.S. without having to sacrifice its fundamental positions. PLO leader Farouk Kaddoumi said, in February 1977, that his organization was not willing to change its “Covenant” calling for the destruction of Israel.13

One environmental factor in helping to shift perceptions was Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s public call for the PLO and Israel to mutually recognize each other.14 Not likely, came the retort from Israel’s U.N. Ambassador Chaim Herzog. Speaking at a Chicago UJA gathering, he lambasted American Jews who proffer the “illusion” that the PLO was capable of changing.15 Israeli Defense Minister Shimon Peres took public cognizance of the shift in U.S. policy toward the PLO. The change was later made explicit by Carter aide Robert Lipshitz when he said that the Palestinian issue was “central” to resolving the Middle East conflict.16

A comprehensive catalog of environmental factors which contributed to the change in the political image of the PLO need not be compiled in order to make the prima facie case that the Jewish community was influenced by its political habitat. Typical of events which served to boost the PLO’s image was an invitation from U.N. Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim for the group to attend a U.N. session at which President Jimmy Carter was scheduled to speak. The White House portrayed developments as mere serendipity, directing inquiries to the State Department and the U.N.17 The import of such happenstance was not lost on the official Jewish leadership. Arthur J. Levine, Acting Chairman of the Presidents Conference, sent a telegram to the White House expressing “concern” over the U.N. invitation to the PLO. Rabbi Arthur Hertzberg of the American Jewish Congress said it was regrettable that Carter “should permit himself to be placed in a position of personally greeting a representative of the PLO.”18

Agenda Setting

It was President Carter who forcefully placed the idea of a Palestinian homeland on the American political agenda. Controlling the agenda and the political climate is crucial to political suasion. Practitioners of political suasion often combine agenda setting with tactics of “incrementalism” (“salami tactics”). For instance, throughout his White House stewardship, Carter repeatedly insinuated (and occasionally made explicit) his opposition to a PLO-led state in the West Bank and Gaza. The President advocated not a Palestinian-Arab state but rather a Palestinian homeland (which to some might conjure visions of a pastoral American Indian Reservation). He first introduced this approach at a town meeting in Clinton, Massachusetts.19 Nevertheless, in the special vocabulary of Middle East politics, the President appeared to be on the brink of calling for the establishment of a Palestinian state. It did not take long for the significance of the “homeland” phrase to elicit a PLO response. Appearing on the CBS Television program 60 Minutes shorter after the Carter speech, Arafat praised the President for his pronouncement.20

On the periphery of environmental factors contributing to a change in perceptions on the part of the American Jewish leadership was criticism from various respected “wise men.” Typical were the writings, in Foreign Affairs, of George Ball. He called for saving Israel from itself by forcing the Jewish State to confront the centrality of the Palestinian issue.21 This saving-Israel-from-itself theme gained much currency across the political spectrum. For political suasion to be effective, both positive messages as well as critical ones need to be made in an unambiguous and reinforcing manner. Thus, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Andrew Young followed up the President’s Clinton Massachusetts speech with a Presidents Conference meeting. He said Carter’s use of the terms “defensible borders” and “Palestinian homeland” were deliberate.22 Imperfect information further contributed to the manipulation campaign. These included media reports, officially denied, that Carter and Sadat had already agreed on the need to establish a Palestinian state led by the PLO.23

For disassociation to be effective, the president needed to be portrayed as a friend of the Jewish community respectful of Jewish history and apprehensions but nevertheless dedicated to establishing a Palestinian-Arab homeland. Thus, one need not be overly cynical to suggest that the decision by President and Mrs. Carter to publicize their participation in a 1977 Passover Seder at the home of his aide, Robert Lipshutz, was tied to the Administration’s overall political suasion efforts. Despite the symbolism, some Jewish leaders who discerned an acceleration in U.S. pressure on the Rabin Government were not placated. Hertzberg, President of the American Jewish Congress, said that if the Administration tries to pressure Israel into a precipitous peace, American Jews should tell them “to go hang.” Hertzberg said: “A hurried settlement may not be a settlement at all . . . peace cannot be imposed for ‘Israel’s own good’ or ‘in spite of herself’.”24 Thus, only four months into its stewardship, the Administration’s relationship with the organized Jewish community was already frayed. In response, the White House backed away slightly from its strident tone, saying it was too early to define the nature of Palestinian participation in a Geneva peace conference or to decide on the PLO’s role.25

Plainly, American perceptions of Arab intentions and American Jewish perceptions of Arab intentions were diametrically opposite. In scrutinizing the Arab world, the Jewish leadership saw a continuation of the zero-sum approach; thus they did not see the basis for Carter’s receptivity of the Palestinian cause. Only recently, Arafat had made a very strong zero-sum case to a Kuwaiti newspaper.
I am not a man for settlements or concessions. I will carry the struggle until every inch of Palestinian soil is retrieved. . . . Our struggle in the occupied land will witness a violent and steady escalation, which will begin with a resurgence of our suicide strikes against the Zionist foe. The coming weeks will see many forms of the Palestinian struggle within the occupied homeland. I will leave it to the fedayeen (“self-sacrifice”) activity to speak for itself and to translate these words into extraordinary deeds . . . our revolution is a revolution of liberation, not a revolution of concessions. We will not give up one inch of our lands, nor will we relinquish a single one of our rights.26

Political manipulation, as noted earlier, depends in part on insinuation. Only a Machiavellian mind would suggest that Carter intentionally used religion to “send a message” to American Jews to ease off their frontal assault on his Middle East policies. Nevertheless, the effect of press reports which quoted Carter as telling a Church study group that the Jews killed Jesus was sobering. The President promptly denounced the accusation that Jews “crucified Christ,” saying he did not believe in collective Jewish guilt.27 Possibly to further allay Jewish concerns about Carter Administration policy, NSC Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski met with a delegation from the Presidents Conference at the White House several days later. He assured them that ties between the U.S. and Israel would continue to remain close.28

Landmark Event
Political Turnabout in Israel – Likud Victory

Since 1967, under Prime Ministers Golda Meir, Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, the U.S. and Israel quarreled over settlements, the handling of violent Arab unrest, and Israeli moves which hinted at long-term retention of Judea, Samaria, Gaza, the Golan (and parts of Jerusalem). Low-key American Jewish chiding of Israeli West Bank policies, from some quarters at least, had also become part of the overall triangular relationship.

The 1977 election results sent shock waves through the U.S. foreign policy fraternity and the American Jewish leadership.29 The Likud victory also created an unprecedented political context. Now, it became easier to “disassociate” the U.S. Jewish community from the policies of the new Government of Israel. Since before 1948, American Jewish leaders had identified pro-Israelism with the politics of David Ben-Gurion and the Israeli Labor Party. Though Golda Meir, Ben-Gurion and other Labor politicians would frequently clash with Diaspora leaders over various issues – mostly Zionism and security – there was nevertheless a certain commonality in their world view.30 Now, the political nemesis of the very leadership with whom they most closely identified had wrested control of the Jewish State. It is reasonable to surmise that the President was made familiar with these facts almost immediately.

The predisposition of the media and Jewish leadership against the Likud world view preordained turbulence ahead. The foreign press portrayed Begin as a former terrorist.31 Time magazine helpfully instructed its millions of readers to pronounce Begin’s name by rhyming it with the Dickens character Fagin. Newsweek called Begin a zealot and fundamentalist, beginning its report on his victory with: “The people of Camp Kadum greeted Menachem Begin like a conquering hero. The hard-scrabble settlements, built by Zionist zealots on Arab land of the occupied West Bank of the Jordan, had been declared illegal by the previous government of Israel.”32 President Carter was reported “disappointed but not crushed.” Few U.S. officials had any experience dealing with Begin or the Likud. The President said only that U.S. policy “will not be affected by changes in leadership” within Israel.33 Portentously, the White House suggested that Begin would “moderate” his views as a result of interacting with U.S. Jewish leaders.34

Begin held a zero-sum image of the Arab-Israel struggle.35 Nevertheless, immediately upon victory he called on the Labor Party to join in a coalition government. As for the United States, Begin declared: “The U.S. government should not be concerned because of the change in government. All of Israel is striving for peace.” Begin, however, favored “peace for peace,” seeing no merit in the “land-for-peace” formula, a diplomatic catechism embodied in the 1967 U.N. Security Council Resolution 242. Begin asserted that Jews have an inalienable right to live in Eretz Israel (The Land of Israel), which includes the West Bank. To a newspaper reporter’s question which implied otherwise he responded: “What occupied territories? If you mean Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, they are liberated territories.”36

The White House determined not to offer Begin a “honeymoon” period. Political suasion efforts, utilizing insinuation, commenced straight away. To set a demarche the White House released the following “Notice to the Press”:
As a matter of historical record, U.N. General Assembly Resolution 181, November 1947, provided for the recognition of a Jewish and an Arab state in Palestine and U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194, of December 1948, endorsed the right to return to their homes or choose compensation for lost property . . . (while) not binding on the U.S. Under the 1948 resolution, a Palestine Conciliation Commission consisting of France, Turkey and the U.S. was to present the General Assembly with detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the Jerusalem area. . . . 37

This was too much even for the Labor Party. Outgoing Foreign Minister Yigal Allon summoned the American Ambassador to Israel to express Israel’s vexation over the Administration’s latest pronouncement on a Middle East peace formula.38

Cautious Jewish Support for Begin

Carter’s public calls on Israel to withdraw from almost all the Administered Territories undercut former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, contributing to Begin’s victory, in the view of certain Jewish leaders.39 In that light, they came to Begin’s early defense when the Carter Administration opened its relationship with Begin on an adversarial plane. Schindler said the State Department declaration on U.N. Resolution 181 was at variance with previous statements about Judea and Samaria and a transparent response to Begin’s election victory. He asked how the U.S. presumed to be an honest broker if it was going to make references to General Assembly resolutions of 1947 and 1948, now anathema to Israel, and which the Arabs had immediately rejected.40

The White House now grew increasingly concerned by what it perceived as attacks by the Jewish leadership against Carter and Brzezinski.41 This was the context of a Brzezinski White House invitation to certain Jewish leaders at which he warned them not to support the Begin government’s “extremist” policies. Some Jewish leaders openly charged the Administration with trying to split the American Jewish community away from the newly elected Begin government. Speaking in Tel Aviv, Jacques T. Torczner, a former President of the Zionist Organization of America, complained that the Administration was concurrently seeking to undermine the importance of the Presidents Conference.42 Actually, by June 1977 Carter and his closest aides were conferring on how to neutralize pressure from the organized Jewish community.43

Concerned about the perception that U.S. Jews were “divided” over whether to support the new Israeli Government and about reported U.S. efforts to drive a wedge between American Jews and Israel as part of a strategy to force Israel to accept an American imposed peace plan, Schindler announced that the Presidents Conference would indeed support the policies of the Israeli government and made plans to lead a Presidents Conference delegation to Israel to meet with Premier Begin. Commenting that some of Carter’s recent remarks had “frightened” Israel, Schindler also said: “The thrust of President Carter’s statements suggest the outlines of an imposed settlement and creates the impression that this is an abandonment of standing U.S. policies that the parties must resolve their own differences in face-to-face negotiations between Arabs and Israelis.”44

Schindler balanced these remarks by letting it be known that American Jews could unite more easily behind a broad-based coalition government which included Labor.45 After his meeting in Israel with Begin, Schindler noted their differences and offered a balanced assessment:
I feel a kinship to Begin, for his sense of Jewish destiny and for his expectations of the Jewish future, despite the obvious political differences between us. I don’t expect the majority of American Jews to embrace Begin’s ideology now, but I’m sure they’ll respond to him as a person. . . . If he fails to convince Carter of his ideas, the question is – will he be able to bend? Then will come the test of Begin’s statesmanship, and the test of U.S. Jewry’s willingness to follow him – and how far. . . . You realize that no matter who would have headed the government here, and under any circumstances, there would have been disagreements and friction now.46

The Carter Administration remained resolute in its approach. The Palestinian issue was at the root of the continuing Arab conflict with Israel. Therefore, the central pillar in the Administration’s Arab-Israel policy would remain the Palestinian issue. Speaking in San Francisco, at a meeting of the World Affairs Council, Vice President Walter Mondale called upon Israel to return “approximately” to its pre-1967 borders. Mondale argued that this would enable the Palestinian-Arabs to “shed their status as homeless refugees” and establish a homeland or “entity” linked, in some fashion, to Jordan.47 Mondale’s rhetoric intensified Jewish apprehensions that the Administration would try to impose a settlement rather than encouraging the Arabs and Israelis to negotiate one.48

Begin Government signals regarding the PLO were slightly jumbled when Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizmann commented irreverently that he was prepared to meet with Yasir Arafat: “I shall tell Arafat what I think of him and he may tell me what he thinks of me. If he shoots me, I shall shoot back.”49

The Administration, however, continued to speak with one voice on the solution to the Arab-Israel conflict. The State Department, reiterating Vice President Mondale’s speech, said that Israel must withdraw from the areas captured in 1967 and that the Palestinians must be granted a homeland. But perhaps to ameliorate American Jewish concerns about an imposed solution, the statement offered that the “exact nature” of the homeland “should be negotiated between the parties.” In the words of spokesman Hodding Carter:
The President has spoken of the need for a homeland for the Palestinians whose exact nature should be negotiated between the parties. . . . We consider that this resolution means withdrawal from all three fronts in the Middle East dispute – that is, Sinai, Golan, West Bank and Gaza – the exact borders and security arrangements being agreed in the negotiations . . . no territories, including the West Bank, are automatically excluded from the items to be negotiated.50

The long enduring chasm between U.S. and Israeli perceptions over the essence of the conflict had become more pronounced because of the Carter Administration’s focus on the Palestinian issue and the willingness of certain Arab leaders to speak, however obliquely, about Israel’s right to exist.51 As The Jerusalem Post reported from Washington:
The U.S. and Israel fundamentally disagree over the Arab states’ willingness to live in peace with a secure Israel, U.S. officials said last week. . . . U.S. policy-makers firmly believe that the Arabs are ready to live in peace with an Israel that includes only the pre-1967 borders, while Israeli leaders are not yet convinced of this Arab moderation. . . . U.S. officials said if the Likud is serious about embarking on a major public relations campaign to convince Americans that Israel should not withdraw from any part of the Gaza Strip, Judea or Samaria, the prospective Israeli leadership should know that there is very little support in the U.S. Government or among the public at large for this position. . . . Not many Americans will accept Israel’s religious or national claim that these areas are an integral part of the historical Land of Israel.52

Isolated support for the zero-sum assessment as well as Jewish rights to the West Bank could still be heard. For example, Senator Bob Dole (R-Kansas) told a Zionist Organization of American meeting in Jerusalem that the West Bank – far from being occupied – had been “liberated” by Israel.53 However, the Administration displayed a greater receptivity to the opposing viewpoint. Thus, a delegation of American Arab officials led by William Small and Dr. M.T. Mehdi visited the White House to exhort one of the Administration’s key Middle East staffers, William Quandt, to push for PLO recognition.54 Meanwhile, the stature of the PLO was further elevated when two prominent members of the House of Representatives, Lee Hamilton (D-Ind) and David Obey (D-WI) met with PLO Chairman Arafat in Cairo. They recommended that the U.S. should open direct negotiations with the PLO because, Arafat told them, the PLO accepted Israel’s right to exist and was willing to live in peace with the Jewish State.55

Civility at First Carter-Begin Meeting

President Carter prepared for his first meeting with Begin, in part, by “poring over Menachem Begin’s book The Revolt in a studious search for clues to the personality of the new Israeli Prime Minister.”56 Observers expected the two to get on poorly. Expecting the worst, even Golda Meir (Begin’s long-time political rival) remarked: “If the Americans put pressure on Israel to give in to the Arabs, I’m ready to spend the last days of my life fighting for Begin’s government.”57

Actually, the two men did not quarrel at their first meeting. Begin termed his first trip to the U.S. as Premier “a success” and said he was leaving the country “a happy man.”58 In fact, mutual civility did not signal a shift in policy. Indeed, the American offensive against Jewish claims to Israel’s post-1967 boundaries intensified. Only days after Begin departed from the United States, the State Department leaked documents purporting to show that President Truman wanted Israel to withdraw to its U.N.-authorized borders after the 1948 War of Independence.59 The message was transparent: Israel could hardly claim to have a legitimate birthright to the West Bank when even its proprietorship to territory inside the “green line” could be so easily challenged.

The State Department’s relentless opposition to Jewish inhabitation in the Territories was sustained when several days later it released a statement expressing “disappointment” over the building of three new Jewish villages on the West Bank.60

U.S. Restates “Talk” Position

Whether and under what circumstances the U.S. would talk to the PLO was an issue which took on a life of its own. Behind the scenes, the Administration was inclined to discuss with the PLO conditions for its participation in the peace process.61 The publicly avowed United States policy was to forgo contacts with the PLO until it recognized Israel, as Secretary of State Cyrus Vance explained prior to embarking on a visit to the Middle East in August 1977. He did “not expect there will be any meeting” with the PLO “on this trip.” Vance acknowledged that the U.S. was receiving “communications” from the PLO through intermediaries but was not responding.62 The fundamental U.S.-Israeli dispute over PLO intentions, the nature of the conflict, and Israeli claims to the West Bank took a back-seat to the charade over possible U.S. plans to talk to the PLO.

Unable to articulate a persuasive argument on behalf of the zero-sum character of the dispute, incapable of explaining why what the PLO said about Israel was irrelevant to the organization’s true essence, and uncomfortable supporting Israeli claims to the West Bank, the Presidents Conference was left only to react negatively to hints and clues that the U.S. was moving closer to “talking” to the PLO. As “peace process” modalities were being bandied about, the PLO issue was catapulted to the forefront of the political agenda by a Presidential press conference remark. At an impromptu news conference in Plains, Georgia, Carter said he had received reports through third parties that the PLO may be willing to recognize Israel’s right to exist. The President said: “If the Palestinians should say ‘we recognize U.N. Resolution 242 in its entirety, but we think the Palestinians have additional status than just refugees,’ that would suit us O.K.” The PLO torpedoed Carter’s offer by denying it had signaled a willingness to accept Israel’s existence.63 Israel, at any rate, vehemently opposed a role for the PLO in the peace process.64 Warning that Labor and Likud were united on the issue, Knesset Member Abba Eban criticized U.S. overtures to the PLO.65

Integral to political suasion, as noted previously, are efforts to manipulate the dimensions of discussion. In Carter’s case this involved an almost continuous flirtation with the PLO interspersed with episodic reassurances to the Jewish community that the Administration was not flirting with the PLO. The cycle of overtures, retractions, hints, and clarifications by U.S. policymakers toward the PLO had become routine. Again in August, Secretary of State Vance spoke out on the PLO: “If they recognize Israel’s right to exist, we will talk to them.”66

Though fragmented and bewildered over what Israel should do about the West Bank and the Palestinian-Arabs, the Jewish leadership was largely united in opposition to the PLO. More than merely contemplating various scenarios out loud, Joseph Sternstein of the Zionist Organization of America said, Administration statements showed the U.S. was making plans to deal with the PLO.67 Presidents Conference Chairman Schindler and Premier Begin agreed, in Jerusalem, that U.S. Jewish leaders would organize a public campaign against the Administration’s PLO policy.68

Sanitizing PLO’s Image in U.S.69

Even as the PLO was reiterating its vow to escalate the armed struggle against the Jewish State, the Carter Administration had embarked on an effort to sanitize the image of the PLO so as to legitimize its presence at anticipated Middle East peace talks.70 Through a confidential emissary, the Administration was privately working to achieve some sort of understanding with the PLO.71 Allowing the PLO to operate in Washington, D.C. Information Office unhindered was intended to be interpreted as a positive U.S. signal to the PLO.

Adding to the mix, other voices were also being raised in support of U.S.-PLO ties. While there is no evidence to indicate they acted in concert, the Administration’s PLO stance was nevertheless bolstered elsewhere in the political system. One source of support was Senator George McGovern (D-S.D) who cited the Helsinki Accords as applicable to the PLO, in calling upon the State Department to ease access for PLO members to enter the U.S. for informational purposes.72

Carter-U.S. Jews Discuss Pledge Not To Talk To PLO

As tensions between the Administration and the pro-Israel community continued to rise, the President discussed the PLO issue at a private White House meeting with Rabbi Schindler and Yehuda Hellman, Executive Vice President of the Presidents Conference. The Jewish leaders gave Carter a letter noting that the United States had committed itself since September 1, 1975 not to deal with the PLO until it recognizes Israel’s right to exist and accepts U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Their letter said that the President’s recent public remarks seemed to be backing away from this commitment. He had publicly implied that the PLO no longer had to accept Israel’s right to exist and that it could modify the terms of 242 in accepting it.73 Carter wrote back to the Presidents Conference the very same day. His handwritten note assured the Jewish leadership that the U.S. position on the PLO remains unchanged. “I can assure you,” the President wrote, “that our position regarding the PLO is consistent with commitments previously made voluntarily to the Israeli government.”74 Despite these assurances, press reports surfaced the following month suggesting that Yasir Arafat and U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon Richard B. Parket had met in Beirut.75

U.S.-Soviet Joint Declaration on Mideast

Political suasion efforts also call for strategic choice selection or making choices which force choices. Catching many of the key Middle Eastern players by surprise, the United States and the Soviet Union issued a joint statement, in October 1977, on the Arab-Israel conflict. The statement accentuated the Palestinian issue by calling for the participation of “representatives . . . of the Palestinian people” and hinted at the prospect of a superpower imposed solution.76 Specifically, the superpowers agreed that the Palestinian-Arabs should be allowed to establish an “entity” in the West Bank. Furthermore, the statement used the politically loaded expression “legitimate rights” of the Palestinian people, implying the right to statehood. The Jerusalem Post reported that: “American sources hint that Carter himself decided to move on the joint American-Soviet statement as a means of demonstrating his displeasure with Israel’s attitude on settlements in the territories.”77 Israel would have to choose to cooperate or face concerted diplomatic pressure from both superpowers.

Reaction from U.S. Jewish leaders, as well as from the Israeli government, was harsh. The superpowers were seeking to impose a solution in place of encouraging face-to-face negotiations among the parties, Jewish critics charged. Schindler viewed the statement ominously as an abandonment of America’s commitment to Israel.78 Mobilized, the pro-Israel camp went into full gear. Senator Henry Jackson (D-Washington) and AFL-CIO president George Meany both criticized the President’s “courtship” of the PLO. “The fox is back in the chicken coop. The American people must certainly raise the question of why bring the Russians in at a time when the Egyptians have been throwing them out,” Senator Jackson told NBC-TV’s Meet the Press.79 The Presidents Conference called an emergency meeting on October 3 to deal with the Administration’s “betrayal” of Israel.80 The pro-Israel community further mobilized 8,000 telephone calls to the White House critical of the Soviet-U.S. joint statement. Mark Siegel, the White House liaison to the Jewish community, received 170 “angry” telephone calls in one day. Meanwhile, the President’s overall approval rating in the polls was 46 percent.81

The level of Jewish vexation over the enhanced position of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the wake of the joint statement can be gauged by Schindler’s reaction. Fearing that PLO participation at proposed Geneva-based Middle East peace talks was now a real possibility, Schindler and Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan jointly launched a major public relations effort, traveling to a number of American cities to campaign against the joint statement.82 Dayan had previously been scheduled to visit the U.S. on U.N. business and planned to meet with the President. Actually, in speaking with American Jews across the United States, Dayan sought to play down the U.S.-Israel rift. He warned against backing the President into a corner.83 When Dayan finally met with Carter at the U.N., differences were papered over. Dayan announced that Israel was prepared to go to Geneva for peace talks. The Foreign Ministry and the President agreed that after an opening “plenary group” the discussions would break up into bilateral talks and multi-lateral working groups. Israel was prepared to negotiate with Palestinian representatives, but the PLO itself was not mentioned. While still holding to the view that Carter was naïve about Arab intentions, the Carter-Dayan meeting helped ease the level of tension between the Administration and the organized Jewish community. Schindler remarked: “We have to watch developments – and developments will be watched.”84

Carter Reiterates Palestinian Angle

The President fully expected the PLO to recognize Israel based on indirect messages he was getting from Arab sources and from Landrum Bolling, president of Lilly Endowment Inc., who had been meeting with Arafat.85 This helps explain Carter’s continued emphasis on the centrality of the Palestinian issue. At his U.N. appearance the President reiterated that “the legitimate rights of the Palestinians must be recognized.”86 But he backtracked slightly some days later when he told a visiting Congressional delegation that he opposed a Palestinian state although he did not want to say so publicly.87

White House Lobbies U.S. Jewry

Essential to the disassociation policy was the need to drive a wedge between Israel and her American Jewish supporters. The Administration’s approach was to use suasion, where possible, to split the Jewish community away from Israeli policies. Intent on bringing the Administration’s message directly to the Jewish community, Robert Lipshutz, Counsel to the President, held several speaking engagements before the Maryland Jewish community in October. He emphasized that solving the Palestinian problem was something Israel needed to do for its own “viability.”88

Politically sensitive to charges that the President had turned against Israel, Administration officials sought to reach out to the Jewish community with frequent sessions pressing the point that Jimmy Carter remained committed to the Jewish State.89 Indeed, the “disassociation” strategy made it absolutely vital for the Administration to reassure the American Jewish leadership of its continued support for Israel. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, for instance, held a series of meetings with the Jewish leadership in an effort to stem Jewish opposition to Carter’s perceived policy tilt toward the Palestinian Arabs and the PLO.90 Apparently pursuing a two-track approach, the Administration worked to bolster its frayed bone fides within the pro-Israel community while simultaneously promoting the PLO as a potential partner in the peace process and asserting that one could be pro-Israel while not holding the PLO in odium. This approach was again manifested when, late in October, the State Department allowed Mahmoud Salem Darwish, a junior PLO official, to enter the U.S. for purposes which were not made clear.91

The idea of a PLO-led state continued to gain momentum. Support for the PLO cause was snowballing. In Washington, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator John Sparkman (D-Alabama), announced that he supported the creation of a Palestinian state. Sparkman also called upon the Palestinians to recognize Israel as a quid pro quo.92 Abroad, meanwhile, British Prime Minister James Callahan called for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank. While in West Germany top officials of the PLO were already holding talks with ranking politicians.93 An unmistakable diplomatic signal that the U.S. favored, at the least, a West Bank in Arab hands came when Ambassador Young abstained in a General Assembly vote against Jewish settlements in the Administered Territories.94

III

Landmark Event: Sadat’s Jerusalem Initiative

Carter’s single-minded focus on the Palestinian problem explains his initially cool reaction to Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s momentous announcement that he would travel to Jerusalem. In effect, and despite denials, Sadat diverted attention away from the Palestinian aspect of the Arab-Israel conflict back to the state level. His historic November 1977 visit to Jerusalem heralded a return to a more diffuse peace-making approach with the Palestinian facet – one of several core issues to be confronted.95

Still, President Carter was not easily dissuaded. Just days after Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem, Carter reprised his call for an international conference in Geneva based upon the joint U.S.-USSR resolution. Only in mid-December did Carter acknowledge that the PLO had ruled itself out of the conflict resolution process – and, there being no other suitable representative of the Palestinian-Arabs – leaving advocacy of their cause to Egypt.96 As events unfolded (and even though Begin thought prospects for Geneva talks were good), the spotlight shifted to a Cairo conference where the only Arab party willing to attend was Egypt itself. Then, on December 19, 1977, Begin proposed “self-rule” for the Arab residents of Judea, Samaria and Gaza. Distinguishing between autonomy for people as against dominion over the land, Begin also emphasized that Israel would never deal with the PLO.97

U.S. Jews Back in Play

In New York, Begin briefed the Conference of Presidents on his self-rule game plan.98 It did not take Sadat long to recognize the expediency of establishing channels of communication to the Jewish leadership.99 By the end of January 1978, Sadat had issued an “open letter” to American Jews urging them to pressure Israel into making concessions to Egypt.100 Not wanting to be used to influence the talks, the Presidents Conference announced that it would not allow itself to serve as a surrogate for direct Egyptian-Israeli negotiations.101 The White House and Sadat were forced to turn elsewhere. Arrangements were already under way for Sadat to meet with Philip Klutznick, the head of the World Jewish Congress. Meanwhile, Klutznick was aware that the Presidents Conference was about to convene in order to discuss precisely Sadat’s efforts to use meetings with the Jewish community as a form of leverage against the Israelis. Klutznick explains:
I tried to reach Schindler by phone to tell him about the meeting I had already scheduled with Sadat, but he did not get my phone call until after the conference adopted a ban on such meetings. I did not cancel the event set for the Egyptian embassy; to do so would be an affront to the president of Egypt and to the White House as well. . . .

The scheduled meeting in the Egyptian embassy, held during a pause in the official U.S.-Egyptian negotiations, was marked by spirited exchanges not only about the possibilities for a settlement in the Middle East but on the relationship between the American Jewish community and Israel and its perceptions of dangers to that state. President Sadat throughout the encounter was ebullient and charming, but I could not tell whether his attitudes were affected by what he heard from our group. Later, however, I learned why the White House was anxious for the meeting to happen. They wanted Sadat to know that American Jews would support moves toward peace if the proposed terms were fair to all parties in the Israeli-Arab conflict. . . .102

Palestinian Centrality

Whatever the efforts to build support for Sadat within the Jewish community, the Administration maintained its strategic policy focus on the Palestinian issue. The United States denied it was making overtures to the PLO to entice it into the peace process.103 Indeed, Brzezinski protested that the PLO had disqualified itself from participating in the peace process because of its intransigence. Moderate Palestinians would take the place of the PLO, Brzezinski asserted.104

Some officials within the State Department were apprehensive that an Egyptian-Israeli state-to-state remedy was in the works and that it would relegate the Palestinian-Arab problem to the back burner. For example, U.S. Ambassador to the Netherlands Robert J. McClosky publicly complained that the United States did not have an apparent blueprint for a Palestinian homeland.105 Meanwhile, Representative Paul Findley (R-Ill.) emerged as a key champion of the PLO on Capitol Hill. After meeting with Arafat in Syria early in 1978, Findley contended that the group had moderated its position and could not be ignored in conflict resolution efforts.106

Sadat Continues Lobbying

Sadat met with Schindler in Aswan, Egypt to lobby the American Jewish leader to intervene with Israel. He promised that Egypt would guarantee Israel’s security if it were forthcoming at the negotiating table. But Schindler said he could not support the establishment of a Palestinian-Arab state because it posed a security threat for Israel. He also suggested that Sadat did not particularly favor such a state either.107 Some days later, Sadat published an open letter to U.S. Jews urging them to “contribute” to the peace process. Schindler’s reply was that embracing Egypt’s negotiating position was not the only way to foster the peace process.108

The President continued in his efforts to control the political climate and set the agenda. Carter persistently underscored, in his public remarks, the centrality of the Palestinian problem to the conflict. Visiting President Sadat in Aswan during January, Carter stressed that peace would depend on resolving the “Palestinian problem in all its aspects,” recognition of the “legitimate rights” of the Palestinians, and Israeli withdrawal from “territories occupied” in 1967.109

Determined to press the Palestinian cause through his disassociation policy, Carter and Mondale invited elements of the American Jewish leadership to a three-and-a-half-hour White House Dinner. Schindler, chairman of the Presidents Conference, was conspicuous by his absence. The guests included: Frank Lautenberg of the UJA, Richard Mass of the American Jewish Committee, Theodore Mann of the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council, Philip Klutznick of the World Jewish Congress, David Blumberg of B’nai B’rith, Max Greenberg of the Anti-Defamation League, Ed Wanders, a former President of the America-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), and Albert Picker of Miami.110 Later in the month, the White House invited 31 federation community leaders from 19 cities to hear Mondale and Brzezinski defend the sale of U.S. weapons to Arab countries as well as American opposition to Jews establishing towns on the West Bank.111 The wooing of American Jewry was supplemented by a verbal offensive against Israel’s diplomatic stance. In mid-February, the State Department issued a blistering attack on Israel’s West Bank policy.112

The Other War Being Lost

Plainly, given its continuing dependence on the United States, Israel needed the support of American public opinion and for the American Jewish community to serve as the vanguard of that support. However, several ingredients undermined Israel’s standing in public opinion. The facts-on-the-ground were that the Palestinian-Arabs wanted Israel out of the West Bank and Gaza; Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem meant that the most populous Arab state had recognized Israel’s right to exist in the Arab world; the United States publicly committed itself to support Israel, except for its West Bank policies. The perception of the conflict was being transformed from a largely zero-sum context – pitting one Jewish State against legions of Arab and Islamic countries – into a non-zero-sum dispute between Israelis and stateless Palestinians. In this new setting, Israel was hard pressed to explain why it was not more conciliatory. The agent of this change had been, in no small measure, the President of the United States himself.

None of this was lost on Schindler. Speaking at the 29th World Zionist Congress in Jerusalem, he said that Israel’s image in American public opinion had suffered a “major setback.” Carter was moving toward imposing his own solution on an Israel whose image had been transformed. The Jewish State was made to appear “untruthful” and “conniving.” President Sadat’s analysis of the Arab-Israel conflict had largely been accepted by the American people. State Department assertions that Jewish settlements in Judea, Samaria and Gaza were “illegal” further contributed to Israel’s sagging image. Finally, the American news media held Israel and the Arabs to different standards.113

One casualty of the friction between the White House and the Jewish leadership was Mark Alan Siegel, a 31-year-old political scientist, who had been the Administration’s point-man on Jewish concerns. Citing differences with the President’s Mideast policy, Siegel withdrew from the liaison role (and days later resigned from the White House). Lipshitz and Stuart Eizenstat were assigned to fill the vacated job in addition to their regular responsibilities.114

Schindler-Carter Duel

Over time, Carter came to see Schindler as being too close politically to the Begin government and personally obdurate in the face of the President’s efforts to resolve the Arab-Israel conflict. Disassociation was suffering because of Schindler. This was especially ironic given that, privately, Schindler and Begin held few political views in common. Notwithstanding Administration hints that Carter would be pleased to see Schindler’s term as Chairman of the Presidents Conference come to a close, the Conference voted, in an unprecedented move, to extend Schindler’s term beyond its second year.115 The Jewish leadership was sending Carter an obvious message. Schindler later denied telling The New York Times that “Carter was a question mark” regarding his personal feelings toward Jews. Another question mark was NSC Adviser Brzezinski whose sentiments with respect to Jews were also grist for the rumor mills.116

After the coastal road massacre, the U.S. Jewish leadership again called upon the Administration to close the PLO offices in the United States. But State Department spokesman Tom Reston said that due to U.S. laws it was impossible to do so.117 It was in this atmosphere that the next Carter-Begin meeting was held.

On Sunday, March 4, 1978, Carter met with Begin at the White House in an atmosphere marked by “cold formality.”118 The Administration, according to press reports, held Begin accountable for lack of progress in the peace process. The Carter-Begin sessions had been “very, very rough.”
The exchange had been so bitter, so acrimonious, so offensive, Carter said, that he was unable to sleep afterward – and, as one aide said, “He never has trouble sleeping.” . . . As soon as the Israelis were seated, Carter delivered a somewhat stern lecture . . . [Carter] told Begin that Israel would be making a serious mistake if it let this chance for a settlement collapse. The President, according to these sources, said he would not hesitate to go to the American people and put the blame for failure squarely on Israel. . . .119

The American Jewish leadership was being placed in an unenviable position. From Washington, Begin went to New York to address the Presidents Conference. He urged the Jewish leaders to mobilize public opinion on Israel’s behalf: “Go around, take our peace plan, make it known, ask for support.”120 Emboldened, Schindler told the gathering: “Away with the counsel of timidity. Away with the caution of cowardice. Away with those who would flatter themselves into the good graces of the powerful. Away with those who have no convictions. Away with those who would beg for good-will and toady for favor. Who are we? We are Americans with our roots deep in the soil of this land. We are also Jews.”121 But despite the tough talk, U.S. Jewish leaders were decidedly uncomfortable about being publicly cast in the role of Begin supporters in an intemperate political clash with the President of the United States.

IV
Disassociation Realized

Carter’s efforts to separate American Jews from Begin’s West Bank policies came to fruition a month later. A front-page report in The New York Times announced that a group of 37 prominent American Jews had signed a letter supporting “Peace Now.”122 They opposed Jewish settlements on the West Bank and urged Begin to show “greater flexibility.” They said: “. . . Even as we continue to oppose those aspects of American policy which threaten to diminish Israel’s security . . . we are disturbed by the Begin Government’s response to President Sadat’s peace initiative.” Signatories included Rabbi Schindler’s own deputy at the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, Albert Vorspan, political sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset, Irving Levine and Ira Silverman of the American Jewish Committee, Saul Bellow, the Nobel Prize laureate, Breira leader Eugene Borowitz, Leonard Fein of Brandeis, former Conference of Presidents head Rabbi Joachim Prinz and others.123 The path-breaking manifesto legitimized protest against Begin’s policies by aligning criticism with the Prime Minister’s domestic antagonists.124

Only days prior to the “letter of 37” another group of Jewish leaders, associated with liberal organizations, testified before a Knesset committee hearing. They warned that continued Jewish settlement beyond the “Green Line” was damaging to Israel’s image in the United States. Participants included Howard Squadron and Naomi Levine of the AJCongress, Bert Gold of the AJCommittee, Burton Joseph and Benjamin Epstein of the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith, as well as Theodore Mann and Albert Chernin of the National Jewish Community Advisory Council.125

Some of these very leaders were present at a late April meeting in Washington D.C. between a Presidents Conference delegation and Vice President Mondale. The President himself briefly greeted the gathering. Some in the delegation debated with Mondale, arguing that the West Bank settlements were not technically “illegal.”126

Now, a year and a half into the Carter Administration, Jewish criticism of Israeli policies came from diffuse sources with differing motives. With some Israelis calling for an exchange of land-for-peace, individual U.S. Jews became increasingly vocal in criticizing Israeli policies.127 Along the lines of the disassociation strategy, a number of American Jewish leaders wanted to calibrate their support: advocating continued U.S. support for Israel while withholding backing for the Government’s West Bank policies. Schindler, meanwhile, appeared to be leading Begin to believe that the level of U.S. Jewish support for his stance was stable while, at the same time, telling the media something else entirely. Nahum Goldmann bluntly told NSC Adviser Brzezinski that the Carter Administration would have to “break the Jewish lobby” to foster the peace process.128

What impact, if any, all this was having on PLO diplomatic inroads in the United States is difficult to assess. Around this time, though, the State Department allowed the PLO to open an information office in Washington D.C. The Administration claimed it had no legal way to block the move. But some Jewish groups, including the ADL, insisted that the Administration could shut the PLO’s New York and Washington operations if it really wanted to.129 The Administration was sending a tactful perceptual message that changes in PLO goals had earned it a diplomatic bonus. Now, the lure of moderation was attracting the attention of the PLO leadership. Arafat promoted the non-zero-sum message by stating that the PLO would accept the existence of Israel alongside a PLO-led state. The PLO, he explained, was willing to establish its state on land “liberated or from which the Israelis have withdrawn.”130

In the wake of the “letter of the 37,” a new etiquette in Diaspora-Israel relations prevailed. Criticism of Israeli policies by prominent Jewish figures became unexceptional. Arthur Hertzberg of the American Jewish Congress told Israel TV that polls demonstrated American Jewish support for the State of Israel was not the same as support for Israeli Government policies in the Territories. He reiterated this distinction in a Hebrew newspaper Op-Ed essay.131 There was almost a palpable sense of relief on the part of some Jewish leaders that they could join Carter in criticizing Israel instead of having to defend Israel from Carter’s criticism.

Perhaps not surprisingly, given her recent defense of Begin, the Prime Minister found an ally in former Prime Minister Golda Meir. She chastised Peace Now for suggesting that a trade of “land for peace” in the Jordan Valley and the Golan was a viable negotiating position for Israel. Peace, she suggested, could not be purchased at any price.132

The Administration now engaged in an effort to sanitize the PLO’s image even as it sought to moderate PLO policies. So, while deploring the June 1978 bombing of Jerusalem’s Mahaneh Yehuda open-air market, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State William Harrop refused to characterize the PLO as either a “terrorist” or “non-terrorist” group.133 From the Administration’s perspective, the Palestinian cause had to be unlinked from the scourge of terrorism. It had to be judged on its own merits. Only that way could U.S. Jews play their assigned role in promoting the peace process.

During nearly 30 years in opposition, Begin had maintained a tradition of not criticizing the Israeli government while abroad or in writings aimed specifically at a non-Israeli readership. This is worthwhile noting because, as I argue, it was partly their exposure to Israeli criticism of Begin (added to Administration admonishment of Begin) which countenanced, indeed inspired, so much of the American Jewish protest against Begin. Thus, in the summer of 1978, Labor Party leader Shimon Peres published an Op-Ed essay in The New York Times advocating an exchange of some West Bank land-for-peace and implying that, unlike the Begin-led Israeli Government, Labor was sensitive to the conflicting considerations which needed to be taken into account in order to promote peace. He recalled that Begin “vehemently and consistently opposed the idea of partition, which enabled Israel to be born.” Labor’s aim was: “A fair solution, under which as many Palestinians as possible would be under an Arab flag while” Israeli security needs were protected. This could be accomplished by turning over parts of the West Bank to Jordan (which was largely a Palestinian state anyway).134

Ted Mann

In late June 1978, Theodore R. Mann, a Czechoslovakian-born attorney based in Philadelphia, and head of the umbrella National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council (NJCRAC), replaced Schindler as Chairman of the Presidents Conference. His policy differences with the Israeli Government were widely known.135 Confronted with the Andrew Young Affair and Carter’s adversarial approach to Begin, Mann did his duty and pursued the course established by previous chairman. He would react to crises as they developed and try to be generally supportive of Begin’s approach. However, the Presidents Conference would not actively champion Begin’s line with regard to the Administered Territories.

The importance Carter attached to garnering American Jewish support for his policies can be gleaned from his appointment of former AIPAC chairman Ed Sanders as the White House liaison with the Jewish community.136 Mark Alan Segal, an earlier liaison, leveled an unprecedented and blunt indictment of Carter, calling the president “hostile toward Israel.”137 But Carter’s alleged insensitivity toward Israel did not inhibit other American Jews from criticizing Begin. An ad carrying 700 names of American Jews supporting Peace Now was published in the Jerusalem Post in July.138 On the other hand, the quarrelsome mood between the Administration and Israel did seemingly lead some establishment supporters of “disassociation” to having second thoughts. Given the Begin Government’s line, it was difficult to calibrate pressure on Israel to abandon the Territories while simultaneously preserving the essential fabric of the U.S.-Israel relationship. This led AJCongress head Howard Squadron to warn against an “imposed” peace.139 Ted Mann adhered to a similar position in urging the Egyptians to resume their talks with Israel. He said it would be a serious error for the U.S. to press for Israeli concessions.140

Camp David

In August 1978, the White House announced that Sadat and Begin would meet at Camp David to continue their quest for an agreement. The Camp David negotiations are tangentially linked to the U.S.-PLO dialogue topic in the sense that the process helped solidify the Arab-Israel struggle in non-zero-sum parameters. In Israel, “Peace Now” mobilized fifty thousand demonstrators in Tel Aviv on the eve of the Camp David talks to urge Begin to show “flexibility.”141 Meanwhile, in the U.S., Howard Squadron, a sometime Begin critic now serving as Acting Chairman of the Presidents Conference, expressed ostensible support for Israel’s position going into the Camp David talks.142

The Administration was clearly frustrated by its inability to gain concessions from the PLO. Talks would have to proceed without direct input from the Palestinian Arabs. Unable to persuade the PLO to make the necessary concessions, the Administration shifted tactics. The United States announced it would bar entry of PLO representatives into the country as part of a program to keep out anyone advocating the assassination of U.S. government officials.143 President Carter went so far as to equate the PLO with the Ku Klux Klan and Nazis, saying it would be nice if they would all just go away. This get-tough course was maintained for some time. Nevertheless, it did not prevent Carter from enigmatically commenting that: “As a result of Camp David, the people of the Palestinian area will have a chance to administer their own affairs, including the right to worship.”144

When finally achieved, the Camp David Agreement, which included an Israeli commitment for a three-month settlement freeze, was denounced by virtually the entire Arab world as well as the Palestine Liberation Organization. Almost immediately, the United States and Israel differed on how the agreement was to be interpreted and implemented. Unconnected to Administration efforts, but worth noting because they contributed to the overall political environment, the U.N. and the American media helped keep the spotlight on the Palestinian-Arab issue. ABC television broadcast a documentary approbative of the PLO cause;145 at the U.N. , a $500,000 pro-PLO informational program was well under way.146

Carter and the Jewish leadership remained at odds over Camp David interpretation and implementation issues. White House pressure on Israel intensified. The Presidents Conference complained that Carter was championing the Egyptian side. A litany of seemingly unconnected events exacerbated tensions, including: the duration of the settlement freeze agreed to by Begin; “off the cuff” remarks by Hodding Carter terming Begin a “terrorist”; a White House snub of Begin during his brief visit to North America; Carter’s insinuation that U.S. Jews were making too much of the PLO issue; the President implying that the PLO was capable of evolving in a moderate direction; and Carter’s comments on the future of Jerusalem, contributed to a deepening estrangement between the White House and the Presidents Conference.147

U.S.-Israel tensions were now shaped by Israel’s desire to exploit the opening with Egypt in order to solve the Arab-Israel conflict at the state-to-state level. But the U.S. seemed to be encouraging Sadat to hold the prospect of an Israel-Egypt peace treaty hostage to the Palestinian-Arab component . Meanwhile, Israel sought to avoid linking the lack of a West Bank autonomy breakthrough with the signing of a peace treaty. Now, Begin’s Jewish critics, even those who had signed a public letter on behalf of Peace Now, denounced the Administration for siding with Egypt. Ted Mann led a Presidents Conference delegation to a meeting with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance where they told Vance that the U.S. should serve as a mediator rather than take sides.148

Both the Administration and the PLO worked assiduously to keep Camp David from eclipsing the PLO cause. Reiterating his earlier message, implying that it no longer demanded the dismantling of Israel, Arafat announced in December 1978 that the PLO was willing to form a state in any part of Palestine evacuated by Israel.149 Illustrative of how the Administration shaped the agenda and made choices which forced the Jewish leadership into making its own selections, UN Ambassador Andrew Young insinuated that American diplomacy was being hampered by the lack of an “effective relationship with the Palestinian people.” He argued that the United States ought to “have some way of relating to the Palestinian people” and noted that Washington was working on this problem. The PLO’s UN delegation, Young further implied, was a moderating influence on the group. Palestinians believed that the peace process did not offer them self-determination. A link between the U.S. and the PLO would address Palestinian concerns.150

Hodding Carter balanced Young’s remarks by stating: “We have not changed our policy regarding the PLO. Our only contacts with the PLO in New York City – and nowhere else – are incidental and related to our responsibilities as host country to the UN.”151 But Jewish leaders were not mollified. Some suggested that Young was the Administration’s point-man in laying the groundwork for a U.S.-PLO relationship.152

On the Friday after Young’s comments, Mann led a Presidents Conference delegation to the White House for a meeting with Carter. The President again assured the Jewish leaders that the United States would not deal with the PLO until it accepts Israel’s sovereignty and its right to exist.153 The Administration’s tacit commitment to bring the PLO into the negotiations under previously enunciated conditions was something the Israelis reluctantly acknowledged. Foreign Minister Dayan remarked that it would be difficult to keep the PLO out of the peace process. His political confidant, Zalman Shoval, said that Dayan was not advocating a PLO role but merely facing reality.154 The idea of the centrality of the Palestinian problem was on Carter’s mind when, in March 1979, he traveled to the region in order to personally pursue the talks started at Camp David. While in Cairo for talks with Sadat, Carter restated his view that peace depended on including the “Palestinian people” in the process.155

Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty Signed

With the exception of Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem two years earlier, no event contributed more to recasting the Arab-Israel conflict along non-zero-sum terms than the U.S.-brokered peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. Decades of overt hostility and war between Egypt and Israel officially came to a close on March 26, 1979. The treaty was premised upon the Camp David Accords which called for negotiations over the West Bank to take place in stages. Broadly speaking, this was to involve:
Electing a self-governing Authority in the Administered Territories.
This Authority would negotiate a transitional arrangement for the West Bank and Gaza for a period of five years aimed at providing autonomy to the area’s inhabitants.
The five-year period would begin after the Authority was elected.
At the third-year point, talks would start to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza.156

From the vantage point of political suasion analysis, the American handling of the post-treaty era reveals how a determined player can manipulate dimensions so as to gain situational advantage. Far from encouraging the Egyptian-Israeli relationship to serve as a stepping stone toward similar arrangements with other Arab states, and far from diminishing the stature of the PLO, the Administration toiled assiduously to keep the PLO in the game. Notwithstanding what they were telling the Israelis and their American Jewish supporters, U.S. authorities were leaving the door more than slightly ajar to the prospect of PLO participation in the peace process. The PLO would not be allowed to participate based on its platform calling for Israel’s dismantlement. But the U.S. seemed committed to teasing the PLO into transforming itself into an acceptable player.

The U.S. romanced the PLO while rejecting Jewish settlement in Samaria, Judea and Gaza. These mutually reinforcing tactics were based on the assumption that the PLO could be coaxed into accepting something less than the destruction of Israel, namely: the West Bank and Gaza, so long as there was something tangible left to offer the Palestinian Arabs. Therefore, Israeli actions which connoted retention of the Territories had to be denigrated and undermined. So, for example, in early April 1979, the PLO’s Beirut chief Shafik al-Hout was granted a special waiver to tour U.S. Ivy League college campuses. He had been invited to the U.S. by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. Hodding Carter, the State Department spokesman, said in response to a question, that the U.S. had no knowledge linking al-Hout with terrorism.157 Subsequent press reports revealed that Vance had apparently arranged for the Immigration and Naturalization Service to allow him into the United States. Later, two Administration officials stumbled upon al-Hout at the Syrian Embassy on the occasion of Syrian Nation Day.158 The State Department position before a Senate Sub-Committee was that the United States could have “informal” contacts with the PLO without violating its “no talk” agreement with Israel.159

The success of the American flirtation with the PLO depended on making clear what was expected of the group. Thus, the President told a news conference that he would not negotiate with the PLO unless it endorsed UN Resolution 242.160 This was the message that would be affirmed time and again. Carter also let it be known that his Administration was not surreptitiously negotiating with the PLO.161

Presidents Conference Consensus on Settlements

Jewish life in the West Bank, PLO contacts and the prospect of trading captured land in anticipation of peace were inextricably linked issues. Despite their discomfiture over Begin government policies, the Administration’s relentless, determined criticism of Jewish settlements in the Territories as illegal was not well received within the Presidents Conference. Carter’s focus on settlements seemed disproportionate compared to other elements of the dispute. Even “land-for-peace” advocates, such as American Jewish Congress president Howard Squadron, viewed the Administration’s approach as counter-productive. Ted Mann, Chairman of the Presidents Conference, said that American Jews accepted Jewish settlement in the Territories as “legal” and “necessary.” Though, as Ha’aretz reported, Mann was critical of one particular settlement at Elon Moreh.162

But a nascent internal opposition within the Jewish establishment had, by now, emerged. So, the Presidents Conference effort to speak with one voice on this divisive issue was hardly successful. Allen Pollack of the Labor Zionist Alliance and Frieda Leeman of the Pioneer Women issued a joint statement asserting: “There is no consensus in the American Jewish community or even in the Conference of Presidents regarding the Israeli government settlement policy.” Indeed, sixty-two “prominent settlement opponents issued a public letter critical of Begin’s West Bank policy.163

In mid-June, Mann, Israel Miller and Yehuda Hellman met with Begin on the settlement issue. Reports leaked to the press suggested that the Jewish leaders opposed the creation of the Elon Moreh settlement because of its location near an Arab population center.164 Elon Moreh, portrayed as being situated on “expropriated Arab land,” served as a catalyst for a new spurt of anti-Israeli Government criticism. Spearheaded by the publicity know-how of Martin Peretz, owner of the New Republic, fifty-nine well known American Jews, including composer Leonard Bernstein, said they found Jewish retention of Samaria and Judea, with its 750,000 Arab inhabitants, “morally unacceptable.” Publicly, Mann said: “That such settlements are legal is not only my view but the consensus in the American Jewish community.”165

Mann’s comments followed on the heels of a Presidents Conference attempt at a consensus stance regarding West Bank settlement. The common position proclaimed that:
Jewish settlements in Judea, Samaria and Gaza were legal.
Jordan is Palestine and no second Palestinian state should be established.
Jerusalem is indivisible.
The U.S. should have no relations with the PLO.
Israel will respect Camp David.166

While the Jewish leadership was grappling with the issue of what should be done in connection with Jewish settlement in the Territories, the State Department continued its ongoing efforts to draw the PLO into the peace process. The standard proviso remained operative: the United States was willing to talk to the PLO if it recognized Israel’s right to exist. According to Hodding Carter:
We continued to hope that the PLO will change its firmly held position and concede and grant Israel’s right to exist – in which case the President has said he would be willing to talk to the PLO. There is no assumption that anybody else will be willing. Our efforts are aimed specifically at the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza to indicate we want them to be participants as called for in the peace treaty.167

Strategic choices force choices but in the interim they can also cause frustrations. Because of the Administration’s unswerving accent on the Palestinian question, the Jewish leadership was being pressured into making a choice it was not ready to make. This resulted in worsening relations between the Jewish leadership and the President. The pressure was kept on in various ways. For instance, Carter showed little acceptance of Israel’s course of harsh reprisals in response to acts of Arab terrorism. Mann felt prompted to complain that “the equation of Israeli attempts to wipe out terrorism with terrorism itself, is a moral outrage.”168

Never had a United States President offered so heartfelt an embrace of the Palestinian-Arab cause as did Jimmy Carter. To the Jewish leadership’s consternation, Carter likened the Palestinian-Arab cause to the United States civil rights movement. He spoke of the Arab right to return to homes in what had become Israel. And he pointed to his Jewish advisers, Sol Linowitz and Robert Strauss, as fully supporting the Administration policy on the Palestinians.169 Jewish dismay and disappointment over the civil rights analogy was almost immediate.170 The White House promptly issued a statement clarifying the President’s reference to the U.S. civil rights movement: Carter wanted his remarks to be interpreted as referring to the fact that the civil rights movement in the U.S. was largely successful because it was peaceful.171

Categorization of the Conflict

Incrementally, the perception of the conflict was in transition. The non-zero-sum configuration took on greater vitality. The American focus on the Palestinian issue was the end-product of a number of concrete changes on the ground since 1967. Nevertheless, a policy tilt toward the Palestinian-Arabs at Israel’s expense was contingent upon a transformation of the perceptions. This had to be accomplished in real terms – by getting the Arab camp to accept Israel’s existence – and on a more sublime psychological level by changing popular (especially Jewish) attitudes toward the Palestinian vanguard.172 The fundamental question remained: was the Arab camp’s relatively recent concern about the appearance of moderation translatable into actual moderation?

Even in the wake of Sadat’s 1977 peace overture, elements of the Jewish leadership remained suspicious of Arab intentions. In particular, Arafat’s image – so closely associated with the struggle he represented – had been thoroughly demonized in the mind’s eye of many Jews. Remarks by Congressman Paul Findley about Arafat’s image “problem” together with his suggestion that what the PLO leader needed were some pointers on public relations, only served to heighten Jewish suspicions.173 Furthermore, many in the Jewish leadership surmised that the Administration was tacitly cooperating in refining Arafat’s image.174 Increasingly Arafat came to be presented in the Western press and through meetings with Western European leaders, as a moderate willing to negotiate a plan of coexistence with Israel.175 With American acquiescence, Arafat was welcomed in Vienna in 1979 for contacts with the Socialist International. In return the PLO promised to stop terrorist activities outside Israel. Some U.S. officials suggested that adherence to this pledge would show “Arafat has power and is of good faith.” According to the Christian Science Monitor:
It is also believed that the Socialist International is maintaining PLO contacts in consultation with the United States. According to some diplomats, President Carter recently asked Willy Brandt to ‘sound out the PLO.’ Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky claims that ‘I also informed the American Ambassador [in Vienna, Milton A. Wolfe] a day before Arafat’s arrival. . . . [U.S. officials] point to the fact that [Kreisky and Brandt] would not do something which would make the U.S. in the long run unhappy. . . . These officials point out that Washington’s attitude toward the Palestinians has changed, but the U.S. has ‘limited possibilities’ of expressing this without endangering its role as mediator in the Egyptian-Israeli peace process. . . .176

For all his efforts to “diplomatically mainstream” the PLO, it is perhaps ironic that Carter continued to profess an aversion to creating a PLO-led state:
I am against any creation of a separate Palestinian state. I don’t think it would be good for the Palestinians. I don’t think it would be good for Israel. I don’t think it would be good for the Arab neighbors of such a state. . . . We must address and resolve the Palestinian question in all its aspects . . . [they] should have a right to a voice in the determination of their own future.177

V

Andrew Young Affair

From the viewpoint of political suasion analysis, the import of the Andrew Young affair cannot be overstated. Andrew Young’s personal relationship with the President of the United States seemed especially significant. The stunning revelation that, in his capacity as Ambassador to the U.N., Young had held secret contacts with the PLO’s Zehdi Labib Terzi, coupled with the news that U.S. Ambassador to Austria Milton Wolf had been holding talks with Issam Sartawi, shocked the Jewish leadership. Here was an Administration making a strategic choice that left the Jewish leadership little room to maneuver. Jewish leaders were incensed, with some, individually, calling for Young’s resignation.

Inasmuch as the PLO had not met conditions for a dialogue with the United States, the August 1979 disclosure that the Carter Administration was nevertheless engaged in secret contacts with the PLO dramatically heightened tensions between the White House and the Jewish community. In announcing that Wolf (who is Jewish) also had contact with the PLO, the State Department seemed to be trying to draw some of the focus away from Young. Vance publicly rebuked Young for his unauthorized contacts with the PLO.178

The event contained all the ingredients needed to foster saturation media coverage: the nation’s first Black American U.N. Ambassador was under fire from the U.S. Jewish community over the PLO. Two days after the meetings were made public Young resigned, blaming Israel for the notoriety attached to the expose.179 Even as the Wolf-Sartawi meetings were being downplayed as having little significance, Young’s resignation only exacerbated frictions. Resentment developed between American Jews and the Black community over charges that Jews had driven Young from office. Meanwhile, the tensions between the Jewish community and the White House persisted, despite a meeting between Mann and Robert Strauss.180

What was serendipity for the Administration proved ruinous for Jewish efforts to contain the PLO cause. Whatever his initial designs, Young became a vocal advocate of closer U.S.-PLO ties after his resignation. He said the policy of not talking to the PLO was “ridiculous.” On the CBS broadcast Face the Nation, he also said that American Blacks would suffer most if an Arab oil embargo were again imposed on the United States. Israel, he charged, did not appreciate the impact of such an embargo on the Black community in the United States.181

In the face of White House silence, Mann wrote Carter to reiterate the position of the Jewish leadership: “As you know we did not ask for Ambassador Young’s resignation, nor is his resignation an issue in the relationship between the Jewish and the black communities. Our differences are with State Department policy. Those differences remain.”182 That was, decidedly, not the position many key African-American leaders took. Days after Young resigned, Dr. Joseph Lowerly, President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, William Jones, Wyatt Walker, Harry Gibson, Philip Cousin and George Lawrence held a conspicuous meeting with New York-based PLO officials.183

The Jewish leadership found that holding the dike against the pressure of PLO public relations advances was becoming progressively burdensome. Every new revelation undermined the legitimacy of holding the PLO in odium. The Jewish community was further shaken by rumors – unfounded, it turned out – that Dr. Nahum Goldman, president of the World Jewish Congress, was now set to meet Yasir Arafat.184 Toward the end of August, White House envoy Robert Strauss met with a Presidents Conference delegation led by Mann in Washington. Having just returned from a round of talks in the Middle East, Strauss said U.S. policy on the PLO had not changed but he also insisted that the Palestinians had to be brought into the peace process.185

The Administration continued to demonstrate an unprecedented regard for Palestinian-Arab sensibilities. For example, an Israeli Air Force strike against PLO targets in Lebanon induced the State Department to charge Israel with practicing “terror.”186 In Paris, at one of his final appearances as U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Young said that American blacks “now believe that the Palestinians are oppressed and will act accordingly.” He would “continue to oppose the fact that Israel can take decisions concerning the national interests of the United States.” Young predicted that the time would come when the U.S. would engage the PLO in a diplomatic dialogue.187 In Geneva, meantime, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Human Rights Commission Beverly Carter voted affirmatively on a resolution supporting the PLO.188

Evidently, these U.S. policy signals (whether purposeful or inadvertent) did not convince Arafat that the time was ripe for an explicit overture to the United States. In an interview with Barbara Walters on the ABC news television program Issues and Answers, he refused to directly address the issue of coexistence between a Palestinian and Jewish state.189

Environmental Factors

The PLO’s fortunes were on the rise everywhere and the Presidents Conference worked strenuously to keep pace with Arab diplomatic achievements. For example, Mann and Yehuda Hellman met with the Spanish Ambassador to the United State sin Washington to protest an Arafat visit to Spain.190 But the shifting perceptual climate within the American political system contributed to intensifying support for a U.S.-PLO dialogue. The National Council of Churches endorsed Young’s actions and urged both the United States and Israel to negotiate with the PLO.191 The NAACP also joined the chorus, calling for a dialogue with the PLO. Its executive Director Benjamin Hooks urged Carter to rethink his “no talk” PLO policy.192 B‘nai B’rith, the American Jewish Committee and the Synagogue Council of America (all members of the Presidents Conference) challenged the promotion of a U.S.-PLO dialogue. The Presidents Conference also worked diligently behind the scenes to block the seemingly inexorable momentum toward a U.S.-PLO dialogue. Mann reported that he had received new assurances from the Administration that it would not openly deal with the PLO. He told US News and World Report that he opposed Arafat’s involvement in the “peace process” even if the PLO accepted Israel’s right to exist: “It gains us nothing to try to put words in PLO leaders’ mouths that they are unwilling to say themselves. We’ve learned from the last couple of generations that when somebody threatens to extinguish a whole people, he deserves to be taken at his word. The PLO is no better than the Nazis and dealing with them is appeasing them.”193 Meanwhile, Mann tried to put the best possible face on the Black community’s apparent support for U.S.-PLO talks.194

American political suasion efforts, aimed at getting the U.S. Jewish community to embrace the Administration’s evaluation that the Palestinian issue was central to resolving the Arab-Israel conflict, took various forms. At a dinner speech sponsored by the World Jewish Congress in New York, Brzezinski urged Israel to accept the “legitimate” rights of the Palestinian Arabs.195 A related message came from Douglas Bennet, head of the Agency for International Development, who warned, while on a visit to Israel, that failure to embrace the Administration’s viewpoint would result in U.S. public opinion turning anti-Israel, particularly when the Jewish State requested more economic aid.196

Arguably, from the Administration’s vantage point, it was fortunate that the Jewish community came out of the Andrew Young affair badly bruised politically. Their lesson was that continued support for Israel now carried a domestic political and social penalty. Belatedly, late in September, in the face of continued Black-Jewish tensions, Carter revealed that the Jewish leadership had not approached him to dismiss Ambassador Young.197

The ambience of crisis, another ingredient in political manipulation, persisted in Black-Jewish relations. Now out of Government, Young was even more adamant in his advocacy of a U.S.-PLO dialogue. On the occasion of the Jewish High Holy Days, Young instructed Jews to repent for Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians.198 Then in October, Arafat received a delegation of Black leaders, including Jesse Jackson, thereby keeping the issue of U.S.-PLO relations very much in the news.

In this overall perceptual climate, the Administration continued to maintain that American policy on the PLO had not changed.199 Responding to a news conference question, Carter repeated that the U.S. would not talk with the PLO until it recognized Israel’s right to exist and U.N. Resolution 242.200 Among State Department Arabists, there was widespread support for Carter’s line. U.S. Ambassador Talcott Seelye met with PLO officials during a Damascus reception held on behalf of Jesse Jackson. But officially the State Department dismissed the presence of Seelye as “a set-up.”201

For reasons that remain unclear, in mid-October, Andrew Young let it be known that Israel was, after all, not to blame for his resignation as U.N. Ambassador.202 But Black-Jewish tensions about the PLO had been a sideshow. The constant reality was that the PLO issue would not go away. The Atlantic Council, an influential “think tank,” issued a study authored by Brent Scowcroft and Andrew Goodpaster urging that informal U.S.-PLO contacts be maintained.203 Representative Lee Hamilton (a proponent of a U.S.-PLO dialogue) challenged the Administration on whether it also refused to talk with PLO sympathizers.204 Tangentially linked to the PLO issue, and certainly to Jewish perceptions about Begin, was the October 1979 resignation from the Israeli Cabinet of Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan. Dayan’s departure reverberated within the American Jewish leadership, leaving the impression that the Israelis were themselves divided on the future of the West Bank.205

VI

Elections

Liberal Jewish leaders were in a quandary. The Presidential elections now loomed on the horizon and some of them found it difficult to offer knee-jerk support for the liberal Democrat incumbent. The Carter Administration’s handling of the Palestinian issue – making it the centerpiece of its Arab-Israel policy – resulted in lasting negative repercussions within the Jewish community. Staunchly liberal Jewish leaders, including Schindler, the former chairman of the Presidents Conference, could not bring themselves to forgive the President. Schindler made a number of damnatory charges: that the Carter Administration had exploited Jews for political gain and that its handling of the Andrew Young affair was nothing short of “political anti-Semitism.”206 Still, it was hardly surprising that both major parties reiterated their commitment to a secure Israel and a “no-talk” policy toward the PLO.207

The appointment of Philip Klutznik, a former World Jewish Congress president (and strong Begin critic), as Secretary of Commerce was seen by some as an effort by the Administration to make amends with the Jewish community.208 Coincidentally, or not, other signals were also forthcoming. Senator George McGovern, visiting Jerusalem, said that “for the moment” he endorsed American policy of not talking to the PLO.209 Sol Linowitz offered that some Israeli settlements on the West Bank were demonstrably necessary for Israel’s security.210 In one of the season’s more unseemly episodes, Carter was virtually “endorsed” by former Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizmann. Weizmann had gone through a political metamorphosis (having served as the Likud campaign manager in 1977 but winding up on the Israeli Left).211

The Administration sought to walk a fine line between political expediency at home and the pursuit of its policies abroad. There was no reaction, for instance, to Farouk Kaddoumi’s warning that Arabs participating in the Autonomy talks with Israel would be considered traitors.212 During the Teheran hostage ordeal, the State Department downplayed the PLO’s role in training and supporting the anti-Shah forces aligned with Ayatollah Khomeini. The United States said that, in fact, the PLO was playing a constructive role in the hostage crisis.213 Carter must have been frustrated that the Presidential election season made it politic to tone down the rhetoric about Arab-Israel conflict resolution. Others, however, were available to step into the limelight. At the start of 1980, a House delegation appointed by Speaker Tip O’Neil met with with Arafat in Lebanon. Congressman Toby Moffett said the Arafat meeting had been “unscheduled.” But the delegation said it intended to promote the creation of a Palestinian state. At the meeting, Arafat “pledged to keep his promise not to attack Israel anymore from Lebanon – whatever that is worth,” according to Moffett.214 They, in turn, urged the PLO chief to maintain a “moderate stance.”215

Still, the PLO remained anathema to mainstream American politicians. While perceptions of the Arab-Israel conflict were in transition, it is worth noting that politicians nevertheless viewed an association with the PLO as a political liability. For instance, Senator Edward Kennedy, who was contemplating a run for the Democratic presidential nomination, called upon the Administration to end its flirtation with the PLO.216 Leaks to the news media suggested that the Administration was pursuing a new “Middle East doctrine” which downgraded Israel as a strategic asset.217 Countervailing pressure came from the Protestant, politically liberal, National Council of Churches which had become an important booster of the PLO in the United States. The NCC held “hearings” on the Middle East to which Jewish groups were invited to testify. None did.218

Jewish Opposition Takes Shape

The division of anti-Likud opposition, which for purposes of exposition I define as internal opposition, outside the elite and peace camp, would not take firm shape until the Reagan years. But its basic outlines had come into focus. Jewish dissidents critical of the Begin Government were given a major boost when Arthur Hertzberg, Vice President of the World Jewish Congress, embraced the line long espoused by WJC head Nahum Goldman. Hertzberg had traversed the philosophical distance from wanting to tell the Ford Administration to “go hang,” when it appeared that the U.S. would impose a solution the Arab-Israel conflict, to becoming a key Israel government critic. Hertzberg shifted from being a supporter of Israeli policies to opposing these same policies from within. Eventually, he would wind up as a party to the outside elite. Toward the end of the Carter years, Hertzberg insisted that: “The single most dangerous thing that can happen to Israel is the muting of dissent.”219

Also by early 1980, Rabbi Alexander Schindler abandoned his stance of publicly supporting Israeli policies. Breira and the New Jewish Agenda had already trail-blazed the road the peace camp would take. And Nahum Goldmann of the WJC had earlier set the stage for the trans-national and outside elite to lobby against Israeli policies. Schindler’s defection significantly promoted efforts to dissociate American Jews from Israel’s policies in Judea and Samaria. Equally important, it facilitated the development of a legitimate internal opposition within Presidents Conference affiliated groups.

The fact that Schindler was a former Presidents Conference chairman lent a great deal of prestige to his complaint that funds spent in the West Bank would be better allocated within the “green line.”220 During his tenure at the Presidents Conference he felt it inappropriate to openly challenge Begin. But Schindler’s criticism now was a public re-affirmation of the views he had held before assuming the top Jewish leadership position.

Illustrative of disassociation, the prestigious American Jewish Committee, under the leadership of Richard Maas and Bert Gold, told Begin that he was overestimating support for his policies among American Jewry. In conjunction with a Presidents Conference session in Jerusalem, the AJCommittee warned Begin that they would not defend his plans to re-establish the Hebron Jewish community (which had been wiped out during the Arab uprising in 1929).221 Yet as much as the Jewish leadership wanted to disassociate themselves from Israel’s retention of Judea and Samaria, they found it difficult to support the tone and nuance of the Administration’s approach. They were troubled by a U.S.-supported United Nations Security Council resolution calling upon Israel to dismantle Jewish settlements in “Palestinian territories.” The Carter Administration was merely pursuing its policy of political suasion. Tactically, situational advantage seeking opportunities presented themselves regularly at the U.N.. The Jewish leadership, however, had never embraced the idea of an Israeli withdrawal from Jerusalem. The State Department explanation was the U.S. support of the resolution was based on “the understanding that all references to Jerusalem would be deleted” but that a “communications foul-up” led to the U.S. vote.222 Presidents Conference Chairman Ted Mann asserted that the inclusion of Jerusalem was “unacceptable to all segments of Jewish opinion.”223

The Administration may have made some tactical political missteps, but its policy remained firmly grounded in the belief that the Palestinian Arab issue was at the crux of the Arab-Israel conflict. As Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South East Asian Affairs, Harold Saunders told a Washington policy conference, the “need to deal with the Palestinian problem” was basic to U.S. policy.224 But equally important was having domestic Jewish support for its policies. To that end Administration officials went out of their way to reassure Jewish leaders of the President’s basic support for Israel. This was an absolutely essential element in the disassociation process directed at driving a wedge between Israel’s West Bank policies and the U.S. Jewish community. To allay their concerns about U.S. support for Israel, Linowitz and Strauss addressed a closed-door meeting of some 100 Jewish leaders at the Manhattan Club. The Jewish leaders insisted that Carter issue a “clear public statement stressing support for Israel.”225 There was no reason such a request could not easily be met. Within days the President vowed that the guiding premise of his Mideast policy was Israeli security and that he, furthermore, favored an “undivided” Jerusalem.226 Later, the President even reaffirmed his opposition to the establishment of a Palestinian state.227

Disassociation was a highly nuanced policy. New York’s grass-roots Jewish voters could not distinguish it from outright anti-Israel hostility. Politically, the president’s Middle East policy may have cost him the New York State Democratic primary elections which Senator Edward Kennedy won with strong Jewish support.228

Continuing its effort to gather support for Administration policies among American Jews, in late April, Carter designated Alfred Moses, who had ties with the American Jewish Committee, as his new liaison to the Jewish community.229 Synchronous with these outreach efforts, the President continued his quest of bringing the PLO into the diplomatic mainstream. On a trip to Zimbabwe for that country’s independence festivities, Andrew Young, serving as Carter’s official representative, once again took the opportunity to meet with PLO officials who were also attending the celebrations.230

Israeli Labor Party leader Shimon Peres may not have boosted Carter’s standing among U.S. Jews, even as he did his best to undermine Begin’s position. On a visit to the United States, Peres met with Carter and said Labor opposed the Israeli government’s Autonomy plan for the Palestinian Arabs. He said that while a self-governing authority in the Gaza District might be workable he continued to favor the Jordanian option for the West Bank.231

Many a Jewish leader who was thoroughly uncomfortable with Begin’s policies found Carter’s disassociation approach too heavy-handed. It was one thing to focus attention on the mounting long-term costs of not accommodating Palestinian Arab aspirations, but the imbalance was too great. Even though it was essential to effective disassociation, not enough emphasis was being placed on reassuring the American Jewish community of continued U.S. political support for Israel. The decision not to order a veto of a U.N. Security Council resolution critical of Israeli reprisal raids against PLO targets rankled. Schindler, by no means a Begin ally, lambasted Carter: “By refusing to exercise its right of veto, the White House has encouraged PLO terrorism, given the green light to those countries eager to follow the example of Austria in conferring legitimacy on Yasir Arafat, heightened Israel’s diplomatic isolation and turned its back on the Camp David accords.”232

The President’s efforts to repeal the Wolf Amendment, passed by Congress to bar American financial support to United Nations programs promoting the PLO, further dismayed the Jewish leadership.233 Yet, because of their own criticism of Begin’s policies, just where the Jewish leadership stood was obscure. Still, the perception that they privately supported U.S. pressure on Israel to force a change in its West Bank policies rankled. Mann, the Presidents Conference head, wrote The New York Times challenging columnist and Israel critic Anthony Lewis:
First let me try to end one of the myths that Mr. Lewis has perpetuated in so many of his columns. He suggests that I really agree with him but that I will not say so publicly because the American Jewish tradition “evidently demands solidarity above all.”

. . . The basic flaw in Mr. Lewis’s argument is his assumption that Israel has it in its power to resolve the conflict; that if Israel would only stop building settlements in the West Bank, the Palestinian Arabs and/or Jordan might enter the peace process.

. . . Oh, how I would like to believe that! But Mr. Lewis offers not a shred of evidence to support his assertion. . . . Add to this the continuing refusal of the P.L.O. to amend the Palestinian National Covenant, which calls for the annihilation of Israel . . .

One can legitimately argue whether Israel’s current settlement policy is good for its image (it clearly is not) or even whether it is in Israel’s own best interest. But it is foolish and deceptive to suggest that if Israel’s policy were to change, Palestinians or Jordan would enter the peace process. . . . If Israel’s enemies still regard peace with the Jewish State as unthinkable, are settlements not a legitimate way to prevent the West Bank from evolving into a sovereign state from which terrorist attacks will make life in Israel intolerable?234

Mann’s quandary found resonance elsewhere in the Jewish establishment. The American Jewish Committee chapter in Washington, D.C. voted 37 to 23 with 40 abstentions to stop criticizing Israel’s efforts to settle Judea and Samaria.235

No such qualms troubled the hard-left (ideologically identical on Arab-Israel issues with the peace camp). I.F. Stone and Milton Viorst of The New Yorker brought Arab leaders deported from the West Bank to public forums aimed at mostly Jewish audiences. The deportees were represented as forces for moderation interested in a non-zero-sum outcome to the conflict. Arrangements were made for the deportees to meet with Congressional supporters of a U.S.-PLO dialogue such as Representative Lee Hamilton (D-Tenn.) of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.236

Two Leadership Changes

Edgar Bronfman, the Canadian billionaire, became acting President of the World Jewish Congress, after Carter formally appointed Klutznik to be Secretary of Labor. His great wealth allowed him to salvage the moribund WJC. An outspoken critic of Begin, Bronfman promised to refrain from criticizing Israel.237 Nevertheless, with the WJC as a platform Bronfman became an even more important transnational political actor.238 Also in June 1980, New York attorney Howard Squadron was elected Chairman of the Presidents Conference.239 Like other Jewish leaders, Squadron took a “pragmatic non-zero-sum” approach. Squadron’s analysis of the Israel-Egyptian peace talks is illustrative: “Sadat would probably prefer that Israel was not there but as long as it’s there, it’s better to make peace with her.”240

Yet another complication encountered by the Administration in its attempt to articulate a carefully calibrated critique of Israel’s West Bank policies, while simultaneously espousing overall support of the Jewish State, was that it left the White House open to criticism that the United States was sending mixed messages. Senator George McGovern criticized Carter along precisely these lines and, surprisingly, urged him to reject European efforts to bring the PLO into the peace process.241 Befuddlement was, however, a two-way street. Bolstered by none other than Schindler’s criticism of Israel’s settlement policy, Senator Adlai Stevenson (D-Ill.) reproached Begin for “blithely, sometimes insultingly” ignoring American policy on the West Bank.242

Rita Hauser

Rita Hauser came to prominence as a pro-Israel activist associated with the AJCommittee. After Begin’s election, while still with the AJCommittee, Hauser became publicly critical of Israeli policies. After leaving the Committee, she became a paramount outside elite actor. Her role in the U.S. decision to enter into a dialogue with the PLO will be examined, in greater detail, later on. The evolution in her thinking can be gleaned from Hauser’s first public denunciation of Israeli West Bank policy in June 1980. She argued that while Camp David was a success, the Administration’s overall approach was muddled.

A consistent U.S. position on such issues as the PLO might have brought forward a more moderate Palestinian entity. The U.S. “sent conflicting signals, convincing the most extreme elements in the Mid East that there is no reason to change their position.” Hauser saw the current stalemate as disastrous for Israel too. “The current settlement policy is a disaster. It is provocative. You just can’t establish Jewish settlements in places like Nablus and Hebron. The sooner Begin is replaced the better. His policies are not accepted by Israelis; they are dangerous policies.”

Only months earlier she had quite the Connally presidential campaign to protest a pro-Arab tilt in his Middle East policy. In particular, she criticized his call for a total Israeli withdrawal to the pre-1967 borders. Connally said that the Palestinians should decide the nature of the homeland they would establish after a withdrawal.243

Rita Hauser’s views surfaced publicly again when she asserted that Republican Presidential candidate Ronald Reagan would be more pro-Israel than Carter. Reagan’s steadfast support of Taiwan demonstrated that he was the kind of politician who would never abandon Israel for the sake of political expediency, Hauser said. She again accused the Carter Administration of having “flirted with the PLO,” suggesting that if not for the “stink” raised by American Jews, “Carter would have appeased the Arabs in every way he could.”244

VII

As its annual report proudly notes, “The 1980 Presidential campaign catapulted the Presidents Conference onto the front pages of the nation’s newspapers as each major candidate appeared before it to present his views and answer questions on critical foreign policy issues that American Jews would take into account as they cast their ballots.”245 Squadron held pre-election sessions with both Carter and Reagan but, as is traditional, issued no endorsement of either candidate.

56 For Disassociation

Brandeis University professor Leonard Fein, later operative in the outside opposition, helped orchestrate a major anti-Begin public relations coup by enlisting the support of key establishment figures including Ted Mann. Implying that the non-zero-sum nature of the Arab-Israel conflict was an established fact, 56 Jewish intellectuals and leaders – including three past Chairmen of the Presidents Conference (Joachim Prinz, 1965-67; Alexander Schindler, 1976-78; and Theodore Mann, whose term had expired only the day before) – criticized “extremists” in the Begin government for wanting to maintain Jewish control over Judea and Samaria.

While issued in Jerusalem, their statement quickly made its way onto the front page of The New York Times. According to Fein: “We are trying to make a clear distinction between Israel and certain policies of Israel.” The 56 signatories supported “land-for-peace.” An advertisement aimed at U.S. Jews put the pro-“Peace Now” position this way: “Our way is the way of coexistence and tolerance. Our way is the way of peace and security through territorial compromise on the West Bank. Our way seeks to unite the Jewish people around its Jewish and humanist heritage.”246 Official Jewish reaction to the declaration was as swift as it was indecisive. Presidents Conference Chairman Howard Squadron did not dispute the substance of the critique. Instead, Squadron said that it was better to stress those issues on which there was a consensus since the negative publicity created by the statement was divisive and unhelpful.247

Undoubtedly, with so many disparate signals being sent, Jewish opponents of a U.S.-PLO dialogue were apprehensive about a possible American policy shift. Leaders of the Orthodox Agudath Israel, led by its president Rabbi Moshe Sherer, met with White House officials in early July. While raising concerns about several domestic issues, Agudah leaders used the session to press the Administration not to negotiate with the PLO until it meets the terms set by the United States. Sherer argued that even if the PLO met these terms, their actual compliance should be intensively monitored.248

Insinuating Carter Administration plans for its second term, Secretary of State Edmund Muskie (Cyrus Vance had resigned over the Iranian hostage rescue attempt) told the Foreign Policy Association in New York: “Perhaps we must” recognize the PLO but “not before Israel, Egypt and the U.S. reach agreement on autonomy for the West Bank.”249 Innuendo, used in this way, can facilitate political suasion.

Ted Mann endorsed Carter’s re-election bid.250 Mann, immediate past Chairman of the Presidents Conference, told a Jerusalem news conference that American Jewry was united behind the idea that the West Bank had security value to Israel but not in support of Jewish settlement on ideological grounds: “The propriety of having to stay in the West Bank for security reasons is well within the worldwide Jewish consensus. The idea that Israel should stay there in order to make the borders of ‘Medinat Yisrael’ [the State of Israel] coterminous with those of ‘Eretz Yisroel’ [the Land of Israel] is far, far outside that consensus.”251

The political price of a successful disassociation policy came to light even on the Jerusalem issue. American Jewish leadership viewed the Likud controlled Knesset’s surprise declaration that Jerusalem was the undivided capital of Israel as unnecessarily antagonistic. Their lack of public support may have incorrectly signaled the Administration that disassociation extended to Jerusalem. In the wake of the Knesset vote, Muskie met with a Presidents Conference delegation at the State Department. Afterwards, Squadron said that he had “no position” regarding the Knesset decision. The U.S. then abstained at the U.N. on a vote condemning Israel for the Jerusalem law.252 Squadron and others, in turn, expressed disappointment with the Administration’s abstention. Even Schindler complained: “Once again the Carter Administration has followed the path of appeasing the Arab states and the terrorist PLO.” In an effort to clarify their position on Jerusalem, 39 prominent American Jewish critics of Israel including Leonard Fein, Albert Vorspan and Schindler issued a new statement proclaiming that Jerusalem was the eternal capital of Israel and expressing regret that the U.S. failed to veto the anti-Israel UN resolution.253

With the election drawing nearer, Carter accelerated his efforts to woo the American Jewish electorate. In an appearance at the Forest Hills Jewish Center in Queens, New York he reaffirmed his opposition to a Palestinian State and to the PLO.254 Elsewhere, Reagan weighed in with the comment that the PLO was a terrorist organization and its actions were not those of commandos or freedom fighters.255 In the course of a Presidential debate with Reagan, Carter matched Reagan by also terming the PLO a “terrorist organization.”256 Meeting with Mann and other prominent Jewish supporters, Carter reiterated his anti-PLO stance and requested Jewish support in his re-election bid. Former Defense Minister Ezer Weizmann also publicly championed Carter’s re-election bid.257

Public Remains Anti-PLO

Given Jewish establishment criticism of Israeli policies toward the Palestinian Arabs and the degree to which their cause had been catapulted to center stage by the media and the Administration, it is remarkable that the American public continued to support the Likud Government’s position on the PLO. World Jewish Congress head Edgar Bronfman privately commissioned a poll of Jews and non-Jews, conducted by Louis Harrris, probing attitudes about Israel and the PLO. By a 62-23 percent majority, the public believed that “Israel is right not to agree to sit down with the PLO because the PLO is a terrorist organization and wants to destroy Israel.”258

Involved in a tough re-election campaign, Paul Findley, one of Israel’s sternest critics in the House of Representatives, defended himself with pro-Israel voters by arguing that Robert Strauss, President Carter’s special Mideast envoy – and at the time the President’s campaign chairman – gave him “full backing” for his contacts with PLO leader Arafat. Strauss disavowed Findley’s depiction.259

Conclusion

On election day, in spite of his presumably weak political standing in the Jewish community, Carter managed to capture the Jewish vote (which is traditionally liberal-democratic). However, a larger percentage of Jews than is usual voted for Republican victor Ronald Reagan. In marked contrast to the first Reagan year, the Carter years were characterized by a high degree of Administration cohesiveness on Arab-Israel issues. The President, Brzezinski and Vance shared the view that the Palestinian issue was key to finding a solution to the conflict. They pursued a comprehensive solution rather than the step-by-step approach favored by Kissinger. The Administration sought but failed to bring the PLO into the peace process by getting Arafat to explicitly accept Israel’s right to exist. As Vance wrote later on:
The President and I were convinced that no lasting solution in the Middle East would be possible until, consistent with Israel’s right to live in peace and security, a just answer to the Palestinian question could be found, one almost certainly leading to a Palestinian homeland and some form of self-determination.260

Indeed, almost immediately after the election, cleavages within the Republican camp over the Palestinian Arab issue came to public attention. Senator Charles Percy, about to take his seat as Republican chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, commented that there could not be a solution to the Middle East conflict without the Palestinians. Percy said that he favored a West Bank federated to Jordan.261 Later, on a visit to the Soviet Union, Percy privately told Soviet leaders that the U.S. did not oppose the establishment of a PLO-led state on the West Bank. To Percy’s dismay, classified U.S. Embassy cables from Moscow summarizing his talks were leaked. The leak seemed to involve a contest of wills among foreign policy decision makers. Richard Allen, the incoming National Security Advisor, made it known that Percy’s views did not reflect Reagan Administration thinking.262 Predictably, meanwhile, Schindler and other Jewish leaders criticized the observations about a PLO-state attributed to Percy.263

A week later Secretary of State-designate Alexander Haig said that he opposed U.S. talks with or recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization.264 Percy backpedaled his views, announcing that while favoring a Palestinian “entity” he did not support a PLO-led state. Opponents of the evolving U.S.-PLO relationship were heartened by the selection of Dr. Jean Kirkpatrick as the new U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. as well as the previously announced appointment of Richard Allen as the incoming National Security Adviser. Both were on record as opposing the PLO and Carter’s non-zero-sum analysis of the Arab-Israel conflict.

Reagan’s election did not lead Jewish opponents of Israeli policies to retire from the scene. Vigorous opposition from within the Jewish community could be anticipated from a new peace camp group, New Jewish Agenda, established by Rabbi Gerald Serrotta and other left-wing Jews in Washington DC. Some NJA founders had been associated with Breira (and its advocacy work on behalf of the PLO). Moreover, in remarks which were both prescient and self-fulfilling, Arthur Hertzberg, a leader of the American Jewish Congress and a Begin critic, told the British Board of Deputies in London (a body similar to the Presidents Conference in the United States) that problems between the U.S. and Israel would continue under the Reagan Administration. He ridiculed the notion that Israel-U.S. relations would now stabilize because the Reagan Administration would treat the Jewish State as a first-class ally.265

Between 1977 and 1980 the Carter Administration had fostered the emerging centrality of the Palestinian issue. Israel’s political position was greatly weakened by orchestrated divisions between it and the American Jewish establishment. As a result of the Sadat trip to Jerusalem, the nature of the conflict was now seen as full of nuances. The American Jewish leadership, while not ready to embrace an unreformed PLO, had already moved close to the Palestinian Arabs. For the Israeli Government this was a distinction without a difference. The Jewish leadership was ignoring their warnings that accommodating Palestinian aspirations would be the first stage in the PLO’s plan to destroy Israel.266