Chapter 7 Perception Disassociation and Manipulation: The Emerging Centrality of the Palestinian Issue in the Carter Administration 1977-1980

Chapter 7

Perception Disassociation and Manipulation:
The Emerging Centrality of the Palestinian Issue
in the Carter Administration 1977-1980


A dramatic shift in tone but not in substance occurred under Jimmy Carter. Ford and Carter shared an almost identical strategic outlook on what U.S. policy toward the Palestinian-Arabs and the PLO should be. But it was Carter who fostered the already developing wedge between the American Jewish community and the Israeli Government over the West Bank through a policy of “disassociation.” The new President made it clear, from the beginning of his Administration, that the Palestinian issue was at the root of the Arab-Israel conundrum. During his single term, American sensitivity toward the Palestinian cause manifested itself as never before.

I

Political Suasion by U.S.

Substantively, Carter continued the course established by Ford of trying to coax the PLO into making diplomatic and semantic concessions so that it could be ushered into the peace process. Simply stated, the mission of U.S. policy was to promote an Arab-Israel accord and thereby buttress the overall American geo-strategic position in the region. The United States’ strategy was to facilitate the entry and participation of the Palestinian-Arabs (perhaps the PLO under the right set of circumstances) into the peace process. U.S. Jewish leaders in particular, and American Jewish public opinion in general, were the targets of this strategy (though they were by no means the only targets), whose success depended on political suasion. U.S. strategy also included making clear its opposition to a continued Israeli presence in the Administered Territories. These strategic choices forced the American Jewish community to make its own set of selections.

Situational advantage seeking is a characteristic of political suasion. In this case, the Administration used the Camp David negotiations to reprise the Palestinian-Arab facet of the Arab-Israel conflict. Carter’s political suasion efforts also included undertaking to split the Jewish community away from Israel (disassociation) using tactics common to political combat: divide and conquer and widening the circle so as to dilute the power of your critics and empower those likely to support you. The President’s “power to persuade” (as Neustadt terms it) was employed with great finesse to control the climate of discussion and set the political agenda. Political suasion efforts were further assisted by the imperfect information available to the Jewish leadership. For instance, unbeknownst to them the Administration was periodically conducting secret negotiations with the PLO. They were also unaware of the extent to which neutralizing American Jewish advocacy for Israel was part of the Administration’s grand strategy. Deft use of insinuation was yet another building block of the Administration’s political suasion efforts as experienced by the Jewish leadership. Political suasion also benefits from a sense of crisis sometimes exacerbated by time constraints. The tension of time constraints also contributed to Israeli concessions at the Camp David talks. The atmosphere of crisis in Black-Jewish relations, engendered in the wake of the Young Affair, signaled the Jewish community that their standing and interests at home could be challenged by continued support of “intransigent” Israeli policies Finally, U.S. efforts at political suasion were also exemplified by “salami tactics” so that the embrace of a stance essentially neutral toward the PLO was developed incrementally. The full panoply of American efforts at political manipulation on the PLO issue can best be intuited from the description of Carter Administration activities depicted later in this chapter. For now it is enough to emphasize that the Administration successfully controlled the political agenda, key to political suasion, by riveting attention on the Palestinian-Arab issue.

Political Suasion by U.S. Jews

There is also another vantage point through which the political suasion analysis can be employed in an effort to better understand the role of the American Jewish community in the U.S.-PLO relationship. Political suasion efforts were not limited to one actor alone. As U.S. Jewish leadership elements were persuaded that the essential course (if not tone) of American policy toward the Palestinian-Arabs was correct, they too engaged in political manipulation, so that within the Jewish community, the internal opposition, outside elite, peace-camp activists and various trans-national actors all engaged in political suasion. Their targets included American Jewish public opinion as well as Israeli decision makers. With the exception of the peace activist camp, which favored unconditional dialogue with the PLO, the mission of these groups was to hold the U.S. to its commitment not to talk to the PLO unless and until it met the conditions set forth in 1975. In fact, this was the consensus position of the organized Jewish community as a whole. What distinguished the dissidents from the Presidents Conference was the alacrity with which they looked forward to seeing the 1975 conditions met based on their perception that the nature of the Arab-Israel conflict was indeed being transformed in a non-zero-sum direction.

One need not make the argument that Jewish critics of Israeli policies operated in collusion with the Administration to assert that the outcome of the combined campaign was potent. Political suasion by Jewish elements included making strategic choices forcing choices. For instance, critics deftly publicized their differences with the Begin Government in the American media by regularly demanding “territorial compromise.” The Likud was unable to successfully articulate why, in the long term, “territorial compromise” was a bad idea. Situational advantage-seeking was also employed. An Israeli announcement of the establishment of a new settlement in the Administered Territories was often followed by statements intended to disassociate American Jews from the Likud government’s West Bank policy. Steps were taken to split the majority and manipulate dimensions by holding “unauthorized” meetings with Arab leaders or by denouncing “consensus” statements painstakingly sculpted by the Presidents Conference almost as soon as they were issued. By never pressing Jewish historic, strategic and religious claims to the West Bank (except for Jerusalem), the organized Jewish community, in tandem with their critics, contributed to the shaping of the political agenda. Insinuation, another tool of manipulation, was used repeatedly. For instance, Jewish “exasperation” with Begin both personally and politically was leaked to the press. Crisis conditions were orchestrated between the American Jewish community and the Likud Government. Cleavages were publicized which served to undermine support for Israeli policies within the American Jewish community. A fuller description of political suasion undertaken within the Jewish community on the U.S.-PLO issue is presented later on in the chapter.

Perceptual Factors

A careful review of events during this period suggests that from the start of the Carter years, American Jewish perceptions of the Arab-Israel conflict were more non-zero-sum than zero-sum. By the end of the Carter years there was no ambivalence. The Palestinian-Arab dimension was accepted as being at the core of the Arab-Israel conflict. The categorization of the conflict, during the Carter years, was that of a struggle in transition from the Arabs v. Israel to the Palestinian-Arabs v. Israel. Attitudes toward the Palestine Liberation Organization were, however, another matter. With the exception of iconoclasts such as Nahum Goldmann, who was rumored to have been prepared to meet Arafat in 1979, American Jews held a highly negative image of the PLO. Their self-image was that of a liberal Jewish leadership forced to defend the hardline conservative policies of the Begin government in the face of pressure from an insensitive (to Jews and Israel) Carter Administration. Their image of the Arabs was going through a process of transformation. Clearly, Egypt was willing to trade de jure peace in exchange for territory. Arafat and the PLO insinuated a willingness to accept Judea, Samaria, Gaza and Jerusalem in exchange for a vague de facto arrangement with Israel, thus changing the perception that the Arabs were committed to drive the Jews into the sea.

The fluidity of Jewish perceptions can be gauged by contrasting, on the one hand, Arthur Hertzberg’s 1977 comment that Jews should tell the Administration “to go hang” if it tries to impose a settlement “for Israel’s own good” with a 1978 letter signed by 37 Jewish critics of Israel which included this argument: “Even as we continue to oppose aspects of American policy which threaten to diminish Israel’s security . . . we are disturbed by the Begin Government’s response to President Sadat’s peace initiative.”

To provide cognitive consistency to this self-contradictory stance Jewish critics could argue: despite changes in the Arab line, Israel still faces security threats and dangers. Conversely, at a time of great opportunity, Israel is being led by the wrong man with the wrong ideology. Their criticism could then be justified by maintaining that Begin’s settlement policy did not enhance the Jewish State’s security; that Begin contributed to a bad image for Israel and Jews generally; and that Begin was obsessed with Eretz Israel (the Land of Israel) while their own concern was with Medinat Israel (the State of Israel).

Jewish perceptions are reflected in several consistent objectives: pressuring the Carter Administration to adhere to the 1975 U.S. pledge about not talking to the PLO; undermining Begin’s status and policies among U.S. Jews; and developing a new criterion for being “pro-Israel.” The community opposed U.S. pressure on Israel to return to the 1948 borders; it opposed an imposed solution which circumvented face-to-face talks between the parties; and it opposed pressure aimed solely at Israel and the Carter Administration’s apparent preoccupation with the Palestinian-Arab dimension of the conflict.

The political psychology of perceptions also includes a schemata for approval and self-justification. Arguably, the American Jewish leadership sought the approval of the liberal media (pundits, editorial writers, journalists with the prestige press and television networks) with whose worldview they closely identified. Their principal self-justification, it can be easily argued, was saving Israel from all that Begin stood for (namely, Jewish parochialism).

I argue that cognizance of the role played by the Jewish leadership is fundamental to a comprehensive understanding of how the U.S. approached the issue of negotiating with the PLO. Individual Jewish leaders contributed to the perceptual dynamics of this issue in two interrelated ways: the actions they took affected how events within the political arena were perceived. Meanwhile, they were themselves affected by the perceptual environment.

During the Carter years, a number of individuals played important supporting roles in the overall U.S.-Israel-PLO chronicle. Many of them continued, long after the Carter years, to be combatants on the political battlefield upon which this issue was fought between 1977 and December 1988. They include: Alexander Schindler, chairman of the Presidents Conference; Albert Vorspan, Schindler’s deputy in the Reform movement; Rita Hauser, who quit the Connally for President campaign because the former Texas Governor had called on Israel to withdraw to its 1948 borders; Philip Klutznik, who moved from the World Jewish Congress to the Carter cabinet; Edgar Bronfman, who replaced Klutznik at the WJC; Arthur Hertzberg, who became the Vice President of the WJC; Leonard Fein, an academic, who helped lead the anti-Likud movement among scholars on the college campus; and Ted Mann of the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council, who served as chairman of the Presidents Conference directly after Schindler. Based on their public comments during the Carter years, it is a fairly straightforward task to identify the belief system to which they generally adhered: they believed in a liberal (Labor-Left oriented) interpretation of Zionism stressing democratic values. They opposed imbuing the movement with strains of nationalism or religion. Consequently, they opposed claims to the West Bank based on nationalism and religion. In a non-zero-sum setting, strategic requirements could be negotiated in the course of the evolving peace process.

Disassociation (Psychological Warfare) Model

I argue that, for reasons of political expediency, the Carter Administration engaged in a policy of disassociation whose goal or mission was to slacken American Jewish opposition toward the establishment of a Palestinian homeland (perhaps a state), thereby enabling a solution of the Palestinian-Arab problem. Strategically, the Administration sought to focus attention on the mounting long-term costs of not accommodating Palestinian-Arab aspirations. It also sought to foster debate among American Jews (and others) on Israeli West Bank policies.

Disassociation was intended to give succor to the nascent peace movement inside Israel. My focus, however, is on another aspect of disassociation which was intended to induce Jewish American criticism of Israel’s handling of the peace process. The underpinnings of disassociation included these premises:
Post 1967, the Arabs are willing to reach an accommodation (non-zero sum).
A comprehensive approach is better than an incremental one.
The Palestinian-Arab problem is absolutely fundamental to the Arab-Israel conflict.
The West Bank and Gaza can be used to solve the Palestinian-Arab problem.
The Likud Government will not cooperate by agreeing to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza.
A Labor Government will likely cooperate and withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza.
Under the right set of circumstances most Israelis will favor an exchange of land for peace.


Tactically, disassociation justified U.S. pressure on Israel by arguing that America did not want to be associated, in the eyes of the Arab world, with any part of the occupation. In all other spheres U.S. support for Israel would remain undiminished. In particular, this dual approach was intended to encourage American Jewish criticism of Israeli policies by demonstrating that such criticism did not debilitate Israel’s overall security position.

For disassociation to work, attempts to orchestrate a partial or step-by-step settlement would have to end. A more tractable political situation would have to be incubated. A political environment would have to be created which fostered American Jewish (and Israeli) elements willing to accommodate Palestinian-Arab aspirations. Ideally, American military and economic aid to Israel should be used to shape the debate over the Administered Territories. Disassociation depended on a number of specific ingredients:
A continuation of high levels of military and economic aid to Israel;
Repeated reassurances of U.S. support for Israel’s security;
Expressions of opposition to any and all aspects of the “occupation” in an explicit, concrete, public and regular manner;
Blaming the Likud government for blocking the peace process.


Diplomatically, the U.S. had to be prepared to deduct funds spent on settlements from U.S. aid to Israel; U.N. condemnations of Israel should no longer be blocked even if they were one-sided; Public debate over Israel’s West Bank and Gaza
FIGURE NO. 4
policies should be encouraged; Meanwhile, the U.S. should establish an informal dialogue with the PLO intended to encourage the group to be more responsible and forthcoming vis-à-vis U.S. peace process demands.1

II

To understand the nature of U.S. policy toward the PLO and the pivotal role played by the American Jewish community in defining that relationship, it is necessary to understand how the American Jewish image of the PLO shifted. In what was a recurring cycle, several weeks before Carter took office, the PLO denied that it had signed a joint statement with a group of Israeli doves recognizing Israel’s right to exist.2 This led Israel’s Ambassador to the U.S., shortly after Carter took office, to lament the willingness of some American Jews to meet with PLO officials.3

Perceptions of the conflict were affected by a range of environmental factors. One catalyst which gave the PLO cause a major boost was the first ever New York Times Magazine essay on the Palestinian-Arabs. Edward R. F. Sheehan’s feature story advocated the creation of a Palestinian state on the West Bank alongside Israel. Sheehan also called for Israeli reparation payments to the PLO-led state.4 Sheehan’s essay reverberated within the community just as Carter was about to take office.

Jewish Criticism of Israeli Policies: Breira

It is worth recalling that American Jewish unease with Israeli policies predates the Carter years .Some Jewish criticism of Israel, especially in its Left-wing (peace camp) incarnation, can be traced back to 1973. The year American involvement in the Vietnam War ended was also the year when the Yom Kippur War demonstrated the continuing volatility of the Arab-Israel conflict. Some “progressive” Jews, who had been active in the anti-Vietnam War movement, now turned their attention to the Arab-Israel conflict. These Jews felt “dis-empowered” within the community and were searching for “connection” and “meaning.” They were uncomfortable with, in the words of Marla Brettschneider, “the subservience of American Jewish communal concerns to Israeli issues” and embarked on a campaign to redefine what it meant to be “pro-Israel.”5 By the early 1990s it could be easily posited that they succeeded.

One of the earliest efforts by the ultra-Left to redefine pro-Israelism came as a result of the establishment of Breira. Its formation posed the question: Was it beyond the pale for a Jewish group to champion PLO participation in the peace process and to tenaciously promote the Palestinan-Arab cause? For the organized community the challenge was to decide how sweeping Jewish organizational structure should be and whether it ought to encompass groups like Breira.

The lesson of the Yom Kippur War for the Jewish Left was that “the situation in the Occupied Territories was untenable and could not last.”6 In November 1973, with the support of 250 Reform and Conservative rabbis, Robert Loeb helped launch Breira. Within two years the group evolved into a fairly structured membership organization. Breira (Hebrew for alternative) was a play on the Labor Party slogan “ein breira (there is no alternative).” The group took a neo-Marxist line on Israeli domestic politics. Its core leadership elements were drawn from academia, “rabbinical students and Jewish professionals from such establishment organizations as the American Jewish Committee and B’nai B’rith and the editors of Jewish and Zionist magazines such as Hadassah Magazine, Sh’ma and the Jewish Spectator.”7 The group received positive attention in the prestige press in 1976. Together with the American Friends Service Committee, Breira was active in promoting Jewish-PLO contacts.8 By 1977, Breira’s efforts to redefine the parameters of legitimate Jewish communal advocacy and its demand for “open discussion and debate” drew a sharp negative response from the establishment.

In 1976, with Labor’s Rabin in the Prime Minister’s Office, Breira’s pro-PLO dialogue stance was vigorously rebuffed by Israeli officials in the United States as “poison.”9 In February 1977, the Jewish Community Council of Greater Washington, an umbrella group of local institutions, rejected Breira’s charges that the dissenters’ calls for “diversity” and “discussion” were contributing to Jewish disunity.10 But clearly many establishment Jewish leaders saw things differently. Judah Cahn, President of the New York Board of Rabbis, for example, denounced Breira as a danger to Israel’s security.11 This early history of Breira helps establish the perceptual yardstick on the U.S.-PLO dialogue issue. The extent to which perceptions among the Jewish elite deviated from 1977 to 1988 is depicted in the pages which follow. While recognizing that many factors contributed to this perceptual evolution, I call explicit attention to the role of political suasion in influencing the change.

While these events were occurring within the Jewish community, the Carter Administration was engaged in a multi-level effort to create a new “peace process” agenda. One pillar of this strategy required the Administration to induce the PLO into modifying its zero-sum stance. Criticism and punishment of PLO activities were balanced by frequent expressions of understanding about the Palestinian problem. Characteristic of this calibrating technique was the State Department decision to block the PLO’s Sabri Jiryis from participating in a Quaker political meeting which he had been invited to address.12 The PLO response to Carter’s efforts at political suasion was to remain steadfast. The organization wanted diplomatic links with the U.S. without having to sacrifice its fundamental positions. PLO leader Farouk Kaddoumi said, in February 1977, that his organization was not willing to change its “Covenant” calling for the destruction of Israel.13

One environmental factor in helping to shift perceptions was Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s public call for the PLO and Israel to mutually recognize each other.14 Not likely, came the retort from Israel’s U.N. Ambassador Chaim Herzog. Speaking at a Chicago UJA gathering, he lambasted American Jews who proffer the “illusion” that the PLO was capable of changing.15 Israeli Defense Minister Shimon Peres took public cognizance of the shift in U.S. policy toward the PLO. The change was later made explicit by Carter aide Robert Lipshitz when he said that the Palestinian issue was “central” to resolving the Middle East conflict.16

A comprehensive catalog of environmental factors which contributed to the change in the political image of the PLO need not be compiled in order to make the prima facie case that the Jewish community was influenced by its political habitat. Typical of events which served to boost the PLO’s image was an invitation from U.N. Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim for the group to attend a U.N. session at which President Jimmy Carter was scheduled to speak. The White House portrayed developments as mere serendipity, directing inquiries to the State Department and the U.N.17 The import of such happenstance was not lost on the official Jewish leadership. Arthur J. Levine, Acting Chairman of the Presidents Conference, sent a telegram to the White House expressing “concern” over the U.N. invitation to the PLO. Rabbi Arthur Hertzberg of the American Jewish Congress said it was regrettable that Carter “should permit himself to be placed in a position of personally greeting a representative of the PLO.”18

Agenda Setting

It was President Carter who forcefully placed the idea of a Palestinian homeland on the American political agenda. Controlling the agenda and the political climate is crucial to political suasion. Practitioners of political suasion often combine agenda setting with tactics of “incrementalism” (“salami tactics”). For instance, throughout his White House stewardship, Carter repeatedly insinuated (and occasionally made explicit) his opposition to a PLO-led state in the West Bank and Gaza. The President advocated not a Palestinian-Arab state but rather a Palestinian homeland (which to some might conjure visions of a pastoral American Indian Reservation). He first introduced this approach at a town meeting in Clinton, Massachusetts.19 Nevertheless, in the special vocabulary of Middle East politics, the President appeared to be on the brink of calling for the establishment of a Palestinian state. It did not take long for the significance of the “homeland” phrase to elicit a PLO response. Appearing on the CBS Television program 60 Minutes shorter after the Carter speech, Arafat praised the President for his pronouncement.20

On the periphery of environmental factors contributing to a change in perceptions on the part of the American Jewish leadership was criticism from various respected “wise men.” Typical were the writings, in Foreign Affairs, of George Ball. He called for saving Israel from itself by forcing the Jewish State to confront the centrality of the Palestinian issue.21 This saving-Israel-from-itself theme gained much currency across the political spectrum. For political suasion to be effective, both positive messages as well as critical ones need to be made in an unambiguous and reinforcing manner. Thus, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Andrew Young followed up the President’s Clinton Massachusetts speech with a Presidents Conference meeting. He said Carter’s use of the terms “defensible borders” and “Palestinian homeland” were deliberate.22 Imperfect information further contributed to the manipulation campaign. These included media reports, officially denied, that Carter and Sadat had already agreed on the need to establish a Palestinian state led by the PLO.23

For disassociation to be effective, the president needed to be portrayed as a friend of the Jewish community respectful of Jewish history and apprehensions but nevertheless dedicated to establishing a Palestinian-Arab homeland. Thus, one need not be overly cynical to suggest that the decision by President and Mrs. Carter to publicize their participation in a 1977 Passover Seder at the home of his aide, Robert Lipshutz, was tied to the Administration’s overall political suasion efforts. Despite the symbolism, some Jewish leaders who discerned an acceleration in U.S. pressure on the Rabin Government were not placated. Hertzberg, President of the American Jewish Congress, said that if the Administration tries to pressure Israel into a precipitous peace, American Jews should tell them “to go hang.” Hertzberg said: “A hurried settlement may not be a settlement at all . . . peace cannot be imposed for ‘Israel’s own good’ or ‘in spite of herself’.”24 Thus, only four months into its stewardship, the Administration’s relationship with the organized Jewish community was already frayed. In response, the White House backed away slightly from its strident tone, saying it was too early to define the nature of Palestinian participation in a Geneva peace conference or to decide on the PLO’s role.25

Plainly, American perceptions of Arab intentions and American Jewish perceptions of Arab intentions were diametrically opposite. In scrutinizing the Arab world, the Jewish leadership saw a continuation of the zero-sum approach; thus they did not see the basis for Carter’s receptivity of the Palestinian cause. Only recently, Arafat had made a very strong zero-sum case to a Kuwaiti newspaper.
I am not a man for settlements or concessions. I will carry the struggle until every inch of Palestinian soil is retrieved. . . . Our struggle in the occupied land will witness a violent and steady escalation, which will begin with a resurgence of our suicide strikes against the Zionist foe. The coming weeks will see many forms of the Palestinian struggle within the occupied homeland. I will leave it to the fedayeen (“self-sacrifice”) activity to speak for itself and to translate these words into extraordinary deeds . . . our revolution is a revolution of liberation, not a revolution of concessions. We will not give up one inch of our lands, nor will we relinquish a single one of our rights.26


Political manipulation, as noted earlier, depends in part on insinuation. Only a Machiavellian mind would suggest that Carter intentionally used religion to “send a message” to American Jews to ease off their frontal assault on his Middle East policies. Nevertheless, the effect of press reports which quoted Carter as telling a Church study group that the Jews killed Jesus was sobering. The President promptly denounced the accusation that Jews “crucified Christ,” saying he did not believe in collective Jewish guilt.27 Possibly to further allay Jewish concerns about Carter Administration policy, NSC Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski met with a delegation from the Presidents Conference at the White House several days later. He assured them that ties between the U.S. and Israel would continue to remain close.28

Landmark Event
Political Turnabout in Israel – Likud Victory

Since 1967, under Prime Ministers Golda Meir, Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, the U.S. and Israel quarreled over settlements, the handling of violent Arab unrest, and Israeli moves which hinted at long-term retention of Judea, Samaria, Gaza, the Golan (and parts of Jerusalem). Low-key American Jewish chiding of Israeli West Bank policies, from some quarters at least, had also become part of the overall triangular relationship.

The 1977 election results sent shock waves through the U.S. foreign policy fraternity and the American Jewish leadership.29 The Likud victory also created an unprecedented political context. Now, it became easier to “disassociate” the U.S. Jewish community from the policies of the new Government of Israel. Since before 1948, American Jewish leaders had identified pro-Israelism with the politics of David Ben-Gurion and the Israeli Labor Party. Though Golda Meir, Ben-Gurion and other Labor politicians would frequently clash with Diaspora leaders over various issues – mostly Zionism and security – there was nevertheless a certain commonality in their world view.30 Now, the political nemesis of the very leadership with whom they most closely identified had wrested control of the Jewish State. It is reasonable to surmise that the President was made familiar with these facts almost immediately.

The predisposition of the media and Jewish leadership against the Likud world view preordained turbulence ahead. The foreign press portrayed Begin as a former terrorist.31 Time magazine helpfully instructed its millions of readers to pronounce Begin’s name by rhyming it with the Dickens character Fagin. Newsweek called Begin a zealot and fundamentalist, beginning its report on his victory with: “The people of Camp Kadum greeted Menachem Begin like a conquering hero. The hard-scrabble settlements, built by Zionist zealots on Arab land of the occupied West Bank of the Jordan, had been declared illegal by the previous government of Israel.”32 President Carter was reported “disappointed but not crushed.” Few U.S. officials had any experience dealing with Begin or the Likud. The President said only that U.S. policy “will not be affected by changes in leadership” within Israel.33 Portentously, the White House suggested that Begin would “moderate” his views as a result of interacting with U.S. Jewish leaders.34

Begin held a zero-sum image of the Arab-Israel struggle.35 Nevertheless, immediately upon victory he called on the Labor Party to join in a coalition government. As for the United States, Begin declared: “The U.S. government should not be concerned because of the change in government. All of Israel is striving for peace.” Begin, however, favored “peace for peace,” seeing no merit in the “land-for-peace” formula, a diplomatic catechism embodied in the 1967 U.N. Security Council Resolution 242. Begin asserted that Jews have an inalienable right to live in Eretz Israel (The Land of Israel), which includes the West Bank. To a newspaper reporter’s question which implied otherwise he responded: “What occupied territories? If you mean Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, they are liberated territories.”36

The White House determined not to offer Begin a “honeymoon” period. Political suasion efforts, utilizing insinuation, commenced straight away. To set a demarche the White House released the following “Notice to the Press”:
As a matter of historical record, U.N. General Assembly Resolution 181, November 1947, provided for the recognition of a Jewish and an Arab state in Palestine and U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194, of December 1948, endorsed the right to return to their homes or choose compensation for lost property . . . (while) not binding on the U.S. Under the 1948 resolution, a Palestine Conciliation Commission consisting of France, Turkey and the U.S. was to present the General Assembly with detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the Jerusalem area. . . . 37


This was too much even for the Labor Party. Outgoing Foreign Minister Yigal Allon summoned the American Ambassador to Israel to express Israel’s vexation over the Administration’s latest pronouncement on a Middle East peace formula.38

Cautious Jewish Support for Begin

Carter’s public calls on Israel to withdraw from almost all the Administered Territories undercut former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, contributing to Begin’s victory, in the view of certain Jewish leaders.39 In that light, they came to Begin’s early defense when the Carter Administration opened its relationship with Begin on an adversarial plane. Schindler said the State Department declaration on U.N. Resolution 181 was at variance with previous statements about Judea and Samaria and a transparent response to Begin’s election victory. He asked how the U.S. presumed to be an honest broker if it was going to make references to General Assembly resolutions of 1947 and 1948, now anathema to Israel, and which the Arabs had immediately rejected.40

The White House now grew increasingly concerned by what it perceived as attacks by the Jewish leadership against Carter and Brzezinski.41 This was the context of a Brzezinski White House invitation to certain Jewish leaders at which he warned them not to support the Begin government’s “extremist” policies. Some Jewish leaders openly charged the Administration with trying to split the American Jewish community away from the newly elected Begin government. Speaking in Tel Aviv, Jacques T. Torczner, a former President of the Zionist Organization of America, complained that the Administration was concurrently seeking to undermine the importance of the Presidents Conference.42 Actually, by June 1977 Carter and his closest aides were conferring on how to neutralize pressure from the organized Jewish community.43

Concerned about the perception that U.S. Jews were “divided” over whether to support the new Israeli Government and about reported U.S. efforts to drive a wedge between American Jews and Israel as part of a strategy to force Israel to accept an American imposed peace plan, Schindler announced that the Presidents Conference would indeed support the policies of the Israeli government and made plans to lead a Presidents Conference delegation to Israel to meet with Premier Begin. Commenting that some of Carter’s recent remarks had “frightened” Israel, Schindler also said: “The thrust of President Carter’s statements suggest the outlines of an imposed settlement and creates the impression that this is an abandonment of standing U.S. policies that the parties must resolve their own differences in face-to-face negotiations between Arabs and Israelis.”44

Schindler balanced these remarks by letting it be known that American Jews could unite more easily behind a broad-based coalition government which included Labor.45 After his meeting in Israel with Begin, Schindler noted their differences and offered a balanced assessment:
I feel a kinship to Begin, for his sense of Jewish destiny and for his expectations of the Jewish future, despite the obvious political differences between us. I don’t expect the majority of American Jews to embrace Begin’s ideology now, but I’m sure they’ll respond to him as a person. . . . If he fails to convince Carter of his ideas, the question is – will he be able to bend? Then will come the test of Begin’s statesmanship, and the test of U.S. Jewry’s willingness to follow him – and how far. . . . You realize that no matter who would have headed the government here, and under any circumstances, there would have been disagreements and friction now.46


The Carter Administration remained resolute in its approach. The Palestinian issue was at the root of the continuing Arab conflict with Israel. Therefore, the central pillar in the Administration’s Arab-Israel policy would remain the Palestinian issue. Speaking in San Francisco, at a meeting of the World Affairs Council, Vice President Walter Mondale called upon Israel to return “approximately” to its pre-1967 borders. Mondale argued that this would enable the Palestinian-Arabs to “shed their status as homeless refugees” and establish a homeland or “entity” linked, in some fashion, to Jordan.47 Mondale’s rhetoric intensified Jewish apprehensions that the Administration would try to impose a settlement rather than encouraging the Arabs and Israelis to negotiate one.48

Begin Government signals regarding the PLO were slightly jumbled when Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizmann commented irreverently that he was prepared to meet with Yasir Arafat: “I shall tell Arafat what I think of him and he may tell me what he thinks of me. If he shoots me, I shall shoot back.”49

The Administration, however, continued to speak with one voice on the solution to the Arab-Israel conflict. The State Department, reiterating Vice President Mondale’s speech, said that Israel must withdraw from the areas captured in 1967 and that the Palestinians must be granted a homeland. But perhaps to ameliorate American Jewish concerns about an imposed solution, the statement offered that the “exact nature” of the homeland “should be negotiated between the parties.” In the words of spokesman Hodding Carter:
The President has spoken of the need for a homeland for the Palestinians whose exact nature should be negotiated between the parties. . . . We consider that this resolution means withdrawal from all three fronts in the Middle East dispute – that is, Sinai, Golan, West Bank and Gaza – the exact borders and security arrangements being agreed in the negotiations . . . no territories, including the West Bank, are automatically excluded from the items to be negotiated.50


The long enduring chasm between U.S. and Israeli perceptions over the essence of the conflict had become more pronounced because of the Carter Administration’s focus on the Palestinian issue and the willingness of certain Arab leaders to speak, however obliquely, about Israel’s right to exist.51 As The Jerusalem Post reported from Washington:
The U.S. and Israel fundamentally disagree over the Arab states’ willingness to live in peace with a secure Israel, U.S. officials said last week. . . . U.S. policy-makers firmly believe that the Arabs are ready to live in peace with an Israel that includes only the pre-1967 borders, while Israeli leaders are not yet convinced of this Arab moderation. . . . U.S. officials said if the Likud is serious about embarking on a major public relations campaign to convince Americans that Israel should not withdraw from any part of the Gaza Strip, Judea or Samaria, the prospective Israeli leadership should know that there is very little support in the U.S. Government or among the public at large for this position. . . . Not many Americans will accept Israel’s religious or national claim that these areas are an integral part of the historical Land of Israel.52


Isolated support for the zero-sum assessment as well as Jewish rights to the West Bank could still be heard. For example, Senator Bob Dole (R-Kansas) told a Zionist Organization of American meeting in Jerusalem that the West Bank – far from being occupied – had been “liberated” by Israel.53 However, the Administration displayed a greater receptivity to the opposing viewpoint. Thus, a delegation of American Arab officials led by William Small and Dr. M.T. Mehdi visited the White House to exhort one of the Administration’s key Middle East staffers, William Quandt, to push for PLO recognition.54 Meanwhile, the stature of the PLO was further elevated when two prominent members of the House of Representatives, Lee Hamilton (D-Ind) and David Obey (D-WI) met with PLO Chairman Arafat in Cairo. They recommended that the U.S. should open direct negotiations with the PLO because, Arafat told them, the PLO accepted Israel’s right to exist and was willing to live in peace with the Jewish State.55

Civility at First Carter-Begin Meeting

President Carter prepared for his first meeting with Begin, in part, by “poring over Menachem Begin’s book The Revolt in a studious search for clues to the personality of the new Israeli Prime Minister.”56 Observers expected the two to get on poorly. Expecting the worst, even Golda Meir (Begin’s long-time political rival) remarked: “If the Americans put pressure on Israel to give in to the Arabs, I’m ready to spend the last days of my life fighting for Begin’s government.”57

Actually, the two men did not quarrel at their first meeting. Begin termed his first trip to the U.S. as Premier “a success” and said he was leaving the country “a happy man.”58 In fact, mutual civility did not signal a shift in policy. Indeed, the American offensive against Jewish claims to Israel’s post-1967 boundaries intensified. Only days after Begin departed from the United States, the State Department leaked documents purporting to show that President Truman wanted Israel to withdraw to its U.N.-authorized borders after the 1948 War of Independence.59 The message was transparent: Israel could hardly claim to have a legitimate birthright to the West Bank when even its proprietorship to territory inside the “green line” could be so easily challenged.

The State Department’s relentless opposition to Jewish inhabitation in the Territories was sustained when several days later it released a statement expressing “disappointment” over the building of three new Jewish villages on the West Bank.60

U.S. Restates “Talk” Position

Whether and under what circumstances the U.S. would talk to the PLO was an issue which took on a life of its own. Behind the scenes, the Administration was inclined to discuss with the PLO conditions for its participation in the peace process.61 The publicly avowed United States policy was to forgo contacts with the PLO until it recognized Israel, as Secretary of State Cyrus Vance explained prior to embarking on a visit to the Middle East in August 1977. He did “not expect there will be any meeting” with the PLO “on this trip.” Vance acknowledged that the U.S. was receiving “communications” from the PLO through intermediaries but was not responding.62 The fundamental U.S.-Israeli dispute over PLO intentions, the nature of the conflict, and Israeli claims to the West Bank took a back-seat to the charade over possible U.S. plans to talk to the PLO.

Unable to articulate a persuasive argument on behalf of the zero-sum character of the dispute, incapable of explaining why what the PLO said about Israel was irrelevant to the organization’s true essence, and uncomfortable supporting Israeli claims to the West Bank, the Presidents Conference was left only to react negatively to hints and clues that the U.S. was moving closer to “talking” to the PLO. As “peace process” modalities were being bandied about, the PLO issue was catapulted to the forefront of the political agenda by a Presidential press conference remark. At an impromptu news conference in Plains, Georgia, Carter said he had received reports through third parties that the PLO may be willing to recognize Israel’s right to exist. The President said: “If the Palestinians should say ‘we recognize U.N. Resolution 242 in its entirety, but we think the Palestinians have additional status than just refugees,’ that would suit us O.K.” The PLO torpedoed Carter’s offer by denying it had signaled a willingness to accept Israel’s existence.63 Israel, at any rate, vehemently opposed a role for the PLO in the peace process.64 Warning that Labor and Likud were united on the issue, Knesset Member Abba Eban criticized U.S. overtures to the PLO.65

Integral to political suasion, as noted previously, are efforts to manipulate the dimensions of discussion. In Carter’s case this involved an almost continuous flirtation with the PLO interspersed with episodic reassurances to the Jewish community that the Administration was not flirting with the PLO. The cycle of overtures, retractions, hints, and clarifications by U.S. policymakers toward the PLO had become routine. Again in August, Secretary of State Vance spoke out on the PLO: “If they recognize Israel’s right to exist, we will talk to them.”66

Though fragmented and bewildered over what Israel should do about the West Bank and the Palestinian-Arabs, the Jewish leadership was largely united in opposition to the PLO. More than merely contemplating various scenarios out loud, Joseph Sternstein of the Zionist Organization of America said, Administration statements showed the U.S. was making plans to deal with the PLO.67 Presidents Conference Chairman Schindler and Premier Begin agreed, in Jerusalem, that U.S. Jewish leaders would organize a public campaign against the Administration’s PLO policy.68

Sanitizing PLO’s Image in U.S.69

Even as the PLO was reiterating its vow to escalate the armed struggle against the Jewish State, the Carter Administration had embarked on an effort to sanitize the image of the PLO so as to legitimize its presence at anticipated Middle East peace talks.70 Through a confidential emissary, the Administration was privately working to achieve some sort of understanding with the PLO.71 Allowing the PLO to operate in Washington, D.C. Information Office unhindered was intended to be interpreted as a positive U.S. signal to the PLO.

Adding to the mix, other voices were also being raised in support of U.S.-PLO ties. While there is no evidence to indicate they acted in concert, the Administration’s PLO stance was nevertheless bolstered elsewhere in the political system. One source of support was Senator George McGovern (D-S.D) who cited the Helsinki Accords as applicable to the PLO, in calling upon the State Department to ease access for PLO members to enter the U.S. for informational purposes.72

Carter-U.S. Jews Discuss Pledge Not To Talk To PLO

As tensions between the Administration and the pro-Israel community continued to rise, the President discussed the PLO issue at a private White House meeting with Rabbi Schindler and Yehuda Hellman, Executive Vice President of the Presidents Conference. The Jewish leaders gave Carter a letter noting that the United States had committed itself since September 1, 1975 not to deal with the PLO until it recognizes Israel’s right to exist and accepts U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Their letter said that the President’s recent public remarks seemed to be backing away from this commitment. He had publicly implied that the PLO no longer had to accept Israel’s right to exist and that it could modify the terms of 242 in accepting it.73 Carter wrote back to the Presidents Conference the very same day. His handwritten note assured the Jewish leadership that the U.S. position on the PLO remains unchanged. “I can assure you,” the President wrote, “that our position regarding the PLO is consistent with commitments previously made voluntarily to the Israeli government.”74 Despite these assurances, press reports surfaced the following month suggesting that Yasir Arafat and U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon Richard B. Parket had met in Beirut.75

U.S.-Soviet Joint Declaration on Mideast

Political suasion efforts also call for strategic choice selection or making choices which force choices. Catching many of the key Middle Eastern players by surprise, the United States and the Soviet Union issued a joint statement, in October 1977, on the Arab-Israel conflict. The statement accentuated the Palestinian issue by calling for the participation of “representatives . . . of the Palestinian people” and hinted at the prospect of a superpower imposed solution.76 Specifically, the superpowers agreed that the Palestinian-Arabs should be allowed to establish an “entity” in the West Bank. Furthermore, the statement used the politically loaded expression “legitimate rights” of the Palestinian people, implying the right to statehood. The Jerusalem Post reported that: “American sources hint that Carter himself decided to move on the joint American-Soviet statement as a means of demonstrating his displeasure with Israel’s attitude on settlements in the territories.”77 Israel would have to choose to cooperate or face concerted diplomatic pressure from both superpowers.

Reaction from U.S. Jewish leaders, as well as from the Israeli government, was harsh. The superpowers were seeking to impose a solution in place of encouraging face-to-face negotiations among the parties, Jewish critics charged. Schindler viewed the statement ominously as an abandonment of America’s commitment to Israel.78 Mobilized, the pro-Israel camp went into full gear. Senator Henry Jackson (D-Washington) and AFL-CIO president George Meany both criticized the President’s “courtship” of the PLO. “The fox is back in the chicken coop. The American people must certainly raise the question of why bring the Russians in at a time when the Egyptians have been throwing them out,” Senator Jackson told NBC-TV’s Meet the Press.79 The Presidents Conference called an emergency meeting on October 3 to deal with the Administration’s “betrayal” of Israel.80 The pro-Israel community further mobilized 8,000 telephone calls to the White House critical of the Soviet-U.S. joint statement. Mark Siegel, the White House liaison to the Jewish community, received 170 “angry” telephone calls in one day. Meanwhile, the President’s overall approval rating in the polls was 46 percent.81

The level of Jewish vexation over the enhanced position of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the wake of the joint statement can be gauged by Schindler’s reaction. Fearing that PLO participation at proposed Geneva-based Middle East peace talks was now a real possibility, Schindler and Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan jointly launched a major public relations effort, traveling to a number of American cities to campaign against the joint statement.82 Dayan had previously been scheduled to visit the U.S. on U.N. business and planned to meet with the President. Actually, in speaking with American Jews across the United States, Dayan sought to play down the U.S.-Israel rift. He warned against backing the President into a corner.83 When Dayan finally met with Carter at the U.N., differences were papered over. Dayan announced that Israel was prepared to go to Geneva for peace talks. The Foreign Ministry and the President agreed that after an opening “plenary group” the discussions would break up into bilateral talks and multi-lateral working groups. Israel was prepared to negotiate with Palestinian representatives, but the PLO itself was not mentioned. While still holding to the view that Carter was naïve about Arab intentions, the Carter-Dayan meeting helped ease the level of tension between the Administration and the organized Jewish community. Schindler remarked: “We have to watch developments – and developments will be watched.”84

Carter Reiterates Palestinian Angle

The President fully expected the PLO to recognize Israel based on indirect messages he was getting from Arab sources and from Landrum Bolling, president of Lilly Endowment Inc., who had been meeting with Arafat.85 This helps explain Carter’s continued emphasis on the centrality of the Palestinian issue. At his U.N. appearance the President reiterated that “the legitimate rights of the Palestinians must be recognized.”86 But he backtracked slightly some days later when he told a visiting Congressional delegation that he opposed a Palestinian state although he did not want to say so publicly.87

White House Lobbies U.S. Jewry

Essential to the disassociation policy was the need to drive a wedge between Israel and her American Jewish supporters. The Administration’s approach was to use suasion, where possible, to split the Jewish community away from Israeli policies. Intent on bringing the Administration’s message directly to the Jewish community, Robert Lipshutz, Counsel to the President, held several speaking engagements before the Maryland Jewish community in October. He emphasized that solving the Palestinian problem was something Israel needed to do for its own “viability.”88

Politically sensitive to charges that the President had turned against Israel, Administration officials sought to reach out to the Jewish community with frequent sessions pressing the point that Jimmy Carter remained committed to the Jewish State.89 Indeed, the “disassociation” strategy made it absolutely vital for the Administration to reassure the American Jewish leadership of its continued support for Israel. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, for instance, held a series of meetings with the Jewish leadership in an effort to stem Jewish opposition to Carter’s perceived policy tilt toward the Palestinian Arabs and the PLO.90 Apparently pursuing a two-track approach, the Administration worked to bolster its frayed bone fides within the pro-Israel community while simultaneously promoting the PLO as a potential partner in the peace process and asserting that one could be pro-Israel while not holding the PLO in odium. This approach was again manifested when, late in October, the State Department allowed Mahmoud Salem Darwish, a junior PLO official, to enter the U.S. for purposes which were not made clear.91

The idea of a PLO-led state continued to gain momentum. Support for the PLO cause was snowballing. In Washington, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator John Sparkman (D-Alabama), announced that he supported the creation of a Palestinian state. Sparkman also called upon the Palestinians to recognize Israel as a quid pro quo.92 Abroad, meanwhile, British Prime Minister James Callahan called for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank. While in West Germany top officials of the PLO were already holding talks with ranking politicians.93 An unmistakable diplomatic signal that the U.S. favored, at the least, a West Bank in Arab hands came when Ambassador Young abstained in a General Assembly vote against Jewish settlements in the Administered Territories.94

III

Landmark Event: Sadat’s Jerusalem Initiative

Carter’s single-minded focus on the Palestinian problem explains his initially cool reaction to Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s momentous announcement that he would travel to Jerusalem. In effect, and despite denials, Sadat diverted attention away from the Palestinian aspect of the Arab-Israel conflict back to the state level. His historic November 1977 visit to Jerusalem heralded a return to a more diffuse peace-making approach with the Palestinian facet – one of several core issues to be confronted.95

Still, President Carter was not easily dissuaded. Just days after Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem, Carter reprised his call for an international conference in Geneva based upon the joint U.S.-USSR resolution. Only in mid-December did Carter acknowledge that the PLO had ruled itself out of the conflict resolution process – and, there being no other suitable representative of the Palestinian-Arabs – leaving advocacy of their cause to Egypt.96 As events unfolded (and even though Begin thought prospects for Geneva talks were good), the spotlight shifted to a Cairo conference where the only Arab party willing to attend was Egypt itself. Then, on December 19, 1977, Begin proposed “self-rule” for the Arab residents of Judea, Samaria and Gaza. Distinguishing between autonomy for people as against dominion over the land, Begin also emphasized that Israel would never deal with the PLO.97

U.S. Jews Back in Play

In New York, Begin briefed the Conference of Presidents on his self-rule game plan.98 It did not take Sadat long to recognize the expediency of establishing channels of communication to the Jewish leadership.99 By the end of January 1978, Sadat had issued an “open letter” to American Jews urging them to pressure Israel into making concessions to Egypt.100 Not wanting to be used to influence the talks, the Presidents Conference announced that it would not allow itself to serve as a surrogate for direct Egyptian-Israeli negotiations.101 The White House and Sadat were forced to turn elsewhere. Arrangements were already under way for Sadat to meet with Philip Klutznick, the head of the World Jewish Congress. Meanwhile, Klutznick was aware that the Presidents Conference was about to convene in order to discuss precisely Sadat’s efforts to use meetings with the Jewish community as a form of leverage against the Israelis. Klutznick explains:
I tried to reach Schindler by phone to tell him about the meeting I had already scheduled with Sadat, but he did not get my phone call until after the conference adopted a ban on such meetings. I did not cancel the event set for the Egyptian embassy; to do so would be an affront to the president of Egypt and to the White House as well. . . .

The scheduled meeting in the Egyptian embassy, held during a pause in the official U.S.-Egyptian negotiations, was marked by spirited exchanges not only about the possibilities for a settlement in the Middle East but on the relationship between the American Jewish community and Israel and its perceptions of dangers to that state. President Sadat throughout the encounter was ebullient and charming, but I could not tell whether his attitudes were affected by what he heard from our group. Later, however, I learned why the White House was anxious for the meeting to happen. They wanted Sadat to know that American Jews would support moves toward peace if the proposed terms were fair to all parties in the Israeli-Arab conflict. . . .102


Palestinian Centrality

Whatever the efforts to build support for Sadat within the Jewish community, the Administration maintained its strategic policy focus on the Palestinian issue. The United States denied it was making overtures to the PLO to entice it into the peace process.103 Indeed, Brzezinski protested that the PLO had disqualified itself from participating in the peace process because of its intransigence. Moderate Palestinians would take the place of the PLO, Brzezinski asserted.104

Some officials within the State Department were apprehensive that an Egyptian-Israeli state-to-state remedy was in the works and that it would relegate the Palestinian-Arab problem to the back burner. For example, U.S. Ambassador to the Netherlands Robert J. McClosky publicly complained that the United States did not have an apparent blueprint for a Palestinian homeland.105 Meanwhile, Representative Paul Findley (R-Ill.) emerged as a key champion of the PLO on Capitol Hill. After meeting with Arafat in Syria early in 1978, Findley contended that the group had moderated its position and could not be ignored in conflict resolution efforts.106

Sadat Continues Lobbying

Sadat met with Schindler in Aswan, Egypt to lobby the American Jewish leader to intervene with Israel. He promised that Egypt would guarantee Israel’s security if it were forthcoming at the negotiating table. But Schindler said he could not support the establishment of a Palestinian-Arab state because it posed a security threat for Israel. He also suggested that Sadat did not particularly favor such a state either.107 Some days later, Sadat published an open letter to U.S. Jews urging them to “contribute” to the peace process. Schindler’s reply was that embracing Egypt’s negotiating position was not the only way to foster the peace process.108

The President continued in his efforts to control the political climate and set the agenda. Carter persistently underscored, in his public remarks, the centrality of the Palestinian problem to the conflict. Visiting President Sadat in Aswan during January, Carter stressed that peace would depend on resolving the “Palestinian problem in all its aspects,” recognition of the “legitimate rights” of the Palestinians, and Israeli withdrawal from “territories occupied” in 1967.109

Determined to press the Palestinian cause through his disassociation policy, Carter and Mondale invited elements of the American Jewish leadership to a three-and-a-half-hour White House Dinner. Schindler, chairman of the Presidents Conference, was conspicuous by his absence. The guests included: Frank Lautenberg of the UJA, Richard Mass of the American Jewish Committee, Theodore Mann of the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council, Philip Klutznick of the World Jewish Congress, David Blumberg of B’nai B’rith, Max Greenberg of the Anti-Defamation League, Ed Wanders, a former President of the America-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), and Albert Picker of Miami.110 Later in the month, the White House invited 31 federation community leaders from 19 cities to hear Mondale and Brzezinski defend the sale of U.S. weapons to Arab countries as well as American opposition to Jews establishing towns on the West Bank.111 The wooing of American Jewry was supplemented by a verbal offensive against Israel’s diplomatic stance. In mid-February, the State Department issued a blistering attack on Israel’s West Bank policy.112

The Other War Being Lost

Plainly, given its continuing dependence on the United States, Israel needed the support of American public opinion and for the American Jewish community to serve as the vanguard of that support. However, several ingredients undermined Israel’s standing in public opinion. The facts-on-the-ground were that the Palestinian-Arabs wanted Israel out of the West Bank and Gaza; Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem meant that the most populous Arab state had recognized Israel’s right to exist in the Arab world; the United States publicly committed itself to support Israel, except for its West Bank policies. The perception of the conflict was being transformed from a largely zero-sum context – pitting one Jewish State against legions of Arab and Islamic countries – into a non-zero-sum dispute between Israelis and stateless Palestinians. In this new setting, Israel was hard pressed to explain why it was not more conciliatory. The agent of this change had been, in no small measure, the President of the United States himself.

None of this was lost on Schindler. Speaking at the 29th World Zionist Congress in Jerusalem, he said that Israel’s image in American public opinion had suffered a “major setback.” Carter was moving toward imposing his own solution on an Israel whose image had been transformed. The Jewish State was made to appear “untruthful” and “conniving.” President Sadat’s analysis of the Arab-Israel conflict had largely been accepted by the American people. State Department assertions that Jewish settlements in Judea, Samaria and Gaza were “illegal” further contributed to Israel’s sagging image. Finally, the American news media held Israel and the Arabs to different standards.113

One casualty of the friction between the White House and the Jewish leadership was Mark Alan Siegel, a 31-year-old political scientist, who had been the Administration’s point-man on Jewish concerns. Citing differences with the President’s Mideast policy, Siegel withdrew from the liaison role (and days later resigned from the White House). Lipshitz and Stuart Eizenstat were assigned to fill the vacated job in addition to their regular responsibilities.114

Schindler-Carter Duel

Over time, Carter came to see Schindler as being too close politically to the Begin government and personally obdurate in the face of the President’s efforts to resolve the Arab-Israel conflict. Disassociation was suffering because of Schindler. This was especially ironic given that, privately, Schindler and Begin held few political views in common. Notwithstanding Administration hints that Carter would be pleased to see Schindler’s term as Chairman of the Presidents Conference come to a close, the Conference voted, in an unprecedented move, to extend Schindler’s term beyond its second year.115 The Jewish leadership was sending Carter an obvious message. Schindler later denied telling The New York Times that “Carter was a question mark” regarding his personal feelings toward Jews. Another question mark was NSC Adviser Brzezinski whose sentiments with respect to Jews were also grist for the rumor mills.116

After the coastal road massacre, the U.S. Jewish leadership again called upon the Administration to close the PLO offices in the United States. But State Department spokesman Tom Reston said that due to U.S. laws it was impossible to do so.117 It was in this atmosphere that the next Carter-Begin meeting was held.

On Sunday, March 4, 1978, Carter met with Begin at the White House in an atmosphere marked by “cold formality.”118 The Administration, according to press reports, held Begin accountable for lack of progress in the peace process. The Carter-Begin sessions had been “very, very rough.”
The exchange had been so bitter, so acrimonious, so offensive, Carter said, that he was unable to sleep afterward – and, as one aide said, “He never has trouble sleeping.” . . . As soon as the Israelis were seated, Carter delivered a somewhat stern lecture . . . [Carter] told Begin that Israel would be making a serious mistake if it let this chance for a settlement collapse. The President, according to these sources, said he would not hesitate to go to the American people and put the blame for failure squarely on Israel. . . .119


The American Jewish leadership was being placed in an unenviable position. From Washington, Begin went to New York to address the Presidents Conference. He urged the Jewish leaders to mobilize public opinion on Israel’s behalf: “Go around, take our peace plan, make it known, ask for support.”120 Emboldened, Schindler told the gathering: “Away with the counsel of timidity. Away with the caution of cowardice. Away with those who would flatter themselves into the good graces of the powerful. Away with those who have no convictions. Away with those who would beg for good-will and toady for favor. Who are we? We are Americans with our roots deep in the soil of this land. We are also Jews.”121 But despite the tough talk, U.S. Jewish leaders were decidedly uncomfortable about being publicly cast in the role of Begin supporters in an intemperate political clash with the President of the United States.

IV
Disassociation Realized

Carter’s efforts to separate American Jews from Begin’s West Bank policies came to fruition a month later. A front-page report in The New York Times announced that a group of 37 prominent American Jews had signed a letter supporting “Peace Now.”122 They opposed Jewish settlements on the West Bank and urged Begin to show “greater flexibility.” They said: “. . . Even as we continue to oppose those aspects of American policy which threaten to diminish Israel’s security . . . we are disturbed by the Begin Government’s response to President Sadat’s peace initiative.” Signatories included Rabbi Schindler’s own deputy at the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, Albert Vorspan, political sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset, Irving Levine and Ira Silverman of the American Jewish Committee, Saul Bellow, the Nobel Prize laureate, Breira leader Eugene Borowitz, Leonard Fein of Brandeis, former Conference of Presidents head Rabbi Joachim Prinz and others.123 The path-breaking manifesto legitimized protest against Begin’s policies by aligning criticism with the Prime Minister’s domestic antagonists.124

Only days prior to the “letter of 37” another group of Jewish leaders, associated with liberal organizations, testified before a Knesset committee hearing. They warned that continued Jewish settlement beyond the “Green Line” was damaging to Israel’s image in the United States. Participants included Howard Squadron and Naomi Levine of the AJCongress, Bert Gold of the AJCommittee, Burton Joseph and Benjamin Epstein of the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith, as well as Theodore Mann and Albert Chernin of the National Jewish Community Advisory Council.125

Some of these very leaders were present at a late April meeting in Washington D.C. between a Presidents Conference delegation and Vice President Mondale. The President himself briefly greeted the gathering. Some in the delegation debated with Mondale, arguing that the West Bank settlements were not technically “illegal.”126

Now, a year and a half into the Carter Administration, Jewish criticism of Israeli policies came from diffuse sources with differing motives. With some Israelis calling for an exchange of land-for-peace, individual U.S. Jews became increasingly vocal in criticizing Israeli policies.127 Along the lines of the disassociation strategy, a number of American Jewish leaders wanted to calibrate their support: advocating continued U.S. support for Israel while withholding backing for the Government’s West Bank policies. Schindler, meanwhile, appeared to be leading Begin to believe that the level of U.S. Jewish support for his stance was stable while, at the same time, telling the media something else entirely. Nahum Goldmann bluntly told NSC Adviser Brzezinski that the Carter Administration would have to “break the Jewish lobby” to foster the peace process.128

What impact, if any, all this was having on PLO diplomatic inroads in the United States is difficult to assess. Around this time, though, the State Department allowed the PLO to open an information office in Washington D.C. The Administration claimed it had no legal way to block the move. But some Jewish groups, including the ADL, insisted that the Administration could shut the PLO’s New York and Washington operations if it really wanted to.129 The Administration was sending a tactful perceptual message that changes in PLO goals had earned it a diplomatic bonus. Now, the lure of moderation was attracting the attention of the PLO leadership. Arafat promoted the non-zero-sum message by stating that the PLO would accept the existence of Israel alongside a PLO-led state. The PLO, he explained, was willing to establish its state on land “liberated or from which the Israelis have withdrawn.”130

In the wake of the “letter of the 37,” a new etiquette in Diaspora-Israel relations prevailed. Criticism of Israeli policies by prominent Jewish figures became unexceptional. Arthur Hertzberg of the American Jewish Congress told Israel TV that polls demonstrated American Jewish support for the State of Israel was not the same as support for Israeli Government policies in the Territories. He reiterated this distinction in a Hebrew newspaper Op-Ed essay.131 There was almost a palpable sense of relief on the part of some Jewish leaders that they could join Carter in criticizing Israel instead of having to defend Israel from Carter’s criticism.

Perhaps not surprisingly, given her recent defense of Begin, the Prime Minister found an ally in former Prime Minister Golda Meir. She chastised Peace Now for suggesting that a trade of “land for peace” in the Jordan Valley and the Golan was a viable negotiating position for Israel. Peace, she suggested, could not be purchased at any price.132

The Administration now engaged in an effort to sanitize the PLO’s image even as it sought to moderate PLO policies. So, while deploring the June 1978 bombing of Jerusalem’s Mahaneh Yehuda open-air market, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State William Harrop refused to characterize the PLO as either a “terrorist” or “non-terrorist” group.133 From the Administration’s perspective, the Palestinian cause had to be unlinked from the scourge of terrorism. It had to be judged on its own merits. Only that way could U.S. Jews play their assigned role in promoting the peace process.

During nearly 30 years in opposition, Begin had maintained a tradition of not criticizing the Israeli government while abroad or in writings aimed specifically at a non-Israeli readership. This is worthwhile noting because, as I argue, it was partly their exposure to Israeli criticism of Begin (added to Administration admonishment of Begin) which countenanced, indeed inspired, so much of the American Jewish protest against Begin. Thus, in the summer of 1978, Labor Party leader Shimon Peres published an Op-Ed essay in The New York Times advocating an exchange of some West Bank land-for-peace and implying that, unlike the Begin-led Israeli Government, Labor was sensitive to the conflicting considerations which needed to be taken into account in order to promote peace. He recalled that Begin “vehemently and consistently opposed the idea of partition, which enabled Israel to be born.” Labor’s aim was: “A fair solution, under which as many Palestinians as possible would be under an Arab flag while” Israeli security needs were protected. This could be accomplished by turning over parts of the West Bank to Jordan (which was largely a Palestinian state anyway).134

Ted Mann

In late June 1978, Theodore R. Mann, a Czechoslovakian-born attorney based in Philadelphia, and head of the umbrella National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council (NJCRAC), replaced Schindler as Chairman of the Presidents Conference. His policy differences with the Israeli Government were widely known.135 Confronted with the Andrew Young Affair and Carter’s adversarial approach to Begin, Mann did his duty and pursued the course established by previous chairman. He would react to crises as they developed and try to be generally supportive of Begin’s approach. However, the Presidents Conference would not actively champion Begin’s line with regard to the Administered Territories.

The importance Carter attached to garnering American Jewish support for his policies can be gleaned from his appointment of former AIPAC chairman Ed Sanders as the White House liaison with the Jewish community.136 Mark Alan Segal, an earlier liaison, leveled an unprecedented and blunt indictment of Carter, calling the president “hostile toward Israel.”137 But Carter’s alleged insensitivity toward Israel did not inhibit other American Jews from criticizing Begin. An ad carrying 700 names of American Jews supporting Peace Now was published in the Jerusalem Post in July.138 On the other hand, the quarrelsome mood between the Administration and Israel did seemingly lead some establishment supporters of “disassociation” to having second thoughts. Given the Begin Government’s line, it was difficult to calibrate pressure on Israel to abandon the Territories while simultaneously preserving the essential fabric of the U.S.-Israel relationship. This led AJCongress head Howard Squadron to warn against an “imposed” peace.139 Ted Mann adhered to a similar position in urging the Egyptians to resume their talks with Israel. He said it would be a serious error for the U.S. to press for Israeli concessions.140

Camp David

In August 1978, the White House announced that Sadat and Begin would meet at Camp David to continue their quest for an agreement. The Camp David negotiations are tangentially linked to the U.S.-PLO dialogue topic in the sense that the process helped solidify the Arab-Israel struggle in non-zero-sum parameters. In Israel, “Peace Now” mobilized fifty thousand demonstrators in Tel Aviv on the eve of the Camp David talks to urge Begin to show “flexibility.”141 Meanwhile, in the U.S., Howard Squadron, a sometime Begin critic now serving as Acting Chairman of the Presidents Conference, expressed ostensible support for Israel’s position going into the Camp David talks.142

The Administration was clearly frustrated by its inability to gain concessions from the PLO. Talks would have to proceed without direct input from the Palestinian Arabs. Unable to persuade the PLO to make the necessary concessions, the Administration shifted tactics. The United States announced it would bar entry of PLO representatives into the country as part of a program to keep out anyone advocating the assassination of U.S. government officials.143 President Carter went so far as to equate the PLO with the Ku Klux Klan and Nazis, saying it would be nice if they would all just go away. This get-tough course was maintained for some time. Nevertheless, it did not prevent Carter from enigmatically commenting that: “As a result of Camp David, the people of the Palestinian area will have a chance to administer their own affairs, including the right to worship.”144

When finally achieved, the Camp David Agreement, which included an Israeli commitment for a three-month settlement freeze, was denounced by virtually the entire Arab world as well as the Palestine Liberation Organization. Almost immediately, the United States and Israel differed on how the agreement was to be interpreted and implemented. Unconnected to Administration efforts, but worth noting because they contributed to the overall political environment, the U.N. and the American media helped keep the spotlight on the Palestinian-Arab issue. ABC television broadcast a documentary approbative of the PLO cause;145 at the U.N. , a $500,000 pro-PLO informational program was well under way.146

Carter and the Jewish leadership remained at odds over Camp David interpretation and implementation issues. White House pressure on Israel intensified. The Presidents Conference complained that Carter was championing the Egyptian side. A litany of seemingly unconnected events exacerbated tensions, including: the duration of the settlement freeze agreed to by Begin; “off the cuff” remarks by Hodding Carter terming Begin a “terrorist”; a White House snub of Begin during his brief visit to North America; Carter’s insinuation that U.S. Jews were making too much of the PLO issue; the President implying that the PLO was capable of evolving in a moderate direction; and Carter’s comments on the future of Jerusalem, contributed to a deepening estrangement between the White House and the Presidents Conference.147

U.S.-Israel tensions were now shaped by Israel’s desire to exploit the opening with Egypt in order to solve the Arab-Israel conflict at the state-to-state level. But the U.S. seemed to be encouraging Sadat to hold the prospect of an Israel-Egypt peace treaty hostage to the Palestinian-Arab component . Meanwhile, Israel sought to avoid linking the lack of a West Bank autonomy breakthrough with the signing of a peace treaty. Now, Begin’s Jewish critics, even those who had signed a public letter on behalf of Peace Now, denounced the Administration for siding with Egypt. Ted Mann led a Presidents Conference delegation to a meeting with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance where they told Vance that the U.S. should serve as a mediator rather than take sides.148

Both the Administration and the PLO worked assiduously to keep Camp David from eclipsing the PLO cause. Reiterating his earlier message, implying that it no longer demanded the dismantling of Israel, Arafat announced in December 1978 that the PLO was willing to form a state in any part of Palestine evacuated by Israel.149 Illustrative of how the Administration shaped the agenda and made choices which forced the Jewish leadership into making its own selections, UN Ambassador Andrew Young insinuated that American diplomacy was being hampered by the lack of an “effective relationship with the Palestinian people.” He argued that the United States ought to “have some way of relating to the Palestinian people” and noted that Washington was working on this problem. The PLO’s UN delegation, Young further implied, was a moderating influence on the group. Palestinians believed that the peace process did not offer them self-determination. A link between the U.S. and the PLO would address Palestinian concerns.150

Hodding Carter balanced Young’s remarks by stating: “We have not changed our policy regarding the PLO. Our only contacts with the PLO in New York City – and nowhere else – are incidental and related to our responsibilities as host country to the UN.”151 But Jewish leaders were not mollified. Some suggested that Young was the Administration’s point-man in laying the groundwork for a U.S.-PLO relationship.152

On the Friday after Young’s comments, Mann led a Presidents Conference delegation to the White House for a meeting with Carter. The President again assured the Jewish leaders that the United States would not deal with the PLO until it accepts Israel’s sovereignty and its right to exist.153 The Administration’s tacit commitment to bring the PLO into the negotiations under previously enunciated conditions was something the Israelis reluctantly acknowledged. Foreign Minister Dayan remarked that it would be difficult to keep the PLO out of the peace process. His political confidant, Zalman Shoval, said that Dayan was not advocating a PLO role but merely facing reality.154 The idea of the centrality of the Palestinian problem was on Carter’s mind when, in March 1979, he traveled to the region in order to personally pursue the talks started at Camp David. While in Cairo for talks with Sadat, Carter restated his view that peace depended on including the “Palestinian people” in the process.155

Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty Signed

With the exception of Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem two years earlier, no event contributed more to recasting the Arab-Israel conflict along non-zero-sum terms than the U.S.-brokered peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. Decades of overt hostility and war between Egypt and Israel officially came to a close on March 26, 1979. The treaty was premised upon the Camp David Accords which called for negotiations over the West Bank to take place in stages. Broadly speaking, this was to involve:
Electing a self-governing Authority in the Administered Territories.
This Authority would negotiate a transitional arrangement for the West Bank and Gaza for a period of five years aimed at providing autonomy to the area’s inhabitants.
The five-year period would begin after the Authority was elected.
At the third-year point, talks would start to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza.156

From the vantage point of political suasion analysis, the American handling of the post-treaty era reveals how a determined player can manipulate dimensions so as to gain situational advantage. Far from encouraging the Egyptian-Israeli relationship to serve as a stepping stone toward similar arrangements with other Arab states, and far from diminishing the stature of the PLO, the Administration toiled assiduously to keep the PLO in the game. Notwithstanding what they were telling the Israelis and their American Jewish supporters, U.S. authorities were leaving the door more than slightly ajar to the prospect of PLO participation in the peace process. The PLO would not be allowed to participate based on its platform calling for Israel’s dismantlement. But the U.S. seemed committed to teasing the PLO into transforming itself into an acceptable player.

The U.S. romanced the PLO while rejecting Jewish settlement in Samaria, Judea and Gaza. These mutually reinforcing tactics were based on the assumption that the PLO could be coaxed into accepting something less than the destruction of Israel, namely: the West Bank and Gaza, so long as there was something tangible left to offer the Palestinian Arabs. Therefore, Israeli actions which connoted retention of the Territories had to be denigrated and undermined. So, for example, in early April 1979, the PLO’s Beirut chief Shafik al-Hout was granted a special waiver to tour U.S. Ivy League college campuses. He had been invited to the U.S. by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. Hodding Carter, the State Department spokesman, said in response to a question, that the U.S. had no knowledge linking al-Hout with terrorism.157 Subsequent press reports revealed that Vance had apparently arranged for the Immigration and Naturalization Service to allow him into the United States. Later, two Administration officials stumbled upon al-Hout at the Syrian Embassy on the occasion of Syrian Nation Day.158 The State Department position before a Senate Sub-Committee was that the United States could have “informal” contacts with the PLO without violating its “no talk” agreement with Israel.159

The success of the American flirtation with the PLO depended on making clear what was expected of the group. Thus, the President told a news conference that he would not negotiate with the PLO unless it endorsed UN Resolution 242.160 This was the message that would be affirmed time and again. Carter also let it be known that his Administration was not surreptitiously negotiating with the PLO.161

Presidents Conference Consensus on Settlements

Jewish life in the West Bank, PLO contacts and the prospect of trading captured land in anticipation of peace were inextricably linked issues. Despite their discomfiture over Begin government policies, the Administration’s relentless, determined criticism of Jewish settlements in the Territories as illegal was not well received within the Presidents Conference. Carter’s focus on settlements seemed disproportionate compared to other elements of the dispute. Even “land-for-peace” advocates, such as American Jewish Congress president Howard Squadron, viewed the Administration’s approach as counter-productive. Ted Mann, Chairman of the Presidents Conference, said that American Jews accepted Jewish settlement in the Territories as “legal” and “necessary.” Though, as Ha’aretz reported, Mann was critical of one particular settlement at Elon Moreh.162

But a nascent internal opposition within the Jewish establishment had, by now, emerged. So, the Presidents Conference effort to speak with one voice on this divisive issue was hardly successful. Allen Pollack of the Labor Zionist Alliance and Frieda Leeman of the Pioneer Women issued a joint statement asserting: “There is no consensus in the American Jewish community or even in the Conference of Presidents regarding the Israeli government settlement policy.” Indeed, sixty-two “prominent settlement opponents issued a public letter critical of Begin’s West Bank policy.163

In mid-June, Mann, Israel Miller and Yehuda Hellman met with Begin on the settlement issue. Reports leaked to the press suggested that the Jewish leaders opposed the creation of the Elon Moreh settlement because of its location near an Arab population center.164 Elon Moreh, portrayed as being situated on “expropriated Arab land,” served as a catalyst for a new spurt of anti-Israeli Government criticism. Spearheaded by the publicity know-how of Martin Peretz, owner of the New Republic, fifty-nine well known American Jews, including composer Leonard Bernstein, said they found Jewish retention of Samaria and Judea, with its 750,000 Arab inhabitants, “morally unacceptable.” Publicly, Mann said: “That such settlements are legal is not only my view but the consensus in the American Jewish community.”165

Mann’s comments followed on the heels of a Presidents Conference attempt at a consensus stance regarding West Bank settlement. The common position proclaimed that:
Jewish settlements in Judea, Samaria and Gaza were legal.
Jordan is Palestine and no second Palestinian state should be established.
Jerusalem is indivisible.
The U.S. should have no relations with the PLO.
Israel will respect Camp David.166

While the Jewish leadership was grappling with the issue of what should be done in connection with Jewish settlement in the Territories, the State Department continued its ongoing efforts to draw the PLO into the peace process. The standard proviso remained operative: the United States was willing to talk to the PLO if it recognized Israel’s right to exist. According to Hodding Carter:
We continued to hope that the PLO will change its firmly held position and concede and grant Israel’s right to exist – in which case the President has said he would be willing to talk to the PLO. There is no assumption that anybody else will be willing. Our efforts are aimed specifically at the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza to indicate we want them to be participants as called for in the peace treaty.167


Strategic choices force choices but in the interim they can also cause frustrations. Because of the Administration’s unswerving accent on the Palestinian question, the Jewish leadership was being pressured into making a choice it was not ready to make. This resulted in worsening relations between the Jewish leadership and the President. The pressure was kept on in various ways. For instance, Carter showed little acceptance of Israel’s course of harsh reprisals in response to acts of Arab terrorism. Mann felt prompted to complain that “the equation of Israeli attempts to wipe out terrorism with terrorism itself, is a moral outrage.”168

Never had a United States President offered so heartfelt an embrace of the Palestinian-Arab cause as did Jimmy Carter. To the Jewish leadership’s consternation, Carter likened the Palestinian-Arab cause to the United States civil rights movement. He spoke of the Arab right to return to homes in what had become Israel. And he pointed to his Jewish advisers, Sol Linowitz and Robert Strauss, as fully supporting the Administration policy on the Palestinians.169 Jewish dismay and disappointment over the civil rights analogy was almost immediate.170 The White House promptly issued a statement clarifying the President’s reference to the U.S. civil rights movement: Carter wanted his remarks to be interpreted as referring to the fact that the civil rights movement in the U.S. was largely successful because it was peaceful.171

Categorization of the Conflict

Incrementally, the perception of the conflict was in transition. The non-zero-sum configuration took on greater vitality. The American focus on the Palestinian issue was the end-product of a number of concrete changes on the ground since 1967. Nevertheless, a policy tilt toward the Palestinian-Arabs at Israel’s expense was contingent upon a transformation of the perceptions. This had to be accomplished in real terms – by getting the Arab camp to accept Israel’s existence – and on a more sublime psychological level by changing popular (especially Jewish) attitudes toward the Palestinian vanguard.172 The fundamental question remained: was the Arab camp’s relatively recent concern about the appearance of moderation translatable into actual moderation?

Even in the wake of Sadat’s 1977 peace overture, elements of the Jewish leadership remained suspicious of Arab intentions. In particular, Arafat’s image – so closely associated with the struggle he represented – had been thoroughly demonized in the mind’s eye of many Jews. Remarks by Congressman Paul Findley about Arafat’s image “problem” together with his suggestion that what the PLO leader needed were some pointers on public relations, only served to heighten Jewish suspicions.173 Furthermore, many in the Jewish leadership surmised that the Administration was tacitly cooperating in refining Arafat’s image.174 Increasingly Arafat came to be presented in the Western press and through meetings with Western European leaders, as a moderate willing to negotiate a plan of coexistence with Israel.175 With American acquiescence, Arafat was welcomed in Vienna in 1979 for contacts with the Socialist International. In return the PLO promised to stop terrorist activities outside Israel. Some U.S. officials suggested that adherence to this pledge would show “Arafat has power and is of good faith.” According to the Christian Science Monitor:
It is also believed that the Socialist International is maintaining PLO contacts in consultation with the United States. According to some diplomats, President Carter recently asked Willy Brandt to ‘sound out the PLO.’ Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky claims that ‘I also informed the American Ambassador [in Vienna, Milton A. Wolfe] a day before Arafat’s arrival. . . . [U.S. officials] point to the fact that [Kreisky and Brandt] would not do something which would make the U.S. in the long run unhappy. . . . These officials point out that Washington’s attitude toward the Palestinians has changed, but the U.S. has ‘limited possibilities’ of expressing this without endangering its role as mediator in the Egyptian-Israeli peace process. . . .176


For all his efforts to “diplomatically mainstream” the PLO, it is perhaps ironic that Carter continued to profess an aversion to creating a PLO-led state:
I am against any creation of a separate Palestinian state. I don’t think it would be good for the Palestinians. I don’t think it would be good for Israel. I don’t think it would be good for the Arab neighbors of such a state. . . . We must address and resolve the Palestinian question in all its aspects . . . [they] should have a right to a voice in the determination of their own future.177

V

Andrew Young Affair

From the viewpoint of political suasion analysis, the import of the Andrew Young affair cannot be overstated. Andrew Young’s personal relationship with the President of the United States seemed especially significant. The stunning revelation that, in his capacity as Ambassador to the U.N., Young had held secret contacts with the PLO’s Zehdi Labib Terzi, coupled with the news that U.S. Ambassador to Austria Milton Wolf had been holding talks with Issam Sartawi, shocked the Jewish leadership. Here was an Administration making a strategic choice that left the Jewish leadership little room to maneuver. Jewish leaders were incensed, with some, individually, calling for Young’s resignation.

Inasmuch as the PLO had not met conditions for a dialogue with the United States, the August 1979 disclosure that the Carter Administration was nevertheless engaged in secret contacts with the PLO dramatically heightened tensions between the White House and the Jewish community. In announcing that Wolf (who is Jewish) also had contact with the PLO, the State Department seemed to be trying to draw some of the focus away from Young. Vance publicly rebuked Young for his unauthorized contacts with the PLO.178

The event contained all the ingredients needed to foster saturation media coverage: the nation’s first Black American U.N. Ambassador was under fire from the U.S. Jewish community over the PLO. Two days after the meetings were made public Young resigned, blaming Israel for the notoriety attached to the expose.179 Even as the Wolf-Sartawi meetings were being downplayed as having little significance, Young’s resignation only exacerbated frictions. Resentment developed between American Jews and the Black community over charges that Jews had driven Young from office. Meanwhile, the tensions between the Jewish community and the White House persisted, despite a meeting between Mann and Robert Strauss.180

What was serendipity for the Administration proved ruinous for Jewish efforts to contain the PLO cause. Whatever his initial designs, Young became a vocal advocate of closer U.S.-PLO ties after his resignation. He said the policy of not talking to the PLO was “ridiculous.” On the CBS broadcast Face the Nation, he also said that American Blacks would suffer most if an Arab oil embargo were again imposed on the United States. Israel, he charged, did not appreciate the impact of such an embargo on the Black community in the United States.181

In the face of White House silence, Mann wrote Carter to reiterate the position of the Jewish leadership: “As you know we did not ask for Ambassador Young’s resignation, nor is his resignation an issue in the relationship between the Jewish and the black communities. Our differences are with State Department policy. Those differences remain.”182 That was, decidedly, not the position many key African-American leaders took. Days after Young resigned, Dr. Joseph Lowerly, President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, William Jones, Wyatt Walker, Harry Gibson, Philip Cousin and George Lawrence held a conspicuous meeting with New York-based PLO officials.183

The Jewish leadership found that holding the dike against the pressure of PLO public relations advances was becoming progressively burdensome. Every new revelation undermined the legitimacy of holding the PLO in odium. The Jewish community was further shaken by rumors – unfounded, it turned out – that Dr. Nahum Goldman, president of the World Jewish Congress, was now set to meet Yasir Arafat.184 Toward the end of August, White House envoy Robert Strauss met with a Presidents Conference delegation led by Mann in Washington. Having just returned from a round of talks in the Middle East, Strauss said U.S. policy on the PLO had not changed but he also insisted that the Palestinians had to be brought into the peace process.185

The Administration continued to demonstrate an unprecedented regard for Palestinian-Arab sensibilities. For example, an Israeli Air Force strike against PLO targets in Lebanon induced the State Department to charge Israel with practicing “terror.”186 In Paris, at one of his final appearances as U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Young said that American blacks “now believe that the Palestinians are oppressed and will act accordingly.” He would “continue to oppose the fact that Israel can take decisions concerning the national interests of the United States.” Young predicted that the time would come when the U.S. would engage the PLO in a diplomatic dialogue.187 In Geneva, meantime, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Human Rights Commission Beverly Carter voted affirmatively on a resolution supporting the PLO.188

Evidently, these U.S. policy signals (whether purposeful or inadvertent) did not convince Arafat that the time was ripe for an explicit overture to the United States. In an interview with Barbara Walters on the ABC news television program Issues and Answers, he refused to directly address the issue of coexistence between a Palestinian and Jewish state.189


Environmental Factors

The PLO’s fortunes were on the rise everywhere and the Presidents Conference worked strenuously to keep pace with Arab diplomatic achievements. For example, Mann and Yehuda Hellman met with the Spanish Ambassador to the United State sin Washington to protest an Arafat visit to Spain.190 But the shifting perceptual climate within the American political system contributed to intensifying support for a U.S.-PLO dialogue. The National Council of Churches endorsed Young’s actions and urged both the United States and Israel to negotiate with the PLO.191 The NAACP also joined the chorus, calling for a dialogue with the PLO. Its executive Director Benjamin Hooks urged Carter to rethink his “no talk” PLO policy.192 B‘nai B’rith, the American Jewish Committee and the Synagogue Council of America (all members of the Presidents Conference) challenged the promotion of a U.S.-PLO dialogue. The Presidents Conference also worked diligently behind the scenes to block the seemingly inexorable momentum toward a U.S.-PLO dialogue. Mann reported that he had received new assurances from the Administration that it would not openly deal with the PLO. He told US News and World Report that he opposed Arafat’s involvement in the “peace process” even if the PLO accepted Israel’s right to exist: “It gains us nothing to try to put words in PLO leaders’ mouths that they are unwilling to say themselves. We’ve learned from the last couple of generations that when somebody threatens to extinguish a whole people, he deserves to be taken at his word. The PLO is no better than the Nazis and dealing with them is appeasing them.”193 Meanwhile, Mann tried to put the best possible face on the Black community’s apparent support for U.S.-PLO talks.194

American political suasion efforts, aimed at getting the U.S. Jewish community to embrace the Administration’s evaluation that the Palestinian issue was central to resolving the Arab-Israel conflict, took various forms. At a dinner speech sponsored by the World Jewish Congress in New York, Brzezinski urged Israel to accept the “legitimate” rights of the Palestinian Arabs.195 A related message came from Douglas Bennet, head of the Agency for International Development, who warned, while on a visit to Israel, that failure to embrace the Administration’s viewpoint would result in U.S. public opinion turning anti-Israel, particularly when the Jewish State requested more economic aid.196

Arguably, from the Administration’s vantage point, it was fortunate that the Jewish community came out of the Andrew Young affair badly bruised politically. Their lesson was that continued support for Israel now carried a domestic political and social penalty. Belatedly, late in September, in the face of continued Black-Jewish tensions, Carter revealed that the Jewish leadership had not approached him to dismiss Ambassador Young.197

The ambience of crisis, another ingredient in political manipulation, persisted in Black-Jewish relations. Now out of Government, Young was even more adamant in his advocacy of a U.S.-PLO dialogue. On the occasion of the Jewish High Holy Days, Young instructed Jews to repent for Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians.198 Then in October, Arafat received a delegation of Black leaders, including Jesse Jackson, thereby keeping the issue of U.S.-PLO relations very much in the news.

In this overall perceptual climate, the Administration continued to maintain that American policy on the PLO had not changed.199 Responding to a news conference question, Carter repeated that the U.S. would not talk with the PLO until it recognized Israel’s right to exist and U.N. Resolution 242.200 Among State Department Arabists, there was widespread support for Carter’s line. U.S. Ambassador Talcott Seelye met with PLO officials during a Damascus reception held on behalf of Jesse Jackson. But officially the State Department dismissed the presence of Seelye as “a set-up.”201

For reasons that remain unclear, in mid-October, Andrew Young let it be known that Israel was, after all, not to blame for his resignation as U.N. Ambassador.202 But Black-Jewish tensions about the PLO had been a sideshow. The constant reality was that the PLO issue would not go away. The Atlantic Council, an influential “think tank,” issued a study authored by Brent Scowcroft and Andrew Goodpaster urging that informal U.S.-PLO contacts be maintained.203 Representative Lee Hamilton (a proponent of a U.S.-PLO dialogue) challenged the Administration on whether it also refused to talk with PLO sympathizers.204 Tangentially linked to the PLO issue, and certainly to Jewish perceptions about Begin, was the October 1979 resignation from the Israeli Cabinet of Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan. Dayan’s departure reverberated within the American Jewish leadership, leaving the impression that the Israelis were themselves divided on the future of the West Bank.205

VI

Elections

Liberal Jewish leaders were in a quandary. The Presidential elections now loomed on the horizon and some of them found it difficult to offer knee-jerk support for the liberal Democrat incumbent. The Carter Administration’s handling of the Palestinian issue – making it the centerpiece of its Arab-Israel policy – resulted in lasting negative repercussions within the Jewish community. Staunchly liberal Jewish leaders, including Schindler, the former chairman of the Presidents Conference, could not bring themselves to forgive the President. Schindler made a number of damnatory charges: that the Carter Administration had exploited Jews for political gain and that its handling of the Andrew Young affair was nothing short of “political anti-Semitism.”206 Still, it was hardly surprising that both major parties reiterated their commitment to a secure Israel and a “no-talk” policy toward the PLO.207

The appointment of Philip Klutznik, a former World Jewish Congress president (and strong Begin critic), as Secretary of Commerce was seen by some as an effort by the Administration to make amends with the Jewish community.208 Coincidentally, or not, other signals were also forthcoming. Senator George McGovern, visiting Jerusalem, said that “for the moment” he endorsed American policy of not talking to the PLO.209 Sol Linowitz offered that some Israeli settlements on the West Bank were demonstrably necessary for Israel’s security.210 In one of the season’s more unseemly episodes, Carter was virtually “endorsed” by former Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizmann. Weizmann had gone through a political metamorphosis (having served as the Likud campaign manager in 1977 but winding up on the Israeli Left).211

The Administration sought to walk a fine line between political expediency at home and the pursuit of its policies abroad. There was no reaction, for instance, to Farouk Kaddoumi’s warning that Arabs participating in the Autonomy talks with Israel would be considered traitors.212 During the Teheran hostage ordeal, the State Department downplayed the PLO’s role in training and supporting the anti-Shah forces aligned with Ayatollah Khomeini. The United States said that, in fact, the PLO was playing a constructive role in the hostage crisis.213 Carter must have been frustrated that the Presidential election season made it politic to tone down the rhetoric about Arab-Israel conflict resolution. Others, however, were available to step into the limelight. At the start of 1980, a House delegation appointed by Speaker Tip O’Neil met with with Arafat in Lebanon. Congressman Toby Moffett said the Arafat meeting had been “unscheduled.” But the delegation said it intended to promote the creation of a Palestinian state. At the meeting, Arafat “pledged to keep his promise not to attack Israel anymore from Lebanon – whatever that is worth,” according to Moffett.214 They, in turn, urged the PLO chief to maintain a “moderate stance.”215

Still, the PLO remained anathema to mainstream American politicians. While perceptions of the Arab-Israel conflict were in transition, it is worth noting that politicians nevertheless viewed an association with the PLO as a political liability. For instance, Senator Edward Kennedy, who was contemplating a run for the Democratic presidential nomination, called upon the Administration to end its flirtation with the PLO.216 Leaks to the news media suggested that the Administration was pursuing a new “Middle East doctrine” which downgraded Israel as a strategic asset.217 Countervailing pressure came from the Protestant, politically liberal, National Council of Churches which had become an important booster of the PLO in the United States. The NCC held “hearings” on the Middle East to which Jewish groups were invited to testify. None did.218

Jewish Opposition Takes Shape

The division of anti-Likud opposition, which for purposes of exposition I define as internal opposition, outside the elite and peace camp, would not take firm shape until the Reagan years. But its basic outlines had come into focus. Jewish dissidents critical of the Begin Government were given a major boost when Arthur Hertzberg, Vice President of the World Jewish Congress, embraced the line long espoused by WJC head Nahum Goldman. Hertzberg had traversed the philosophical distance from wanting to tell the Ford Administration to “go hang,” when it appeared that the U.S. would impose a solution the Arab-Israel conflict, to becoming a key Israel government critic. Hertzberg shifted from being a supporter of Israeli policies to opposing these same policies from within. Eventually, he would wind up as a party to the outside elite. Toward the end of the Carter years, Hertzberg insisted that: “The single most dangerous thing that can happen to Israel is the muting of dissent.”219

Also by early 1980, Rabbi Alexander Schindler abandoned his stance of publicly supporting Israeli policies. Breira and the New Jewish Agenda had already trail-blazed the road the peace camp would take. And Nahum Goldmann of the WJC had earlier set the stage for the trans-national and outside elite to lobby against Israeli policies. Schindler’s defection significantly promoted efforts to dissociate American Jews from Israel’s policies in Judea and Samaria. Equally important, it facilitated the development of a legitimate internal opposition within Presidents Conference affiliated groups.

The fact that Schindler was a former Presidents Conference chairman lent a great deal of prestige to his complaint that funds spent in the West Bank would be better allocated within the “green line.”220 During his tenure at the Presidents Conference he felt it inappropriate to openly challenge Begin. But Schindler’s criticism now was a public re-affirmation of the views he had held before assuming the top Jewish leadership position.

Illustrative of disassociation, the prestigious American Jewish Committee, under the leadership of Richard Maas and Bert Gold, told Begin that he was overestimating support for his policies among American Jewry. In conjunction with a Presidents Conference session in Jerusalem, the AJCommittee warned Begin that they would not defend his plans to re-establish the Hebron Jewish community (which had been wiped out during the Arab uprising in 1929).221 Yet as much as the Jewish leadership wanted to disassociate themselves from Israel’s retention of Judea and Samaria, they found it difficult to support the tone and nuance of the Administration’s approach. They were troubled by a U.S.-supported United Nations Security Council resolution calling upon Israel to dismantle Jewish settlements in “Palestinian territories.” The Carter Administration was merely pursuing its policy of political suasion. Tactically, situational advantage seeking opportunities presented themselves regularly at the U.N.. The Jewish leadership, however, had never embraced the idea of an Israeli withdrawal from Jerusalem. The State Department explanation was the U.S. support of the resolution was based on “the understanding that all references to Jerusalem would be deleted” but that a “communications foul-up” led to the U.S. vote.222 Presidents Conference Chairman Ted Mann asserted that the inclusion of Jerusalem was “unacceptable to all segments of Jewish opinion.”223

The Administration may have made some tactical political missteps, but its policy remained firmly grounded in the belief that the Palestinian Arab issue was at the crux of the Arab-Israel conflict. As Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South East Asian Affairs, Harold Saunders told a Washington policy conference, the “need to deal with the Palestinian problem” was basic to U.S. policy.224 But equally important was having domestic Jewish support for its policies. To that end Administration officials went out of their way to reassure Jewish leaders of the President’s basic support for Israel. This was an absolutely essential element in the disassociation process directed at driving a wedge between Israel’s West Bank policies and the U.S. Jewish community. To allay their concerns about U.S. support for Israel, Linowitz and Strauss addressed a closed-door meeting of some 100 Jewish leaders at the Manhattan Club. The Jewish leaders insisted that Carter issue a “clear public statement stressing support for Israel.”225 There was no reason such a request could not easily be met. Within days the President vowed that the guiding premise of his Mideast policy was Israeli security and that he, furthermore, favored an “undivided” Jerusalem.226 Later, the President even reaffirmed his opposition to the establishment of a Palestinian state.227

Disassociation was a highly nuanced policy. New York’s grass-roots Jewish voters could not distinguish it from outright anti-Israel hostility. Politically, the president’s Middle East policy may have cost him the New York State Democratic primary elections which Senator Edward Kennedy won with strong Jewish support.228

Continuing its effort to gather support for Administration policies among American Jews, in late April, Carter designated Alfred Moses, who had ties with the American Jewish Committee, as his new liaison to the Jewish community.229 Synchronous with these outreach efforts, the President continued his quest of bringing the PLO into the diplomatic mainstream. On a trip to Zimbabwe for that country’s independence festivities, Andrew Young, serving as Carter’s official representative, once again took the opportunity to meet with PLO officials who were also attending the celebrations.230

Israeli Labor Party leader Shimon Peres may not have boosted Carter’s standing among U.S. Jews, even as he did his best to undermine Begin’s position. On a visit to the United States, Peres met with Carter and said Labor opposed the Israeli government’s Autonomy plan for the Palestinian Arabs. He said that while a self-governing authority in the Gaza District might be workable he continued to favor the Jordanian option for the West Bank.231

Many a Jewish leader who was thoroughly uncomfortable with Begin’s policies found Carter’s disassociation approach too heavy-handed. It was one thing to focus attention on the mounting long-term costs of not accommodating Palestinian Arab aspirations, but the imbalance was too great. Even though it was essential to effective disassociation, not enough emphasis was being placed on reassuring the American Jewish community of continued U.S. political support for Israel. The decision not to order a veto of a U.N. Security Council resolution critical of Israeli reprisal raids against PLO targets rankled. Schindler, by no means a Begin ally, lambasted Carter: “By refusing to exercise its right of veto, the White House has encouraged PLO terrorism, given the green light to those countries eager to follow the example of Austria in conferring legitimacy on Yasir Arafat, heightened Israel’s diplomatic isolation and turned its back on the Camp David accords.”232

The President’s efforts to repeal the Wolf Amendment, passed by Congress to bar American financial support to United Nations programs promoting the PLO, further dismayed the Jewish leadership.233 Yet, because of their own criticism of Begin’s policies, just where the Jewish leadership stood was obscure. Still, the perception that they privately supported U.S. pressure on Israel to force a change in its West Bank policies rankled. Mann, the Presidents Conference head, wrote The New York Times challenging columnist and Israel critic Anthony Lewis:
First let me try to end one of the myths that Mr. Lewis has perpetuated in so many of his columns. He suggests that I really agree with him but that I will not say so publicly because the American Jewish tradition “evidently demands solidarity above all.”

. . . The basic flaw in Mr. Lewis’s argument is his assumption that Israel has it in its power to resolve the conflict; that if Israel would only stop building settlements in the West Bank, the Palestinian Arabs and/or Jordan might enter the peace process.

. . . Oh, how I would like to believe that! But Mr. Lewis offers not a shred of evidence to support his assertion. . . . Add to this the continuing refusal of the P.L.O. to amend the Palestinian National Covenant, which calls for the annihilation of Israel . . .

One can legitimately argue whether Israel’s current settlement policy is good for its image (it clearly is not) or even whether it is in Israel’s own best interest. But it is foolish and deceptive to suggest that if Israel’s policy were to change, Palestinians or Jordan would enter the peace process. . . . If Israel’s enemies still regard peace with the Jewish State as unthinkable, are settlements not a legitimate way to prevent the West Bank from evolving into a sovereign state from which terrorist attacks will make life in Israel intolerable?234


Mann’s quandary found resonance elsewhere in the Jewish establishment. The American Jewish Committee chapter in Washington, D.C. voted 37 to 23 with 40 abstentions to stop criticizing Israel’s efforts to settle Judea and Samaria.235

No such qualms troubled the hard-left (ideologically identical on Arab-Israel issues with the peace camp). I.F. Stone and Milton Viorst of The New Yorker brought Arab leaders deported from the West Bank to public forums aimed at mostly Jewish audiences. The deportees were represented as forces for moderation interested in a non-zero-sum outcome to the conflict. Arrangements were made for the deportees to meet with Congressional supporters of a U.S.-PLO dialogue such as Representative Lee Hamilton (D-Tenn.) of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.236

Two Leadership Changes

Edgar Bronfman, the Canadian billionaire, became acting President of the World Jewish Congress, after Carter formally appointed Klutznik to be Secretary of Labor. His great wealth allowed him to salvage the moribund WJC. An outspoken critic of Begin, Bronfman promised to refrain from criticizing Israel.237 Nevertheless, with the WJC as a platform Bronfman became an even more important transnational political actor.238 Also in June 1980, New York attorney Howard Squadron was elected Chairman of the Presidents Conference.239 Like other Jewish leaders, Squadron took a “pragmatic non-zero-sum” approach. Squadron’s analysis of the Israel-Egyptian peace talks is illustrative: “Sadat would probably prefer that Israel was not there but as long as it’s there, it’s better to make peace with her.”240

Yet another complication encountered by the Administration in its attempt to articulate a carefully calibrated critique of Israel’s West Bank policies, while simultaneously espousing overall support of the Jewish State, was that it left the White House open to criticism that the United States was sending mixed messages. Senator George McGovern criticized Carter along precisely these lines and, surprisingly, urged him to reject European efforts to bring the PLO into the peace process.241 Befuddlement was, however, a two-way street. Bolstered by none other than Schindler’s criticism of Israel’s settlement policy, Senator Adlai Stevenson (D-Ill.) reproached Begin for “blithely, sometimes insultingly” ignoring American policy on the West Bank.242

Rita Hauser

Rita Hauser came to prominence as a pro-Israel activist associated with the AJCommittee. After Begin’s election, while still with the AJCommittee, Hauser became publicly critical of Israeli policies. After leaving the Committee, she became a paramount outside elite actor. Her role in the U.S. decision to enter into a dialogue with the PLO will be examined, in greater detail, later on. The evolution in her thinking can be gleaned from Hauser’s first public denunciation of Israeli West Bank policy in June 1980. She argued that while Camp David was a success, the Administration’s overall approach was muddled.

A consistent U.S. position on such issues as the PLO might have brought forward a more moderate Palestinian entity. The U.S. “sent conflicting signals, convincing the most extreme elements in the Mid East that there is no reason to change their position.” Hauser saw the current stalemate as disastrous for Israel too. “The current settlement policy is a disaster. It is provocative. You just can’t establish Jewish settlements in places like Nablus and Hebron. The sooner Begin is replaced the better. His policies are not accepted by Israelis; they are dangerous policies.”

Only months earlier she had quite the Connally presidential campaign to protest a pro-Arab tilt in his Middle East policy. In particular, she criticized his call for a total Israeli withdrawal to the pre-1967 borders. Connally said that the Palestinians should decide the nature of the homeland they would establish after a withdrawal.243

Rita Hauser’s views surfaced publicly again when she asserted that Republican Presidential candidate Ronald Reagan would be more pro-Israel than Carter. Reagan’s steadfast support of Taiwan demonstrated that he was the kind of politician who would never abandon Israel for the sake of political expediency, Hauser said. She again accused the Carter Administration of having “flirted with the PLO,” suggesting that if not for the “stink” raised by American Jews, “Carter would have appeased the Arabs in every way he could.”244

VII

As its annual report proudly notes, “The 1980 Presidential campaign catapulted the Presidents Conference onto the front pages of the nation’s newspapers as each major candidate appeared before it to present his views and answer questions on critical foreign policy issues that American Jews would take into account as they cast their ballots.”245 Squadron held pre-election sessions with both Carter and Reagan but, as is traditional, issued no endorsement of either candidate.

56 For Disassociation

Brandeis University professor Leonard Fein, later operative in the outside opposition, helped orchestrate a major anti-Begin public relations coup by enlisting the support of key establishment figures including Ted Mann. Implying that the non-zero-sum nature of the Arab-Israel conflict was an established fact, 56 Jewish intellectuals and leaders – including three past Chairmen of the Presidents Conference (Joachim Prinz, 1965-67; Alexander Schindler, 1976-78; and Theodore Mann, whose term had expired only the day before) – criticized “extremists” in the Begin government for wanting to maintain Jewish control over Judea and Samaria.

While issued in Jerusalem, their statement quickly made its way onto the front page of The New York Times. According to Fein: “We are trying to make a clear distinction between Israel and certain policies of Israel.” The 56 signatories supported “land-for-peace.” An advertisement aimed at U.S. Jews put the pro-“Peace Now” position this way: “Our way is the way of coexistence and tolerance. Our way is the way of peace and security through territorial compromise on the West Bank. Our way seeks to unite the Jewish people around its Jewish and humanist heritage.”246 Official Jewish reaction to the declaration was as swift as it was indecisive. Presidents Conference Chairman Howard Squadron did not dispute the substance of the critique. Instead, Squadron said that it was better to stress those issues on which there was a consensus since the negative publicity created by the statement was divisive and unhelpful.247

Undoubtedly, with so many disparate signals being sent, Jewish opponents of a U.S.-PLO dialogue were apprehensive about a possible American policy shift. Leaders of the Orthodox Agudath Israel, led by its president Rabbi Moshe Sherer, met with White House officials in early July. While raising concerns about several domestic issues, Agudah leaders used the session to press the Administration not to negotiate with the PLO until it meets the terms set by the United States. Sherer argued that even if the PLO met these terms, their actual compliance should be intensively monitored.248

Insinuating Carter Administration plans for its second term, Secretary of State Edmund Muskie (Cyrus Vance had resigned over the Iranian hostage rescue attempt) told the Foreign Policy Association in New York: “Perhaps we must” recognize the PLO but “not before Israel, Egypt and the U.S. reach agreement on autonomy for the West Bank.”249 Innuendo, used in this way, can facilitate political suasion.

Ted Mann endorsed Carter’s re-election bid.250 Mann, immediate past Chairman of the Presidents Conference, told a Jerusalem news conference that American Jewry was united behind the idea that the West Bank had security value to Israel but not in support of Jewish settlement on ideological grounds: “The propriety of having to stay in the West Bank for security reasons is well within the worldwide Jewish consensus. The idea that Israel should stay there in order to make the borders of ‘Medinat Yisrael’ [the State of Israel] coterminous with those of ‘Eretz Yisroel’ [the Land of Israel] is far, far outside that consensus.”251

The political price of a successful disassociation policy came to light even on the Jerusalem issue. American Jewish leadership viewed the Likud controlled Knesset’s surprise declaration that Jerusalem was the undivided capital of Israel as unnecessarily antagonistic. Their lack of public support may have incorrectly signaled the Administration that disassociation extended to Jerusalem. In the wake of the Knesset vote, Muskie met with a Presidents Conference delegation at the State Department. Afterwards, Squadron said that he had “no position” regarding the Knesset decision. The U.S. then abstained at the U.N. on a vote condemning Israel for the Jerusalem law.252 Squadron and others, in turn, expressed disappointment with the Administration’s abstention. Even Schindler complained: “Once again the Carter Administration has followed the path of appeasing the Arab states and the terrorist PLO.” In an effort to clarify their position on Jerusalem, 39 prominent American Jewish critics of Israel including Leonard Fein, Albert Vorspan and Schindler issued a new statement proclaiming that Jerusalem was the eternal capital of Israel and expressing regret that the U.S. failed to veto the anti-Israel UN resolution.253

With the election drawing nearer, Carter accelerated his efforts to woo the American Jewish electorate. In an appearance at the Forest Hills Jewish Center in Queens, New York he reaffirmed his opposition to a Palestinian State and to the PLO.254 Elsewhere, Reagan weighed in with the comment that the PLO was a terrorist organization and its actions were not those of commandos or freedom fighters.255 In the course of a Presidential debate with Reagan, Carter matched Reagan by also terming the PLO a “terrorist organization.”256 Meeting with Mann and other prominent Jewish supporters, Carter reiterated his anti-PLO stance and requested Jewish support in his re-election bid. Former Defense Minister Ezer Weizmann also publicly championed Carter’s re-election bid.257

Public Remains Anti-PLO

Given Jewish establishment criticism of Israeli policies toward the Palestinian Arabs and the degree to which their cause had been catapulted to center stage by the media and the Administration, it is remarkable that the American public continued to support the Likud Government’s position on the PLO. World Jewish Congress head Edgar Bronfman privately commissioned a poll of Jews and non-Jews, conducted by Louis Harrris, probing attitudes about Israel and the PLO. By a 62-23 percent majority, the public believed that “Israel is right not to agree to sit down with the PLO because the PLO is a terrorist organization and wants to destroy Israel.”258

Involved in a tough re-election campaign, Paul Findley, one of Israel’s sternest critics in the House of Representatives, defended himself with pro-Israel voters by arguing that Robert Strauss, President Carter’s special Mideast envoy – and at the time the President’s campaign chairman – gave him “full backing” for his contacts with PLO leader Arafat. Strauss disavowed Findley’s depiction.259

Conclusion

On election day, in spite of his presumably weak political standing in the Jewish community, Carter managed to capture the Jewish vote (which is traditionally liberal-democratic). However, a larger percentage of Jews than is usual voted for Republican victor Ronald Reagan. In marked contrast to the first Reagan year, the Carter years were characterized by a high degree of Administration cohesiveness on Arab-Israel issues. The President, Brzezinski and Vance shared the view that the Palestinian issue was key to finding a solution to the conflict. They pursued a comprehensive solution rather than the step-by-step approach favored by Kissinger. The Administration sought but failed to bring the PLO into the peace process by getting Arafat to explicitly accept Israel’s right to exist. As Vance wrote later on:
The President and I were convinced that no lasting solution in the Middle East would be possible until, consistent with Israel’s right to live in peace and security, a just answer to the Palestinian question could be found, one almost certainly leading to a Palestinian homeland and some form of self-determination.260


Indeed, almost immediately after the election, cleavages within the Republican camp over the Palestinian Arab issue came to public attention. Senator Charles Percy, about to take his seat as Republican chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, commented that there could not be a solution to the Middle East conflict without the Palestinians. Percy said that he favored a West Bank federated to Jordan.261 Later, on a visit to the Soviet Union, Percy privately told Soviet leaders that the U.S. did not oppose the establishment of a PLO-led state on the West Bank. To Percy’s dismay, classified U.S. Embassy cables from Moscow summarizing his talks were leaked. The leak seemed to involve a contest of wills among foreign policy decision makers. Richard Allen, the incoming National Security Advisor, made it known that Percy’s views did not reflect Reagan Administration thinking.262 Predictably, meanwhile, Schindler and other Jewish leaders criticized the observations about a PLO-state attributed to Percy.263

A week later Secretary of State-designate Alexander Haig said that he opposed U.S. talks with or recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization.264 Percy backpedaled his views, announcing that while favoring a Palestinian “entity” he did not support a PLO-led state. Opponents of the evolving U.S.-PLO relationship were heartened by the selection of Dr. Jean Kirkpatrick as the new U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. as well as the previously announced appointment of Richard Allen as the incoming National Security Adviser. Both were on record as opposing the PLO and Carter’s non-zero-sum analysis of the Arab-Israel conflict.

Reagan’s election did not lead Jewish opponents of Israeli policies to retire from the scene. Vigorous opposition from within the Jewish community could be anticipated from a new peace camp group, New Jewish Agenda, established by Rabbi Gerald Serrotta and other left-wing Jews in Washington DC. Some NJA founders had been associated with Breira (and its advocacy work on behalf of the PLO). Moreover, in remarks which were both prescient and self-fulfilling, Arthur Hertzberg, a leader of the American Jewish Congress and a Begin critic, told the British Board of Deputies in London (a body similar to the Presidents Conference in the United States) that problems between the U.S. and Israel would continue under the Reagan Administration. He ridiculed the notion that Israel-U.S. relations would now stabilize because the Reagan Administration would treat the Jewish State as a first-class ally.265

Between 1977 and 1980 the Carter Administration had fostered the emerging centrality of the Palestinian issue. Israel’s political position was greatly weakened by orchestrated divisions between it and the American Jewish establishment. As a result of the Sadat trip to Jerusalem, the nature of the conflict was now seen as full of nuances. The American Jewish leadership, while not ready to embrace an unreformed PLO, had already moved close to the Palestinian Arabs. For the Israeli Government this was a distinction without a difference. The Jewish leadership was ignoring their warnings that accommodating Palestinian aspirations would be the first stage in the PLO’s plan to destroy Israel.266